STATE OF MAINE v. J.R.
Som-17-489
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
August 14, 2018
2018 ME 117
MEAD, J.
Argued: June 13, 2018.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] J.R. appeals from the judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, Benson, J.), sitting as the juvenile court, that adjudicated him of having committed two counts of criminal mischief (Class D),
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] J.R. was born on March 3, 2001. He was fifteen when the State filed, on January 13, 2017, the first of the three juvenile petitions that are the subject of this appeal. In docket number SKODC-JV-17-0005 (17-0005), the State alleged that, on November 15, 2016, J.R. “receive[d], retain[ed], or dispose[d] of a scooter, . . . knowing it had been stolen, or believing probably that it had been stolen, with the intent to deprive [the owner] of the property,” and that he damaged the scooter by “painting” the number “420” on it. The petition in 17-0005 charged J.R. with theft by receiving stolen property (Class E),
[¶3] On February 27, 2017, J.R. appeared at an initial hearing and denied both charges. The court ordered his release on the conditions that he (1) refrain from any illegal acts, including the use of alcohol or illegal drugs; (2) remain under house arrest when not at school, travelling to or from school, or under the supervision of his parents or someone approved by his Juvenile Community Corrections Officer (JCCO); (3) have no contact with the owner of the scooter or the juveniles involved in its theft or reporting it stolen to the police; and (4) report regularly to his JCCO. The court set the matter for an adjudicatory hearing on April 10, 2017.
[¶4] Before that next hearing occurred, however, the State filed a second petition, which was entered in docket number SKODC-JV-17-0021 (17-0021). The petition charged J.R. with aggravated criminal mischief (Class C),
[¶5] In the period following the continuance, however, J.R. did not meaningfully participate in services. He attended only a few brief counseling sessions, which the counselor then discontinued due to J.R.‘s lack of engagement. When J.R. failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing on June 12, the court ordered a warrant for his arrest and subsequent detention, which issued later that month. While J.R.‘s whereabouts were unknown, the State filed a third petition against him. That petition, entered in SKODC-JV-17-0034 (17-0034), charged J.R. with burglary (Class B),
[¶6] On October 12, 2017, law enforcement took J.R. into custody and, after a hearing the next day, the court (Benson, J.) ordered him to remain detained until the adjudicatory hearing later in the month. See
[¶7] After J.R. admitted to the offenses of receiving stolen property and criminal mischief in 17-0005 and the amended charges of unauthorized taking in 17-0034 and criminal mischief in 17-0021, the court found, based upon a thorough colloquy with J.R., that “his admissions [were] knowing and voluntary.” The court then proceeded to determine an appropriate disposition.
[¶8] Regarding the disposition of J.R.‘s case, the court and the State expressed that their ultimate objective was “rehabilitation of the juvenile.” The court further explained that, to fulfill the overarching intent of the Maine Juvenile Code, “the Court is bound to impose the least restrictive dispositional alternative.” The court rejected the possibility of a straight probationary disposition, stating “there‘s just no indication that . . . if I were to [order probation] . . . that [it] would succeed.” The court was apparently—and appropriately—frustrated by a lack of suitable alternatives for treating J.R. in the community: “Looking at [the factors for withholding an institutional disposition], everyone up to this point has bent over backwards in order to impose the least restrictive alternative so that you could try to succeed . . . . And up to this point, you just haven‘t justified the confidence.”
[¶9] The court ordered that J.R. be committed to an approved juvenile detention facility for an indeterminate period not to exceed his eighteenth birthday. J.R. timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶10] J.R. argues that the court abused its discretion and otherwise erred3 when it determined that a disposition committing him to Long Creek was the least restrictive alternative, absent any explicit finding that his commitment was necessary to protect the public. See
A. The Maine Juvenile Code
[¶11] The juvenile court correctly noted the Maine Juvenile Code‘s stated preference for keeping juveniles in the home, whenever possible, and its emphasis upon rehabilitation. Title
A. To secure for each juvenile subject to these provisions such care and guidance, preferably in the juvenile‘s own home, as will best serve the juvenile‘s welfare and the interests of society;
B. To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including improvement of home environment;
C. To remove a juvenile from the custody of the juvenile‘s parents only when the juvenile‘s welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endangered or, when necessary, to punish a child adjudicated, pursuant to chapter 507, as having committed a juvenile crime;
D. To secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of the juvenile‘s parents the necessary treatment, care, guidance and discipline to assist that juvenile in becoming a responsible and productive member of society;
E. To provide procedures through which the provisions of the law are executed and enforced and that ensure that the parties receive fair hearings at which their rights as citizens are recognized and protected; and
F. To provide consequences, which may include those of a punitive nature, for repeated serious criminal behavior or repeated violations of probation conditions.
Rehabilitation remains among the goals even in situations requiring the removal of a juvenile from the custody of his parents: when “confinement is necessary for protection of the public” because it will (1) prevent the juvenile from committing another crime, (2) most effectively provide correctional treatment to the juvenile, or (3) avoid “depreciat[ing] the seriousness of the juvenile‘s conduct.”
[¶12] Commentary from the 1979 amendment to sections 3002 and 3313 also evinces the Legislature‘s preference for treatment in the community. The 1979 commentary states that the intent of those sections is “to give priority to the least restrictive . . . disposition (section 3313) that is appropriate.” See 1979 Commentary at 398, 479, included with 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 3002, 3313 (2003). Further emphasizing the Juvenile Code‘s intent to avoid the institutional commitment of a juvenile when possible,
[¶13] An argument akin to those advanced by J.R. has been presented to us previously. Nearly forty years ago, we upheld the constitutionality of the Maine Juvenile Code against a fourteen-year-old‘s equal protection and due process challenge to his indeterminate commitment for a “possible seven[-]year term [that was] on its face longer than the five[-]year term [that] might have been imposed upon an adult convicted of a similar offense.” State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 586 (Me. 1979). We held then that the Juvenile Code‘s “goals of rehabilitation and treatment, now in large degree eschewed by the sentencing provisions of the Maine Criminal Code, justif[ied] longer indeterminate sentences for juveniles” because those features of the juvenile system were a rational basis for sentencing young offenders differently.5 Id.
[¶14] Today, the goal of rehabilitation clearly remains at the heart of the Juvenile Code. In the years following our decision in Gleason, the Legislature has enacted only minor changes to the express purposes of the Juvenile Code and the criteria for withholding an institutional disposition. See Historical and Statutory Notes at 399, 479, included with 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 3002, 3313 (2003).6 We turn now to J.R.‘s argument
1. The Least Restrictive Dispositional Alternative
[¶15] Despite the predominantly rehabilitative purposes behind the Juvenile Code generally, and the criteria for institutional dispositions more specifically, J.R. asserts that commitment to Long Creek is not rehabilitative but punitive. J.R. argues in the alternative that even if such commitments can serve the objective of rehabilitation, the court nonetheless abused its discretion because committing him for an indeterminate period was not the least restrictive disposition.
[¶16] As J.R. notes, section 3314 provides for various dispositional alternatives, such as probation, that are less restrictive than commitment. See
[¶17] Although the court did not expressly identify those concerns as the grounds for its disposition, “[w]e have never required the sentencing judge to address each of the factors set out [in the sentencing statute] and explicitly negate them.” State v. Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 22, 852 A.2d 70. In arriving at the disposition here, it is clear that the court took the factors in section 3313 into account. The court specifically referred to “a number of factors that I am supposed to look at in determining whether . . . to withhold an institutional disposition.” We therefore infer from the record that the court appropriately considered the factors in section 3313. Id.
[¶18] Against those controlling factors that persuaded the court that J.R.‘s commitment was necessary to protect the public, J.R. counters that he did not contemplate or cause any harm by his conduct and had no prior adjudicatory record. See
[¶19] First, J.R. was escalating the seriousness of his criminal conduct in relatively short order. His later offenses occurred after he had been released on then-pending juvenile petitions. The trajectory of his behaviors clearly portends future crimes. Second, J.R. failed to meaningfully engage in counseling when given the opportunity
2. The Proportionality of J.R.‘s Indeterminate Commitment
[¶20] We turn next to J.R.‘s argument that his indeterminate commitment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to his juvenile crimes because it potentially incarcerates him for a longer term than the sentences for adults convicted of similar property crimes.7 See
[¶21] We first must recognize that “[c]ourts rarely find sentences disproportionate pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, except in cases involving the death penalty or juvenile defendants.” State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 26, 65 A.3d 1242. As J.R. appears to concede, his case is immediately distinguishable from the U.S. Supreme Court‘s line of Eighth Amendment cases regarding juvenile defendants tried as adults for the most serious types of crimes and subjected to the harshest of sentences.8 “However, the United States Supreme
[¶22] J.R.‘s argument, requesting that we overrule Gleason and determine that his disposition is disproportionate punishment, does not square with the statutory mandates applicable to his case. The Juvenile Code in Maine continues to treat juveniles differently from adult offenders, see
[¶23] In citing Gleason, we confirm that, despite the apparent disparity in J.R.‘s disposition and the statutory limits on misdemeanor sentences for adult offenders, see
[¶24] J.R. was adjudged to have committed two counts of criminal mischief (Class D) and three counts of theft (Class E) in four different instances of criminal conduct increasing in seriousness over time. The length of the institutional disposition ordered by the court was mandated by statute as an indeterminate period not to exceed J.R.‘s eighteenth birthday. See
[¶25] Militating against an inference that J.R.‘s sentence is grossly disproportionate is J.R.‘s need for substance abuse rehabilitation and his potential to spend only as much time as it takes to complete the rehabilitation program. All agreed at the dispositional hearing that J.R. needs “real treatment,” and all agree on appeal that J.R.‘s substance abuse was a significant factor in the court‘s disposition. Ultimately,
[¶26] We need not, and do not, reach the second step of the proportionality analysis because J.R.‘s disposition leads to no inference of gross disproportionality. See Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 29, 65 A.3d 1242. We note, however, that comparing the length of J.R.‘s disposition with that of sentences imposed upon adults, even those convicted of similar crimes, would be inapt.9 The different purposes of the criminal sentencing statutes and those governing the disposition of juvenile crimes are too great to support an effective comparison. See Gleason, 404 A.2d at 580-81, 586.
[¶27] In conclusion, we note the gaps in the continuum of care that are exemplified by J.R.‘s case. In such a case, where the juvenile is unable to engage meaningfully in rehabilitation services in an unsecured setting, Long Creek‘s secure facility often remains the least restrictive and only choice to undertake the process of substance abuse and correctional treatment for a youth adjudicated of having committed juvenile crimes. The court is not a provider of social services, and judges’ options for the disposition of cases are limited to existing programs and services. Resources for intervention that have been established by the Legislature, communities, and public and private entities are simply too few and far apart to provide judges with creative alternatives. By imposing the minimum term permissible for an indeterminate commitment to Long Creek, the court acted within its discretion and did not err in applying the mandates of section 3313 to J.R.‘s specific needs. We, therefore, affirm.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
SAUFLEY, C.J., with whom GORMAN and JABAR, JJ., join, concurring.
[¶28] I concur completely in the thoughtful and thorough analysis of the Court. This youth was spiraling out of control, leaving the parties and the court with very few options.
[¶29] I write separately, however, to address the unfortunate gap in services and placements available to Maine‘s children and youth who, as with J.R., have found themselves in trouble with the law.
[¶30] The Legislature has been very clear regarding the purposes of the Maine Juvenile Code. See
1. Purposes. The purposes of this part are: . . . .
D. To secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of the juvenile‘s parents the necessary treatment, care, guidance, and discipline to assist that juvenile in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.
Id. § 3002(1)(D). If we are all to pursue the Legislature‘s goals in juvenile proceedings, a much greater range of “treatment, care, guidance, and discipline” options must be available to address the individualized needs and challenges of each child and youth.
[¶31] As the Court notes cogently, “In the circumstances presented here, the only meaningful less restrictive alternative to commitment was to place J.R. on probation.” Court‘s Opinion ¶ 16. In this context, where J.R.‘s behavior was escalating consistently despite the resources that had been provided, despite parental efforts, and despite the adults’ forewarning of potential consequences of his errant behavior, “[t]he trajectory of his behaviors clearly portends future crime.” Court‘s Opinion ¶ 19. In the absence of a resource that was capable of interrupting the escalation of his unacceptable behavior, J.R. would very likely have gone on to commit more serious crimes, possibly harming other members of the public and certainly harming his own potential. Accordingly, the State‘s position and the court‘s decision were appropriate and within reason given their alternatives.
[¶32] Nonetheless, the fact that the court was left with two stark alternatives—probation, which would almost certainly fail, or incarceration, which has its own substantial negative repercussions10—is a tragedy. While the
lack of alternatives available today may not be directly contrary to the strictures of Maine law or the Constitutions, we can and must do better for Maine‘s youth.[¶33] The lack of alternatives available to the court, to the youth and his family, and to the attorneys attempting to carry out the Legislature‘s mandate for rehabilitation of a youth who is out of control, is both shortsighted and fraught with potential long-term consequences. We, in government, must find additional alternatives for our children and youth. That continuum of care should include both well-proven and promising innovative programs, including such options as evidence-based behavioral modification programs, residential treatment facilities, enhanced mental health treatment services, and even group homes with structure and
[¶34] As we plan for the future of this great State, it is my hope that new and effective alternatives will be available for our children and youth who are in need of individualized services.
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau, PLLC, Portland, for Appellant J.R.
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Carie James, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Emma E. Bond, Esq., Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Meagan S. Sway, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation
Skowhegan District Court docket numbers JV-2017-05, JV-2017-21, JV-2017-34
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
Notes
§ 1151. Purposes
The general purposes of the provisions of this part are:
1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when required in the interest of public safety;
2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be compensated and other purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served.
3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further criminality;
4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on the conviction of a crime;
5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological goals;
6. To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a just individualization of sentences;
7. To promote the development of correctional programs that elicit the cooperation of convicted persons;
8. To permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses, with reference to the factors, among others, of:
A. The age of the victim, particularly of a victim of an advanced age or of a young age who has a reduced ability to self-protect or who suffers more significant harm due to age; and
B. The selection by the defendant of the person against whom the crime was committed or of the property that was damaged or otherwise affected by the crime because of the race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or homelessness of that person or of the owner or occupant of that property; and
9. To recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual and society and to recognize batterers’ intervention programs certified pursuant to Title 19-A, section 4014 as the most appropriate and effective community intervention in cases involving domestic violence.
Id. at 73.the incarceration of many youth at Long Creek for low-risk offenses, the high rate of referrals of youth to Long Creek from mental health placements, the limited number of community-based mental health services for Maine‘s adolescent population, questions about the quality and effectiveness of existing community-based mental health services, the high cost of keeping a youth at the facility ($250,000 per year per youth), and the availability of federal funds (e.g., through Medicaid) to support community-based programs but not institutional care.