State of Minnesota v. Derek Lawrence Stavish

Minnesota, Respondent, STATE STAVISH, Appellant. Lawrence

Derek

No. A14-0771. of Minnesota.

Supreme Court

Aug. 19, 2015. injuries to Stav

Brent Lehnen and serious suppress ish. Stavish moved test results from a blood concentration taken after the accident on draw grounds that his was drawn without The a and without his consent. sup granted district court the motion to that press concluding, part, in the State satisfy exigent circumstances failed in applied as Missouri —, ap The 185 L.Ed.2d court reversed, peals concluding the State jus established circumstances tified the warrantless search. State Stavish, (Minn.App .2014). agree that Because we the State jus that exigent established in tified the warrantless blood draw this case, we affirm. 18, 2012,

On the of June evening responded (cid:127)Minnesota State Patrol to 911 call regarding vehicle crash in rural Ni- Swanson, General, Attorney Lori Saint County. upon investiga- collet an Based Paul, MN; M. scene, and Michelle Zehnder tion at the officers determined Attorney, Fischer, County James Nicollet in fatality, accident resulted one Dunn, County Attorney, Deputy P. driver, Chief the alleged appellant Derek Stav- MN, Peter, ish, for respondent. seriously injured, Saint and was that alcohol in have been a factor the accident. Ventura, James M. M. Ventura James An from officer obtained blood draw Law, MN; Wayzata, Attorney at Michael testing and later of that Stavish PLLC, Gaarder, Pennington & Cherne S. 0.20. revealed alcohol concentration of Neal, Minnesota; Cloud, and John J. St. Dahl, charges & Zimmer- filed criminal Willenbring, Wocken seven (1) MN, PLLC, against op- criminal Spring, appel- mann Cold Stavish: vehicular death, resulting lant. eration in in violation 1(1) (2012) 609.21, § (op- Minn.Stat. subd. erating grossly negli- a motor in a vehicle OPINION (2) manner); gent oper- criminal vehicular DIETZEN, Justice. death, resulting in ation violation of (l)(2)(i) 609.21, § Appellant charged (operat- Derek Stavish was Minn.Stat. subd. op ing negligent of criminal vehicular a motor vehicle in a manner with three counts (3) death, alcohol); influence resulting two counts of under the eration while driving resulting while criminal vehicular fourth-degree impaired, operation death, 609.21, driving; § and aris in violation driving reckless careless of Minn.Stat. 1(3) ing single-vehicle out rollover on a motor while (operating of a crash subd. vehicle or having June in the an alcohol concentration of 0.08 resulted death (4) more); im- fourth-degree driving while the crash site around 10:45 he p.m., was (DWI), in violation of that two paired people ejected Minn.Stat. informed had been 1(1) (2014) 169A.20, § while from the (driving person subd. vehicle that one had fourth-, (5) alcohol); died. person ejected, The other under the influence later DWI, identified as degree in violation of section sustained serious in- 1(5) juries, transported 169A.20, (driving subd. with an alcohol ambulance to (NUMC), New Medical more, Ulm Center concentration or measured of 0.08 as (6) possibly would transported by helicop- within 2 driving); hours of reckless ter from to a NUMC medical trauma cen- 169.13, § driving, in violation Minn.Stat. (7) NUMC, ter. Before he was transported to (2014); driving, subd. 1 careless Stavish admitted one of thе officers that 169.13, § violation of Minn.Stat. subd. he was the driver of the vehicle. The officers the scene accident decid- a brought suppress Stavish motion to Sergeant ed that go Martens would to the the alcohol concentration test The results. hospital to determine the involvement of parties acknowledged that when Stavish’s alcohol in the crash. Upon arrival at the drawn, blood was our v. decision State room, emergency Sergeant NUMC Mar- (Minn. Shriner, 538, 751 N.W.2d 548-50 Stavish, spoke tens to being who was tend- 2008), abrogated Missouri v. by multiple — ed medical personnel. Stavish U.S. —, 1552, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 133 185 strongly alcohol, smelled and admitted (2013), warrantless, a permitted 696 non- to Sergeant Martens he had been defendant, consensual draw from blood a drinking prior Sergeant to the crash. provided that officer probable the had Martens advised an emergency room commit-, cause to believe the defendant had nurse that he needed a draw from blood opera ted criminal vеhicular homicide or a sample was drawn at 11:18 acknowledged tion. But also parties the p.m. Testing of sample the blood revealed Supreme the United States Court’s an alcohol concentration of 0.20. —, decision in U.S. 133 1552, Shriner, abrogated S.Ct. which was Sergeant Martens testified he be- prior hearing released to the omnibus and lieved the authority he had to obtain the applicable was to this case. ar Stavish law, sample blood under Minnesota gued that the draw a blood constituted not therefore did secure a warrant or ob- warrantless, nonconsensual search taken Sergeant tain'Stavish’s consent. Martens n violationof rights. that, his constitutional admitted at the time blood Stavish’s exigencies State countered that drawn, was 70 minutes in the 2- remained justified situation a un warrantless search hour window for a obtaining sample. at —, der McNeely, U.S. 133 Sergeant hospital per- Martens did not ask at 1561. sonnel Stavish whether would airlifted center, to medical another and did not After a hearing, contested omnibus attempt judge contact to the on-call or operative district court forth the set prosecutor to obtain a warrant. telephonic pretrial two orders. Law enforcement p.m. order, received a of a report crash at 10:28 In a 2013 September pretrial Sergeant Martens testified that the first district denied motion court Stavish’s officers to at the alcohol suppress arrive accident scene concentration test re- single- observed that had there been a sults. The court the State concluded justi- vehicle involving pickup prove exigent rollover crash failed to draw, truck. fying When but that Sergeant Martens arrived warrantless blood 674 prosecution.” of a were likelihood successful test results

the alcohol concentration (Minn. Zais, 32, v. N.W.2d 36 State good-faith under admissible (citations omitted). because, 2011) Previously, we exclusionary at the rule taken, imрact established a have held critical draw was such time the blood prevent if of evidence would See the exclusion constitutional. search was deemed successfully prosecuting from Shriner, State at 549-50. 751 N.W.2d charges. specific one of the State Un for district filed motion Stavish (Minn.2009) derdahl, 677, N.W.2d The dis its decision. court reconsider (holding that “an order that dismisses Brooks, court, upon State v. relying trict charges charges, DWI even when other (Minn.2013), de cert. remain, impact will a critical on have - nied, Hicks, prosecution’s case”); (2014), a second pretrial filed L.Ed.2d 759 (1974) Minn. granted Stavish’s May 2014 that order pretrial suppressing that a order (holding suppressed the reconsider and motion to of an concentration test results results test on alcohol concentration appealable by the State because this court declined resolve ground that prevented prosecution successful order good-faith excep of a Brooks on the basis charged driving with offense exclusionary rule. The court tion to the greater, concentration of 0.10 or alcohol to reconsider the denied the State’s motion though charges even other were not affect ap The State exigency determination. ed). pretrial order. second pealed the We conclude the State has estab appeals reversed the dis The court that it prove lished cannot an essential suppressing order alcohol trict court’s charged if the element of two of the counts results, concluding test concentration sup alcohol concentration evidence is justified situation exigencies pressed. charging Specifically, count draw, the blood warrantless blood homicide, Stavish with criminal vehicular therefore constitutional. State draw was 609.21, § violation Minn.Stat. subd. (Minn. 1(3), charging and the count Stavish with appeals The court of did not App.2014). DWI, fourth-degree in violation of Minn. exception issue. good-faith reach the We 169A.20, 1(5), § require Stat. subd. granted review. State to establish that Stavish’s alcohol I. concentration was at or exceeded 0.08. charges two of case Because in this this pretrial is a State’s Because will dismissed if the concentra be appeal, first must determine whether we suppressed, tion evidence is has State alcohol concentra suppression impact established critical this case. critical impact tion test will have a results may case. A pretrial on the State’s order II. only the State shows appealed be when next war- We address whether Stavish’s error, alleged court’s unless “the district rantless blood violated Fourth draw his reversed, impact have a on the will critical rights. The Amend- Amendment Fourth outcome the trial.” Minn. R.Crim. P. ment to the United States Constitution 2(b). 28.04, pretrial When a order subd. provides: prosecu criminal suppresses evidence in a tion, excluding right people must of the be secure show houses, papers, and ef- “significantly persons, the evidence reduces the their fects, against may unreasonable searches and exist when “there is compelling need seizures, violated, shall not be and no for official action and no time to secure a issue, upon probable shall but Warrants warrant.” Michigan Tyler, 436 U.S. cause, supported by affirmation, Oath or 56 L.Ed.2d 486 particularly describing place searched, persons and the or things The United Supreme States Court to be seized. has recognized several circumstances that U.S. Const. amend. XIV. It is well-settled may give rise to an exigency justifies that a blood draw ais search that is sub search, a warrantless including preventing ject to Fourth protections. Amendment the imminent destruction of evidence. — at —, McNeely, U.S. 133 S.Ct. at King, at —, 131 S.Ct. at 1856- 57. To resolve whether a law enforcement The Fourth express Amendment officer faced an emergency justified (1) ly requires that a search and seizure bе acting warrant, without a the Court applies (2) reasonable, and that “a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. not be probable issued unless cause is at —, See U.S. properly scope established and the at 1559. The exigent analy authorized search ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‍is set out particu with requires sis an objective evaluation of the larity.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. reasonably available to the officer at 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 the time of the search. Brigham City, See (2011). A warrantless search or seizure is 404, 126 547 U.S. at S.Ct. 1943. See, presumptively e.g., unreasonable. id. (referring home); to the search of a A. at —, 133 S.Ct. at The (referring 1558 to the United per Supreme search of the States Court has son). presumption, however, considered may exigent whether circumstances overcome in justify some existed to circumstances because a warrantless blood draw “the ultimate a suspected touchstone of the Fourth drunk driver in two relevant — Amendment is Brigham McNeely, U.S. —, reasonableness.” cases. 133 S.Ct. Stuart, City 398, v. 403, 1552; 547 U.S. 126 California, S.Ct. Schmerber v. (2006)

1943, (citations 164 757, L.Ed.2d 650 1826, 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 908 omitted). In the defendant was arrested at a hospital suspicion on of driving under A person warrantless search of a the influence receiving while he was treat only is reasonable if it falls within a recog injuries ment for suffered in an accident in exception nized to the warrant require 758, which he had been the driver. Id. at —, ment. U.S. at 86 S.Ct. 1826. The officer ordered a blood S.Ct. 1558. One well-recognized excep sample taken without a warrant and over tion to the requirement warrant applies objection. 768-69, defendant’s Id. at when exigencies “the of the situation make 86 S.Ct. 1826. the needs of law compel enforcement so ling that the objec warrantless search is The Court held that exigencies tively reasonable under the Fourth the situation made the warrantless blood Arizona, Amendment.” Mincey reasonable, 437 draw and therefore that U.S. 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d defendant’s Fourth rights Amendment (1978) (citations omitted). Exigent cir were not violated. Id. at justifying cumstanсes a warrantless search 1826. It reasoned “special that facts” ren- Nevertheless, at 1563. Court to act S.Ct. police for the appropriate it dered recognized that in some circumstances law special Those Id. a warrant. without may a warrantless have been enforcement conduct the evidence could were imminent prevent draw to de- percentage of alcohol in blood “the lost because evidence. shortly after struction of alcohol concentration begins diminish the blood at-, But at 1561. wheth- body as functions to Id. S.Ct. stops, drinking exist must be exigent Id. at er system.” it from the eliminate totality in each on the Moreover, the time decided based neces- 1826. the circumstances. Id. bring defendant sary to of the accident investigate scene considering In circum- whether time to seek out being in there no resulted in present, McNeely are the Court stances a warrant. Id. at and secure magistrate a that “the mеtabolization alco- reaffirmed “spe- 770-71, these S.Ct. 1826. Given the ensuing hol in the bloodstream and facts,” “might reasonably the officer cial factors among of evidence are loss with that he was confronted have believed deciding in whether a must be considered delay neces- emergency, which an -, required.” Id. at warrant warrant, a the cir- under sary to obtain “[Bjecause at 1568. an S.Ct. individual’s cumstances, threatened the destruction of level soon after gradually alcohol declines Id. at 86 S.Ct. 1826. evidence.” delay in stops drinking, significant he a Supreme negatively probative testing will affect In Missouri split a Id. at certiorari to resolve value results.” granted Court “the natu at 1561. The Court also acknowl- authority regarding whether even can edged though experts the blood work metabolization of ral exigency an alcohol concentra- per se backwards use presents stream time taken sample to the Fourth tion at the was justifies an аn requirement determine alcohol concentration Amendment’s offense, alleged long testing all drunk- time of “intervals nonconsensual at —, questions accuracy raise about the driving cases.” The case involved a DWI investi the calculations.” Id. S.Ct. at at 1556. time, stopped by At the the Court McNeely was same noted gation, which Schmerber police speeding officer for advancements since Missouri officer, pro- expeditious allow for more of DWI. Id. who decided suspected Id. McNeely cessing applications. that of warrant at several indicia observed Thus, intoxicated, McNeely -, at if requested pro that 1561-63. under circumstances, sample. totality of law McNeely a Id. When the the en- vide breath a sample, reasonably a the offi forcement “can obtain war- provide breath failed hospi a sample sample drawn at a rant before blood can be drawn cer had McNeely’s undermining the effi- tal, significаntly measured alcohol without which search, cacy at at Fourth 0.154. Id. Amendment concentration at-, that Id. they 1556-57. mandates do so.” at S.Ct. at 1561. concluded that natural The Court Schmerber, dissipation light McNeely of alcohol In gradual whether, bloodstream, itself, all inquiry in and of relevant under defendant’s to the exigency every reasonably an the facts available officer does not constitute search, it was justify objectively case at the time drunk-driving sufficient conclude reasonable for the officer to that warrantless blood draw. Id. an emergency, he or she was faced with in found determining whether exigent delay necessary exist.”). which the to obtain a war significantly rant would undermine the ef The relevant circumstances in this case ficacy of the search.1 are that officers from the State Patrol at —, (stating responded report to a single-vehicle of a Fourth Amendment mandates that an offi involving accident a fatality injuries cer оbtain warrant before a blood draw Stavish, ejected who was from his vehicle. doing “significantly unless so would under- Upon scene, his arrival at the accident search”); min[e] Sergeant Martens learned from other offi- 86 S.Ct. 1826 cers that Stavish had admitted to being (“The present however, officer in the driver, had sustained injuries, serious might reasonably have believed that he had transported by been ambulance to a was confronted with emergency, an nearby hospital, possibly and would be air- delay necessary which the to obtain a war lifted to a hospital. different Sergeant rant, circumstances, under the threatened Martens then drove to to talk evidence.”) the destruction of

with Stavish and determine the involve- B. ment of alcohol in the accident. When he spoke with room, Stavish in the emergency mind, With this framework in Sergeant Martens detected the question strong we turn to the of whether the odor of alcohol. State established that The record exigent circum also indicates justified Sergeant stances Martens multiple warrantless blood observed Ture, personnel draw. See State v. medical tending 632 N.W.2d to Stavish in the (Minn.2001) (“The emergency state bears the bur room. den establishing We conclude that the State estab requirement”). We review the lished totality-of-the-circum under

district findings court’s factual under the approach stances exigent circum clearly erroneous standard. State v. justified stances Zornes, (Minn.2013). warrantless blood 831 N.W.2d draw. The relevant circumstances But are we review the district legal court’s Thus, law enforcement had reason to believe conclusions de novo. Id. we review allegedly the court’s ultimate who admitted to determination of exi being driver, alcohol, gency de novo. See In re had consumed Welfare of D.A.G., (Minn.1992) and that alcohol contributed to the acci (“[W]e make our Thus, own evaluation of the important dent. it was to draw probable In addition to the existеnce of cir cause to believe the defendant has cumstances, probable there must be cause to “probable committed a crime and cause to believe the defendant committed a crime in believe ... administration of the [blood nonconsensual, order for a warrantless blood discovery test will alcohol] result in the draw to be See constitutional. State v. prosecution evidence that will aid the of 79, (Minn. 1980) Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 81-82 (quoting Speak, that crime” State v. 339 (stating prerequisite that "the constitutional 741, (Minn. 1983))). N.W.2d 745 to the warrantless nonconsensual removal of however, argue does not that the State lacked blood of a conscious or unconscious driver” is probable cause to conclude that he committed "probable plus exigent cause circum DWI, operation criminal vehicular or or that stances”); Lee, see also State v. n the administration of a blood alcohol test (Minn.1998) (stating proba 381 discovery would not result of evidence required purposes ble cause that is for aof prosecution relevant to of a crime. warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw is

678 a availability his blood draw of ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‍the acci- future within hours blood

Stavish’s Martens not Sergeant admissi- uncertain. did reliability and to ensure dent likely know was re- long evi- how Stavish to alcohol concentration of the bility 169A.20, hospital § main at or fur- subd. the same whether Minn.Stat. dence.2 See preclude 1(5) obtaining alcohol ther medical care would impairment as an (defining stayed sample a if at greater, 0.08 or as meas- even Stavish concentration it driving). Consequently, same was ob- hospital. 2 hours of time of ured within jectively Sergeant in- reasonable for Martens Additionally, sustained serious Stavish faced to that he was with an emergency medical conclude juries that necessitated delay emergency necessary and in which the to hospital potentially a re- at treatment a trаnsported helicop- obtain threatened destruc- he be quired that Schmerber, hospital. medical tion evidence.3 See another Stavish’s ter to need for treatment rendered 86 S.Ct. 1826. and condition with, charged among prove other does not the State’s burden to was eliminate Stavish that, driving impaired present while things, the offense of the circumstances because 169A.20, 1(5), § subd. under Minn.Stat. particular a warrant could a not have impairment as con defines an alcohol which reasonably a been obtained before blood draw greater within of 0.08 or measured centration undermining significantly without Although driving. time of of the hours 169A.20, Thus, of the section search. subdivi- testing a blood sam concentration alcohol 1(5), sion is not unconstitutional. driving ple more than hours after obtained prove impairment, may be admissible to still argues Page’s 3. Justice that we dissent have 169A.45, (2014), § subd. see Minn.Stat. analogy ignored drawn but to Schmerber exigency is relevant window 2-hour between faсtual differences Schmerber collecting sample analysis a because disagree. ap- and We this case. Schmerber window best ensures that the sam within that plied totality-of-the-circumstances a approach prove impairment. to ple can be used Cf. whether determine circumstances U.S. at -, - given See 384 existed in a case. U.S. at 770- (“While experts can work backwards from Page correctly 86 S.Ct. 1826. Justice concentration] alcohol at the time the [blood points factually distinguish- is out Schmerber sample was taken to determine alcohol [blood Sergeant able because Martens was re- not alleged at the time of concentration] quired investigate the scene of the accident fense, may longer questions intervals raise and, necessary unlike in the time calculation.”). accuracy of the about hospital transport the accused to the 169A.20, argues § that Minn.Stat. Stavish 769-71, significant not a id. at factor. See 1(5), legislative is unconstitutional as a subd. dissent, however, ignores S.Ct. 1826. The statutory exigency a attempt to create emergency present medical in this case protections. constitutional This circumvents present was not in Schmerber. While both merit. argument lacks Under section injured were Schmerber and Stavish in car 1(5), 169A.20,subdivision measurement of an hospital accidents and taken to for treat- higher of 0.08 concentration or within ment, ejected Stavish was from his vehicle driving is an element of the offense hours injuries required and sustained serious impaired. driving McNeely while does not emergency medical treatment at the prohibit criminalizing from a State such con required transport have air to anoth- - generally See duct. hospital. er We that if an observe accident 1552; Olson, State v. cf. resulting the death of one individual (Minn.1982) ("The power to define 17-18 injury requiring serious to another continuous which the conduct constitutes criminal of medical treatmеnt advanced does not legislature.”). vested in fense ... 169A.20, qualify exigency exception, Moreover, 1(5), for the it is diffi- section subdivision imagine cult to would so a blood does not authorize draw without qualify. McNeelyrequire Schmerber and purport Both warrant or to establish the natural all relevant un- dissipation single-factor alcohol as a exi court examine facts gency, McNeely. totality in circumvention of It also der of the circumstances. See

679 argues, center, and the Stavish district court medical Sergeant Martens could concluded, Sergeant Martens’ failure still have reasonably concluded that he was to ask the treating physician or other hos- faced with an emergency situation. Given would, fact, if pital personnel Stavish be the seriousness of Stavish’s condition and airlifted to another medical center under- the fact that Stavish’s diagnosis medical argument mines the Sergeant State’s and treatment was evolving, Sergeant Martens emergency. was faced with an Martens could not predict whether Stavish The district court reasoned that such an would continue to be available for a blood inquiry would “have been simple enough to draw even if he was not transported to a [make], and it provided would have hospital. Therefore, different Sergeant trooper with a definite answer.” We dis- Martens’ verify failure to whether Stavish agree for two reasons. would in fact be airlifted does not undercut the existence of exigent circumstances.

First, existing federal and state privacy laws limit information may Stavish argues, next and Justice person’s disclosed about a medical condi Page’s asserts, dissent that the State failed tion and treatment person’s without the establish circumstances because written consent.4 The existing applicable it prove did not Sergeant Martens likely precluded law would have Sergeant could not have obtained a telephonic wаr Martens from obtaining additional infor 2 rant within hours of the accident. See mation regarding Stavish’s medical condi Minn. R.Crim. P. 36.01-.08 (authorizing tion and treatment from treating phy search testimony). warrants on oral It is sician or other personnel without true that when Sergeant Martens obtained Second, Stavish’s written consent. if even the blood sample from there were Sergeant Martens knew that Stavish was 70 minutes left in the 2-hour window es not going to be transported to another by 169A.20, § tablished Minn.Stat. subd. at-, McNeely, -U.S. 133 S.Ct. at by mitted provider. health care 45 C.F.R. ("In finding (2014). § warrantless blood test reason- 160.103 privacy protec HIPAA's electronic, written, able in apply we considered all of the tions and oral Rasak, facts particular E.g., and circumstances of the case information. Holman v. carefully (2008), holding Mich.App. based our spe- on those facts.”); aff'd, cific id. 133 S.Ct. at Mich. (“Whether (2010); Rights, Dep’t Office for Civil warrantless blood test of a Serv’cs, drunk-driving suspect Health & Privacy Human OCR is reasonable must be Brief: Summary Privаcy the HIPAA totality determined case case Rule at based on the (2003), circumstances.”). http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. 4. The federal Portability Health Insurance Without the written authorization indi (HIPAA) Accountability Act of 1996 vidual, man- provider a health care or other cov regulations governing privacy dates standards entity permitted ered protected is to disclose for certain health care information. Pub. L. health information to a law enforcement offi 104-191, (1996) (codified No. 110 Stat. 1936 cer for law purposes only enforcement if one primarily in Titles and 42 of the Unit- exceptions applies. of six See 45 C.F.R. Code). 164.512(f) ed regulations (2013). States § HIPAA excep None of these specify the circumstances under which implicated by health specific tions are facts of providers care and other "covered entities]” this case. See id. The Minnesota Health Rec information,” "protected disclose health provides privacy protections ords Act similar broadly which is defined to include patient individu- health care information and does ally identifiable information that relates to a not contain a law enforcement patient’s past, present, or future medical con- applicable specific this case. dition or treatment and is §§ received or trans- See Minn.Stat. 144.291-144.34 must however, quantum pres- evidence the State fails to of 1(5). argument, Stavish’s circumstances. totality prove exigent of the circumstances. ent to the consider that 70 re true minutes it is Although Second, appeals court of relied the the window and that 2-hour in the

mained accident took upon place the fact that the likely long how it establish not State did county in one Stavish was taken to a while telephonic to obtain a taken would have hospital county for treatment. a second and warrant, medical condition Stavish’s The fact that at 908. medical treatment emergency ongoing hospital county in a different analysis. Spe the the is located nature of changed the itself uncertainty of the site does not create than accident the seriousness cifically, condition, Instead, coupled with exigent medical circumstances. the rele Stavish’s to hos transport another is whether the time nec possibility the vant consideration Mar Sergeant for pital, impossible it the essary hospital, made to the accused to bring long Stavish would know how tens to the hospital, for the to travel to or officer Thus, a blood draw. Ser available ability to impacted the officer’s obtain emergen was faced with an geant Martens draw warrant before the blood without it was to in which reasonable cy situation undermining efficacy the significantly delay necessary to ob any that conclude case, hospital In the was the search. this “significantly under- would tain a warrant the only а minute drive from crash 10-15 efficacy of search.”5 min[e] site, already at the hospi was Stavish at —, Sergeant tal when Martens arrived. 1561. Therefore, fact that the location of the were in crash site and the differ C. by not itself relevant to ent counties was agree we with the court Although Sergeant ability to obtain a war Martens’ that the ultimate determination of appeals’ rant before the blood draw. justified draw blood warrantless circumstances, we that conclude exigent III. underlying erred appeals its the court Because we conclude First, respects. the court reasoning two exigent proved the existence of circum law upon relied fact appeals justifying the warrantless stances attempting evi “was to obtain enforcement draw, to we do not need address the probable to a vehicular dence essential argument good- State’s alternative charge, merely not a DWI homicide exclusionary faith rulе Stavish, 852 at 909. charge.” States, applies. See Davis v. United of the offense does not The seriousness U.S.—,—, exigency, Mincey, 437 U.S. itself create (2011) (holding L.Ed.2d that evidence and does not reduce the cases, many say In the State mere fact an search. That is not suspect injured impaired-driving length present need to evidence about the emergency per se creates brought to the room telephonic it time takes to obtain warrant Instead, exigent the State circumstances. But order establish circumstances. reasonably avail- must establish this even evidence in exi- without such regarding suspect’s the officer able to gent specif- because the circumstances existed to rea- medical condition allowed officer any delay necessary ic facts establish sonably that there was not time to conclude significantly obtain a would under- with- a warrant before blood draw obtain the search. mine undermining efficacy of significantly out

681 in during obtained search conducted ob- the court doubles down and again “rea- jectively binding ap- dopts 779, reasonable reliance on a per exigency,” se id. at this subject precedent is not to the ex- time pellate refusing to hold the State to its rule). clusionary “heavy burden” to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness associated with a war- Affirmed. rantless search of person, Welsh v. Wisconsin, GILDEA, 740, 749-50, 466 U.S. (dissenting). Chief Justice 104 S.Ct. 2091, (1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 732 by establish- respectfully join I dissent and Justice ing delay that “the necessary to obtain a Page’s in I part. agree dissent with Jus- warrant, circumstances, under the threat- Page that tice the State ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‍did not meet its ” ened evidence,’ ‘the destruction prove exigency, join burden to and I in California, Schmerber v. 384 U.S. I Page’s sections and II of Justice dissent 1826, (1966) (cita- 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 908 exigency on the issue except to the extent omitted). tion upon The record which the Bernard, he discusses v. State court finds the existence of circum- (Minn.2015). 762 stances is so minimаl that the decision For the reasons set forth in my separate here, effect, in nullifies the warrant re- dissent in State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d quirement in every suspected drunk-driv- (Minn. 868, 19, Aug. WL 4928147 ing involving case an accident with serious 2015), I apply good would not faith injuries contradicting basic Fourth — exception in this case. Amendment principles and the Supreme Court’s in McNeely. decision PAGE, (dissenting). Justice I respectfully dissent. In this I. efforts, court continues begun its The Fourth Amendment provides, in rel Bernard, (Minn.2015), v. 859 N.W.2d 762 part, evant right people “[t]he Lindquist, and reiterated in State v. houses, to be secure in persons, their pa (Minn. 868, Aug. WL 4928147 effects, pers, against unreasonable 19, 2015), to protect its erroneous decision seizures, searches and shall not be violat Shriner, (Minn. in State v. 751 N.W.2d 538 ed, issue, and no upon Warrants shall but 2008) (establishing that the evanescent na probable cause.” A blood draw is a search ture of the bloodstream ais person subject to Fourth single-factor exigency), abrogated by Mis Amendment protections. Missouri — U.S. —, souri v. —, —, (2013) thаt, (holding L.Ed.2d 696 1558, 185L.Ed.2d 696 contrary to this court’s decisions in Shri ner, dissipation of alcohol the blood A person warrantless search of a is rea does not a per exigency), create se only sonable if it recognized falls within a Bernard, progeny. Shriner’s In we “fun to the warrant requirement. damentally departed] —, from longstanding McNeely, U.S. at Fourth principles” Amendment justify well-recognized One exception to warrantless breath test as a valid search requirement applies the warrant when incident “creating a exigencies novel “the of the situation make the arrest — bright-line rule” that “simply readopts a needs compelling of law enforcement so per exigency se under a different name.” objectively warrantless search is [a] (Minn.2015) (Page, N.W.2d at under reasonable the Fourth Amend J., Stras, J., Here, & dissenting jointly). Kentucky King, ment.” in the blood of alcohol 1849, 1856, 179 percentage L.Ed.2d 865 drinking shortly after begins to diminish (citation (alteration omit

(2011) original) body functions to eliminate as thе stops, exigent cir ted). whether To determine Particularly in a system. it from the search, a warrantless justified cumstances this, time had to be as where case such totality-of-the- in a engage must a court to a bring to the accused taken analysis. McNeely, eircumstances acci- investigate the scene of the and to —, at 1554. This S.Ct. at 133 U.S. a dent, time to seek out there was no objective an evaluation requires analysis and secure a warrant. magistrate reasonably to the officer available the facts 770-71, these 1826. “Given at 86 S.Ct. Brigham Id. See time of the search. at the facts,” warrantless blood draw 404, special Stuart, 398, 126 S.Ct. 547 U.S. City v. Amendment. violate the Fourth did not (2006). 1943, The State L.Ed.2d 650 164 771, noted 1826. The Court Id. at 86 S.Ct. attempting “heavy burden when a bears only judgment this on that it “reach[ed] might need that urgent an demonstrate 772, Id. at present record.” or arrests.” searches justify warrantless added). (emphasis S.Ct. 1826 86 749-50, Wisconsin, 740, 466 U.S. Welsh (1984); 2091, see considered L.Ed.2d 732 In the Court 104 S.Ct. metabolization of al 750, (explaining the nаtural 104 S.Ct. “whether also id. at presents per a se cohol in the bloodstream government on the that “the burden is justifies that exigency exigent circumstances demonstrate requirement Amendment’s warrant Fourth of unreason presumption overcome testing in all blood for nonconsensual to a warrantless that attaches” ableness —, at drunk-driving cases.” search). that, at 1556. The Court held 133 S.Ct. has Supreme Court States United dissipation natural of alcohol “while the considered whether finding exigen a support the blood draw justify a warrantless blood existed to Schmerber, case, as it did in cy specific in a in two relevant drunk driver suspected at categorically.” Id. it does not do so — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. cases. “[wjheth Instead, -, at 1563. 133 S.Ct. 1552; California, 384 U.S. Schmerber test of a drunk- er a warrantless blood 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 must be de driving suspect is reasonable considered In Court totality on a case case based termined taking of blood the warrantless whether re circumstances.” Id. The Court injured in a car crash and person from a assumption that there is never jected the influence of driving under the arrested for drunk-driving time to secure a warrant the Fourth Amendment. alcohol violated cases, reasoning that the collection of BAC 766-68, 1826. The at or nev present not a “now evidence does the warrantless concluded Court evidence “dissi er” situation because BAC not unconstitutional be blood draw was relatively gradual time in a pates over who ordered the blood cause the officer -, manner.” Id. at predictable “might reasonably have believed draw reasoned at 1561. The Court also S.Ct. emergency, in he confronted with an changes advances and technological delay necessary to obtain war which the was decided court rules since Schmerber rant, circumstances, processing ‘threatened expeditious under the “the more permit ” -, at at applications.” of evidence.’ Id. Id. destruction warrant omitted). (сitation Accordingly, the Court specif at 1561-62. More S.Ct. case-by- careful “depart from declined ically, explained the Court (“The exigency,” case assessment of id. state bears the burden of establish required 133 S.Ct. at and instead ing an exception to the require that courts determine in each ment.”), based and the deference that must be totality circumstances, on the given to the district court’s Al findings. whether a warrantless blood test of a though we review the ultimate determina reasonable, drunk-driving suspect is id. novo, tion of exigency de we review the If under the district findings court’s factual for clear totality of the circumstances law enforce- Zornes, error. See State v. reasonably

ment “can a warrant obtain (Minn.2013) (“The [district] sample before can be drawn with- findings court’s factual [relating to a significantly out undermining Fourth Amendment search and seizure] search, of the the Fourth Amendment error, are reviewed for clear but the de they mandates that do so.” Id. applies novo standard to application the of Here, 1561. the State has the facts to the Fourth Amendment....” establish, failed to under the standard set (citations omitted)). McNeely, out in that the Fourth Amend- The district court found that “[t]he blood

ment does not mandate a warrant in this draw p.m., occurred at 11:18 50 minutes case. after the reported,” crash was and that “there was thus still 70 remaining minutes II. to sample obtain a from defendant.” The Schmerber, In light McNeely of I district court also found that “Trooper agree with the court that the relevant in begun Martens could have telephonic the whether, quiry is under all of the facts earlier, process warrant even while driving reasonably available to the officer at the from the crash [hospital]” site to the be- search, objectively time the it was rea cause personal Martens had his cell phone sonable for the officer to conclude that he with him. findings supported These are or she emergency was faced with an in record, by the clearly thus are not delay which the necessary to obtain a war erroneous. rant, circumstances, under “sig the would nificantly light the In findings regarding undermin[e] these at —, Martens, search.”1 U.S. Sergeant 133 time available to it is S.Ct. at 1561. But I agree do not that the clear that the State did not meet its bur- standard, record this case prove meets den to exigent circumstances. No particularly light finding by the State’s burden the district court or evidence in Welsh, to establish exigency, see suggests Sergeant U.S. record Martens 749-50, 2091; see also State v. could not have obtained a warrant within Ture, (Minn.2001) remaining the time in the 2-hour window.2 disagree (2014), 1. While I with impairment the court's conclusion which defines as an alco regarding greater the existence of circum- hol concentration of 0.08 or measured stances, agree driving. I do with the within 2 court’s discussion hours of the time of I do regarding disagree in Part not appeals’ II.C the court of with the court’s stаtement that misplaced exigen reliance on the this 2-hour window is relevant to the seriousness of the cy being investigated analysis collecting sample offense because a blood and the fact that within that window best that the accident scene and were ensures sam located ple prove impairment. can be used in different counties. Cf. U.S. at -, McNeely, - 133 S.Ct. at 1563 (“While charged driving experts Stavish was with while im- can work backwards from 169A.20, 1(5) paired § under Minn.Stat. ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‍subd. [blood concentration] at the time the necessary time length regarding contends generally the State

While un- Notwithstanding outlined process warrant a warrant. telephonic obtain is burdensome P. 36.01-08 Minn. R.Crim. medical certainty surrounding Stavish’s on- guarantee is no that there of air trans- possibility and the condition a call at have answered would judge call that Mar- the State failed to establish port, no presented night, time of have obtained a warrant tens could not how approximately establishing evidence sufficiently period partic- short time — a war have taken obtain long it would found that ularly the district court since actually unavaila judge was rant or that steps to initiate could have taken Martens establishing any evidence ble.3 Without ar- before telephonic process meet its bur facts, cannot the State such hospital. at the riving delay necessary to to show that den circumstances, warrant, under analogy obtain to Schmer The court draws efficacy of undermin[ed] “significantly ber, but disre at —, the search.” key differences between gards the To conclude at 1561. otherwise one. In case and this effect, per another se exi to, in create that, “special facts” highlighted two Court McNeely. Id. at in contravention gency dissipation the natural in combination with 1561, If the —,—, 1563. S.Ct. at bloodstream, from the would of alcohol the burden actually established record reasonably an officer to believe have led pro tеlephonic warrant nature of the some magistrate there was no time to seek out thing, but all we cess, be one that would a warrant: “time had to and secure assertion, nothing the State’s have here is hospital the accused to a bring taken to that a the record established more. If scene of the acci investigate and to the unavailable, actually that would judge was 770-71, at 1826. dent.” are the all we have here thing, but be one not “special present facts” are Those same speculations. State’s testimony Sergeant Martens’ estab here. however, court, the asserts The only min hospital lished cir- prove exigent met its burden assumed away utes and that other officers medical con- because Stavish’s cumstances the responsibility investigating serious, requiring air possibly dition was Moreover, as noted in scene. center, and another medical transport changes technological advances were diagnosis and trеatment his because years in the 47 since Schmer- court rules also relies on the fact The court evolving. permit remote war ber was decided now verify not Stavish’s could that Martens expeditious applications rant and more transport for or need medical condition 1561-62; at processing. warrant given limitations personnel hospital with (out P. 36.01-36.08 see also Minn. R.Crim. privacy and state laws. by federal imposed telephonic war lining requirements ignores complete is the But the court what applications). rant presented by the State lack of evidence circumstances, is in a existence of [blood to determine sample was taken alleged time of- position at the than this court to understand concentration] fense, better questions longer intervals raise telephonic long obtain a how it can take to calculation.”). accuracy of the about State's and to determine whether the warrant arguments were credible. judge, court who 3. I that the district note establish the that the State did not found context, the mere fact that ord justify In this this is sufficient to a warrantless draw, involved an any like accident blood record will not be suffi seriously injured cient, drunk-driving and a sus at least the context of an accident. pect only does not warrant the same result. The Iway can understand this deci McNeely recognized court, the need for a case- sion is the again, once pretending by-case assessment of exigency rejecting that McNeely happened. never See State Bernard, argument (Minn. there is never time to v. 2015) J., obtain a warrant in drunk-driving (Page, Stras, J., cases. & dissenting at —, —, jointly); U.S. 133 S.Ct. at State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d Instead, (Minn. drunk-driving 867-68, those “[i]n 2015 WL 4928147 Aug. 2015) investigations police J., where can (Page, officers dissenting). In reasonably obtain a process, warrant before a blood only ignores court not McNee sample can be significantly ly’s requirement drawn without case-by-case of a assess search, undermining exigency, of the the ment of but also the princi basic they Fourth Amendment ple mandates do that a warrantless search of a person is (citation so.” Id. presumptively unreasonable, imposing a omitted). That “heavy is the case here. The burden” on the State “to demon telephonic record fails to establish that a an urgent justifies strate need” that such a not, Welsh, totality 749-50, warrant could under the search. including proximity of S.Ct. 2091. circumstances— scene, to the accident

availability of other investigate officers to III. scene, ability apply and the for a only remaining question is whether by telephone been reason —have the BAC evidence should nevertheless be ably obtained before blood draw with good-faith admissible under the exception “significantly undermining” validity out exclusionary rale because the blood admissibility corresponding or of the BAC draw, taken, it time was evidence. Id. 1561. by deemed constitutional pre-McNeely our Therеfore, I conclude that the failed State Netland, precedent, v. State 762 N.W.2d delay necessary establish that (Minn.2009), Shriner, v. warrant, circumstances, obtain a under the (Minn.2008). N.W.2d 538 In United States “significantly undermin[ed] —Davis, —, —, search,” id., accordingly, failed to 2419, 2434, (2011), 180 L.Ed.2d 285 meet its burden to establish cir Supreme United States Court held that justified cumstances that the warrantless “[ejvidence during obtained a search con and nonconsensual blood draw from Stav ducted in reasonable reliance on binding ish. precedent subject is not to the exclusion to, effect, ary

To conclude otherwise is adopted good- rule.” We the Davis per permits new se rule that faith exception Lindquist, State v. create warrantless, (Minn. nonconsensual blood draw N.W.2d 2015 WL 4928147 2015). any drunk-driving suspect time a Aug. Lindquist is seri- I dissented in ously injured hospital. good-faith and taken to the It on the exception basis Const, how, I, 8,4 is difficult to if § understand this rec- violates Minn. art. see 869 I, Every person remedy 4. Article section of Minnesota Consti- is entitled to a certain injuries wrongs all laws for or which provides: tution person, property he receive to his or J., matter is re- dissenting), appeals and I is reversed and this (Page, at 868 for trial. adop- sentiments here. manded district court those renew mocks good-faith tion BY THE COURT: constitutionally guarantee of a mandated /s/- by remedy leaving in the laws” “certain Barry Anderson G. rights been violated have those whose Associate Justice remedy. such a search without illegal created rem- legislatively It also mocks GILDEA, C.J., PAGE and and seizures in illegal searches edy for JJ„ LILLEHAUG, dissent. § 626.21 See Lind- Minn.Stat. (Lillehaug, J., at 890 quist,

dissenting). reasons, respectfully I dissent.

For these

In re Petition AC DISCIPLINARY AGAINST Todd Allen DUCK TION SON, Attorney, Registra a Minnesota 219125. tion No. Minnesota, Appellant, STATE No. A15-0567. Supreme Court of Minnesota. LARSON, Respondent. Rae Cree Aug. No. A14-0128. 2015.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug.

ORDER Files, records, upon all the

Based herein,

proceedings HEREBY

IT IS ORDERED opinion Lindquist, in State v.

light of our A12-0599, 2015 WL

No. (Minn. 19, 2015), holding Aug. ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‍exclusionary apply rule does not

violations of Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, I, or Article Section Constitution, when Minnesota law faith, acts in good objectively

enforcement appellate binding

reasonable reliance on of the court

precedent, decision character, denial, justice freely promptly delay, con- to obtain and without purchase, completely without and without formable to laws.

Case Details

Case Name: State of Minnesota v. Derek Lawrence Stavish

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Aug 19, 2015

Citation: 868 N.W.2d 670

Docket Number: A14-771

Court Abbreviation: Minn.