Ramsey County, Ryan David Petersen, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
A19-0686
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 26, 2019
Anderson, J. Took no part, Gildea, C.J.
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________
Ryan David Petersen, Oak Park Heights, Minnesota, pro se appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on the merits.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
ANDERSON, Justice.
Appellant Ryan David Petersen was convicted of the first-degree premeditated murder of Chase Passauer. On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018). Petersen then sought postconviction relief, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied his petition without a hearing. Because we conclude that Petersen’s claim fails on the merits, we affirm the district court.
FACTS
The murder of Chase Passauer arose from a dispute between Petersen and his criminal defense attorney.1 On the day of the murder, Petersen exchanged a series of text messages with his attorney concerning a parking ticket. When the attorney informed Petersen that he was unable to talk by phone because he was preparing for court, and he would not handle Petersen’s parking ticket, Petersen fired the attorney and demanded a refund of the $7,000 retainer he had previously paid. Petersen told his girlfriend that he intended to get his money back from, аnd shoot, the attorney. Petersen then drove five miles to the attorney’s office and, with a hidden .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun in his waistband, entered the building, ascended the stairs, and entered the law office through unlocked doors.
The State charged Petersen by complaint with second-degree intentional murder. Just before his second court appearance,2 Petersen informed the State that he intended to enter a straight pleа to the charge of second-degree intentional murder. The State filed an amended complaint charging Petersen with first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intentional murder, and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The State also informed the district court that a grand jury proceeding would be convened to consider the first-degree murder charge.
Petersen still attempted to plead guilty to the second-degree murder charge, but the district court did not accept his plea. Five days later, a grand jury indicted Petersen on all three charges. The district court denied Petersen’s motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment.
After a bench trial, the district court found Petersen guilty of all three charges. The district court sentenced Petersen to life in prison without the possibility of release for first-
Petersen filed a direct appeal. See Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1. We determined that (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to accept Petersen’s guilty plea to second-degree intentional murder, and (2) sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding of premeditation. Id. at 6, 8. Accordingly, we affirmed Petersen’s convictions. Id. at 9.
Petersen filed a petition for postconviction relief. He argued that his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder must be set aside and that, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he should receive a new sentencing hearing for his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The district court denied Petersen’s petition without a hearing, and Peterson now appeals.
ANALYSIS
A person convicted of a crime may petition for postconviction relief under
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Petersen must show that (1) his appellate counsel’s representation on direct appeal “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the prоceeding would have been different,” id. at 694; see also Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001). Courts “may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014). In addition, when determining whether an attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, courts do not second-guess the decision of appellate counsel not to raise a claim that “counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.” Reed, 793 N.W.2d at 733 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Petersen raises four claims of error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. We consider each claim in turn.
A.
Petersen first argues that the district court erred by determining that his appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that his convictions for first-degree murder and second-degree murder violated
“Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or аn included offense, but not both.”
Although similar to section 609.04, section 609.035 focuses on the issue of sentences, as opposed to conviction. It states:
Except [for subdivisions and sections that do not apply to this case], if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.
In this case, the district court acknowledged that the sentencing order arising from the court trial erroneously states that Petersen was “convicted” of second-degree intentional murder. More specifically, the district court acknowledged that “the sentencing order dated October 7, 2016 contains a clerical error in indicating [that Petersen] was convicted of” second-degree intentional murder; thus, the court directed that the order “be corrected to reflect [that Petersen] was found guilty by the court but no conviction was entered by the court.” The district court also observed that no punishment was imposed for the second-
On appeal, Petersen fails to acknowledge that the district court agreed that the clerical error in the sentencing order required correction for consistency with section 609.04. Instead, he contends that the guilty verdicts for both first-degree murder and second-degree murder violate sections 609.04 and 609.035. We disаgree.
As a matter of law, the guilty verdicts for both first-degree murder and second-degree murder do not violate section 609.04 or section 609.035. A guilty verdict is not a conviction. Pierson, 715 N.W.2d at 925 (holding that “a conviction occurs only after the district court judge accepts, records, and adjudicates” a finding of guilt). And, in accordance with Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d at 293, Petersen was not sentenced for second-degree murder. Instead, like the defendant in Rhodes, 735 N.W.2d at 320 n.7, Petersen was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenсed on that count only. As explained in Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d at 589, sentencing Petersen on the first-degree murder count—the most serious offense—aligns with the purpose of section 609.035. Thus, appellate counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness when she did not raise claims on direct appeal that the guilty verdicts violated sections 609.04 and 609.035.
Petersen next argues that the district court erred by determining that his appellate counsel wаs not ineffective when counsel failed to argue that the charging document was defective.5 Petersen’s argument fails under both prongs of Strickland.
Under the first prong of Strickland, Petersen’s argument fails because he has not shown that appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the charging document fell below an objective level of reasonableness. 466 U.S. at 688. “An offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment. The prosecutor may initially proceed by a complaint after an arrest without a warrant or as the basis to issue an arrest warrant.”6
Under the second prong of Strickland, Petersen fails to show that, even if appellate counsel had argued on direct appeal that the charging document was defective, the outcome would have been different. Because Rule 17.01 allows a complaint to charge first-degree murder while a grand jury is convened, and beсause the timing requirement in
C.
Petersen also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to assert that the amended complaint was a defective charging document. Had that argument been pursued, he asserts, the first-degree murder charge would have been dismissed, leaving only the second-degree murder charge, for which the district court would have been compelled to accept his plea. In support of this argument, Petersen relies on State v. Linehan, 150 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1967), which he contends holds that he has an absolute right to plead guilty to the second-degree murder charge.
To appropriately analyze Petersen’s argument, the context of Linehan is important. In Linehan, the defendant was charged by indictment with first-degree murder, third-degree murder, and kidnapping. Id. at 205. The defendant attempted to plead guilty to the third-degree murder chаrge, but the district court rejected that plea. Id. Subsequently, the prosecution dismissed the indictment, charged only kidnapping, and the defendant was convicted. Id. On appeal, we stated that “[t]here is nothing in the grand jury’s action showing an intent to vary the rule that the defendant has no absolute right to plead guilty to anything less than the entire indictment.” Id. at 207. Petersen interprets this language to imply that if a defendant has no absolute right to plead to anything less than the entire complаint, then the defendant necessarily has an absolute right to plead to the entire complaint.
Because appellate counsel reasonably could conclude that Peterson did not have an absolute right to plead guilty under Linehan, Petersen has failed to establish the first prong of Strickland.
D.
In addition, Petersen argues that the district court erred by failing to consider his arguments that appellatе counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to assert a violation of
Petersen contends that his first-degree murder conviction violates
Every defendant in a criminal action is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and, in case of a reasonable doubt, is entitled tо acquittal; and when an offense has been proved against the defendant, and there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be convicted only of the lowest.
We considered, and rejected, a similar argument in State v. Hallmark, stating that “section 611.02 does not require a defendant found guilty of two crimes to be sentenced on the lesser of the two crimes.” 927 N.W.2d 281, 306 (Minn. 2019).9 In Hallmark, the defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree
Like the defendant in Hallmark, Petersen alsо misstates the meaning of section 611.02. Petersen argues that, because he was found guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder, “there is a doubt as to which of the two the [judge] intended to find [him] ‘guilty’ of.” But verdicts finding Peterson guilty of both first-degree and second-degree murder do not, by definition, create “doubt” as to his guilt for either crime. Rather, Petersen is guilty of both crimes; he was convicted of, and sentenced for, first-degree premeditated murdеr and neither the conviction nor the sentence are prohibited by section 611.02. And on direct appeal, we concluded “that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the totality of the evidence is that Petersen’s murder of Passauer was a premeditated act.” Petersen, 910 N.W.2d at 8. Thus, section 611.02 is inapplicable here because there is no doubt about Petersen’s guilt of first-degree premeditated murder.10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.
GILDEA, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
guilty plea on the ground that the second аppearance was an Omnibus Hearing under
Notes
Petersen also cites State v. Hernandez, No. C8-00-1482, 2001 WL 641526 (Minn. App. June 12, 2001), in his brief to support his argument that section 611.02 requires a second-degree murder sentence here. But Hernandez involves a case in which the court of appeals held, based on the language of the jury instructions, that the jury’s verdicts were legally inconsistent. Id. at *2. The instructions required the jury tо find that the defendant “knew or believed” that the substance she was selling was cocaine for one charge, while simultaneously finding that the defendant “knew or believed” that the substance she was selling was amphetamine for a different charge. Id. at *1. That is not this case.