State of New York v. RollinsState of New York v. Rollins
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mustafa T. Kasubhai
OPINION AND ORDER
KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia (“Plaintiffs“) bring this action against the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA“) and Brooke Rollins in her official capacity as Secretary of the USDA (“Defendants“). Plaintiffs claim Defendants’ memoranda implementing recent changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program violate the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80) and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgement (ECF No. 92). For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted, and Defendants’ motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
I. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Congress enacted the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP“) “to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation‘s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households” through program benefits that “[increase] food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation.”
Congress authorized USDA to issue regulations to ensure the effective administration of SNAP.
A. H.R. 1
Congress amended SNAP by passing H.R. 1 on July 4, 2025. One Big Beautiful Bill Act, H.R. 1, 119th Cong. (2025). Among other changes, Congress (1) limited the categories of non-citizens eligible to receive SNAP benefits, (2) limited automatic qualification for standard utility allowances, (3) narrowed categories of work exemptions for able-bodied adults without dependents, and (4) added a “state quality control incentive” which requires a state to pay a portion of the cost of SNAP benefits if the state exceeds certain “payment error rates.” H.R. 1 §§ 10108 (non-citizen eligibility), 10103 (standard utility allowances), 10102 (able-bodied adults), 10105(a) (quality control incentive); see also
1. The State Quality Control Incentive
Seeking to “encourage[] States to administer the SNAP program more efficiently and effectively” and address “the minimal incentive for States to control costs, enhance efficiencies, and improve outcomes for recipients,” Congress enacted the state quality control incentive provision. H.R. Rep. No. 119-106(I), at 47-48, 50-51 (2025); H.R. 1 § 10105(2). The provision reduces the amount of federally funded SNAP benefits based on a state‘s “payment error rate,” leaving the state to pay the remainder.
A state bears no share of the cost of SNAP benefits until fiscal year 2028.
2. Non-Citizen Eligibility
Prior to H.R. 1, non-citizens classified as individuals granted asylum, refugees, and certain humanitarian parolees were eligible for SNAP benefits.
An LPR is, generally, an immigrant who has been “lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States.”
H.R. 1 similarly did not affect the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA“). Under PRWORA, “qualified aliens” are only eligible for SNAP under certain exceptions.
B. The Exclusionary Period
H.R. 1 did not eliminate statutory and regulatory exclusionary periods, under which certain variations in a state‘s payment rates are not counted towards its payment error rates. Congress provided a statutory exclusion for “[a]ny errors resulting in the application of new regulations promulgated under [SNAP] during the first 120 days from the required implementation date for such regulations.”
II. USDA‘s Guidance
A. The Exclusionary Period
Defendants issued four memoranda (collectively, “Guidance Documents“) to state agencies implementing H.R. 1‘s changes to the SNAP program. Administrative Record (“AR“) at GOV000014 (Aug. 29, 2025), GOV000008 (Oct. 3, 2025), GOV000018 (Oct 31, 2025), GOV000006 (Nov. 14, 2025), ECF No. 77. Each memorandum provided that states would be held harmless for errors in applying H.R. 1‘s changes until November 1, 2025, 120 days from the date of H.R. 1‘s enactment, and therefore set July 4, 2025, as the “required implementation date” of H.R. 1‘s changes to SNAP. AR at GOV000017, GOV000012, GOV000020-21, GOV000007.
B. The Non-Citizen Guidance
Defendants’ October 31, 2025, memorandum (“Non-Citizen Guidance“) provided guidance to the states regarding H.R 1‘s changes to Non-Citizen Eligibility. AR at GOV000018. The Non-Citizen Guidance included charts listing the eligibility of certain non-citizens for SNAP benefits. AR at GOV000022-28. These charts designate certain groups as “not eligible” for SNAP benefits and others as “not eligible unless an LPR” and list groups that can become eligible for SNAP without satisfying an otherwise mandatory five-year waiting period. AR at GOV000024-25. Plaintiffs claim that the Non-Citizen Guidance failed to include Humanitarian Immigrant Groups as (1) eligible if they become LPRs and (2) exempt from the five-year waiting period.
On December 9 and 10, 2025, Defendants released “question-and-answer” documents “provid[ing] additional information” on Non-Citizen eligibility. AR at GOV000029; Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. & Opp‘n 11 n.1, ECF No. 92. The December 10 question-and-answer document (“Q&A Guidance“) is consistent with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of H.R. 1‘s changes to non-citizen eligibility. AR at GOV000031. USDA has not revised its regulations to reflect H.R. 1‘s changes to the SNAP program. Compare
III. Plaintiffs’ Efforts to Implement H.R. 1
Soon after Congress passed H.R. 1, many Plaintiffs requested guidance from Defendants on how to implement the changes to the SNAP program. E.g., DeMarco Decl. ¶ 20 (New York), ECF No. 5; Merolla-Brito Decl. ¶ 18 (Rhode Island), ECF No. 21; Frisch Decl. ¶ 18 (Michigan), ECF No. 16. Defendants failed to respond to some Plaintiffs’ requests for guidance. See, e.g., Frisch Decl. ¶ 18 (Michigan); Morishige Decl. ¶ 21 (Hawai‘i), ECF No. 11. When Defendants
Defendants released guidance on H.R. 1‘s changes to standard utility allowance credits on August 29, 2025. AR at GOV000014. The guidance set forth, for the first time, Defendants’ position that the exclusionary period to implement H.R. 1‘s changes to SNAP began on enactment of H.R. 1. AR at GOV000017; Yaffe Suppl. Decl. ¶ 17 (Maine), ECF No. 85. Under this interpretation, Plaintiffs’ errors after the next sixty-four days would count towards their payment error rates. See AR at GOV000012.
Defendants’ next guidance came on October 3, 2025, in a document providing information on how to implement H.R. 1‘s changes to SNAP eligibility for able-bodied adults without dependents. AR at GOV000008. Again, the guidance provided that the implementation date for the changes began on the enactment of H.R. 1, meaning states had twenty-nine
Defendants issued the Non-Citizen Guidance on October 31, 2025. AR at GOV000018. Defendants again set the exclusionary period to begin on H.R. 1‘s enactment, meaning states would only have one day between receiving the Non-Citizen Guidance and the end of the exclusionary period. AR at GOV000021.
Finally, Defendants issued an exclusionary period memo on November 14, 2025, to answer “follow-up questions submitted by State agencies on the variance exclusion period for implementation of [H.R. 1].” AR at GOV000006. The memo states that the regulatory exclusionary period for implementing H.R. 1‘s changes ended thirteen days earlier, on November 1, 2025. AR at GOV000007.
The Guidance Documents caused widespread confusion for Plaintiffs and their SNAP agencies. In the past, state agencies have waited until USDA issues guidance before implementing statutory changes to SNAP to ensure compliance with USDA‘s interpretation of the law. E.g., Tomasky Decl. ¶¶ 13-14 (New York); Hoffman Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (Oregon); McClelland Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (Colorado), ECF No. 83; Hadler Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (Connecticut), ECF No. 84; Yaffe Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 14-15 (Maine); Burnett Decl. ¶¶ 10-11 (Maryland), ECF No. 86; Frisch Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (Michigan), ECF No. 87; Hogan Suppl. Decl. ¶ 15 (North Carolina), ECF No. 88. After receiving notice that the exclusionary period was well under way, Plaintiffs rushed to implement the changes. Some states instituted manual workarounds to complicated systems with increased risk of human error, reprogrammed applications, or retrained personnel. See, e.g., Hogan Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 30, 38, 39 (North Carolina);
The changes made by H.R. 1 posed particular challenges to Plaintiffs. North Carolina viewed the changes to SNAP for able-bodied adults without dependents as “one of the most complex sets of SNAP eligibility changes in the program‘s history.” Hogan Suppl. Decl. ¶ 36. In Maryland, SNAP cases involving able-bodied adults without dependents require twice as much administrative effort. Burnett Decl. ¶ 37.
For Plaintiffs’ SNAP programs and those who depend on them, the consequences are severe. Plaintiffs historically experience higher payment error rates after changes to the SNAP program. E.g., Hoffman Suppl. Decl. ¶ 16 (Oregon), McClelland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 15 (Colorado); Tomasky Decl. ¶ 14 (New York). Plaintiffs expect that their payment error rates could cause their share of the cost of SNAP benefits to increase by hundreds of millions of dollars. E.g., Adelman Decl. ¶¶ 30, 32 (New Jersey), ECF No. 18; Cole Decl. ¶ 29 (Massachusetts); Reyes Decl. ¶ 33 (Washington). For example, If North Carolina‘s SNAP payment error exceeds ten percent in fiscal year 2026, its cost share in fiscal year 2028 would reach $420 million—enough to effectively end the provision of SNAP in that state and cut off aid to 1.4 million North Carolinians. Hogan Decl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 20.
IV. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed this action and moved for a preliminary injunction on November 26, 2025, challenging Defendants’ Non-Citizen Guidance and exclusionary period as contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Compl. 18-23, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing the Non-Citizen Guidance and the exclusionary period against Plaintiffs or counting errors from misapplication of H.R. 1 to their SNAP programs. Pl. States’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. 32, ECF No. 4.
STANDARDS
Judicial review of agency action is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act.
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 (1977).
Agency decisions are “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Id. at 415. While such review is deferential to the agency action taken, the court must not “rubber-stamp” the agency action as correct. Lands Council v. Martin, 529 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008); N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
A court may set aside an agency‘s action if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “without observance of procedure required by law.”
DISCUSSION
I. Mootness
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the eligibility requirements set forth in Defendants’ Non-Citizen Guidance is moot because, following issuance of the December 10, 2025, Q&A Guidance, both parties agree on H.R. 1‘s changes to non-citizen SNAP eligibility.
A federal court has no authority “to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citation omitted). “[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap‘s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (citations omitted). The central question of a mootness challenge is “not whether the precise relief sought at the time the [action] was filed is still available,” but rather “whether there can be any effective relief.” West v. Sec‘y of Dep‘t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
“The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot” because dismissal would allow the challenged conduct to resume as soon as the case is dismissed. Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). When a government entity voluntary ceases its challenged conduct, the court generally presumes that the government entity acts in good faith, but the governmental entity “still must bear the heavy
An analysis of the relevant factors and the government‘s conduct in this case establishes that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Non-Citizen Guidance is not moot. Although Defendants’ Q&A agrees with Plaintiffs’ position, Defendants assert that the October 31 Non-Citizen Guidance contained no legal errors. Defendants have not rescinded the October 31 Non-Citizen Guidance or acknowledged a substantive error in it. Instead, Defendants contend that the Non-Citizen Guidance “was not erroneous,” view Plaintiffs’ position as a misinterpretation, and insist that the Non-Citizen Guidance is consistent with the Q&A and “never excluded certain LPRs from SNAP eligibility.” Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. & Opp‘n 23; Defs.’ Reply 4, ECF No. 96. This is not the broad and unequivocal change in policy envisioned by Rosebrock, and it indicates that Defendants have not fully addressed Plaintiffs’ challenge despite the fact that Defendants appear to have issued the Q&A in direct response to this litigation, and the Q&A applied long-standing provisions of non-citizen SNAP eligibility. Defendants continue to argue that the Non-Citizen Guidance complies with the law, weighing heavily against a finding that the Q&A moots this case. See West Virginia v. Env‘l Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 720 (2022) (finding no mootness where government vigorously defended its past approach).
II. Final Agency Action
The APA limits judicial review to “final agency action.”
The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “an agency‘s characterization of its action as being provisional or advisory is not necessarily dispositive.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, “[i]t is the effect of the action and not its label that must be considered.” Or. Nat. Desert Ass‘n, 465 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). Thus, an agency‘s interpretive rule, such as its interpretation of a statute, may qualify as a final agency action. See Waterkeeper Alliance v. U.S. Env‘t Prot. Agency, 140 F.4th 1193, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2025); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. Env‘t Prot. Agency, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass‘n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015)).
A. Consummation of the Decision-making Process
To satisfy the first prong of the Bennett test, the agency action must “mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency‘s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78 (citation omitted). Defendants do not contend that their Guidance Documents fail this prong of the Bennett test, and the Court finds that the documents mark the consummation of Defendants decision making process because they call for immediate compliance and make Defendants’ position sufficiently clear. AR at GOV000020 (“State agencies must immediately apply the new eligibility criteria to new applicants . . . .“); AR at GOV000011, GOV000015.
B. Legal Consequences or Obligations
To satisfy the second prong of the Bennett test, the action “must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.‘” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. The second prong provides several avenues for an agency action to meet the finality requirement, including the imposition of an obligation, denial of a right, or fixation of some legal relationship. Oregon Nat. Desert Ass‘n, 465 F.3d at 986-87. The Ninth Circuit focuses on the “practical and legal effects” of the action and interprets finality in a “pragmatic and flexible manner.” Id. at 982 (citation omitted). Courts must consider whether challenged agency actions have the “status of law or comparable legal force, and whether immediate compliance with its terms is expected.” Id. Agency action may be final if it directly and immediately affects “the day-to-day business of the subject party.” Id. at 987 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Guidance Documents have the force of law and immediate compliance with their terms is expected because they call for immediate implementation, announce Defendants’ position as to the exclusionary period, and affect Plaintiffs’ cost share of SNAP benefits. The exclusionary period set forth in the guidance is final agency action.
III. Regulatory Exclusionary Period
Plaintiffs challenge the regulatory exclusionary period announced in the Guidance Documents as (1) contrary to Defendants’ regulations and (2) arbitrary and capricious. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ arguments and the admissibility of evidence they rely on. The
A. The Administrative Record
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute the admissibility of certain documents outside the administrative record, which Plaintiffs contend are relevant to their claims related to the exclusionary period. A court‘s review under the APA is generally confined to the administrative record.
An agency is entitled to a presumption that the administrative record it submits is complete, but that presumption may be rebutted with “clear evidence” to the contrary. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Jeffries, 99 F.4th 438, 445 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Goffney v. Becerra, 995 F.3d 737, 748 (9th Cir. 2021)). Further, courts may admit supplemental information if the agency presents an administrative record that is so sparse as to “frustrate effective judicial review.” Midwater Trawlers Coop v. Dep‘t of Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004).
A court may admit extra record evidence “(1) if admission is necessary to determine ‘whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,’ (2) if ‘the agency has relied on documents not in the record,’ (3) ‘when supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter,’ or (4) ‘when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.‘” Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030 (citation omitted).
Defendants curated an administrative record that is so sparse as to frustrate effective judicial review because they omit all communications from Plaintiffs and any context for their decision to set the required implementation date. The Court is unable to discern whether Defendants considered the relevant factors and explained their decision on the record Defendants would now have the Court rely. The Court will allow Plaintiffs’ declarations to assess whether Defendants considered the relevant factors and explained their decision. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 993 (9th Cir. 2014).
The Court further finds that Plaintiffs have produced clear evidence to rebut the presumption that Defendants submitted a complete administrative record. Defendants in this case have intentionally omitted the very concerns of the states they purport to address in their Guidance Documents. Defendants would have the Court view H.R. 1‘s changes to SNAP in a vacuum, ignore how Defendants have administered past changes to the SNAP program, and conceal relevant evidence contrary to their opinion.
Plaintiffs and Defendants dispute when the exclusionary period begins. Defendants argue that the exclusionary period started immediately with the enactment of H.R. 1 because that statute was made effective immediately. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ position is contrary to law because USDA regulations provide for an exclusionary period that begins after USDA issues its guidance to states.
Both parties agree that the regulatory exclusionary period begins “on the required implementation date.”
Defendants argue that Congress determined “the required implementation date” for H.R. 1‘s changes when it made H.R. 1 effective on enactment. The parties do not dispute that H.R. 1 was effective upon enactment. The question before the Court is not when H.R. 1‘s enactment or effective date may be. Rather, the question is when the exclusionary period begins—that being the required implementation date.
The Court must analyze the relevant statutes and regulations to answer this question. Courts first attempt to discern the plain meaning of a regulation using standard tools of interpretation. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 575 (2019). The court must consider “the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation.” Id. If the court, after exhausting tools of
The Court turns to the text of the regulation, considering the “regulatory scheme ‘as a whole.‘” Amazon.com Inc. v. Comm‘r Internal Rev., 934 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2019). The relevant regulation references implementing or implementation multiple times: it conditions variance as (1) resulting from a new regulation or “implementing memorandum of a mandatory or optional change in Federal law” and (2) occurring within “the first 120 days from the required implementation date.”
These provisions make two things clear. First, variance must result from a new regulation or a new “implementing memorandum” and Defendants issue memoranda telling states how to implement “a mandatory or optional change in federal law,” as they did here. AR at GOV000008 (“This memorandum provides State agencies additional information on implementing Section 10102(a) of [H.R. 1] . . . .“), GOV000014 “The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is issuing this memorandum to provide Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) State agencies with additional information on implementing Section 10103 of [H.R. 1] . . . .“), GOV000018
Defendants argue that this Court should apply the plain meaning of “implement” which they contend means “to give practical effect and ensure of actual fulfilment by concrete measures.” Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. & Opp‘n 25, ECF No. 92. Defendants argue this definition comports with their view that the exclusionary period began on H.R. 1‘s enactment because Congress intended H.R. 1 to have practical effect immediately. Defendants err not in their definition of “implement” but in applying it at such a high level of generality as to displace the regulatory scheme.
Defendants rely heavily on congressional intent but acknowledge H.R. 1 is silent as to the effective dates of the relevant changes to SNAP. Absent contrary Congressional intent, a law is effective when it is enacted. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991). Defendants stretch this principle too far, arguing that Congressional silence on the “effective date” of a legislative provision determines the “implementation date” under an existing administrative scheme. The regulatory scheme consistently contemplates the need to provide guidance and notice before implementing cost sharing rules.
The term “required implementation date” appears in SNAP‘s statutory structure. The statutory exclusionary period, which was unaltered by H.R. 1, excludes errors “resulting in the
USDA uses “effective date” and “implementation date” separately when it makes changes to its regulations. See
Defendants’ interpretation is inconsistent with the text, context, and history of the regulatory exclusionary period. The exclusionary period set out in its Guidance Documents is contrary to law and not entitled to deference.
Even if the regulations were ambiguous, Defendants’ interpretation is unreasonable. Defendants’ interpretation would require states to immediately notify their agencies of any change in federal law that is effective upon enactment to receive the full exclusionary period. See
It is further unreasonable for USDA to issue guidance in September, retroactively informing states that the exclusionary period began sixty-six days earlier and that states would only have sixty-four days of the exclusionary period remaining. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (recognizing the axiom that “administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result“). States would also be on their own to implement changes, undermining Congress‘s directive that USDA should implement SNAP to ensure uniform standards among states. See
The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that separating “required implementation date” from a statute‘s effective date “would give the Executive the power to pocket veto any statute simply by delaying or refusing to implement it.” Def. Cross Mot. 27. This strawman argument ignores that agencies may face suit for failing to act. E.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61-62 (2004);
Defendants’ concern that enacted statutes will be undermined by executive fiat is similarly overblown. Congress does not oversee or regulate SNAP alone; it delegates significant oversight authority to USDA. This includes the power to “formulate and administer” SNAP,
C. Arbitrary and Capricious (Count IV)
The Court further finds that Defendants’ exclusionary period is arbitrary and capricious. An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it fails to make a rational connection between the facts and the decision made. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n, 463 U.S. at 43.
Here, the Guidance Documents only give broad statements that H.R. 1 was effective immediately. AR at GOV000017, GOV000012, GOV000020-21, GOV000007. These cursory statements do not provide the “explained reasoning” required by the APA. Nat‘l Parks Conservation Ass‘n v. E.P.A., 788 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2015). Nor do they grapple with the appropriate facts. For example, the Guidance Documents do not explain why Defendants decided the required implementation date was July 4, 2025, after affirmatively telling states to wait to implement changes until they received guidance. The Guidance Documents also fail to explain why Defendants did not inform states that they considered July 4, 2025, to be the implementation date until August 29, 2025. AR at GOV000014.
Defendants’ position also departs with its past practice. When an agency departs from past practice it must “provide a reasoned explanation for the change,” acknowledge that it is changing position, and consider “serious reliance interests.” FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., LLC, 604 U.S. 542, 568 (2025). This concept is intertwined with the requirement that agency action give “fair notice” to regulated parties. Id. at 569.
Defendants further argue that the six examples provided by Plaintiffs where USDA set an implementation date after a statutory change is insufficient to establish a past agency position. The Court disagrees. Defendants provide no meaningful counter examples, and Plaintiffs’ examples are reinforced by uncontroverted declarations from state agencies.
The exclusionary period is also arbitrary and capricious for failing to provide fair notice to Plaintiffs. Defendants did not release their interpretation until well after the enactment of H.R. 1. When “an agency‘s announcement of its interpretation is preceded by a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction, the potential for unfair surprise is acute.” Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158; see also id. at 158-59 (recognizing the unfairness in requiring “regulated parties to divine the agency‘s interpretations in advance“). To capture the exclusionary period, Plaintiffs would have needed to anticipate that Defendants would require implementation upon enactment of H.R. 1.
Defendants have placed Plaintiffs in an impossible situation to timely implement H.R. 1‘s changes to SNAP though contradictory, absent, and misleading messaging. Defendants now seek to penalize Plaintiffs’ inability to overcome that impossibility by retroactively setting an exclusionary period that gives rise to potentially ruinous financial penalties. Defendants may not mask their conduct with attenuated inferences drawn from H.R. 1‘s effective date. The exclusionary period violates the APA.
IV. Non-Citizen Guidance
The parties dispute the adequacy of Defendants’ October 31, 2025, Non-Citizen Guidance. The Non-Citizen Guidance explains that H.R. 1 limited SNAP eligibility to certain groups, including LPRs. AR at GOV000018. Specifically, it states
Following [H.R. 1], some alien groups previously eligible for SNAP are no longer eligible. Aliens continue to be subject to a 5-year waiting period, unless exempted by PRWORA. The chart below summarizes eligibility for aliens pursuant to [H.R. 1] amendments to section 6(f) of the FNA.
| Eligible Alien Groups Under the OBBB | Eligibility Timing |
|---|---|
| Eligible immediately, with no waiting period, as long as they meet all other SNAP financial and non-financial eligibility requirements. |
|
Eligible after a 5-year waiting period, as long as they meet all other SNAP financial and non-financial eligibility requirements. LPRs may still be eligible for SNAP without a waiting period if they meet one or more of the following conditions:
|
The chart in Attachment 1 illustrates changes to SNAP alien eligibility.
AR at GOV000018-19. Humanitarian Immigrant Groups are omitted from the list of LPRs eligible for SNAP without a waiting period. AR at GOV000019, GOV000022.
The Non-Citizen Guidance also lists various non-citizen groups and their eligibility prior to and after passage of H.R. 1. Humanitarian Immigrant Groups are listed as “Not eligible” for SNAP. AR at GOV000024-25. Other groups are designated as “Not eligible unless an LPR.” AR at GOV000024.
It is undisputed that LPR members of Humanitarian Immigrant Groups are in fact (1) eligible for SNAP and (2) exempt from the five-year waiting period. Plaintiffs contend that the Non-Citizen Guidance is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Contrary to Law (Count I)
A court must set aside agency action that is contrary to law.
Defendants argue that these more specific statements “should not override” the general statement that LPRs are eligible for SNAP benefits. Defendants offer no support for this assertion, and it runs counter to a well-established interpretive rule that the specific controls the general. See Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing the rule‘s application in analyzing statutes).
The Non-Citizen Guidance also omits Humanitarian Immigrant Groups from the list of those exempt from a waiting period for SNAP eligibility. Defendants argue that the list is meant to be a convenient reference for the most common exceptions to the general rule that an LPR may still be eligible for SNAP benefits without the five-year waiting period. Nothing in the Non-Citizen Guidance supports this view. It does not state it is meant only as a reference guide.
Humanitarian Immigrant Groups should be listed as both eligible for SNAP if they are an LPR and exempt from the five-year waiting period. The Non-Citizen Guidance communicates that they are not and is contrary to PWRORA.
B. Arbitrary and Capricious (Count II)
The Non-Citizen Guidance is also arbitrary and capricious. An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” or offered an explanation “that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.” Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Agency actions “unsupported by any explained reasoning” are arbitrary and capricious. Nat‘l Parks Conservation Ass‘n v. EPA, 788 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2015). The Non-Citizen Guidance itself provides no explanation as to why Humanitarian Immigrant Groups are omitted from the list of non-citizen groups that are (1) eligible for SNAP if they are an LPR and (2) exempt from the five-year waiting period under PWRORA. As discussed above, Defendants’ summary judgment briefing argues that the omissions result from the Non-Citizen Guidance‘s intended use as a quick reference guide. This explanation is absent from the record, and the Court rejects it as a post hoc rationalization of past agency action. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2018). The Non-Citizen Guidance offers no explanation for its omissions and is arbitrary and capricious.
V. Remedies
A. Vacatur
The APA requires the reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are unlawful under
Defendants, instead, argue that vacatur should be limited to the Plaintiffs in this case, citing the general rule that a remedy should be no more burdensome than necessary. This Court has rejected narrowing the presumptive remedy to a party-specific one in prior cases and again declines to do so here. New York v. U.S. Dep‘t Energy, No. 25-cv-01458, 2025 WL 3140578, at *16-17 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2025) (recognizing that vacatur acts directly on the agency action and agency action is “the irreducible thing” over which the court has authority); see also Massachusetts v. Nat‘l Insts. H., 770 F. Supp. 3d 277, 329 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing cases).
Having found Defendants’ exclusionary period violates the APA, The Court vacates the exclusionary period set forth in the Guidance Documents. The Court does not vacate the Guidance Documents in their entirety because the exclusionary periods are discrete agency action such that vacatur of the exclusionary periods is severable from the rest of the guidance. See New York, 2025 WL 3140578, at *16;
B. Declaratory Relief
Declaratory relief is appropriate where it will “serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue” and “terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1984). With respect to the exclusionary periods, Plaintiffs seek declarations that (1) the guidance documents’ exclusionary period is unlawful, (2) Defendants must give the states a full 120-day exclusionary period after issuing an implementing memorandum, and (3) Defendants may not reduce the exclusionary period based on a state‘s actual implementation date if they did not provide the states sufficient time to implement those changes. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the Non-Citizen Guidance is unlawful, that LPRs are eligible for SNAP regardless of prior status, and that PWRORA‘s five-year waiting period does not apply to LPRs that are or were members of a Humanitarian Immigrant Group.
1. Exclusionary Periods
Defendants do not meaningfully oppose Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief that the exclusionary period is unlawful other than on the merits. The Court finds that the requested relief is appropriate because it will help settle the legality of the exclusionary periods and afford relief from the uncertainty caused by it.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ request that the Court declare Defendants may not reduce the exclusionary period based on a state‘s implementation date unless they give states enough time to implement the changes, Defendants ask that the Court (1) set the exclusionary period to begin on the day Defendants circulated each guidance document and (2) allow Defendants to count variances that occurred before the states implemented the relevant changes. The Court denies Defendants’ requests because they suffer from the same lack of notice and cause the same unfair surprise to Plaintiffs as setting the implementation date on the day of H.R. 1‘s enactment.
The Court‘s judgment will reflect that (1) the exclusionary period set forth in the Guidance Documents are unlawful, (2) Defendants must give the states 120 days after they issue an implementing memorandum and provide a required implementation date consistent with this opinion and order, and (3) Defendants must provide adequate notice of when a state must implement the changes under H.R. 1 in order to exclude errors prior to the state‘s implementation.
2. Non-Citizen Guidance
Defendants appear to rely solely on their merits arguments in opposing Plaintiffs’ requested relief with respect to the Non-Citizen Guidance. As described above, Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Non-Citizen Guidance is not moot. Defendants have continued to defend the legality of the Non-Citizen Guidance before this Court, and declaratory relief will clarify the legal requirements at issue and terminate the controversy giving rise to the parties’ dispute. The Court‘s judgment will reflect that LPRs are eligible for SNAP regardless of prior status, and that PWRORA‘s five-year waiting period does not apply to LPRs that are or were members of a Humanitarian Immigrant Group.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80) is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 92) is DENIED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
DATED this 17th day of September 2026.
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)
United States District Judge