STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brian George FITCH, Appellant.
No. A15-0769.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 24, 2016.
884 N.W.2d 367
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HUDSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, MN, for appellant.
OPINION
ANDERSON, Justice.
On February 2, 2015, a Stearns County jury found appellant Brian George Fitch guilty of one count of first-degree murder of a peace officer,
I.
A.
In January 2014 Fitch was placed on supervised release from prison. As a condition of his release, Fitch was required to keep his supervising probation officer informed of his place of residence. On June 2, 2014, Fitch‘s probation officer contacted the Minnesota Department of Corrections and notified the department that Fitch had violated the terms of his release by failing to keep the probation officer advised of his current address. A warrant for Fitch‘s arrest was issued based on his failure to comply with the terms оf his supervised release.
On July 28, 2014, Fitch‘s girlfriend, T.M., called the Oakdale Police Department because she and Fitch had been in an argument and she was concerned that Fitch was going to break into her apartment while she was gone. T.M. gave Fitch‘s name and cell phone number to the Oakdale police. The Oakdale police called the cell phone number that T.M. had provided them, but the person who answered denied that he was Fitch.
T.M. saw Fitch the following day, July 29. Fitch was very upset that T.M. had called the police and given them his name. Fitch said that he was upset because “[the police] forgot about [him], now they‘re go-ing to remember [him].” Fitch specifically told T.M. that “if [hе] were to get pulled over [he would] shoot a cop.”
The next day, July 30, at approximately 12:20 p.m., Officer Scott Patrick of the Mendota Heights Police Department activated his squad car‘s emergency lights and pulled over a green Pontiac Grand Am. The Grand Am belonged to Fitch, but Officer Patrick had no way of knowing this at the time. Fitch had only recently purchased the car from a friend, J.L., and title had not yet been transferred. J.L. testified at trial that Fitch had spent the previous night at his house. J.L. testified further that he saw Fitch at the house on the morning of July 30 and that Fitch‘s Grand Am was parked outside the house. One of J.L.‘s roommates, L.P., testified that Fitch left the house around 11:00 a.m. on July 30, and that when she looked outside a short time later, Fitch‘s Grand Am was no longer parked in front of the house.
Officer Patrick left his squad car and walked toward the driver‘s side of the Grand Am. As Officer Patrick approached the driver‘s side door of the vehicle, Fitch leaned out of the window and fired three rounds with a handgun: Officer Patrick suffered gunshot wounds to his leg, abdomen, and head. After firing at Officer Patrick, Fitch sped away through traffic. Officer Patrick was pronounced dead at 12:58 p.m., not long after he was transported to a hospital emergency room.
Shortly after the Grand Am sped away from the scene of Officer Patrick‘s murder, Fitch appeared at the house of an acquaintance, J.C., driving the Grand Am. Severаl eyewitnesses saw a green Grand Am traveling at speeds of 60-75 miles per hour and running stop signs on the route between the scene of Officer Patrick‘s murder and J.C.‘s residence. Fitch asked to borrow a blue Hyundai SUV from J.C.‘s mother, and offered to pay the overdue payments on her vehicle if she allowed him to use it for the afternoon. J.C.‘s mother allowed Fitch to borrow the SUV and J.C. told Fitch that he could park the Grand Am in the backyard, where J.C. covered it with a blue tarp.
After leaving J.C.‘s home, Fitch arrived at K.H.‘s residence driving the blue Hyundai SUV. Fitch asked K.H. to pick up one of Fitch‘s vehicles, which was at a mutual
Fitch, still driving the blue SUV, met K.H. on her way back with the other vehicle and told her to follow him. They parked the other vehicle on Third Street near White Bear Avenue on the east side of Saint Paul. K.H. then got into the blue SUV with Fitch and they made several stops, including at Dairy Queen, an auto-repair shop, Jimmy John‘s, and Walgreens. At Walgreens, Fitch gave K.H. cash and asked her to buy him a cell phone and phone card.
After leaving Walgreens, Fitch and K.H. drove to J.K.‘s residence on West Sycamore Street in Saint Paul. They arrived “around dark,” which J.K. estimated was between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Fitch asked J.K. who else was at the house, told J.K. that he should not let anyone else in the house, and said that everyone should turn off their cell phones. J.K. instructed everyone at his house to remove the batteries from their cell phones.
Fitch had a black handgun equipped with a laser sight with him while at J.K.‘s residence. At some point, Fitch, J.K., and D.B.—another acquaintance of Fitch—went into a back room. The three discussed how Fitch could get to D.B.‘s cabin in Luck, Wisconsin. D.B. drew a map to the cabin for Fitch on a paper bag.
Fitch told J.H., another acquaintance at J.K.‘s residence that evening, that J.H. was going to accompany Fitch to Fitch‘s vehicle, then return the blue Hyundai SUV to J.C.‘s mother. Fitch instructed J.H. to tell anyone who asked that Fitch had gone to Canada. Fitch also warned J.H. that if he told anyone where Fitch wаs actually going, Fitch would kill his entire family.
Approximately 35 minutes after he arrived, Fitch left J.K.‘s residence with K.H. and J.H. Fitch drove the blue Hyundai SUV, J.H. rode in the front passenger seat, and K.H. rode in the backseat. By this time, the police had managed to track Fitch to the Sycamore address. The police chased the blue Hyundai SUV as it left the residence.
Fitch realized that he was being pursued by the police, and numerous police cars joined the chase. The chase wound through the surrounding neighborhood, ending in a parking lot on West Sycamore Street, not far from where the pursuit began. As Fitch was driving the SUV through the parking lot, the vehicle skidded and hit a curb. When the vehicle hit the curb, J.H. unlocked and oрened the door to the vehicle. Fitch pointed a gun at J.H., but J.H. pushed Fitch‘s arm away and was able to escape the vehicle.
After J.H. left, Fitch fired several shots at police officers who had arrived on the scene. A witness testified that he saw several flashes and heard gunshots coming from inside the Hyundai SUV. The witness also testified that the shots from the SUV shattered the driver‘s side window of the vehicle. Three officers testified that they saw Fitch aim a handgun in their direction, that they saw muzzle flashes as Fitch fired the handgun, and that they believed Fitch was shooting at them.
The police officers at the scene returned fire. The shootout lasted less than a minute. The officers stopped firing when they realized that K.H. was still in the backseat of the vehicle and it appeared that she had been shot. Fitch also indicated that he had been shot, but refused to leave the vehicle. Eventually, Fitch was removed from the vehicle by the Saint Paul SWAT team and his gunshot wounds were treated by medics at the scene.
While processing the scene of the shootout, law enforcement recovered a black handgun with a laser sight that matched
B.
Prosecuting Fitch presented venue issues. A Dakota County District Court judge noted that Officer Patrick was killed in Dakota County, but that the shootout with the police, which ultimately led to charges for attempted murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm, occurred in Ramsey County. The State originally charged Fitch by complaint in Dakota County, for the purpose of detention, with two counts of first-degree murder of a peace officer. The Dakota County District Court subsequently issued an order convening a multi-county grand jury, under
The district court‘s order impaneling the multi-district grand jury also specified that Dakota County would be the vеnue for any proceedings if the grand jury indicted Fitch. See
On October 16, 2014, Fitch filed a motion requesting that the district court dismiss the indictmеnt because, among other things, the district court‘s application of
The district court granted the motion to change venue on December 2, 2014. The district court found that the media coverage surrounding the case, including the public‘s exposure to information about Fitch‘s criminal record, made it impossible for Fitch to obtain a fair and impartial jury in Dakota County. As a result, the district court changed the venue to Stearns County. Later, on December 5, 2014, the district court denied Fitch‘s motion to dismiss the indictment and sever the charges. The district court concluded that
The case proceeded to trial in Stearns County. After a full trial, a Stearns County jury found Fitch guilty of all counts. The district court sentenced Fitch to life in prison without the possibility of release for the first-degree murder of Officer Patrick; 216 months in prison, to be served consecutively after the life sentence, for each of the three attemрted murders; and 71 months in prison, with credit for 189 days for time served, for the unauthorized possession of a firearm.
Fitch appealed his convictions to our court, raising two issues. First, Fitch argues that the use of
II.
This case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, which we review de novo. State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 479 (Minn.1999). “Minnesota statutеs are presumed constitutional, and our power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989). The party challenging the “constitutional validity of a statute ... bears the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.” State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.1990); see also State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn.2000) (“The party challenging a statute must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates some provision of the Minnesota Constitution.“).
Fitch argues that the application of
A.
At the outset, it is important to clarify that
Both parties appear to construe a defendant‘s right to a trial by a “jury of the county or district wherein the” alleged crime was committed to be a constitutional right to venue in the location where the alleged crime occurred. Although some of our cases have generally discussed this right in terms of venue or the location of trial, see, e.g., State v. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1990) (referring to
Consequently, Fitch‘s argument that
Similarly, in Krejci, we acknowledged that child abuse cases present “special venue problems” because it is often difficult to determine where the offense occurred. 458 N.W.2d at 411. In light of those problems, we upheld a statute that allowed cases of child abuse to be tried either in the county in which the offense was committed or in the county in which the child was “found,” concluding that the provision was similar to other special-venue provisions that we had upheld in the past. Id.
In 1870, we held that a district court did not violate a defendant‘s rights under
Thus, the language of
B.
Fitch‘s overarching claim is that his rights under
It should be noted that
Generally, a district court‘s designation of venue under subdivision 3 could and should comply with the defendant‘s rights under
To the extent, if any, that
In essence, the State argues that inconvenience to witnesses should be enough to overcome the defendant‘s constitutional right to trial by a jury of the county or district in which the crime was committed. This argument is not only novel, it is also unpersuasive and troubling. There is no limiting principle for when witness convenience
In short, the “special-venue need” that the State advances in this case is simply not the sort of compelling, venue-related interest that we have previously allowed to overcome a defendant‘s rights under
C.
But the fact that
Fitch argues that he had a right to be tried on the Ramsey County charges by a Ramsey County jury. But at the same time that he moved to dismiss the indictment because it violated his rights under
Over the State‘s objection, the district court granted Fitch‘s motion to change venue before deciding Fitch‘s motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court found that the “case ha[d] generated a large amount of publicity in and around Dakota and Ramsey Counties,” concluded that the media coverage made it “difficult if not nearly impossible” to impanel a fair and impartial Dakota County jury, and transferred venue in the case to Stearns County. Fitch was ultimately tried and found guilty by a Stearns County jury.8
III.
Next, Fitch claims that his conviction must be reversed because the district court committed reversible error by denying his motion to sever the first-degree murder charge from the other charges in his case. Fitch argues that the offenses in this case are separated by too much time and distance to be considered “related” and that, even if the offenses were related, joining the offenses for trial was unfairly prejudicial. The State responds by arguing that the offenses were related and properly joined because they occurred within 8 hours and 5 miles of one another and involved a common motive or plan. The State also argues that, even if the joinder was erroneous, Fitch‘s conviction should be affirmed because the joinder was harmless bеyond a reasonable doubt.
We review a district court‘s decision regarding whether to sever charges or offenses de novo. State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 607 (Minn.2006). A district court must sever offenses or charges prior to trial when “the offenses or charges are not related” or “the court determines severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant‘s guilt or innocence of each offense or charge.”
“But the ultimate question in a severance claim ... is one of prejudice.” Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting State v. Townsend, 546 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.1996) (alterations in original)). We have repeatedly and consistently held that joinder is not prejudicial if “evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the other.”11 State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 42 (Minn.1982).
In this case, evidence of the Ramsey County offenses would have been admissible as evidence in a trial for the Dakota County charge in order to establish a consciousness of guilt. See State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 745-47 (Minn.2010); State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn.1988); State v. McTague, 190 Minn. 449, 453-55, 252 N.W. 446, 448 (1934). Additionally, some evidence of the Ramsey County offenses may have been admissible in a trial on thе Dakota County charge to demonstrate that Fitch was in possession of the firearm that killed Officer Patrick. Similarly, evidence of the Dakota County offense would have been admissible in a trial of the Ramsey County charges in order to establish the motive for engaging in a shootout with the police. See Kendell, 723 N.W.2d at 608 n. 8 (noting that evidence of prior murder would have been admissible as evidence of motive in a trial for a subsequent murder that was committed in order to avoid apprehension).
Fitch argues that, even if some evidence of each offense would have been admissible at a separate trial of the other offenses, the joinder deprived the district court of the оpportunity to parse the evidence under
First, the evidence here was overwhelming and the admission of some evidence that may or may not have been excluded had there been separate trials was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Knight, 260 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn.1977) (considering the fact that the evidence against the defendant was “very strong” when determining whether joinder was prejudicial). Second, the offenses in this case are so interrelated that evidence of eaсh offense would have been highly probative of the other, and it would have been unlikely that the prejudicial effect of any of the evidence would have substantially outweighed its probative value. See Kendell, 723 N.W.2d at 609.
Finally, Fitch‘s concern is not unique to this case. The same concern regarding whether each individual piece of evidence would have been admissible at separate trials would have been present in Kendell, Conaway, and Profit, each of which concluded that the fact that evidence regarding each offense generally would have been admissible at a trial for the other offenses supported a finding that the joinder was not prejudicial. See Kendell, 723 N.W.2d at 608-09; Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 460-61; Conaway, 319 N.W.2d at 42. We have never engаged in a searching inquiry regarding whether each individual piece of evidence would have been admissible at a trial for the other offenses, and we decline to do so now.
Because Fitch was not prejudiced by the district court‘s ruling on his severance mo-
IV.
Fitch‘s rights under
Affirmed.
CHUTICH, J., not having been a member at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
G. BARRY ANDERSON
JUSTICE