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State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell
343 S.W.3d 381
Tenn.
2011
Check Treatment

*1 of Tennessee STATE

Teddy Ray MITCHELL. Tennessee, Supreme Court at Knoxville. Jan. 2011 Session. 31, 2011. March *3 Jr.,

Robert E. Cooper, Attorney General Reporter; Harmon, Rachel West Asst. General; Attorney Bell, Berkeley C. Dis- General; Attorney trict Victor Vaughn, General, Asst. District Attorney for the appellant, State of Tennessee. Berg, Darren V. James Wright, Charles Cole, Knoxville, and Robert Deno Tennes- see, for the appellee, Teddy Ray Mitchell.

OPINION WADE, J„

GARY R. delivered Court, opinion of the in which CORNELIA CLARK, C.J., HOLDER, A. M. JANICE KOCH, JR., JJ„ joined. WILLIAM C. LEE, J., SHARON G. separate filed a opinion concurring part and dissenting part. The defendant was convicted disor- derly conduct thirty days and sentenced to jail, probation. be served on On direct appeal, the Ap- Court Criminal reversed, peals holding that the evidence granted insufficient. This Court permission appeal State in order to admissibility racially consider the of a de- term, rogatory sufficiency review the evidence, and to determine whether the conviction violated the constitutional right speech. disput- to free Because the admitted, area for into the demonstration carried testimony properly ed they might either contain a hid- fear that a convic- support sufficient to evidence was A weapon. be used as a weapon den conduct, and there was tion for American flagpole displaying the single right speech, to free no violation of the stand, placed speaker near the flag was reversed. Appeals is Court Criminal in attend- separated which was from those and sentence is judgment The of conviction several officers. ance a fence and reinstated. of the events that led course Background (the Ray Mitchell “Defen- Teddy arrest of *4 dant”) for conduct was reflected on rally p.m. A was scheduled at 2:00 only by testimony at the Defendant’s 24, 2006, County at the Hamblen June trial, by but also two November by in Morristown a grounds Courthouse digital recordings made exhibits video to aware- group attempting raise trial, placed a one taken with camera illegal immigration. the effects of ness of (“THP by Highway the Tennessee Patrol promoted the event with a Organizers video”) of the courthouse upper on an floor general that extended a invita- pamphlet seconds) minute, forty-four (lasting one your fami- rally, “[b]ring tion to attend the angle taken from a different and another flag ly, proudly, wave the American minute, thirty- spectator (lasting a one that display signage educates.” seconds). eight recordings Both video Weisgarber, training Lieutenant a Chris were as exhibits and were used submitted Depart- officer with the Morristown Police in cross-examination of officers. ment, in of placed charge planning only a depicts portion The THP video security rally. and coordination of event, with the Defendant beginning he received information that Because had walking rally parking toward the after between three and five hundred members vehicle, ob- filming partially and the is organization, of an Hispanic having views orange plastic a fenc- hedge scured immigration on the issue were con- can be heard ing. Although the Defendant event, organizers flict with the also intelligible. speaking shouting, little is attend, planned Weisgarber, to Officer heard. The Defen- The officers cannot be County with the of the Hamblen assistance shortly dant after his arrival. is arrested Department Sheriffs and the Tennessee recording, which was not second video Patrol, Highway arranged security force shortly after the position, begins in a fixed ninety seventy-five between law checkpoint. arrival at Defendant’s enforcement officers in an effort to avoid portion marginally is better The audio possible confrontations between the two recording. than the THP Neither video groups. Some officers were stationed on reference recording time-stamping used to buildings, squad the roofs of a number of specific portions of the video. present, designated parking cars were ar- established, trial, Kyle, patrol officer perimeter eas were and the At Andre rally temporary Department, area was marked with with the Morristown Police that he had received instructions orange fencing. checkpoint At a estab- testified rally parking prohibit lished attendants were in advance of the police, near the front of the along screened and searched in order to assure the sidewalk at- weapons present. that no were The secu- When the Defendant courthouse. area, in that rity plan permitted flag, tempted park the American but his vehicle African-American, in- permit Kyle, did not Officer flagpoles size be formed him that he park tape would need to were used in cross-examination. Offi- another location. In response, the Defen- Kyle cer acknowledged that in addition to said, nigger dant “There’s no to tell going the flagpole flag, the Defendant car- me I can park.” where and can’t Officer drink, ried a poster, soft and a lawn chair Kyle then sought assistance from Matt to the entrance. Stuart, also of the Morristown Police De- Stuart, Officer a fifteen-year veteran partment. After Officer Stuart in- also with the Department, testified that he was structed the Defendant that he could not first alerted who, to the Defendant while location, park his vehicle in that the Defen- still inside his car and some distance away, angrily dant reacted “sped off.” Ac- began to “scream” and “holler.” In an cording to Kyle, Officer the Defendant effort to Kyle, assist Officer Officer Stuart parked his vehicle nearby another pro- explained to the Defendant that the area area, hibited but at point officer no was restricted and that the Chief of Police move; was there to direct him to had established the parking rules for the Defendant then “made a b[ee]-line toward event. The officer recalled that the De- *5 gate.” so, the [entrance] As he did Offi- fendant, response, derogatory made re- Kyle cers and Stuart warned officers at Chief, marks about the but moved ve- his the entrance that the Defendant was hicle. He described the Defendant as “mad.” When the Defendant arrived at cursing, “real belligerent,” and “irate.” entrance, the Kyle Officer overheard an- After seeing the park Defendant in anoth- other officer inform him that he could take area, er “no parking” Officer Stuart noti- flag his into the rally area but not the Blair, fied Detective Chris who was at the flagpole, which had a pointed eagle metal entrance, front of the objec- Defendant’s at the He top. recalled that the Defen- tionable demeanor and possibility responded by dant loudly yelling, among “problems.” Stuart, According to Officer things, other “I’m an American. You the Defendant pace” continued at “a fast you mean to tell me I can’t bring a can’t— toward the visibly entrance and was upset. flag....” At point, this Kyle Officer At the checkpoint, he informed the Defen- Stuart, heard Officer who had received a dant that the rules established to ensure radio officer, communication from another safety precluded at the event the use of inform the Defendant that he was under flagpoles rally in the area. The Defendant According Kyle, arrest. to Officer the De- objected, stating he comply would not with fendant “resisted and started fighting, Acting the rule. in response to the radio officer,” pok[ing] Wallen, another Troy communication, Officer Stuart informed

with the flagpole as he did so. Officer the Defendant that he was under arrest Kyle stated that the Defendant shook the process and initiated the taking flagpole up and down as he struggled with custody. Defendant into the officers “they before fell into the cross-examination, On bushes.” Officer Stuart ac- Eventually, Officer Kyle was Lowe, knowledged able to handcuff the that Tom Defendant. Officer Hamblen Kyle County was Commissioner who cross-examined with one of had been invit- event, videotapes speak of the ed to at the During confrontation. had been allowed cross-examination, place to excerpts flagpole displaying of the vid- the American eotape were shown Kyle. flag speaker’s to Officer near the stand. Officer videotape stopped, was started and Stuart was excerpts cross-examined with the record reflects neither which videotape of both videotapes, but the record not does was used nor which portions of the portions video- indicate whether or all of the however, Blair, were in the cross-exami- the record. Detective

videotapes used any identify of the video- explained portion Officer Stuart could nation. words, flag- tape to the oth- in which Defendant used Defendant’s contrast tape fight to either or threaten the officers present, pole could be heard on ers he was loud.” The officer time the arrest was “talking present because before his own tone as “nor- initiated. speaking described when he the Defendant mal” informed Tony Wallen, Officer who had searched ad- he was under arrest. Officer Stuart to the grounds explosives prior he make out the

mitted that could not event, had a wand at also metal detection cursing videotape. Defendant on entrance check for the front in order to Hancock, had been He that the officers weapons. Officer David who confirmed specifically prohibit to the at the front had been assigned checkpoint directed sticks, sign sharp but was not and blunt or flagpoles, entrance courthouse Defendant, arrest, who, objects. in the noticed the When the involved first said, briskly past sign posses- when officer also had a in his Defendant he walked stick, stop supported by began angrily officer who had tried to him. Officer sion Defendant, de- rave” able to being Hancock testified that the “rant and “about not area, presence bring flag” rally at the into the Officer spite of the officers entrance, any- recalled that paying explained “wasn’t attention Wallen he only what ... thing except head on Defendant “more than once” that [and] Al- paying any pole prohibited, flag. was not attention to us.” not the Accord- *6 Wallen, the Defen- though ing Officer Hancock heard to Officer as the Defendant object he Defen- he shouting, vociferously, dant neither heard the continued to shook down, the fight pole up making curse nor saw him with the and contact with dant The arresting officers. Officer Wallen “two or three times.” that the grabbed officer stated he end Detective Blair was stationed pole prevent striking any- it from at the courthouse. gate main front of the body keep falling and to it from a metal He used detection wand to assure He Defendant ground. testified that the weapons that no came into the event site. loudly to know cursed demanded informing a man As Detective Blair was flags permitted. whether Mexican were a they and woman that could not take Wallen, previously Officer who seen had courtyard, knife into atten- pocket his videos, was also cross-examined Defendant, tion was drawn to the who was portions videotape use of of the THP that in a loud He recalled that speaking voice. identified in He were the record. he on though tapped even the Defendant identify tape specifically could not on the him that the shoulder informed when the Defendant and acknowl- cursed permitted, was not Defendant flagpole edged flag that he had control of the ignored presence. his the Defen- Before yet “poked” been the Defen- had not when however, arrest, placed dant was under placed by Officer dant was under arrest Blair Detective had turned his attention Stuart. knife. couple pocket back to the with the Lane, He did not hear the Defen- Officer Frank with the any cursing a detective portions County Department, dant. Detective Blair shown Hamblen Sheriff’s videotapes part-time as with the patrolman of both on cross-examination. worked a in his Police at the time portions videotape Department used Morristown standing cross-examination referenced in this incident. near the are not While area, rally gration. Flyers entrance of his attention had been distributed in was drawn to the Defendant because he order to promote attendance. She stated had become “loud and irate.” Officer that courthouse, when she arrived at the Lane recalled that when he saw the Defen- she found “unbelievable” the number of arrest, dant offer resistance to the he at- law personnel enforcement present. She taser, tempted apply explaining recalled that approached Defendant imposed pain “drive stun” but did not the front entrance rally of the carry- area incapacitate. He did not know whether he ing chair, a sign, a lawn and a flag at- had been in making successful contact with flagpole. tached to a explained She the Defendant. Officer Lane was also when she area, entered the marked offi- portions cross-examined the use of of a required cers her to remove the sticks videotape. The record does not indicate from the several flags small posses- her videotape which portions was used or what put car; sion and them in her she was were displayed during the cross-examina- upset that no one could enter with a flag tion. Officer Lane was unable to identify on a pole or even on tiny “a little stick.” portion videotape in which he While acknowledging that the Defendant attempted to use his taser on the Defen- appeared angry and raised his voice at the dant. officers, she any did not hear cursing and Weisgarber, Lieutenant who also served did not see the Defendant push either gener- as SWAT team commander officer or shake his flag at an officer. Ms. instructor, al departmental testified that Stephens, who wore a larger flag to the he planned security rally had for the event that draped around her shoul- participating coordinated officers in ders, never heard of the officers in- the event. He instructed the officers not form the Defendant that he was under chairs, to allow objects, flag- metal lawn arrest. In opinion, her the Defendant did poles, or anything that could be used as a not resist the arrest. weapon inside the fenced area. He was *7 Lowe, Commissioner a pharmacist by courthouse, standing near the some dis- profession, testified that he Defendant, planned had away tance from the when his rally talk at the about attention was drawn to health issues related screaming loud yelling immigration. near the front organiz- entrance —“loud over He assisted the everything else that going by was on.” Al- ers contacting county mayor the for immediately, most he sent a radio message permission to use the courthouse lawn as get “to person out of there” who [the] was the site of the demonstration. Commis- creating the scene. Weisgarber When ar- sioner Lowe described the courthouse rived at checkpoint, the the Defendant was off,” “completely lawn as cordoned without being by handcuffed the other officers. any access to parking. He stated that cross-examination, On he stated that the numerous law enforcement vehicles were reason he told the “get officers to him out present and that in addition to police, the of there” was that there many people were department, the sheriffs the highway pa- present it “alarming and was other individ- trol, and a body SWAT team full armor uals.” rally. attended the Commissioner Lowe “half-track,” testified that a Stephens, looking

Patricia much organizer of the tank, site, rally, like a parked testified for the was also near the defense. She stated purpose that the rally “snipers” of the was to and that there were three the edu- on cate people illegal about the cost of immi- rooftops. wife, under Tennessee Audrey App.2000) (holding that Lowe’s

Commissioner 40-35-313(a)(l)(A) Code Annotated section Lowe, rally. She helped organize also (1997), judi may impose a trial court near the positioned testified that she of except with the consent cial diversion view of the good had a front entrance and defendant); Ann. see also TenmCode the Defendant confrontation between 40-35-313(a)(1)(A) (2010). § the Defen- stated that the officers. She language nor used obscene dant neither appeal, After the dismissal of the flagpole. She officers with his fought the in the trial court Defendant filed a motion by the get officer struck did not see judicial di- application to withdraw she overheard the claimed that pole. She mo- granted The trial court version. officers, my flag “Don’t let Defendant tell conviction, of judgment tion and entered a ground.” touch the days thirty sentencing the Defendant appeal, In jail confinement. the second State, Lieutenant by the On rebuttal set aside Appeals of Criminal Court large acknowledged that a Weisgarber conduct, hold- disorderly the conviction for at the present were number officers recordings of the inci- ing that the video expected that he rally. explained He with much of the officer’s dent conflicted immigration issue to be “both sides” of ways. testimony significant State pointed out that it in attendance and also Mitchell, E2008-02672-CCA-R3-CD, No. to be highway patrol routine for the (Tenn.Crim.App. *5 2010 WL of this nature. involved in demonstrations 2010). acknowledging Mar. While Appeal recordings the video established Verdict belligerent speaking Defendant was charges on The Defendant was tried with with a raised voice in his interactions resisting conduct and arrest. officers, Appeals Court Criminal deliberations, At of its the conclusion no verbal concluded that there were jury guilty found the Defendant of disor threats made Defendant derly imposed a fine of twen conduct officers and that there was no indication ty-five acquit dollars. The Defendant was had been the video that Officer Wallen sentencing At the resisting ted of arrest. flagpole. the chest Id. struck in requested and was hearing, the Defendant dissented, ob- Judge Ogle Norma McGee Afterward, he granted judicial diversion. serving recordings the video appealed, alleging error the admission incident were not inconsistent with Kyle, challeng of his statement to Officer *8 testimony flag- that the end of the officer’s evidence, ing sufficiency of come contact with Officer pole had into consti arguing that his conviction violated Wallen, briefly,” during the con- “albeit speech. of free protections tutional J., dissenting). (Ogle, frontation. Id. at *6 Appeals dismissed the Court Criminal by right granted application This appeal, pointing appeal out that Court appeal to to con- only judgment permission exists when there is a final the State for (1) conviction, by Appellate Rule of sider whether the trial court erred Tennessee 3(b), prejudicial evi- grant judi potentially Procedure and that the the admission of (2) dence; sufficiency conviction. of the evidence cial diversion did not involve a rule; Mitchell, physical in State v. No. E2007-02807-CCA- the context of facts (Tenn. (3) RS-CD, expressed *2 whether the words 2008 WL 14, 2008); protected right were CrimApp. Aug. accord State v. the Defendant (Tenn.Crim. Norris, speech. to free S.W.3d Analysis danger prejudice.” of the unfair In State Banks, (Tenn.1978), v. 564 S.W.2d

I. quoted this with approval Court a defini argues The Defendant first prejudice: tion of unfair “An undue ten by allowing trial court erred into evidence dency suggest to decision on an improper Kyle the statement he made to Officer basis, commonly, though not necessarily, attempting park while he was to his vehi (internal an emotional one.” quotations cle. The Defendant submits that the evi omitted). “substantially” While the word not relevant charged dence was is not defined either our rule or the been offenses should have excluded rule, corresponding federal this terminolo danger prejudice. because of the of unfair gy place has been construed to “heavy noted, charged As the Defendant was party seeking burden on the to exclude the disorderly resisting with both conduct and James, evidence.” State v. 81 S.W.3d disorderly arrest. The conduct statute (Tenn.2002). The exclusion of relevant person states that commits of- “[a] [the] evidence under our rule has been de who, fense in a [of conduct] scribed as “an extraordinary remedy that public and with intent to place cause should used sparingly.” be White Vanderbilt annoyance [e]ngages fight- or alarm ... v., (Tenn.Ct. Uni ing threatening or violent or behavior[.]” App.1999). issue, addressing When this 39-17-305(a)(l) (2003); Ann. Tenn.Code trial courts must be respectful of the func (6th 2006). see also T.P.I.—Crim. 30.13 ed. jury. tion of the See 22 A. Wright Charles prohibiting resisting The law arrest pro- Graham, Jr., & Kenneth W. Federal Prac vides that is an a person offense for “[i]t (1978). § tice and Procedure Rule intentionally or prevent anyone obstruct 403 decisions fall within the discretionary person known to the abe law enforce- authority of the trial court and will not be ment officer ... from ... effecting a[n] overturned absent an abuse of discretion. any person, arrest ... of including the Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 952. Cf. defendant, by using against force the law instance, enforcement officer or In this another.” Tenn. Defendant filed a 39-16-602(a) (2003); § Code Ann. motion in limine to see also exclude his comments (6th 2006). Kyle, 27.04 to Officer T.P.I.—Crim. ed. who had not included the word “nigger” original police report having any tendency to “[E]vidence explained and who that he had chosen to make the existence of fact that is of boy” substitute the term “black in the consequence to the determination of the report derogatory rather than the more probable action more probable less than actually word the Defendant had used. it would qualifies be without the evidence” motion, The trial court overruled the hold- as relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. While ing that the evidence was reflective of the excluded, irrelevant evidence should be state of Defendant’s mind. generally relevant evidence is admissible view, In our the trial court within *9 acted prohibited by unless the state and federal constitutions, discretionary authority. the bounds of its evidence, other rules of or “nigger” The term is offensive and general “other rules or laws of thus application Nevertheless, prejudicial. in the the use of that courts of Tennessee.” Tenn. R. probative charge Evid. 402. word is also as to the of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, however, provides that relevant evi conduct. The Defendant re- “may dence if probative angrily being park be excluded its acted after told not to area, substantially value is outweighed by prohibited directly challenging the in a 390 threatening in behav- fighting or violent offi- African-American authority of the

the 39-17-305(a)(l). §Ann. Tenn.Code upon ior[.]” was called A white officer cer. however, Appeals, of The Court Criminal no-parking the to confirm intervene and recordings “be- the video concluded that agreed the Defendant restriction before testimony very signifi- the officers’ lie[d] “sped park off’ to Defendant leave. The actions were “void of ways” cant unsupervised, but prohibited, in another physically deemed ... that could be and, appar- exiting his vehicle area before 1241577, Mitchell, 2010 WL threatening.” a “bee-line” to making ently angry, still at *5.2 entrance, front at checkpoint From place. took the confrontation where sufficiency of Initially, when the easily have in- jury could proof, issue, well-established the evidence is at had Kyle and Stuart ferred that Officers “the State appeal, On principles apply. the Defendant eye contact with continual legitimate strongest afforded the must be which, events, of during the entire course and all reasonable view of the evidence transpired within appearances, all may be drawn therefrom.” inferences minutes. matter of 514, Vasques, v. S.W.3d State necessarily a Disorderly conduct is not (Tenn.2007). credibility of the wit “The There is a nexus be act or deed. single nesses, weight given to be their testi initial conduct to the Defendant’s tween the reconciliation of conflicts mony, and his confrontation Kyle and jury ward Officer matters entrusted to the proof are checkpoint. at the stationed police with the Campbell, the trier of fact.” State v. as particular (Tenn.2008) the offensive term is The use of (citing S.W.3d (Tenn. the Defendant ly probative State, of whether v. 575 S.W.2d Byrge or in violent or “[e]ngage[d] fighting sufficiency of Crim.App.1978)). When “with intent to cause threatening behavior” challenged, the relevant the evidence is during the annoyance or alarm” public whether, reviewing the question is after leading interval to his arrest. short favorable to the light in the most evidence not, therefore, its abuse trial court did State, have “any rational trier of fact could authority by admitting the discretionary elements of the crime found the essential al., Ten Neil P. Cohen et evidence. See v. beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson 4.03(8) § Law Evidence 4-67 307, 319, nessee 99 S.Ct. Virginia, U.S. of 2005). (5th ed. (1979); see also Tenn. 61 L.Ed.2d 560 13(e). “Because a verdict of

R.App. P. II. of inno guilt presumption removes presumption guilt, trial testi cence and raises considering After burden criminal defendant bears the tapes, and receiv mony, seeing the video instructions,1 showing that the evidence was jury appeal on trial court’s ing the had, guilty ver legally “in a insufficient to sustain the Defendant concluded Hanson, 279 S.W.3d dict.” State v. with intent to cause public place and (Tenn.2009). [e]ngage[d] ... in 275 annoyance or alarm majority panel, holding, on the 2. so the instructions the trial court 1. Because After course, unnecessary to address found it part jury were not made a made to the constitutionality ap- of the statute's either the record, they presume that this Court must plication conduct or the to the Defendant’s State, Tillery proper. were See admissibility the Defendant's comment to (Tenn.Crim.App.1978). *10 police officer. the African-American

391 sent, In the absence of direct evi Judge Ogle, in reference to the video dence, may a criminal offense be estab recordings, pointed out that the Defen- exclusively by lished circumstantial evi dant, having already demonstrated his an- State, 237, dence. Duchac v. 505 S.W.2d ger after being away directed from a pro- (Tenn.1973); State, 241 Marable v. 203 parking hibited area by Kyle officers 440, 451, (1958). Tenn. 313 S.W.2d 456-58 Stuart, “proceeded at pace,’ a ‘fast visibly however, Ultimately, jury decides “[t]he upset, entry toward the gate where the weight given the to be to circumstantial gathered.” officers were Id. at *6 (Ogle, evidence, and inferences to be drawn ‘[t]he J., dissenting). She observed that when evidence, and[, moreover,] from such the directed to flag remove the from pole, its extent to which the are circumstances con “raved,” the Defendant “ranted” guilt sistent with and inconsistent with in “loudly taunting get the officers to nocence, questions primarily are for the attendees, attention of rally other getting ” Rice, 646, jury.’ State v. 184 S.W.3d 662 into [their] faces.” Id. (Tenn.2006) Marable, (quoting 313 S.W.2d From its extensive discussion of the vid- 457). at appeal, may On the court eotape and conclusion that the videotape substitute its inferences for those drawn testimony “belies the very significant by the trier of fact in circumstantial evi ways,” id. (majority at *5 opinion), the Lewter, dence eases. State v. 313 S.W.3d Appeals Court Criminal appears to have 745, (Tenn.2010); State, Liakas v. reweighed the evidence and concluded that (1956). 856, Tenn. 286 S.W.2d the videotape necessarily “ more reli- The standard of review ‘is the same able than testimony of the witnesses upon whether the conviction is based di testifying on ” behalf of the State. It is of evidence,’ rect circumstantial or a course, jury the role of the to determine Hanson, combination of both. 279 S.W.3d the credibility of the witnesses and to re- Sutton, (quoting at 275 State v. Here, solve the conflicts the evidence. (Tenn.2005)); State v. Pender jury, properly instructed on the statu- (Tenn.Crim. grass, 13 S.W.3d 392-93 crime, tory elements of saw the wit- Dorantes, App.1999); see also State v. nesses, firsthand, testimony heard their (Tenn.2011). S.W.3d and also saw the videotapes. The evidence Appeals The Court of Criminal found when, is sufficient even if a small mar- that the captured by events the video cam- gin, jury a rational unanimously could con- portions eras so with conflicted of the offi- evidence, clude all from of the direct and testimony cers’ that a conviction for disor- circumstantial, Defendant, that the “in a derly conduct was not warranted. For public place with the intent to cause example, pointed the court out that annoyance ... [e]ngage[d] or alarm in ... recordings video did “not show the Defen- threatening behavior.” Ann. Tenn.Code dant shaking flag[pole] up and down 39-17-305(a)(l). § and striking Officer Wallen in the chest undisputed It is that times, rally ... was held two or three or at all” as indi- public place. in a Kyle, Considering cated Officer the issue the videos State, light are ... most favorable to the as we “void of actions that could be do, Mitchell, required physically rally deemed are attracted indi- threatening.” Further, viduals each supporting WL *5. side of the issue of majority opinion illegal immigration. jury observed that there was heard testi- Defendant, testimony mony “no felt officers threat- over short ened time, the Defendant.” Id. In her dis- disregarded parking interval of *11 392 re- stated, entitled to jury the As rudely chal- rally and for the

restrictions testimony, as- in the any Kyle, an solve differences authority of Officer the lenged witnesses, and the credibility used the of The Defendant sess African-American. Offi- evidence as in reference to from all of the inflammatory term inferences an draw v. had to intervene. Defendant. State officer of the Kyle. A white to the behavior cer made angrily Considering and Defendant reacted at 335. The 245 Campbell, S.W.3d only remarks not disparaging favorable to intemperate, light most evidence in the After others as well. Kyle, Officer but State, have determined jury could area, no-parking unguarded in an parking Defendant, public place, in a while security toward the Defendant rushed annoyance public cause intended to place took before All of this checkpoint. in violent or threaten- by engaging alarm video. on either appeared Defendant evidence, therefore, is The ing behavior. stop- amenable to was not The Defendant of the the conviction support sufficient one officer checkpoint. "When ping at the Defendant. stepped path, the Defendant blocked his loudly ques- toward Officer Stuart III. precautions of the propriety tioned the asserts The Defendant also the event. The Defen- established Due Pro violates the that his conviction the attention of attracted dant’s behavior Fourteenth Amendment cess Clause hand, one of on at least spectators several because to the States Constitution United camera to record video whom turned his entitled protections Amendment First at the check- of the Defendant’s behavior vociferously challenge police Defendant was in Weisgarber, who point. Lieutenant from as he refrained authority3 long so coordinating secu- charge planning of words, as defined “fighting” of the use about rally was so concerned rity at New Chaplinsky v. landmark case of that he di- of the Defendant the behavior 766, 568, 62 S.Ct. 86 Hampshire, 315 U.S. “to checkpoint at the rected the officers (1942).4 State, relying on L.Ed. 1031 get him out of there.” 1, Island, 484, 489 n. 116 517 U.S. Rhode Amendment to the United States 3. The First (1996) 1495, (citing any "abridging the prohibits law L.Ed.2d 711 Constitution S.Ct. 134 Const, I, cases). amend. speech,” protections of U.S. ex freedom are First Amendment 1250, Larion, Constitution acknowl while the Tennessee 119 F.3d pansive. Sandul of edges free communication "[t]he Cir.1997). (6th permissi In order to be the invalu thoughts opinions, is one of ble, speech serve any regulation of free "must man, may every rights citizen able interest, public important and substantial write, any subject, freely speak, print on suppression free wholly divorced from being responsible abuse of that liber for the "must be no speech,” and the restrictions Const, I, § The Tennessee ty.” Tenn. art. 19. furtherance of greater than is essential to have a provision has been "construed City Messengers, L Inc. v. that interest.” H & scope as that afforded” at least as broad Brentwood, (Tenn. S.W.2d press speech and of the freedoms of O’Brien, 1979) (citing States v. United Amendment. Leech v. Am. Booksellers First 20 L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. U.S. Assoc., (Tenn.1979). (1968)). Further, Due Process Clause of because the of the United the Fourteenth Amendment who had cursed Chaplinsky, a defendant 4. In protections States Constitution extends officer, "[g-]dam- calling municipal him a gov and local Amendment to state the First fascist” in and "damned ned racketeer” ernment, infringement by a state or local violating a place, convicted of government the First Amendment violates 766. While 62 S.Ct. statute. Id. state Fourteenth. U.S. Const. rather than the statute, XIV; on its validity of the upholding the Liquormart, Inc. v. amend. see also

393 its brief filed with the Court of Criminal dant maintains that his words to the police Appeals, submits that the language of the officers fell below that threshold. Vir Cf. disorderly conduct Black, applies only statute ginia 343, 359-60, 538 U.S. 123 when interpreted proscribe to or words 1536, 155 (2003) (observ S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 535 conduct protected by not or federal ing that a state’s prohibition of “true state constitutions and that the Defen- threats” protection serves as a against the dant’s behavior was unprotected. “fear of violence” and the “disruption that endangers”). Further, fear argues he that

While acknowledging there is no consti this court should subscribe to a concurring abridgement tutional long so as a statute opinion by authored Lew Justice Powell in does prohibit no more than face to face “ Orleans, City is v. New 913, ‘likely words 408 U.S. provoke the 92 average per of 2499, (1972) retaliation, S.Ct. (Powell, son to L.Ed.2d 321 thereby cause a ” J., Johnson, breach Texas v. peace,’ concurring), of the who police wrote that offi 397, 409, 2533, 491 U.S. cers should be S.Ct. more tolerant of “fighting” (1989) (quoting Chaplinsky, words than L.Ed.2d 342 average citizen and held to 574, 766), U.S. 62 S.Ct. the Defen “a higher degree of restraint.”5 Finally, applied, 1989) face Supreme and as (reversing Court made disorderly conduct convic- following observation: defendant, tion where the being urged after down,” Allowing scope language by the broadest a sheriff to "calm called the sheriff Amendment, purpose bitch,” of the Fourteenth "a fat son of a because the conduct it right is well understood that the of free entirely consisted of verbal abuse and there speech is not absolute at all times and un- physical no threat of any assault or indi- der all circumstances. There are certain cation that members of the crowd were incit- narrowly well-defined and limited classes of conduct); State, ed Garvey v. speech, prevention punishment of 709, (re- S.W.2d 711 (Tenn.Crim.App.1975) thought any which has never been to raise versing a conduct conviction for problem. Constitutional These include the shouting "sooey” to walking an officer toward obscene, libelous, profane, lewd and City application Hall "average insulting "fighting" and the or words— person" Chaplinsky). test established in very those which their utterance inflict Read, In State v. 165 Vt. 680 A.2d 944 injury or tend to incite immediate breach (1996), Supreme the Vermont Court peace. ob- It has been well that observed of such served that part any utterances are no essential ideas, exposition police fact slight [t]he and are of that ... such officers are step social value calmly as a to truth trained authoritatively to deal may benefit that be derived from them disorderly persons guarantee is with does not clearly outweighed by the social interest in police officers are immune from react- morality. order and ing instinctively in the face of an abusive 571-72, added) Id. at (emphasis S.Ct. 766 police tirade- expe- While officers are (footnotes omitted). handling unruly persons, rienced at corollary police obligat- is that officers are Creasy, 5. See State v. 831-32 ed persons to confront such frequently. (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (holding that the defen- may rightly expect We police that a officer officer, although dant’s "profane curses of an will act accordance with his or her insulting," adjudged "fighting" were not training disciplinary rules. But to words because the high- officer was held fash- expectation judicial ion this rule that standard, affirming er but from conviction for person relieves a the reach a crimi- disorderly conduct because the defendant had from solely nal statute because the victim is a displayed body also language— offensive police is "physically to invite the use positioning] abusive himself between the officer language police toward ticketing"— officer and the car We do that he was officers. and the officer believe that back-up”); prac- "had called for such a rule is sound in see Scott, also State v. principle. C.C.A. No. 1989 WL tice or in added). at *1-2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar. (emphasis Id. at 950 subject protec expressions not measure on those great relies the Defendant v. Tourism by the United de P.R. Assoc. opinion tion. Posadas per curiam *13 City P.R., 328, 339, in Norwell v. 106 S.Ct. 478 U.S. Supreme States Court Co. of 14, 187, Cincinnati, (1986); 94 S.Ct. 38 2968, 414 U.S. York v. 266 New 92 L.Ed.2d (1973), for his ar support 24, as Ferber, 747, 170 L.Ed.2d n. 102 S.Ct. 458 769 U.S. be re conviction should (1982) (“When that his gument 3348, 1113 73 L.Ed.2d In grounds. First Amendment versed on with a federal stat dealing federal court is Norwell, year old defendant sixty-nine ..., the statute it ... construe ute should employment place from his walking was if the problems, to avoid constitutional residence, when an to his liquor at a store limiting con subject is to such statute officer, suspi notified of a who had been also free to ... A state court is struction. neighborhood, asked in the person cious way. in the same with a state statute deal Id. at 94 lived in the area. whether he cured, the law is If invalid reach of to walk The defendant turned 187. S.Ct. longer proscribing no reason for there is and the officer answering, away without unprotected application the statute’s eventually the defendant persisted. When that state-court decision conduct.... [A] anything,” he said, you people tell “I don’t ... is bind has construed the statute un and later convicted then arrested ...”). to criminal ing. Speech integral “noisy, bois prohibiting der an ordinance protected. is not See United conduct rude, terous, insulting, disorderly” or con — Stevens, U.S. -, 130 v. S.Ct. States annoy.” intent to ... Id. “with the duct (2010); 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 see also reversed, 94 S.Ct. 187. Court Co., Empire Storage v. and Ice Giboney what the mo “[r]egardless that holding 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 336 U.S. expres may have been behind tivation (1949). 834 case, there was in it is clear that sion this fighting or words.” language no abusive indicated, jury, in As 16, 94 187. Id. at S.Ct. law, applicable found structed as conduct aggressive that the Defendant’s foremost, evalu First and “[i]n violated loud and rude behavior and his statute, we constitutionality of a ating the proof, There is the terms of the statute. act presumption begin with circumstantial, ev of each and direct and Pickett, v. ... is constitutional.” State crime of ery element of the (Tenn.2007). charge “Our 5.W.3d Further, also while words and conduct. constitutionality whenever uphold is to may qualify of an idea Farr, expressive conduct v. possible.” Waters (Tenn.2009). “speech,” threatening be Further, protected as this Court by the Defendant havior demonstrated authority to construe has the constitutional view, not, either in our fall within does disorderly conduct statute so our circumstances, these speech except category.6 for Under prohibition there is no Supreme] the words and conduct “Although States assertion [United 6. constituted premise which the Defendant was arrested long accepted the that cer Court has "Deciding public concern. First a matter of 'expressive' tain acts are entitled to private speech public con activity whether is of protection, ... not all Amendment 'content, requires us to examine expressive component will be afford cern with an form, speech, revealed context' of that ‘as protection.” Ronald ed First Amendment " Nowak, Snyder Phelps, record.' on the whole & John E. Treatise D. Rotunda 1207, 1216, - U.S. -, 20.49(a), (4th 179 L.Ed.2d § 131 S.Ct. at 540-41 Constitutional Law Bradstreet, (2011) 2008). Inc. v. (quoting Dun & disagree with the dissent's ed. We I, LEE, J., article the First Amendment and section SHARON G. filed a separate our protections under federal and state opinion concurring part and dissenting implicated. constitutions are not part. Conclusion LEE, J., SHARON G. concurring in The Defendant’s reference to an Afri- part and dissenting part. “nigger”

can-American officer as properly admitted into I separately evidence. The De- write to dissent from the *14 term, fendant’s use of that his refusal to majority’s decision to affirm the defen- obey the officer’s directive to remove his dant’s conviction for disorderly conduct. vehicle from a no-parking area until a giving After proper deference jury’s intervened, angry white officer his re- verdict, I agree cannot that the evidence is sponse, belligerent and his loud and con- sufficient to Mr. support Mitchell’s convic- frontation of the rally officers at the area Moreover, tion for disorderly conduct. I checkpoint qualified threatening as behav- conclude that Mr. Mitchell’s conduct was designed annoy ior in public to alarm a protected as free speech. Moreover, place. the Defendant’s conduct An anti-immigration rally planned protections is not entitled to the of free for the afternoon of June on the reasons, speech. judgment For these the lawn of the Hamblen County Courthouse. of the Appeals Court of Criminal is re- rally organizers encouraged partici- versed and the conviction and sentence is pants reinstated. to attend and “wave adjudged against Costs are the American Defendant, Mitchell, flag proudly the Teddy Ray display for and signage that edu- may which execution if necessary. issue cates.” Teddy Mitchell attempted to do Builders, Inc., 749, 761, Non-Violence, 288, 293, Greenmoss 472 U.S. tive 468 U.S. (1985) (1984)). (opin 105 S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 221 In Unit- Powell, O’Brien, J.)). Court, Although ion of observing the ed States v. the activities taking governmental place sufficiently justified the anti-immigration rally, inside the interest conduct, regulations expressed including upheld "display[ing] signage that edu cates,” prohibiting a burning statute may very of a draft well have risen to the level card, applying four-part a test: speech addressing public an issue of con government cern, regulation sufficiently jus- A is propriety of those activities is not tified if power it is within the constitutional before this Court. None of the Defendant's Government; impor- if it furthers an belligerent threatening statements and interest; governmental tant or substantial if police actions made towards the when seek governmental interest is unrelated to ing rally to enter the involved an issue of suppression expression; of free and if not, therefore, They concern. are enti alleged the incidental restriction on First type "special protection” tled to the dis greater Amendment freedoms is no than is Supreme cussed the United States Court in essential to the furtherance of that interest. - -, Snyder. See U.S. at 131 S.Ct. at 367, 377, 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 1215. (1968). placed The limitations on the Moreover, assuming even that the Defen- rally participants general, and the Defen- protected, dant’s words actions were specifically, including prohibiting dant him choice express of where and when to himself parking bringing from in a restricted area and beyond regulatory is "not the Government’s flagpole rally, into the were reasonable re- time, ‘subject place, reach—it is to reasonable protected speech, particularly strictions on or manner restrictions' that are consistent considering government’s belief that a with the standards announced in this large group Court's opposi- of citizens with views in - -, precedents.” Snyder, rally participants U.S. planned tion to the also (quoting Cmty. S.Ct. at 1218 Clark v. Crea- attend. un- bystanders appear that, police he could officers was arrested before just but In- by Mr. Mitchell’s conduct. disturbed rally. enter deed, that he single person testified confrontation be- Anticipating possible by Mr. Mitchell. or she felt threatened anti-immigra- pro-immigration tween order came across the point, At this Hamblen rally, at the participants tion Weisgarber, who was radio from Officer assembled Department County Sheriffs courthouse, re- stationed next to officers ninety police eighty between Weisgarber Mr. Mitchell. Officer move in and around police agencies from various until his ar- never saw Mr. Mitchell presence includ- rally police site. The after arrest, Stuart, who made County rest. Officer from the Hamblen ed officers explained: Morristown Po- Department, Sheriffs Emergen- the Sevierville Department, lice An came across the radio order High- cy Squad, and the Tennessee Rescue place Mr. Mitchell. A like this remove were in way Patrol. Most of the officers other than the news right here at times *15 uniform; many gear, effect, were in riot some rally a of this one you that see on loaded body were in full armor and carried problem get can person causing AK-47 weapons; and others carried M-16 it people of irate and could whole crowd were on the weapons. So, Police officers thought we we quick. escalate real half- rooftops, on and a ground, snipers every- problem would eliminate the in the track tank was hidden bushes rally. have a peaceful one else could courthouse lawn. Mitchell asked what Mr. did When conduct, Kyle, who disorderly Officer was re-

Parking around the courthouse was arrest, explained in the participated also attempted Mr. Mitchell stricted. When “Sir, you you public when cause a scene area, he had a verbal park in a restricted disorderly.” are used exchange police with two officers and As Mr. Mitchell drove off epithet. racial Sufficiency Evidence of elsewhere, car the two officers park his arrested and indicted Mr. Mitchell was rally walked to the entrance and told resisting conduct and arrest. guy coming, he’s “Hey, officers there this arrest, resisting guilty He was found not Mitchell, sixty-one years Mr. then mad.” the crime of disorder- but was convicted of old, rally carrying arrived at the entrance trial, At the state had the ly conduct. right in his hand a soft drink can and beyond a proving reasonable burden flag, poster, an American his left hand 1) public “in a doubt that Mr. Mitchell was folding lawn chair. There were at least 2) “with intent to cause an- place,” en- standing seven officers at sidewalk 3) alarm,” noyance “engag[ing] or trance courthouse lawn. As Mr. threatening behavior.” ... violent or sidewalk, attempted Mitchell to enter the 39-17-305(a)(l) (2003) § Ann. Tenn.Code stopped he was Officer Stuart added). (emphasis flag take into the told that he could not Mr. Mitchell’s conduct was rally. protested loudly. Although Mr. Mitchell On in the video, the fatal flaw saying belligerent, he can be heard “Can rude and its failure to establish that you flag take the damn Mexican in there? State’s case was was violent or you flag take the Mexican in there? Mr. Mitchell’s conduct Can important There is an telling threatening. You are me that American belligerence between flag....” depict The a scene critical distinction videos “Bel- threatening or conduct. agitated, where Mr. Mitchell is but the and violent 1989). Scott, ligerent” “[g]iven as to or In is defined the defendant became upset with sheriff aggressive hostile behavior.” the local for arresting marked or her husband for driving. reckless Id. at Millsaps, State No. 03C01-9409-CR- (Tenn.Crim Upon arrest, *1. her husband’s *2 which the 1996 WL at defendant 17, 1996) apparently thought was .App.July (quoting American warranted, she other and two individuals Heritage English Lan Dictionary of loud, who were present “mounted a pro (1969)). To be considered threaten guage fane and lewd verbal assault on the sher behavior, ing belligerent behavior must be finale, iff.” Id. As a grand she flung a with an act or combined “overt direct cup of ice parking across the lot and called Id.; see threat harm.” also State v. the sheriff a “fat of a son bitch.” Id. She Melton, M1999-01248-CCA-R3-CD, No. peace. convicted of breach In *7 (Tenn.Crim.App. WL conviction, reversing the the Court of 2000). Aug. “Violent” behavior is de Criminal Appeals held the defendant’s Of, to, relating fined as follows: “1. or words were mere insults and that there by strong physical characterized force. 2. was no that she had evidence threatened Resulting from extreme or intense force. or counseled any physical assault on the Vehemently passionately 3. threaten Further, sheriff. Id. the sheriff did not (7th ing.” Dictionary Black’s Law appear “greatly to be stirred the in 1999). ed. sults.” Id. The court did note that the This belligerent distinction between be- *16 sheriff had a concern that there was a threatening havior and violent or behavior present things crowd get and could out of Millsaps. was evident in Police officers hand: is reasonable to infer ... “[i]t the responded call to a disturbance at a res- sheriff believed he was faced with an ex that taurant and learned the defendant plosive situation and made the arrest had been a in the participant disturbance. prevent However, violence.” Id. at *3. Id. at *1. officers the When the asked the court was an held that this insufficient step outside for additional defendant reason to arrest the defendant because the “ questioning, the became “bellig- defendant danger’ ‘clear present requires test erent,” them, with go .refused to and the reviewing inqui court to make its own at one keys his car of the offi- “toss[ed]” ry ‘danger’ into whether the existed.” Id. outside, Id. cers. Once he was the defen- Commc’ns, (citing Landmark Inc. v. Virgi began “cussing,” “hollering,” dant and be- nia, 435 98 U.S. S.Ct. “very Id. belligerent.” Although came (1978)). Accordingly, in L.Ed.2d revers police the officers testified that the defen- conviction, ing emphasized the court the threatening, dant’s actions were violent or that the defendant had not threatened neither officer the regarded defendant’s assault, anyone physical with that there tossing of as keys threatening his car or was no evidence that members of the menacing. Id. at *2. The Court of Crimi- present crowd were “incited or inclined to Appeals disorderly nal the con- reversed intervene,” “there and that was no ‘clear conviction, that the finding “[bjelliger- duct of violence to present danger’ weigh ent actions do not rise the level of against expression.” her right of free Id. violent or Id. threatening.” required Other what is decisions reveal belligerent

The distinction be- “threatening between for the State to con establish threatening havior violent disorderly behavior duct” for a conduct conviction. (Tenn. Scott, Creasy, was also evident in v. No. In State v. S.W.2d 829 State 16, Crim.App.1994), the was arrest (Tenn.Crim.App. 1989 WL 22736 Mar. defendant officer, license at the calling throwing his driver’s after ed conduct in him the chest. WL profane striking police officer number officer, fist, terms, *2. who police his at de- clenching insulting Id. at the over six feet tall finger at the officer. scribed defendant as pointing his that the fifty pounds, the noted and two hundred and testified appeal, court 831. On to establish that he felt threatened because “thrown not sufficient “words” were opponent but the defendant’s can be used to distract disorderly conduct that items attempting fist and a means of at- clenching with his while to find coupled words conviction, In affirming at officer constitut Id. the pointing finger his tack.” supported distinguished both Scott and “threatening behavior” and the court ed Moreover, the Millsaps: Id. 832. the conviction. emphasized the officer’s specifically

court that, in note unlike the defendant [W]e threat he felt testimony “personally that Scott, appellant not throw his did ened.” Id. parking license across the lot. driver’s Rather, Creasy, like the in defendant he Roberts, In State police officer. directed his action at was ad (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the defendant Moreover, unlike the defendant Mill- judicated delinquent based on his disorder not “toss” saps, appellant did discus ly getting into a heated conduct license driver’s in the direction “I’ll stating, sion with a school official and Rather, threw the officer. he license you.” 661. After take care of Id. at sufficient to strike officer with force told official called defendant Finally, unlike in the chest.... “come on and made official to outside” Millsaps, police [the officer] indicating official should gestures officers appellant’s behavior in outside; interpreted the the official testified come throwing appeared license driver’s threatening. Id. actions as defendant’s menacing. “mere the court appeal, On noted *17 can be epithets, epithets unless the Melton, added); verbal at *7 see also (emphasis words,’ by ‘fighting cannot Bason, considered v. E2000-02276-CCA-R3- State support a conviction under themselves CD, (Tenn.Crim.App. 2001 WL 1152820 disorderly 2001) (defendant statute.” Tennessee’s conduct 1, convicted of Oct. disor accompanied epithets Id. at 663. “Verbal police at derly cursing conduct after offi behavior, threatening physically cers, some screaming, reaching into and his however, support will a under knife); conviction that v. pocket contained State (cit disorderly Id. 03C01-9904-CR-00133, our conduct statute.” Moore, No. 831-32). In Creasy, 9,1999) at ing S.W.2d Dec. (Tenn.Crim.App. WL conviction, noted affirming (defendant the court disorderly conduct convicted of “were the defendant’s statements officers, cursing swinging at after his threatening emphasized officers). in nature” and arms, kicking at testimony apprehen official’s that he felt considering principles After these Roberts, sive and threatened. in the record cases and evidence be- at 663. us, proof I am fore convinced Melton, Likewise, to the conviction for the defendant not sufficient sustain vociferously disorderly after refus- conduct. In chal- convicted of conduct deny authority to him lenging his truck as officers’ ing illegally parked to move officer, rally with calling the to enter his police permission instructed names, no doubt Mr. flag, and American there is profane a number of officer rude, loud, belligerent. gued Mitchell was in its brief before the Court of Crimi- However, nal exchange Appeals the entire verbal be- that Mr. Mitchell’s actions protected tween the numerous officers Mr. were not speech free because they Mitchell to have appears potential lasted less than “had to create danger- situation, proof given 15 seconds. There was no that Mr. ous proximity of the any Mitchell made threats of violence. offense to attending others the rally.” “ proof any There was no of the seven ‘The First Amendment reflects a pro police at the officers entrance felt threat- found national commitment to the principle any ened at time Mr. Mitchell. There that debate on public issues should be ” was no that Mr. proof Mitchell committed uninhibited, robust, wide-open.’ any act any police of violence toward — Snyder U.S. -, -, Phelps, officers or counseled others to do so. Al- 1207, (2011) S.Ct. 179 L.Ed.2d 172 though the State argues that Mr. Mitchell Sullivan, N. Y. (quoting Times v. 376 U.S. flag pole poked “shook the Officer 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 11 L.Ed.2d 686 eagle Wallen two or three times with the (1964)). “[Sjpeech concerning public af flag pole,” attached to the end of the this fairs is more than self-expression; it is the argument simply supported is by the essence of self-government.” Connick v. videotapes that captured the entire en- Myers, 138, 145, 461 U.S. 103 S.Ct. Obviously, counter. jury’s role is to (1983) 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (quoting Garrison v. however, proof; resolve conflicts in the the Louisiana, 64, 74-75, 379 U.S. 85 S.Ct. argument State’s that Mr. Mitchell used 209, (1964)). 13 L.Ed.2d 125 Speech con flag poke Officer Wallen in a threat- public cerns a matter when it can “be ening or violent manner and that this con- fairly relating considered as matter place duct somehow took outside of the social, political, or other concern to the conjecture. video cameras’ view is sheer community.” Id. at 1684. S.Ct. “ debate, Accordingly, ‘[I]n even giving jury’s [we] after must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech verdict the deference to which it enti- is tled, provide adequate I that a order jury ‘breathing conclude rational could space’ protected by have Mr. to the freedoms belligerent, found Mitchell to be ” — rude, loud, First Amendment.’ Snyder, but no jury rational could U.S. -, have at 1219 guilty (quoting found him of violent or S.Ct. Boos v. threat- 312, 322, *18 Barry, 485 ening beyond behavior U.S. 108 S.Ct. reasonable doubt. (1988)). 99 L.Ed.2d 333 I would reverse disorderly and dismiss the conduct conviction. question There is no that Mr. Mitchell’s public rally words and conduct at a on the Speech

Free topic immigration of a matter of concerned social, Given the absence of “public, violent or threaten- or other concern to the conduct, ing Connick, 146, it community.” is clear that Mr. Mitchell 461 at U.S. mean, was arrested because the officers feared 103 S.Ct. 1684. This does not irate; course, he would incite others to become that there were no Mr. limits to indeed, conduct; Kyle Officer admitted that Mr. example, Mitchell’s for the Unit- Mitchell “causing Supreme was arrested for a scene ed historically States Court has in public,” which he equated being “fighting with excluded so-called words” from “disorderly.” Although the State speech protection. did not the ambit of free In speech address the free implications Chaplinsky Hampshire, of this v. New 315 U.S. Court, 568, 766, in (1942), case its brief before this it ar- 62 S.Ct. 86 L.Ed. 1031 400 arrested and con- petitioner was cursing [T]he for a mu-

defendant was convicted conviction, verbally and officer; merely because he victed upholding in nicipal police negatively protested [a officer’s] certain are “[t]here the Court said Surely, one is not to treatment of him. speech, preven- well-defined classes of voicing punished nonprovocatively which has never be for punishment tion and obviously felt objection to what he thought to raise Constitutional been 571-72, by a highly questionable was a detention at 62 S.Ct. 766. problem.” Id. Regardless of what the “insulting police or officer. then described The Court may have been behind the very their motivation fighting which words—those case, it is clear that expression to incite an this injury inflict or tend utterance language fight- abusive or peace.” breach of the Id. there was no immediate ing words. 62 S.Ct. 766. Wilson, v. Similarly, Gooding Id. Chaplinsky, Supreme Court’s Since 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 92 S.Ct. U.S. “fighting pri words” cases have focused (1972), the conviction the Court reversed words or marily on whether a defendant’s ‘White of a who told officers: defendant conduct incited imminent unlawful behav bitch, Likewise, our you.” of a I’ll kill son California, In v. ior or violence. Cohen these recognized courts have Tennessee 15, 20, 29 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. Creasy, 885 S.W.2d at 831 principles. See (1971), example, empha for Court (Defendant’s ‘fighting were not “words (in speech, sized defendant’s nor they neither inflicted words’ because jacket form of a that said “Fuck the tended to incite an immediate breach insult,” Draft”), personal not a “direct Roberts, see also peace.”); present not create a clear and and did (“[M]ere epithets, unless the at 663 verbal danger physical of a violent reaction. words,’ epithets ‘fighting can be considered Likewise, Ohio, Brandenburg support cannot themselves a conviction 444, 447, 1827, 23 U.S. 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d disorderly stat- under Tennessee’s conduct (1969), stated that “free Court ute.”). speech press permit free do not proscribe advocacy State to forbid or Application of these vital constitutional close, except the use of force or of law violation necessarily involves a protections Here, advocacy inciting where is directed to analysis. such the State’s case case imminent action and producing lawless brief before the of Criminal asserted Court likely produce is to incite or such action.” proof Mitchell] that “the reveals [Mr. Indiana, See also Hess v. 414 U.S. conduct after he arrested (1973) (conclud loud, S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 303 approached officers in a publicly immi ing present there was no threat of manner to call attention designed abrasive action). nent lawless flag pole restric- to his frustration over characterization, with which I tion.” This *19 Importantly, Supreme ap- Court has completely agree, would demonstrates in- plied principles these several cases “loud,” may have been “abra- Mr. Mitchell volving police encounters with citizen’s “frustrated,” sive,” he was not but Cincinnati, City officers. In Norwell v. thus, the State’s threatening; violent or Ohio, 14, 16, 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. limit the free nothing does to argument (1973), L.Ed.2d 170 reversed a Court of this case. speech implications prohibiting conviction under ordinance boisterous, rude, insulting The State’s brief the Court Crimi- “noisy, or disor- to apparent in an reference derly” Appeals, conduct. The stated: nal Court Brandenburg, the standards in Cohen and dence is sufficient support to Mr. Mitch- also asserted that Mr. Mitchell’s “actions ell’s conviction for disorderly conduct. I potential had the dangerous create a conclude that absent evidence of violent or situation, given proximity of the of- conduct, threatening Mr. Mitchell’s con- fense to attending rally.” others duct, in protested which he inability State testimony cited officers’ that Mr. “wave the American Flag proudly” at a Mitchell’s conduct “could get whole rally on public concern, an issue of was people crowd of irate” because he was protected speech. scene,” “creating a and that officers need- This, problem.” ed to “eliminate the how-

ever, is the Achilles’ heel in the State’s position. Mr. belligerent Mitchell’s en- officers,

counter with which during he car- drink, chair, ried a a flag, poster, and a lasted less than 15 seconds. None

officers they testified felt threatened dur- encounter, ing the There was no evidence In re Robert Victor LINEWEAVER. produced Mr. Mitchell incited or im- minent lawless action others or that his Appeals Tennessee, Court of behavior likely produce to incite or Section, Western at Nashville. such action. Not a single rally attendee effect, Sept. testified to videotapes this and the Session. do not support the conclusion. Officers’ Jan. 2010. speculation

mere may as to what have happened was not a basis to arrest Mr. Appeal Permission to Denied Mitchell boisterously expressing his Supreme Aug. Court 2010. views on a matter of concern. Therefore, I would hold that Mr. Mitchell’s protected

conduct was speech free under the First Amendment.

Evidence Statements of Defendant’s I majority’s concur with the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discre-

tion in admitting into evidence statements

Mr. Mitchell police made to officers while

he attempting park his automobile before his arrival at the entrance to the

rally and before his arrest for

conduct. Although I do not think the

statements were particularly relevant on the issue of guilty whether he was of disor- conduct,

derly say I cannot that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the evidence.

Conclusion *20 giving After proper deference to the verdict, jury’s I agree cannot that the evi-

Case Details

Case Name: State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 31, 2011
Citation: 343 S.W.3d 381
Docket Number: E2008-02672-SC-R11-CD
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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