STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dakari Michael COLES, Appellant.
No. A13-0789.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
April 15, 2015.
862 N.W.2d 477
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
Appellant Dakari Michael Coles brought a motion challenging his sentence. The district court sentenced Coles pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss several charges, and Coles agreed to receive a sentence for a lesser charge that was an upward durational departure. The question presented is whether Coles may challenge his sentence in a motion to correct his sentence, see
In 2003, Coles, who was then 16, was at a residence along with an 11-year-old and a 9-year-old. The younger child saw Coles with his penis in the other child‘s mouth. Coles offered the younger child $10 to keep what she saw to herself, but she told an adult about the incident.
Respondent the State of Minnesota filed a delinquency petition charging Coles with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Assuming that Coles was certified as an adult, the presumptive sentence for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge was 144 months and the presumptive sentence for first-degree aggravated robbery was 48 months.
On August 28, 2003, Coles and the State reached a plea agreement. They agreed that Coles would plead guilty to an amended charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and to first-degree aggravated robbery in exchange for the State dismissing the first-degree criminal sexual conduct and simple robbery charges. In addition, the parties agreed that Coles would be placed on extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) status, so he could receive treatment, and that he would receive a stayed, 96-month aggregate sentence. This sentence was based on two 48-month, consecutive sentences. The 48-month sentence for second-degree criminal sexual conduct was an upward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence of 21 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (2003). The imposition of consecutive sentences was also an upward departure. Id., II.F.
Coles pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct and first-degree aggravated robbery. The district court accepted his guilty plea, placed him on EJJ status, and sentenced him according to the terms of the plea agreement. During the sentencing, the court stated that it based the upward durational departure on the agreement of the parties and the age difference between Coles and the victim, which the court said made the victim vulnerable.
The basis for the departure is one, this is a negotiation between the parties. . . . I would also find another part of this negotiation besides admission also had to do with the matter being handled as Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile rather than going forward as adult certification. Given the age of the child, of the victim in this matter, that I think [a] very
strong argument can be made for the fact that the age difference given the child‘s develop-stage of child development being what they are, that there was some level of vulnerability for the younger child to being taken advantage of by Mr. Coles and would justify the upward departure.
In a subsequent order, the court also noted that Coles “attempted to manipulate” the younger child “by offering her cash not to tell anyone what she had seen.”
In 2005, the district court found that Coles violated the terms of his EJJ probation by failing to complete, and being discharged from, his juvenile sex offender program. Consequently, the district court revoked Coles’ EJJ status and executed his consecutive, 48-month sentences.2
In 2012, Coles filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief arguing that the court had impermissibly sentenced him. While represented by counsel, Coles later filed a supplemental petition labeled as a petition for postconviction relief, but requesting relief under
Coles argues that his sentence is “not authorized by law” and must be corrected under
I.
The parties disagree over whether Coles’ request for correction of his sentence was brought under the postconviction statute or under the rules of criminal procedure. Minnesota‘s postconviction statute allows a person convicted of a crime to petition the court to correct a sentence when the sentence “violate[s] the person‘s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.”
Coles labeled his supplemental petition as a petition for postconviction relief. But he requested relief pursuant to Rule 27.03. We typically look to the pleadings and the relief sought in order to determine the nature of a claim. See Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn.2002). But the pleadings in this case are not dispositive because Coles arguably invoked both the postconviction statute and our procedural rule.
While Coles’ pleading could be read as invoking both the postconviction statute and Rule 27.03, the language of the statute and the rule, together with our precedent, confirm that Coles’ request falls under the postconviction statute. The language of
In contrast to the comprehensive language of section 590.01, the plain language of Rule 27.03 is limited to sentences, and the court‘s authority under the rule is restricted to modifying a sentence.
In Johnson, the defendant filed a motion challenging the sentence the district court imposed as a result of the defendant‘s guilty plea. Id. at 175. The defendant also challenged the validity of his guilty plea. Id. Because the defendant‘s challenge went beyond the sentence, we held that Rule 27.03 did not apply. See id. at 176. Instead, we held that the defendant had to seek relief under the postconviction statute. Id. We reach the same conclusion in this case.
The district court imposed the sentence at issue as part of the court‘s acceptance of the parties’ negotiated plea agreement. See
But, Coles argues, he is challenging only his sentence, not his plea agreement or conviction, and therefore, he has brought a proper Rule 27.03 motion. We have recognized, however, that a challenge to a sentence imposed as part of a plea agreement involves more than simply the sentence. See State v. Lewis, 656 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn.2003). In some plea agreements, the conviction component and the sentence component are “interrelated.” Id. For example, the parties may have agreed that the defendant would be convicted of a reduced criminal charge but only if the defendant received a sentence longer than the presumptive sentence for the reduced charge. Id. at 536. If the defendant succeeds in reducing his or her sentence, he or she retains the benefit of the reduced criminal charge but the State no longer receives the benefit of the longer sentence. See id. at 539.
Faced with such a situation, we held in Lewis that “where the district court finds no compelling or substantial circumstances supporting an upward departure in the sentence that was agreed upon in a plea agreement, it may consider motions to vacate the conviction and the plea agreement.” Id. The basis for the challenge to the sentence in Lewis was the same as Coles’ challenge to his sentence. Id. at 537. Moreover, just like the defendant in Lewis Coles received the benefit of a reduced criminal sexual conduct charge in exchange for agreeing to an upward durational departure on his sentence for that reduced charge. See id. at 536. Under Lewis, if the district court reduced Coles’ sentence due to improper departure justifications, which is the relief Coles seeks, the court would be “free to consider the effect that changes in the sentence have on the entire plea agreement.”4 Id. at 539.
Based on our precedent, it is clear that Coles’ request involves more than simply the sentence the district court imposed; it involves the plea agreement itself.5 The State and Coles recognized at the plea hearing that Coles’ sentence and conviction were part of a negotiated package in which both Coles and the State received a signifi-
Because Coles’ challenge to his sentence implicates more than simply his sentence, we conclude that it is properly viewed as a petition for postconviction relief under
II.
Coles filed his pleading seeking relief on May 12, 2012, more than 2 years after his conviction was final. Having decided that Coles’ request must be construed as a petition for postconviction relief, we hold that Coles’ request is time-barred by
Affirmed.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
“Curiouser and curiouser!” Lewis Carroll, Alice‘s Adventures in Wonderland (1865), reprinted in The Annotated Alice 35 (Martin Gardner ed., Bramhall House 1960). The result reached by the court and the reasoning behind that result are flawed in a way that brings to mind Alice‘s exclamation. The court holds that Coles’ motion to correct his sentence “is properly viewed as a petition for postconviction relief under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, provides that a “court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law” (emphasis added), provided that the court “does not increase the period of confinement.” Under the plain language of Rule 27.03, a defendant may not challenge his conviction, and Coles has not sought to do so in this case. Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn.2011). While it is true that if Coles’ sentence is corrected the State may choose to seek withdrawal from the plea agreement, the State‘s act of seeking to withdraw, if taken, does not flow either directly or necessarily from the correction of Coles’ sentence. Indeed, the correction of Coles’ sentence by itself will not alter his conviction. If
While the court relies on Johnson, 801 N.W.2d 173, this is a very different case from Johnson. In Johnson, we held that the defendant‘s Rule 27.03 motion should have been brought as a petition for postconviction relief under
The court‘s reasoning to the contrary rests on two faulty assumptions. First, the court assumes that in every case the State will necessarily lose the benefits of its bargained-for plea agreement if a defendant is permitted to bring a motion to correct his or her sentence under Rule 27.03, and second, that even if the State loses some of the benefits of its bargain it will, in every case, reflexively seek to withdraw from the plea agreement. In this case, the court asserts that “the parties made it clear that in this particular plea agreement, the sentence with an upward departure was a crucial term.” The court also asserts that the State “would lose the benefit of almost 3 years of his [conditional] release term” if Coles’ sentence was corrected. While the court‘s assertions may be accurate, the facts of this case should not dictate the outcome of all cases.
In analyzing the facts of this case, the court ignores three crucial points.2 First, because Coles’ sentence is not authorized by law, the State, on the record before us, was not entitled when it entered into the plea agreement, and is not entitled now, to the benefit of the upward sentencing departure. A sentence that is unauthorized by law is an illegal sentence. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the State could actually “lose” a benefit if Coles’ sentence is corrected to comply with the requirements of the sentencing guidelines. It is also worth noting that, if Coles’ sentence is unauthorized by law, the State would not “lose” anything here that would not be lost as a result of a timely petition for postconviction relief under
Second, given the facts of this case, the court ignores the substantial benefits that the State has already received from this illegal sentence, which will not be lost to the State if Coles’ sentence is corrected. Regardless of whether Coles’ sentence is corrected, the State will retain the vast majority of the sentence-related benefits it received from the plea agreement. In addition to the prison sentence, supervised release, and conditional release time already served, the State has benefited from not having to prove Coles’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and not having to face an uncertain outcome at trial. Additionally, correction of Coles’ sentence will not change Coles’ criminal history score going forward or the fact that Coles has a felony conviction.3
Finally, the court ignores the fact that there is no guarantee that the State will in
It is true that the State might seek to have Coles’ conviction vacated for the reasons articulated by the court if Coles’ sentence was in fact reduced. But it is also true that there are any number of reasons why the State enters into plea agreements and why the State, in this case and in general, might rationally choose not to seek to vacate a plea agreement even if the defendant‘s sentence is reduced. The court, however, creates a rule that presumes that in every case involving a plea bargain the State will seek to and be entitled to withdraw from the plea agreement. That blanket rule disregards the various considerations that the State would take into account in deciding whether to seek withdrawal. We should not be making decisions based on speculation as to how the parties may proceed on remand or how the district court will rule. Because the State‘s decision to withdraw from a plea agreement is in fact an independent act that does not flow either directly or necessarily from permitting a defendant to challenge his or her illegal sentence under Rule 27.03,4 it is improper for our court to decide in advance in all cases for all time that every challenge to an illegal sentence affects the underlying conviction.
Because an unlawful sentence may, under Rule 27.03, be corrected at any time, Coles’ motion to correct his sentence is not time barred. The only question remaining is whether Coles is entitled to have his sentence corrected because it is illegal. The answer to that question is yes.
The sentence ranges set forth in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “are presumed to be appropriate” and a departure from the presumptive sentence must be supported by “substantial and compelling circumstances.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D (2003). As a general rule, the maximum upward durational departure that can be justified by aggravating circumstances is double the presumptive sentence. State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn.1981). Only in the “extremely rare” cases that present “severe aggravating circumstances” may the sentencing court impose a greater-than-double upward departure from the presumptive sentence. State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn.1999); State v. Mortland, 399 N.W.2d 92, 94 & n. 1 (Minn.1987).
In this case, Coles’ sentence of commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections for 48 months for second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
Because Coles’ sentence is a durational departure that is based on improper reasons, it is a sentence unauthorized by law that must be corrected under
Further, this result does little to discourage the State, which has the power to structure a plea agreement how it wishes, from bargaining for plea agreements that impose sentences not authorized by law.5 Interestingly, had Coles been convicted after trial and given an illegal sentence, his sentence would be correctable under Rule 27.03 at any time without regard to his conviction. But, under today‘s ruling, because Coles entered into a plea agreement, the same illegal sentence cannot be challenged under Rule 27.03 and cannot and will not be corrected. Such a result, and the reasoning behind that result, is not supported by logic, the text of the rule, our precedent, or, as noted above, our obligation to do justice.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
STRAS, Justice (dissenting).
Because the parties do not present a separation-of-powers question and the