State v. ChaState v. Cha
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Worke, Frisch, Bond
BOND, Judge
In this appeal from the judgment of conviction for two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct following a guilty plea, appellant argues that the district court
FACTS
In September 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Keng Cha with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (count one), in violation of
In February 2025, Cha pleaded guilty to counts two and three. As to potential sentences, the parties agreed that the presumptive guidelines sentence for third-degree criminal sexual conduct for a person who, like Cha, had a criminal-history score of zero, was 48 months in prison. The plea agreement provided that, in exchange for pleading guilty, Cha would receive consecutive sentences totaling 90 months in prison, the state would dismiss count one, and Cha could move for a downward dispositional departure; if the district court granted Cha‘s departure request, Cha would receive a stayed 96-month prison term.
At the plea hearing, Cha admitted that, while working as a high school volleyball coach in 2022, he began a sexual relationship with the victim, who was a 14-year-old student on the team. Cha admitted that he engaged in sexual penetration with the victim on multiple occasions and that he was in a position of authority and in a prohibited
Before the sentencing hearing, Cha filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure and accompanying legal memorandum, arguing that he is particularly amenable to probation based on his age, lack of prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation with the court, participation in Project Pathfinder, Inc., a sex-offender treatment program, and support from family and friends. Cha submitted other supporting documents, including a report of his honorable discharge from the national guard, sex-offender treatment progress reports, and letters of support from his former cultural wife, her sister, and his employer. Cha also complied with the psychosexual evaluation and participated in the PSI, which ultimately recommended the presumptive sentence.
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the parties clarified that the plea agreement provided for either an 86-month executed sentence or a 90-month stayed sentence. The district court then heard oral arguments from defense counsel and the prosecutor, and Cha gave a statement in allocution. The district court denied Cha‘s request for a dispositional departure, reasoning as follows:
The Court will put on the record I have read that presentence investigation report, as well as the psychosexual evaluation report that was filed into this case that was conducted by . . . [a] licensed psychologist, that was filed back on 6/15 of 2025, as well as her recommendations. The Court also read a number of documents filed by the Defense on behalf of Mr. Cha, namely a letter from Project Pathfinder dated 7/23/2025 by his therapist. I should put on the record all those documents were filed confidentially, consistent with the rules,
and [are] nonpublic as medical records. They will be maintained as such, including the psychosexual evaluation. The Court also read the Defense‘s memorandum in support of his motion for departure from the guidelines, filed 7/25/2025, and a number of letters and affidavits, one of which includes a letter from his cultural wife, and . . . a sister of his cultural wife, . . . along with other letters and/or progress review notes and updates supporting Mr. Cha‘s request for a dispositional departure.
First, I want Mr. Cha to know that I can appreciate that you have lack of criminal history, and typically that is a good sign that someone will do well on probation. However, what the Court cannot overlook is the significant age gap, as well as the significance of your role. Your role in this case was such that you were entrusted to be a volleyball coach to the young victim and a number of girls. As you indicated yourself, in one of the reports, they trusted you. You have violated, to the core, the trust of this young victim and her parents. Being in a position of trust, the authority and the responsibility of this young woman is perhaps one of the most grave violations of one‘s sense of personal safety, and emotional and physical well-being. Additionally, it involved the most egregious violation of both vaginal, oral, and other penetration, and while the Court can appreciate all the supporting documents of your active engagement in treatment, because of the seriousness of the offense, and the seriousness of the consequences of your conduct, this is what the Court will do.
The district court sentenced Cha to concurrent prison terms of 48 months on count two and 86 months on count three. Pursuant to the plea agreement, count one was dismissed.
Cha appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts afford the district court great discretion in sentencing and review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate court reverse a district court‘s imposition of the presumptive sentence. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish the presumptive disposition and duration of a sentence depending on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant‘s criminal history. See
Cha moved for a downward dispositional departure on the ground that he is particularly amenable to probation. A dispositional departure “occurs when the presumptive guidelines sentence calls for imprisonment but the district court instead stays execution or imposition of the sentence.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. When considering a dispositional departure, a district court focuses “more on the defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983).
A defendant‘s particular amenability to probation is a mitigating circumstance that may support a downward dispositional departure.
Cha argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a downward dispositional departure. Cha asserts that multiple factors demonstrate his particular amenability to probation, including his young age, lack of prior criminal history, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, cooperation in the prosecution and attitude in court, and his participation and demonstrated progress in sex-offender treatment. See id. Cha cites the PSI report, psychosexual evaluation, and his allocution at sentencing as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility.
Cha‘s argument is unavailing. Even when there is evidence in the record that a defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a district court is not required to grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). We will not reverse a district court‘s refusal to depart “as long as the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011)
Cha argues that the district court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to weigh Cha‘s valid reasons for a dispositional departure against reasons to not grant a departure,” citing State v. Curtiss. 353 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App. 1984). In Curtiss, the district court denied the defendant‘s motion for a downward durational departure and imposed the presumptive sentence because it found that “there were no legitimate reasons for departure.” Id. at 263. This court remanded for resentencing, concluding that there were “[l]egitimate reasons” in the record to support a downward departure and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider those reasons and weigh them against the reasons to not grant a departure. Id. at 263-64.
Unlike in Curtiss, the record in this case demonstrates that the district court carefully evaluated the information presented by both parties and weighed the factors supporting a departure and the reasons not to depart before ruling on Cha‘s departure motion. The district court reviewed the documents Cha submitted in support of his sentencing motion, heard arguments from defense counsel about the factors supporting a downward dispositional departure, and considered Cha‘s allocution. The district court acknowledged
Cha also argues that, in denying his downward dispositional departure, the district court inappropriately centered its analysis on the offense conduct, which is the focus of a durational departure analysis. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624 (explaining that a downward durational departure “is justified only if the defendant‘s conduct was significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense” (quotation omitted)). But when considering a motion for a downward dispositional departure, “a district court may consider both offender- and offense-related factors.” State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). Cha is therefore not entitled to reversal of his sentence because the district court considered, among other factors, the nature of the offense when denying his downward-dispositional-departure motion.
Affirmed.