STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SAMUEL WOODY, Defendant-Appellant.
DOCKET NO. A-0171-23
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
March 11, 2025
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Argued January 7, 2025 – Decided March 11, 2025
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Augustini.
Samuel Woody, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not “constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.” Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited.
I.
We incorporate our decisions affirming defendant‘s convictions for second-degree official misconduct,
In July 2011, defendant‘s co-worker, Plainfield police officer Fernando Sanchez was dating K.C.1 One evening, K.C. saw Officer Sanchez‘s police car parked outside another woman‘s house and became upset. K.C. removed Sanchez‘s personal cellphone from his police car and used it to call the other woman in an effort to contact him.
Defendant followed K.C. outside and asked her to meet him later to “discuss what was going on.” K.C. agreed, and they met near her apartment complex. K.C. believed defendant was still on duty at this time because he was in his police uniform, had his police radio, and was driving his police vehicle.
At defendant‘s direction, K.C. then followed him to a location near his cousin‘s house. Defendant informed her that she could receive five years in prison for entering the officer‘s patrol car and removing his phone. Defendant further stated that he was the individual who would file the paperwork, enter the charges into the computer, and could “get rid of the paperwork.” K.C. testified she interpreted this to mean that her charges would be dismissed. K.C. asked defendant if he could just trust her and get rid of the paperwork. Defendant responded that he could lose his job by doing so.
Defendant arrived at K.C.‘s apartment later the same day and served her with a summons and complaint that contained upgraded charges. When K.C. asked defendant “what about what I did,” he replied, “that never happened.”
At trial, defendant claimed he had a dating relationship with K.C. and assisted her financially. According to defendant, he was off duty when he arrived later at K.C.‘s home after her arrest. Defendant contended that he and K.C. had a consensual encounter.
On July 5, 2017, defendant, initially self-represented, filed his first PCR petition, generally contending ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. Thereafter, PCR counsel was assigned and filed a supplemental brief. After oral argument, the judge rejected defendant‘s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. The first PCR judge, who also presided over defendant‘s trial, found defendant‘s claims that trial counsel failed to investigate the case fully, failed to present an alibi defense, and failed to call Sanchez and Acting Lieutenant Richard Urbanski,2 were without merit.
Defendant then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. On May 24, 2021, the Supreme Court denied defendant‘s petition for a writ of certiorari. Woody v. New Jersey, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 2679 (2021).
On May 20, 2022, defendant, initially self-represented, filed his second PCR petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by his first PCR counsel. Defendant retained counsel, who filed a supplemental brief, amplifying defendant‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Specifically, defendant argued that both his trial and first PCR counsel were ineffective because they failed to investigate and present evidence supporting his description of his relationship with K.C. and version of events. By failing to call Sanchez, Lieutenant Urbanski and Calvin Harrison, who provided a certification stating that he had seen defendant and K.C. in social settings in 2011, defendant argued he was deprived effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also argued that his second PCR petition was timely, and he was entitled to discovery to establish his claims.
II.
On appeal, defendant raises two arguments for our consideration, which he articulates as follows:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SECOND PETITION FOR [PCR] WAS OUT OF TIME. THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AMOUNT TO THE PETITION CONSIDERED TIMELY AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE THE RELAXATION OF [
RULE ] 3:22-12‘[s] PROCEDURAL TIME[-]BAR.POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ENTITLING HIM TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE OR CALL [CALVIN] HARRISON AS A CORROBORATING WITNESS WHO OBSERVED THE ALLEGED VICTIM AND DEFENDANT‘S INTERACTIONS FOR PURPOSES UNDER
N.J.S.A 2C:14-7 RAPE SHIELD SEXUAL CONDUCT INFRINGING UPON [] DEFENDANT‘S RIGHT TO TESTIFY REGARDING HIS SEXUAL HISTORY WITH ALLEGED VICTIM TO NEGATE THE ELEMENTS OF FORCE OR COERCI[O]N REFLECTED IN INDICTMENT UNDERN.J.S.A 2C:14-7 TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE.
(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right has been newly recognized by either of those Courts and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases on collateral review; or (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or
(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief where ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief is being alleged.
Here, defendant‘s second PCR petition was filed well beyond the one-year time limit. Moreover, as the second PCR judge explained, defendant has not asserted a newly recognized constitutional right or that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on information or evidence that could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence. See
Defendant contends that his petition was timely because it was filed within one year of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s denial of his petition for writ of certiorari. In support of his argument that these exceptional circumstances warrant relaxing
First, in Dillard, we addressed the timeliness issue of the filing of petitioner‘s first PCR petition. See id. at 728. Second, we clearly stated that there is no authority for the tolling of the time requirements for the filing of a PCR petition by the “pendency of other proceedings . . . .” Id. at 727. Defendant offered no authority to support his contention that the filing of a second PCR petition is permitted within one year of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari. Thus, we are satisfied the second PCR judge correctly dismissed defendant‘s second PCR petition as time-barred.
Even if we were to review defendant‘s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by both his trial and PCR counsel, we would affirm for the reasons set forth by the second PCR judge. When a PCR judge does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we review both the factual inferences drawn by the judge from the record and the legal conclusions de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338-39 (App. Div. 2020) (citing Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. at 291).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong Strickland test: (1) “counsel made errors so serious that
Having conducted a de novo review of the record, we agree with the second PCR judge‘s decision to deny defendant‘s second PCR petition. Defendant provided no evidence that either his trial attorney or his PCR counsel was ineffective by inadequately investigating his case and failing to call certain witnesses, particularly Harrison. As the second PCR judge found, in light of the overwhelming evidence in the case, defendant failed to assert facts that further investigation or that other witnesses would have altered the verdict. Moreover, as the second PCR judge stated, “[d]efendant was tape recorded committing the
We are also satisfied that the second PCR judge did not abuse his discretion to proceed without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citation omitted).
Therefore, we affirm the order denying defendant‘s second PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing on both procedural and substantive grounds.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
M.C. Hanley
Clerk of the Appellate Division