STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MICHAEL ATKINSON, a/k/a MICHEAL ATKINSON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SHAQUILLE JOHN, a/k/a JOHN SHAQUILLE
DOCKET NO. A-2442-22 A-3419-22
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
March 21, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Natali.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION. This opinion shall not “constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.” Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. Submitted March 6, 2025.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant in A-2442-22 (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant in A-3419-22 (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).
In these appeals that we scheduled back-to-back and consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, defendants Michael Atkinson and Shaquille John challenge orders denying their separate post-conviction relief (PCR) petitions without evidentiary hearings. Unpersuaded by their contentions, we affirm.
I.
We restate the facts relevant to this appeal from our prior opinion where we affirmed Judge Regina Caulfield‘s order denying John‘s, Atkinson‘s, and co-defendant and Bond Street shooting victim Jahid Watson‘s (Watson) application to suppress evidence seized during a police search of a motel room. See State v. John, Nos. A-4139-22, A-5085-17, A-5677-17 (App. Div. Dec. 15, 2020)
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 5, 2014, Detective Alfonso Colon of the Elizabeth Police Department received a telephone call from an anonymous individual, who reported hearing multiple shots fired in a home on Bond Street in Elizabeth. The caller reported seeing two or three individuals carrying another person out of the house. The caller also saw a man and a woman taking duffel bags or suitcases from the house and placing them in a shed. Detective Colon passed this information along to dispatch, who informed him that Sergeant Julian Hilongos was investigating the report and that a shooting victim had been brought to the hospital.
About ten or fifteen minutes later, the individual called Detective Colon a second time. She told the detective a cab had come to the house on Bond Street, and a man and a woman carrying large bags got into the cab and left the premises.1 The anonymous caller specifically identified this cab as Latino Taxi number 57. Detective Colon forwarded this information to Sergeant Hilongos.
After two officers unsuccessfully attempted to locate on Bond Street where the shooting occurred, they learned from the caller‘s report a taxi had been at a home on that street. The taxi company confirmed that one of its drivers had picked up a man and a woman at a specific home on Bond Street and had taken them to a motel on Routes 1 and 9, and then to the Spring Lane Motel.
Because he was concerned the bags the couple were carrying might contain additional victims or weapons, Sergeant Hilongos called for additional units to check for victims or suspects at the Bond Street home and at the Spring Lane Motel. At the Bond Street home, officers found a large amount of blood on the bottom panel of the screen door. The police knocked, announced their presence, and entered the home. They did not locate any victims or other individuals in the home but found blood on the kitchen floor and on the last step before the second-floor landing. The officers then secured the home so they could obtain a search warrant.
Believing that these individuals had been present at the scene of the shooting and might be carrying weapons, Sergeant Hilongos instructed officers to report to the motel. Once at the motel, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. After a few minutes, a woman opened the door. The police arrested the woman, later identified as co-defendant Nicole Robbins, and the man she was with, who was later determined to be another co-defendant, Myles Sneed. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the room, and in the bathroom, they found a rifle. They secured the room in anticipation of applying for a search warrant.
Sneed later cooperated with the officers and consented to a search of the motel room he had rented, and of the house on Bond Street, where he had been staying for some time. After he signed the written consent form, the police searched the motel room and found an extended ammunition magazine, marijuana, the key and receipt for the room, and approximately $900 in cash.
On March 13, 2015, a Union County grand jury returned a ten-count indictment charging defendants with robbery, conspiracy, murder, felony murder, attempted murder, and related firearms offenses. Thereafter, John and Robbins filed a motion to suppress the rifle seized from the motel room. Atkinson and other co-defendants joined in the motion.
Judge Caulfield denied the motion finding the police properly entered the Bond Street home without a warrant under the emergency aid exception because they had a reasonable basis to believe an injured person may have been in the home given the blood found on the door and the report of gunfire in or near the home. The judge also held the police properly entered the motel room without a warrant based on the exigent circumstance that the room‘s occupants were armed and properly discovered the rifle during a protective sweep.
As noted, defendants appealed the order denying their application to suppress evidence seized from the motel room. John, slip op. at 3. We affirmed the judge‘s order on December 15, 2020. Ibid. The Supreme Court denied both John‘s and Atkinson‘s petitions for certification. See State v. John, 247 N.J. 142 (2021).
John filed a timely pro se PCR petition claiming his plea counsel‘s representation was constitutionally deficient because counsel “fail[ed] to
Atkinson filed a similar timely pro se petition in which he too claimed his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance “due to his failure to challenge the existence of the alleged anonymous caller, . . . move for disclosure of the caller to verify the caller‘s existence,” and “verify . . . the credibility of the anonymous caller.” Additionally, Atkinson attested his counsel ignored his repeated requests to “uncover the identity of the anonymous caller” and “obtain any record[s] that would confirm” the existence of the anonymous caller.
Further, the judge explained even if the police knew the caller‘s identity, any motion to compel her identity would have been unsuccessful in light of
In A-3419-22, John presents the following argument for our consideration:
THE IDENTITY OF THE ALLEGED ANONYMOUS CALLER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVEALED TO THE DEFENSE AND TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO RAISE A MOTION SEEKING THE CALLER‘S IDENTITY.
In A-2442-22, Atkinson presents the following arguments:
POINT I
DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVENESS WHERE HIS GUILTY PLEA TO THE BODEGA CRIME AND THE STRENGTH OF HIS REASONS FOR SEEKING TO WITHDRAW IT WERE DEPENDENT ON THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT AND A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER.
B. Defendant‘s motion to suppress was reasonably likely to succeed on its merits if the nature of the relationship between the unidentified informant and the law enforcement officer had been properly presented.
C. Although defendant ple[d] guilty, he would have insisted on going to trial if the motion to suppress was successful.
POINT II
THE RELIABILITY OF THE UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT‘S REPORT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HER AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION.
POINT III
THE INFORMANT‘S IDENTITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE SHE WAS AN ESSENTIAL WITNESS ON A BASIC ISSUE IN THE CASE.
John further expounds on his single point by contending the “identity of the alleged anonymous caller was integral to his defense.” He claims questions remain regarding: 1) “how [the caller] knew there had been gunshots” as opposed to similar non-criminal disturbances such as construction or a car
Next, he maintains the caller did not witness any illegal activity and, in fact, witnessed events suggesting a non-criminal or accidental shooting given the observation of the probable shooters assisting the injured victim into a vehicle. Since, according to John, the caller did not witness a crime, the judge erred in finding
In Atkinson‘s first point, he asserts, the “nature of the relationship between the unnamed source and Detective Colon is significant because an unidentified caller‘s ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are ‘relevant in determining the value of [their] report.‘” Contrary to the judge‘s decision, the record reveals Detective Colon had a relationship with the anonymous caller because, according to his
In sum, defendants argue without information received from the anonymous caller, the police would not have had sufficient information to investigate the chain of events ultimately resulting in the rifle‘s discovery in the motel room. And, if their counsel would have moved to compel the caller‘s identity, defendants would have attempted to discredit her purported percipient observations.
II.
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has not been held, like here, we “conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court.” Id. at 421.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her defense. The right to counsel includes “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Under the first prong of the Strickland standard, a petitioner must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient. It must be demonstrated that counsel‘s handling of the matter “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
Under the second prong, a defendant “must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. There must be a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the
“With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving [their] right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citing State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009); State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002)). A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of a petition for PCR. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; Nash, 212 N.J. at 542; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.
In a matter involving a guilty plea, to show prejudice, a defendant must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). A defendant must show that, “had [they] been properly advised, it would have been rational for [them] to decline the plea
We reject defendants’ arguments and affirm the May 31, 2023 order in A-3419-22, and the January 25, 2023 order in A-2442-22 for the reasons expressed in Judge Caulfield‘s cogent and well-reasoned written decisions. We add the following comments to amplify our decisions.
The judge correctly found both John and Atkinson failed to satisfy the Strickland performance prong. First, even if we indulge defendants’ claim the police had prior involvement with the caller based on the fact the call was received on the officer‘s cell phone, neither defendant presented facts sufficient to overcome the privilege provided in
The informer‘s privilege against disclosure of their identity is well-established and “considered essential to effective enforcement of the criminal code.” State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 381 (1976) (citing State v. Infante, 116 N.J. Super. 252, 257 (App. Div. 1971)). “Without a strong showing of need, courts will generally deny a request for disclosure.” State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 568 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Florez, 134 N.J. 570, 578 (1994)).
The purpose of the privilege is twofold: “to protect the safety of the informant and to encourage the process of informing.” State v. Sessoms, 413 N.J. Super. 338, 343 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957)). The privilege “protect[s] the public interest in a continuous flow of information to law enforcement officials.” Ibid. (quoting Grodjesk v. Faghani, 104 N.J. 89, 97 (1986)).
Both John and Atkinson failed to provide or support their petitions with facts sufficient to establish a “strong showing of need” for the caller‘s identity necessary to overcome the privilege. See McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. at 568 (quoting Florez, 134 N.J. at 578). Thus, the failure of defendants’ counsel to file a motion to compel the State to disclose the identity of the caller does not qualify as constitutionally deficient performance because any such motion would not have been successful. State v. O‘Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) (holding it is “not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion“).
Second, the judge properly concluded both defendants failed to establish how learning the identity of the caller was essential to their defense and
Defendants’ arguments are reduced to unfounded and speculative contentions regarding deficiencies in the caller‘s eyesight, her purported inability to distinguish a gunshot from other sounds, and whether her observations were suggestive of innocent or criminal activity. We are unpersuaded by these arguments because they fail to acknowledge that the police independently corroborated each critical fact conveyed by the caller. Indeed, they observed blood at the Bond Street residence, confirmed the existence of a shooting victim, and confirmed a taxi transported individuals to the hotel where the firearm connected to the bodega shooting was recovered.
The judge correctly found that neither defendant presented evidence sufficient to establish Strickland‘s prejudice prong. Again, all of the critical facts that led the police to the motel were independently corroborated. The judge properly concluded it would not have been rational for defendants to have rejected the State‘s plea offer. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. at 486. Atkinson and John faced the possibility of significantly longer custodial sentences if convicted
Finally, because defendants did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we also conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying defendants’ requests for evidentiary hearings. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (1992). To the extent we have not addressed specifically any of defendant‘s remaining arguments, it is because we have concluded that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
Affirmed in A-3419-22 and A-2442-22.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
M.C. Hally
Clerk of the Appellate Division