STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LATIA R. HARRISÂ (14-11-0654, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-1528-15T3
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Jun 22, 2017|
Check Treatment NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1528-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LATIA R. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted May 30, 2017 – Decided June 22, 2017
Before Judges Haas and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Indictment
No. 14-11-0654.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Alison Perrone, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Thomas A. DeSimone,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Latia Harris appeals from an October 30, 2015 order
denying her motion to withdraw her plea. After reviewing the
record in light of her contentions and the applicable principles
of law, we affirm.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with second-degree
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), and two counts of
terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, following an altercation
memorialized in a video recording. The video showed defendant
approaching the much smaller victim who was walking with her three-
year-old son and pushing a stroller. Although the victim attempted
to walk away, defendant knocked her to the ground and then kneeled
on top of the victim, punching her in the head and face multiple
times. Before she walked away, defendant kicked the victim who
was still lying on the ground, bleeding profusely from her head
and face. Defendant also threatened the victim and child. The
victim was treated in the hospital and discharged with diagnoses
of multiple nasal bone fractures, a nasal septal deviation and
soft tissue swelling, and a head injury.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The State argued
that the video evidence was sufficient to support an attempt to
cause serious bodily injury and the second-degree charge of
aggravated assault. In denying defendant's motion, the trial
judge agreed that the "closed-head injury" and "multiple strikes
by the defendant" were sufficient to establish there was attempt
to cause injury.
2 A-1528-15T3
On April 20, 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree
aggravated assault, to be sentenced as a third-degree crime. The
prosecutor agreed to recommend a three-year sentence subject to
the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to dismiss
the terroristic threat charges. Defense counsel questioned
defendant to establish a factual basis for her plea:
Q Okay. So I'm going to take your
attention to the date of June 24, 2014. Do
you remember that date?
A Yes.
Q You were in the City of Salem,
correct?
A Yes.
Q And at that time, you came in
contact with [the victim] correct?
A Yes.
Q You knew [the victim] through
working, correct?
A Yes.
Q And at that time, you had assaulted
her causing serious bodily injury, correct?
A Yes.
Q And you have no reason to dispute
that the injuries you caused were serious
bodily injuries, is that correct?
A (Inaudible.)
3 A-1528-15T3
Q You don't have any reason to dispute
it, do you?
[Assistant Prosecutor]: You would agree
that those were the injuries that she
sustained that were tantamount to serious
bodily injury?
Defendant: Yes
[By Defense Counsel]:
Q Okay. So how do you plead to
committing a second-degree aggravated assault
to be sentenced as a third on the date in
question? Guilty or not guilty?
A Guilty.
Upon questioning by the court, defendant testified that she
understood that she was giving up her right to a trial by jury and
that she would be required to serve two years, six months and
twenty days before she was eligible for parole. She also testified
that she was satisfied with the services of defense counsel, that
she was not forced or coerced to enter the plea, and that she was
not under the influence of drugs or alcohol or anything that would
affect her ability to understand the proceedings. The judge found
that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea and that
"it was made freely, voluntarily, without coercion[,] with a full
understanding of the ramifications, knowing waiver of trial, [and]
adequate representation of counsel."
4 A-1528-15T3
In August 2015, prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion
to modify her plea agreement1 or, in the alternative, withdraw her
plea.2 She argued that she had established a basis for the motion
under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), in asserting a
colorable claim of innocence because she never attempted or caused
serious bodily injury to the victim.
On October 30, 2015, the court denied defendant's motions
and sentenced her in accordance with the plea agreement. In
reviewing the required factors under Slater, the judge noted that
defendant had not asserted a colorable claim of innocence; she
only argued "that she did not intend to cause serious bodily injury
because she did not use a weapon." The judge further stated that:
The evidence supports the defendant struck the
victim many times while in the presence of the
victim's child, and then threatened the child
as well.
The Court is aware also that the evidence
showed [defendant] standing over . . . a
helpless victim while on the ground and
repeatedly striking her.
1
Defendant sought to eliminate the NERA requirement and serve a
three-year flat sentence. This issue has not been presented to
us on appeal.
2
These motions were heard and determined by a different judge
than had considered the prior motions and conducted the plea
hearing.
5 A-1528-15T3
The judge concluded defendant's argument that she had no intent
to cause or that "she could not have caused serious bodily injury,
frankly, [was] meritless."
After analyzing the remaining Slater factors, the court found
that defendant had failed to meet her burden of proof that the
plea agreement should be set aside, and her motion was denied.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. She contends that
she did not cause serious bodily injury to the victim and that
there is no evidence that she attempted to do so since the
altercation was brief and no weapons were used. Defendant concedes
that she did not dispute at the plea hearing that she caused
serious bodily injury to the victim. However, she contends that
the Slater factors weigh in favor of granting her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea.
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is committed to the judge's
sound discretion. Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 156 (citations omitted); State v. Phillips,133 N.J. Super. 515
, 518 (App. Div. 1975). We will only overturn a judge's decision if there was an abuse of discretion causing the decision to be clearly erroneous. We are mindful that discretion should ordinarily be exercised liberally where the motion is made before sentencing.Slater, supra
, 198 N.J. at 156 (citations omitted). "In a close case, the
6 A-1528-15T3
'scales should usually tip in favor of defendant.'" Ibid. (quoting
State v. Taylor,80 N.J. 353
, 365 (1979)).
A defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that fairness
requires withdrawal of his plea, and he must make that showing
upon a balance of competing factors. State v. Russo, 262 N.J.
Super. 367, 373 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting State v. Huntley, 129
N.J. Super. 13, 17 (App. Div.), certif. denied,66 N.J. 312
, 331 (1974)). Although a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing must be supported by "strong, compelling reasons," [] "a lesser showing is required for motions raised before sentencing."Slater, supra
, 198 N.J. at 160.
The applicable factors are: "(1) whether the defendant has
asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and
strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence
of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in
unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused."
Id. at 157-58 (citation omitted). While all factors must be considered and balanced, "[n]o factor is mandatory; if one is missing, that does not automatically disqualify or dictate relief."Id. at 162.
With respect to the first factor, "[a] bare assertion of
innocence is insufficient to justify withdrawal of a plea." Id.
at 158. Instead, a defendant must "present specific, credible
7 A-1528-15T3
facts and, where possible, point to facts in the record that
buttress [her] claim." Ibid. (citations omitted). There must be more than just a "change of heart" to warrant leave to withdraw a guilty plea once entered.Id. at 157.
According to Slater, the second factor, the nature and
strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal, "focuses on the
basic fairness of enforcing a guilty plea by asking whether
defendant has presented fair and just reasons for withdrawal, and
whether those reasons have any force." Id. at 159. Although we are not to approach the reasons for withdrawal with "skepticism," we "must act with 'great care and realism' because defendants often have little to lose in challenging a guilty plea."Id. at 160
(citingTaylor, supra
, 80 N.J. at 365).
With respect to the third Slater factor, whether the plea was
entered as the result of a plea bargain, the Court noted that
"defendants have a heavier burden in seeking to withdraw pleas
entered as part of a plea bargain." Id. at 160 (citations omitted). However, the Court did "not suggest" that the third factor "be given great weight in the balancing process."Id. at 161.
As to the fourth factor, unfair prejudice to the State or
unfair advantage to the accused, the Court stated that there was
"no fixed formula to analyze the degree of unfair prejudice or
8 A-1528-15T3
advantage that should override withdrawal of a plea" and that
"courts must examine this factor by looking closely at the
particulars of each case." Ibid. The "critical inquiry . . . is whether the passage of time has hampered the State's ability to present important evidence."Ibid. The State need
not show prejudice "if a defendant fails to offer proof of other factors in support of the withdrawal of a plea."Id. at 162.
We consider these factors in light of defendant's arguments
and the evidence in the record. "When evaluating a defendant's
claim of innocence, courts . . . . are not to conduct a mini-trial
[but] should simply consider whether a defendant's assertion of
innocence is more than a blanket, bald statement and rests instead
on particular, plausible facts." Id. at 158-59. Defendant has
not presented "specific, credible facts" to support any colorable
claim of innocence. She asserts only that the altercation was
brief and she used her hands, not a weapon. We agree with the
trial judge that this argument is meritless. Defendant knelt over
a helpless victim striking her multiple times. Her actions belie
any statement that she did not intend to cause serious injury.
This effort to withdraw her plea is essentially the type of "change
of heart" that ordinarily warrants little weight in terms of the
first Slater prong.
9 A-1528-15T3
The second factor considers the nature and strength of
defendant's reasons for withdrawing her plea. Defendant
reiterates the same argument she makes in respect to the first
factor; that she did not commit the crime to which she pled guilty.
As discussed, this does not satisfy this factor.
Although the plea was the result of a plea offer, we do not
accord that fact great weight in assessing the third and fourth
factors because we discern no particular prejudice to the State
if the plea were withdrawn.
Having balanced the Slater factors, we find no error in the
judge's exercise of his "sound discretion" in denying the motion.
We do not consider this the type of "close case" in which the
balance should tip in favor of a defendant. Defendant made a
counseled and knowing decision to plead guilty; her change of
mind, absent viable support for her theoretically colorable claim
of innocence, did not warrant leave to withdraw her plea.
Affirmed.
10 A-1528-15T3