State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Anthoney Micheal Fugalli, Appellant.
A19-2007
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 1, 2021
Thissen, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: December 1, 2021 Office of Appellate Courts
John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, Fairbault, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
Individuals “sell” a prohibited amount of a mixture containing a controlled substance when they offer to sell that amount of a controlled substance, even if less than the amount offered is delivered to the buyer.
Affirmed.
THISSEN, Justice.
This case requires us to determine whether, under
We conclude that under the plain language of section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), individuals “sell” 10 or more grams of heroin when they offer to sell 10 or more grams of heroin, even if the individual delivers, or has the capacity to only deliver, less than 10 grams of heroin to the buyer. We therefore affirm.
On November 15, 2018, Fugalli pleaded guilty to first-degree sale of one or more mixtures of a total weight of 10 grams or more containing heroin on one or more occasions within a 90-day period in violation of section 152.021, subdivision 1(3).2 During his plea hearing, he admitted selling heroin to an informant on four occasions between May 31 and June 19, 2018. On May 31, Fugalli offered to sell three grams of heroin in exchange for $650.00. He used a runner to complete the sale. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) later tested the package and determined that it contained 2.161 grams of heroin. On June 7, Fugalli offered to sell three grams of heroin for $510.00. He used the same runner to complete the sale. The BCA later tested the package and determined that it contained two grams of heroin. On June 12, Fugalli offered to sell three grams of heroin for $510.00, this time completing the sale himself. The BCA tested the package and determined that it contained 2.074 grams of heroin. Finally, on June 19, Fugalli offered to sell four grams of heroin for $750.00, again completing the sale himself. Later BCA testing showed that the package contained 2.671 grams of heroin. In summary, Fugalli admitted at the plea hearing that on four occasions within a 90-day time period, he offered to sell the informant an aggregate amount of 13 grams of heroin and delivered 8.906 grams of heroin.
Before accepting Fugalli‘s guilty plea, the district court noted that “the definition of sale includes offer to sell,” but asked the parties whether any case law addressed the issue
On January 7, 2019, Fugalli moved to withdraw his guilty. Fugalli argued that section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), requires proof that 10 or more grams of heroin were actually delivered. Because Fugalli‘s admissions at the plea hearing established that he delivered less than 10 grams of heroin, he asserted that the plea hearing record did not establish that he committed a first-degree controlled substance sale crime under section 152.021, subd. 1(3), and, therefore, he must be allowed to withdraw his plea.
Following an evidentiary hearing on June 14, 2019, the district court denied Fugalli‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court noted that the factual basis of Fugalli‘s guilty plea was his admission that he offered to sell 13 grams of heroin. The district court concluded that his admission was sufficient and accurate for the first-degree controlled substance sale crime. On September 17, 2019, Fugalli was sentenced to 78 months in prison.
On appeal, Fugalli challenged the district court‘s legal conclusion that his offer to sell more than 10 grams of heroin while delivering less than 10 grams was sufficient for a conviction under
The court of appeals rejected Fugalli‘s argument and affirmed his conviction. It held that his admission to offering to sell 13 grams of heroin “meets the straightforward statutory definition of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. at *2. The court stated, “[T]o conclude that . . . section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), authorizes a first-degree controlled substance conviction only if a defendant actually delivers, rather than merely offers to sell or deliver” would require “ignoring the defining statutory language.” Id.
We granted Fugalli‘s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us from an order denying Fugalli‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a first-degree controlled substance sale crime in violation of section 152.021, subdivision 1(3). Fugalli moved to withdraw his guilty plea under
The manifest injustice claimed here is that the guilty plea was inaccurate. Fugalli asserts that section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), requires proof not only that the accused offered to sell 10 or more grams of heroin, but also that the accused delivered (or at least had access to) 10 or more grams of heroin. In contrast, the State argues that
To resolve this dispute, we must determine the meaning of section 152.021, subdivision 1(3). That is a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020). When interpreting statutes, our objective is to “effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute‘s language is ambiguous. Id. The language of a statute is unambiguous when there is only one reasonable way to read the text. State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Minn. 2021).
The statutory language at issue here provides: “A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the first degree if: . . . (3) on one or more occasions within a 90-day period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a total weight of ten grams or more containing heroin . . . .”
When the Legislature has defined a term, that meaning prevails. See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981). “The legislature defines a term only because it intends in some measure to depart from the ordinary sense of that term. Thus, there is a presumption that we are not to substitute the literal, ordinary meaning . . . for the
Returning to the first-degree controlled substance sale provision under section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), we insert the Legislature‘s definition of “sell” into the statutory definition of the crime. Cf. State v. Traxler, 583 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that substituting the phrase “possess with the intent to manufacture” for “sell” in jury instructions “did not materially misstate the law“). After replacing “sell” with the statutory definition relevant here,
The language self-evidently and unambiguously tells us that individuals “sell” 10 or more grams of heroin when they offer to sell 10 or more grams of heroin. The statutory language does not require anything more. No additional grammatical parsing or lexicographic analysis is necessary to understand what the language plainly says when we apply the Legislature‘s definition. Accordingly, because Fugalli admitted to offering to sell more than 10 grams of heroin, his guilty plea to first-degree sale of heroin, under
Fugalli insists, however, that section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), requires the State to prove that the person making the sale actually delivered more than 10 grams of heroin, or at the very least, had both access and capacity to deliver 10 or more grams of heroin. To
First, he points to prior decisions where we have held that the State must establish four distinct elements to prove the commission of a first-degree controlled substance sale crime: (1) a sale, (2) the unlawfulness of the sale, (3) the weight of the controlled substance sold, and (4) the identity of the controlled substance sold.3 Second, Fugalli observes that the object of the word “offer” in the statutory definition of “sell” is the act of selling. See
We disagree with Fugalli‘s analysis. To begin with, Fugalli‘s argument works too hard and unduly strains the ordinary meaning of the language adopted by the Legislature. Fugalli essentially asks us to read section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), as follows: “A person is guilty of a controlled substance crime in the first degree if on one or more occasions
Moreover, the premise of Fugalli‘s argument is incorrect. The State here did prove all four elements: (1) Fugalli made a “sale“—here, the offer to sell; (2) Fugalli concedes that it was unlawful for him to sell heroin; (3) Fugalli offered to sell 10 or more grams of a substance, meeting the weight element; and (4) Fugalli offered to sell “heroin,” meeting the identity element.
Fugalli also argues that the legislative history of the definition of “sell” in section 152.01, subdivision 15a, compels a decision different from the one we reach today. He points to a short and indecisive discussion between a single legislator and a single witness. We do not need to resort to legislative history when a statute is unambiguous. See State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Minn. 2017) (“[L]egislative history is relevant only if the statute is ambiguous.“). Because the statutory meaning of “sell” is plain and unambiguous for the reasons stated above, we decline to use legislative history to create ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous statute.
Fugalli further asserts that the language of section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), must be construed to require an actual delivery because the First Amendment prohibits the
The pre-ambiguity whole statute canon likewise does not help Fugalli. That canon applies when two statutes were enacted at the same time and address the same subject. See Prigge, 907 N.W.2d at 640 (stating that the whole statute canon did not apply to two statutes enacted at different times and which do not address the same subject and apply to different circumstances); Sheridan v. Comm‘r of Revenue, 963 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2021) (stating that whole statute canon did not apply because the statutes being compared
And the statutes were enacted at different times. It has been a crime to “sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange or distribute” a controlled substance since at least 1971. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 937, § 13, 1971 Minn. Laws 1923, 1931–32; see
In sum, Fugalli‘s efforts to avoid the plain meaning of the statutory language fail. His guilty plea was accurate because he admitted to offering to sell more than 10 grams of heroin, even though he delivered less than that amount.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
Notes
In a series of cases, the court of appeals has discussed the distinct question of whether, when a charge is based on an offer to sell, the State must provide some corroborating evidence that the accused had the intent to follow through on the words of the offer. The court of appeals has reached different answers on that legal question. Compare State v. Lorsung, 658 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Minn. App. 2003) (ruling that evidence of intent to fulfill an offer to sell drugs is not required), rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 2003), and State v. Hebrink, No. C6-02-1288, 2003 WL 21384828, at *3 (Minn. App. June 17, 2003) (ruling that
In each of those cases, resolution of the question was unnecessary because the State had evidence of corroborating acts. See Lorsung, 658 N.W.2d at 217 (affirming a second-degree conviction for offering to sell methamphetamine when over the phone the defendant agreed to sell two eight balls of methamphetamine for $500 and agreed on a meeting location, but never followed through); Hebrink, 2003 WL 21384828, at *3 (affirming first-degree and second-degree convictions for offering to sell cocaine when the defendant exchanged cocaine for $250 in one sale, then accepted $600 for a second sale and never returned or delivered on that sale); Rosillo, 2001 WL 881279, at *2 (affirming first-degree conviction for offering to sell cocaine when the defendant accepted $1,200 and arranged to meet at a later time to deliver cocaine but never showed up or delivered any drugs); Bautista, 1998 WL 422221, at *1 (affirming first-degree conviction for sale of cocaine when defendant made phone calls to arrange a deal for six ounces of cocaine and accepted $3,600 in payment but never delivered any cocaine).
We neither reach nor express an opinion on the issue of intent discussed in the cases cited in this footnote because Fugalli did not raise this issue on appeal. Moreover, during the plea hearing, he admitted evidence of corroborating acts: he in fact delivered heroin to the confidential informant.