State of Tennessee v. Keion Lamonte Jemison
M2025-00142-CCA-R3-CD
Tenn. Crim. App.Jan 9, 2026Check Treatment 01/09/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs December 9, 2025
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KEION LAMONTE JEMISON
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 2022-B-1245 Steve R. Dozier, Judge
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No. M2025-00142-CCA-R3-CD
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Defendant, Keion Lamonte Jemison, appeals from his convictions for reckless homicide,
aggravated assault resulting in death, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence, for which he
is serving an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court
erred by sentencing him for Class B felony possession of a firearm by a person convicted
of a crime of violence, arguing that aggravated assault by recklessness is not included in
the statutory definition of a “crime of violence.” We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.
Nathan S. Moore, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Keion Lamonte Jemison.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Derick Blakely, Wesley
King, and Nicholas Harris, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.
OPINION
This case arises from the January 14, 2022 shooting death of Danny Dixson, Jr. The
evidence at trial reflected that Mr. Dixson and his friend, Angela Scivally, were parked in
a vehicle in front of Room 139 at the Stay Lodge Hotel in Nashville. Defendant, who had
been in contact with Mr. Dixson for several months prior to the shooting, was the registered
guest for Room 139. Defendant walked to the front driver’s side window where Mr.
Dixson was sitting and asked him, “[W]hat about [my] bread.” After Mr. Dixson offered
him $30, Defendant became agitated, gestured at the hotel, and stated, “I owe this
mother***er $350 for this.” Defendant reached inside the window with a 9 millimeter
pistol, shot Mr. Dixson once in the upper left thigh, and told Mr. Dixson that he could
leave. Mr. Dixson drove to the end of the parking lot, drew a .22-caliber pistol, and shot
back at Defendant several times, striking the window of Room 139. Mr. Dixson’s femoral
artery was severed by the initial gunshot, and he died shortly thereafter.
The June 2022 term of the Davidson County Grand Jury issued an indictment
charging Defendant with second degree murder and aggravated assault resulting in death
concerning Mr. Dixson (Counts 1 and 2); aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
concerning Ms. Scivally; and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony
crime of violence (Count 4).
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by sentencing him
in Count 4 for a Class B felony instead of a Class E felony. We will limit our recitation of
the facts accordingly.
Before trial began, the trial court addressed the parties outside the presence of the
jury and discussed that, relative to Count 4, Defendant had the option to stipulate as to his
prior felony conviction so that “the jury wouldn’t be hearing that there was a prior crime
of violence.” The court noted that stipulating was not required, and defense counsel
responded that Defendant “would prefer to stipulate.” After a recess, the hearing resumed,
and the State indicated that a stipulation would be entered; when asked whether he had
anything to add, defense counsel responded negatively.
Before the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court asked the parties outside the
presence of the jury whether a stipulation would be entered. The prosecutor responded
affirmatively and stated that the document had been signed by him and defense counsel.
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the State read the stipulation aloud, and the signed
stipulation was entered as an exhibit. The document read, “As evidenced by the signatures
of counsel, the parties agree to stipulate to the following: [] Defendant in this case . . . had
been convicted [of] a felony crime of violence or a felony involving the use of a deadly
weapon prior to January 14, 2022.”
The trial court issued the pattern jury instruction on stipulation, as follows: “You
have heard a stipulation read into the record. A stipulation is an agreement between the
parties that the facts read into the record may be taken by you, the Jury, as true, thereby
dispensing with the necessity of calling witnesses to establish the subject matter of the
stipulation.” The jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offense of reckless
homicide in Count 1 and the charged offenses in Counts 2, 3, and 4.
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At a sentencing hearing, Defendant testified, in relevant part, that his prior
conviction for “reckless aggravated assault” in Montgomery County Criminal Court case
number 63CC1-2019-CR-5 resulted from his accidentally burning his daughter. Defendant
raised in a sentencing memorandum that his conviction in Count 4 should be a Class E
felony because aggravated assault was not included in the definition of “violent offenses”
set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120(b). At the sentencing hearing, the
State argued that the applicable statutory definition would be Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-501.
The trial court issued a written sentencing order, in which it found the following:
[T]he jury was charged to determine guilt on “Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm by a Convicted Felon” where the first element was “that the
defendant had been convicted of a felony crime of violence or involving the
use of a deadly weapon.” At trial, an agreed stipulation was read to the jury
that Defendant had previously been convicted of a felony crime of violence
and the written form was entered as an exhibit. Defendant stipulated to the
element of the crime he now argues should not apply in the sentencing
determination. The jury, in their role as fact finders, considered this
essential, stipulated element of the crime and returned a guilty verdict for
Count 4.
....
Additionally, Defendant recommends the [c]ourt consider that reckless
aggravated assault is not a crime of violence, irrespective that an unnamed
felony crime of violence was stipulated at trial. As proof, Defendant cites
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(b) where reckless aggravated assault is not
listed to determine a repeat violent offender. The [c]ourt observes the cited
statute is for a determination of a life sentence without parole, for which
Defendant is not eligible nor has the State sought by written notice . . . . For
a determination of whether a defendant meets the criteria of a previous
conviction of a crime of violence, our legislators have provided a definition
under the appropriate title. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1301(3). Aggravated
assault of any degree is included as a crime of violence. Id.
Relative to Count 4, the trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence at 85% release
eligibility. Defendant subsequently filed an untimely notice of appeal, but this court
waived the timely filing requirement upon Defendant’s request.
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Analysis
On appeal, Defendant contends that “[r]eckless aggravated assault is not a crime of
violence according to the Tennessee [C]ode”; that he “was wrongly sentenced as a Range
II offender for a Class B felony.” Defendant avers that previously this court “wrongly
decided that reckless aggravated assault is a violent felony,” citing State v. Brown, No.
E2019-01068-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 2510527, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2020), and urges us to draw a distinction between
aggravated assaults involving recklessness as opposed to knowing or intentional behavior.
Finally, Defendant argued that the trial court “usurped” the role of the jury by instructing
it that, as a matter of law, aggravated assault by recklessness is a felony crime of violence.”
Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a Class E felony; however, if the
prior conviction was for a “felony crime of violence,” the offense is a Class B felony. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2). Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-17-1301(3) sets out that for purposes of the firearm possession statutes, a
‘[c]rime of violence’” includes any degree of murder, voluntary manslaughter . .
.[and]aggravated assault.”
When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, as it is in this case, we simply
apply its plain meaning. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.
2004). In Brown, this court aptly discussed,
Aggravated assault is defined as a crime of violence, and aggravated assault
can be accomplished with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. The
mens rea affects the felony classification for purposes of punishment.
Although the parties refer to the conviction offense as reckless aggravated
assault, the conviction offense is aggravated assault, which in this case is
based upon reckless conduct.
Brown, 2020 WL 2510527, at *6. Any intentional, knowing or reckless aggravated assault is a crime of violence.Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307
(b)(1)(A).
Furthermore, as the trial court correctly noted, Defendant may not stipulate at trial
that he was previously convicted of a crime of violence and then contest it on appeal. State
v. Richards, No. 02C019202-CR-00027, 1992 WL 163414, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July
15, 1992) (“When a party makes a concession by stipulation, that party is bound by that
decision on direct appeal[.]”); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (stating that “[n]othing in this rule
shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who
failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful
effect of an error”). Defendant was indicted for Class B felony possession of a weapon by
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a person convicted of a crime of violence or involving a deadly weapon. At trial, he
stipulated that he had been “convicted a felony crime of violence or a felony involving the
use of a deadly weapon prior to January 14, 2022.” By its verdict, the jury found that
Defendant was guilty of a Class B felony offense. The trial court properly sentenced
Defendant for a Class B felony.
Finally, relative to Defendant’s contention that the trial court usurped the role of the
jury in its instructions, this section of Defendant’s brief does not contain references to the
record and, as such, he has waived consideration of the issue. See Tenn. R. App. P.
27(a)(7)(A) (stating that an appellate brief shall contain an argument “setting forth the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor .
. . with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record.”); Tenn. Ct.
Crim. App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities,
or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court.”).1 In
addition, Defendant failed to raise the issue in a motion for new trial.2 “A party challenging
erroneous or inaccurate jury instructions must at least raise the issue in the motion for new
trial.” State v. Odom, No. M2022-00756-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4171011, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2023) (citing State v. Faulkner,154 S.W.3d 48, 58
(Tenn. 2005)).
Finally, we note that the trial court could not have usurped the jury’s role in this regard
because Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony crime of violence.
Defendant is not entitled to relief.
1
We briefly note that the trial court did not instruct the jury that aggravated assault by recklessness
was a crime of violence. Our review of the record reflects that the only mention of a “crime of violence”
in the jury instructions was in the list of elements for Count 4: “(1) that the defendant had been convicted
of a felony crime of violence or involving the use of a deadly weapon; and (2) that the defendant, after such
felony conviction, possessed a firearm; and (3) that the defendant acted either intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly.” We further note that Defendant’s trial occurred in July 2024, before our supreme court
announced its opinion in State v. Curry, 705 S.W.3d 176, 191-92 (Tenn. 2025). Pursuant to Curry, for purposes of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, if a prior conviction is one of the enumerated crimes of violence set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1301(3), the trial court should instruct the jury that the conviction is a crime of violence.Id. at 192
.
2
Defendant stated in his “motion to file untimely notice of appeal” in this court that he did not file
a motion for new trial.
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Conclusion
In light of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.
s/ Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
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