STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. KARI BRANDENBURG, Second Judicial District Attorney, Petitioner, v. HON. ROSS SANCHEZ, Respondent, and ANTHONY SAMORA, Real Party in Interest.
Docket No. 34,453
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
June 16, 2014
Opinion Number: ____________
Office of the District Attorney
Clara Moran
Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioner
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Scott Fuqua, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent
Edward O. Bustamante
Albuquerque, NM
for Real Party in Interest
BOSSON, Justice.
{1} On December 18, 2013, the undersigned panel of this Court granted a peremptory writ of superintending control directing the district court to determine whether to impose a mandatory life sentence on Defendant, Anthony Samora, after his second conviction for criminal sexual penetration (CSP) in the second degree. We write to explain our decision and to provide guidance for future courts regarding the interplay between
BACKGROUND
{2} In 2004, Defendant pled guilty to the charge of CSP in the second degree for raping a fourteen year-old boy. He served a sentence of three years’ incarceration. Nearly ten years later, a jury convicted Defendant of CSP in the second degree (in the commission of another felony) for raping a fifteen year-old boy. Because this was Defendant‘s second such conviction, the State sought to impose a mandatory life sentence as set forth in
{3} However, on December 11, 2013, the district court concluded that the mandatory life sentence enhancement under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{4} “We review questions of statutory construction de novo.” State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. When this Court construes statutes, our guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent when it enacted the statute. Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047. While the plain meaning of the statute is the starting point of our determination, that alone does not necessarily resolve the question. See State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. We should not allow a literal plain reading of a statute to confound the legislative intent, and therefore, our inquiry does not end with the plain meaning of the words. See id. “This Court has rejected a formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute.” Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10.
{5} In this appeal, Defendant does not argue that he was improperly convicted or that this is not his second conviction for CSP in the second degree. He simply argues that as a matter of law the State may not use
[w]hen a defendant is convicted of a second violent sexual offense, and each violent sexual offense conviction is part of a separate transaction or occurrence, and at least the second violent sexual offense conviction is in New Mexico, the defendant shall, in addition to the punishment imposed for the second violent sexual offense conviction, be punished by a sentence of life imprisonment (emphasis added).
Defendant‘s argument focuses on how the Criminal Sentencing Act defines the term “violent sexual offense.”
{6} Since its enactment in 1996,
{7} The problem, however, is that although Subsection D of
{8} Solely by its reference to Subsection D of
{10} However, the reorganization of
{11} We are charged with the responsibility of construing statutes harmoniously when possible. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 13. “In addition to looking at the statutory language, we also consider the history and background of the statute.” Id. at ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If statutes appear to conflict, they must be construed, if possible, to give effect to each.”
{12} If we were to read the statutes as Defendant suggests, then the 2007 reorganization of
{13} Chapter 69 of New Mexico Laws of 2007 is the result of two bills that were introduced in the New Mexico Senate during the 2007 legislative session. See S.B. 528, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/legislation.aspx?Chamber=S&LegType=B&LegNo=528&year=07 (follow “Final Version” hyperlink). As introduced, the bill did not purport to decrease the penalties for sexual offenses against minors.
{14} Among the differences between the two bills, Senate Bill 528 added a new crime of aggravated criminal sexual penetration as a first-degree felony and numbered it in the CSP statute as Section 30-9-11(C). See S.B. 528 (follow “SJC Committee Substitute” hyperlink) (marking all changes constituting the amended bill). In so doing, it renumbered first-degree CSP, previously at Subsection C, to Subsection D, and second-degree CSP, previously at Subsection
{15} This Court is “skeptical of reading too much into a passive and incidental legislative act.” Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 19. Smith involved three amendments to the DWI statute passed during the same legislative session. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. The Court of Appeals in that case held that the language of the three amendments was irreconcilable, the language of the final bill signed into law (which included lighter penalties) was controlling, and thus the heavier penalty provisions were effectively repealed when the final bill was signed into law. Id. at ¶ 12. Disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, this Court observed that it was “[a] better rule . . . to make legislative intent paramount to the application of a mechanical rule.” Id. at ¶ 21. The Court was unwilling to “elevate[] form over function” by focusing on the sequence in which the bills were signed into law, reading the three amendments as irreconcilable and thus producing “a result clearly not intended by the legislature.” Id.
{16} To read the statutes as Defendant suggests would thwart the Legislature‘s clear intent to impose a mandatory life sentence—to increase, not decrease, the penalties—upon a second conviction for a violent sexual offense involving minors. See
{17}
CONCLUSION
{18} The 2009 amendment of
{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice