STATE OF MAINE v. ROBERT I. BOYD JR.
Docket: Yor-16-168
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
March 2, 2017
2017 ME 36
SAUFLEY, C.J.
Argued: December 15, 2016; Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶1] The State of Maine, with the approval of the Attorney General, see
[¶2] The court found the following facts, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record. See State v. Morrison, 2015 ME 153, ¶¶ 2, 5, 128 A.3d 1060. At about 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 2015, an officer of the Sanford Police Department stopped a vehicle operated by Boyd for continuing to have an expired inspection sticker one month after having been stopped for the expired sticker. In speaking with Boyd, the officer noticed the smell of alcohol on Boyd‘s breath. The officer asked Boyd how much he had had to drink that day. Boyd said that he was hung over, but he denied having had any alcohol that day.
[¶3] The officer conducted multiple field sobriety tests and, based on what he observed, determined that he had probable cause to arrest Boyd for operating under the influence. See
[¶4] The officer then located a paramedic to draw a sample of Boyd‘s blood. The officer did not obtain Boyd‘s consent to the blood test. Nor did the officer read any warnings to Boyd about the consequences of refusing to submit to testing, see
[¶5] On November 20, 2015, Boyd was charged by complaint with operating under the influence (Class D),
[¶6] In an order entered nine days later, the court ordered the suppression of the blood test result, finding that the officer did not obtain a warrant or seek Boyd‘s consent, and that Boyd‘s “amenability and
[¶7] With the written approval of the Attorney General, the State appealed from the court‘s order. See
II. DISCUSSION
[¶8] A blood test for alcohol or drugs is different from a breath test in that it is more intrusive and therefore constitutes a search that more seriously infringes on the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173-2185 (2016). For the results of a blood test to be admissible in the State‘s case-in-chief, the search effectuated through that blood test must meet the Fourth Amendment‘s requirement that a search be reasonable. See id. at ---, 136 S. Ct. at 2173. A search is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to a legally obtained warrant or if an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See
[¶9] Here, the State does not argue that it obtained a warrant or that there were exigent circumstances. The State argues only that the court erred in determining that Boyd did not consent to the search because Boyd‘s acquiescence, combined with the effect of the “implied consent” statute, constituted consent.
[¶10] The State is correct that a search in the form of a blood test is reasonable, even without a warrant, if a person freely and voluntarily consents to the search. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; State v. Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990). To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture.” State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16, 41 A.3d 535 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] Because the State bore the burden of proof and was the unsuccessful party before the suppression court, the State bears the burden to demonstrate on appeal “that the trial court was compelled to make findings in
[¶12] The court was not compelled, based on the evidence presented, to find that Boyd‘s acquiescence to the blood draw demonstrated his voluntary consent and overcame the warrant requirement. See Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367 (holding that, to demonstrate voluntary consent, the State must show “more than a mere ‘acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority‘” (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968))). The police officer who arrested Boyd testified only that Boyd did not object to testing and that he was “very cooperative.” The paramedic similarly testified that Boyd did not object to the blood draw. This evidence does not compel a finding of an objective manifestation of voluntary consent. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16, 41 A.3d 535; cf. Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367 (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained after the defendant taxidermist manifested his consent to the search by accompanying game wardens into his basement shop, where he unlocked, opened, and emptied his freezer).
[¶13] Thus, we turn to the State‘s argument that Maine‘s “implied consent” statute, when combined with Boyd‘s acquiescence to the blood draw, had the effect of establishing Boyd‘s voluntary consent. Maine‘s statute,
[¶14] Had the officer sought and received Boyd‘s voluntary consent, the test results would have been admissible. See Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109. If Boyd had responded to the request for consent by refusing to give it, the officer would have known to warn of the
[¶15] Based on the evidence admitted here, however, which the parties agree did not show that Boyd refused the blood draw, and which did not compel the court to find that Boyd voluntarily and explicitly consented to it, the court properly analyzed whether, based on all of the circumstances, the State proved that Boyd objectively manifested consent. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16, 41 A.3d 535. The evidentiary record does not compel a finding that Boyd freely and voluntarily consented to the drawing and testing of his blood through his mere acquiescence and cooperation. See Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367; see also Collier, 2013 ME 44, ¶ 6, 66 A.3d 563.
The entry is:
Order of suppression affirmed.
Amy McNally, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellee Robert I. Boyd Jr.
York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-30829