State of New Jersey vs. Travis W. Graham

Sep 1, 2026
A-2766-24

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from an April 7, 2025 order denying his first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Because defendant was denied counsel, we vacate and remand.

Four indictments were returned against defendant: (1) indictment number 18-09-2103 included three counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), and one count of fourth-degree possession of an imitation firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(e); (2) indictment number 18-09-2142 included counts for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); (3) indictment number 18-09-2281 included two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), one count of fourth-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(e), one count of third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), and one count of second-degree conspiracy/robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); and (4) indictment number 18-11-2647 included one count of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2)—mandatory life without parole N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(k)—and one count for second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).

On June 28, 2019, defendant pled guilty to amended charges. Count one of indictment number 18-09-2142, count five of indictment number 18-09-2281, and count one of indictment number 18-09-2103 were amended from armed robbery to second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery. Further, indictment number 18-11-2647 was amended from murder to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to dismiss all of the other charges in the four indictments. In addition, at sentencing, the State agreed to recommend that defendant receive three concurrent ten-year sentences, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for the conspiracy charges, and a consecutive twenty-year sentence on the aggravated manslaughter. The aggregated time of the sentences would be thirty years.

On July 26, 2019, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. On December 12, 2024, defendant, self-represented, filed a first petition for PCR. He raised issues concerning counsel‘s statement to him that he would get “‘life in prison,‘” but he now knew he “could never g[et] . . . life“; being “forced into a [thirty-]year deal“; and the court‘s failure to consider his age. In defendant‘s filing he indicated a “desire[] to have counsel represent him.”

In a written decision, the court noted defendant had requested a reduction of his sentence based on mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (“defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense“). In addition, the court noted defendant “argue[d] that [his] attorney misled [him] by advising [him] that [he] could receive a life sentence if convicted of [his] charges.”

Relying on Rule 3:21-10, the court determined that a “motion for a reduction of sentence d[id] not fall under” PCR. Further, defendant‘s petition for PCR was barred under Rule 3:21-10(a), because the petition was “filed . . . later than [sixty] days after the date of the judgment of conviction.”

In addition, the court concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) had become effective after defendant was sentenced and, pursuant to State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84 (2022), the statutory provision had “prospective . . . not retroactive” application. Thus, the court concluded “mitigating factor fourteen d[id] not apply . . . to this matter.” Nevertheless, the court stated it “recognized [defendant‘s] youth when [it] considered the acceptance of [his] guilty plea and . . . sentence.”

Moreover, the court found defendant‘s “exposure was [to] a life sentence[] if [he] w[as] convicted of all . . . charges[,]” therefore, his claim that he was misled by counsel had no merit.

The court determined defendant did not “raise[ a] substantial issue of fact or law which would require representation” and thus concluded “counsel w[ould] not be assigned in this matter.”

In the accompanying order, the court stated “[d]efendant‘s [a]pplication for [PCR], wherein [he] request[ed] a reduction in sentence based on mitigating factor [fourteen], [wa]s denied.”

On appeal, defendant raises the following argument for our consideration:

THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN SUMMARILY DENYING [DEFENDANT]‘S FIRST MOTION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT REPRESENTATION.

Defendant argues “‘every defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel on a first PCR petition,‘” (quoting State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 13 (2002)). He contends the assignment of counsel is mandatory under Rule 3:22-6(a), and the referral to the Office of the Public Defender must be made “whether or not the trial court believes the petition has merit,” (quoting State v. King, 117 N.J. Super. 109, 111 (App. Div. 1971)).

In its statement in lieu of brief, the State “agrees that defendant‘s first petition for [PCR], . . . ‘shall as of course’ be assigned to the Office of Public Defender,” citing Rule 3:22-6(a). The State adds “it is well-established that assignment of counsel on a first petition for [PCR] depends in no way on the merits of the [self-represented] submission,” (quoting Rue, 175 N.J. at 13) (holding “every defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel on a first PCR petition“).

The questions presented in this appeal are questions of law. “We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo.” State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div. 2024) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004)).

PCR “is New Jersey‘s analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.” State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). It “provide[s] a built-in ‘safeguard that ensures that a defendant [i]s not unjustly convicted.‘” State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). “It is not a pro forma ritual.” Rue, 175 N.J. at 18.

Rule 3:22-6 provides:

(a) . . . Assignment on First Petition. . . . [I]f the petition is the first one filed by the defendant attacking the conviction pursuant to this rule, the court shall as of course, unless defendant affirmatively states an intention to proceed [self-represented], by order assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender if the defendant‘s conviction was for an indictable offense . . . .

(b) Assignment of Counsel on Cause Shown. Upon any second or subsequent petition filed pursuant to this Rule attacking the same conviction, the matter shall be assigned to the Office of the Public Defender only upon application therefor and showing of good cause. For purposes of this section, good cause exists only when the court finds that a substantial issue of fact or law requires assignment of counsel and when a second or subsequent petition alleges on its face a basis to preclude dismissal under R[ule] 3:22-4.

[(Emphasis added and boldface omitted).]

”R[ule] 3:22-6(a) requires that the first petition for [PCR m]ust be referred to the [O]ffice of the Public Defender if the petitioner‘s conviction was for an indictable offense unless the petitioner affirmatively states his intention to proceed [self-represented]. This rule is mandatory.” King, 117 N.J. Super. at 111 (emphasis omitted). The referral must be made, notwithstanding the PCR court‘s thoughts regarding the merits of the petition. See ibid. (“The direction to refer the first petition to the [O]ffice of the Public Defender does not in any way depend upon whether the trial court thinks the petition is meritorious.“).

Applying this well-established law, we vacate the order denying defendant‘s first petition for PCR. In accord with Rule 3:22-6(a), and controlling case law, defendant‘s first petition for PCR must be assigned to the Office of the Public Defender. In addition, the court should not have considered the merits in deciding whether to assign regarding the first petition. Further, the court misstepped in applying the standards under Rule 3:22-6(b), “substantial issue of fact or law“; concerning “second or subsequent petitions” for PCR, and denying defendant‘s request for counsel on his first petition for PCR.

We offer no opinion on the ultimate merits of the petition.

Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.