STATE OF MAINE v. CHRISTOPHER TODD HALL
Yor-18-277
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
August 6, 2019
2019 ME 126
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Reporter of Decisions; Argued: April 9, 2019
[¶1] The jury in this case was presented with evidence that Christopher Todd Hall, angry about the results of a court proceeding involving his children, lured the woman who had served as the guardian ad litem in that matter to a house—under false pretenses and disguised with a gray wig and a walker—where he attacked the woman with a cane that had a stun device in its handle, in an attempt to kidnap her. Hall now appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the court (York County, Delahanty, J.) after the jury found him guilty of aggravated assault (Class B),
[¶2] We are asked to construe several statutes to determine whether the court erred in its instructions to the jury and whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of each of the crimes of which Hall was convicted. We affirm the judgment and remand only for further action by the State and the court to dismiss a fourth count on which the parties intended a dismissal after the court declared a mistrial.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Hansley, 2019 ME 35, ¶ 2, 203 A.3d 827. On the evening of October 8, 2015, Hall used a woman‘s voice when he repeatedly called a professional mediator to lure her to a house in Arundel under the pretext of hiring her to mediate a family dispute. Hall was upset with the mediator, who had, years earlier, served as guardian ad litem in a matter involving Hall‘s family. Hall had spoken to a friend about a plan to kidnap people involved in that matter using an electric shock device so that he
[¶4] When the mediator arrived at the house in Arundel, Hall was disguised as an elderly man; he wore a wig and blazer and used a walker and cane. He stood behind his van, which was parked in the driveway, and he gestured for her to park next to the van. Hall had a friend in the van who, by that point, had moved to the driver‘s seat. When the mediator opened the door to her car and swung her legs out, Hall attacked her with a cane that had a stun device in its handle capable of delivering an electric charge measuring up to 2,000 volts. He placed the cane between her legs, activated it one or more times, and put it in contact with her legs multiple times as she screamed and kicked. Leaning into the car, he tried to cover her mouth to prevent her screaming, and she grabbed the wig off his head, kicking until he took the wig and fled. Hall got into the passenger side of his van at the end of the driveway, his friend having already driven it toward the road, and he fled the premises with his friend.
[¶5] In December 2015, Hall was charged by indictment with aggravated assault (Class B),
was not likely to be found (Class B),
[¶6] At Hall‘s jury trial in 2018, Hall chose to represent himself, but he had two attorneys acting as standby counsel. The mediator testified regarding the events at issue as well as her injuries and recovery, including the effect of the attack on her mental health. The State offered testimony from several witnesses, including a detective from the York County Sheriff‘s Office who testified about the stun cane device he had recovered using information provided by the person who had driven Hall‘s van on the night of the alleged crimes.2
[¶7] Hall presented the testimony of several witnesses and his own testimony denying that he intended to kidnap the victim but expounding about how she and others had “stolen” his children based on lies. He also testified that the voltage of the stun cane device was not deadly; that the back of his van had been full of items such that he could not have fit a person inside; that he
had worn a gray wig and carried the cane but had also used a walker as “a barrier so that she could never say that [he] went into her space“; and that the victim had come at him with an open hand and tried to kick him, resulting in the marks on her legs.
[¶9] The definition of “serious bodily injury” was also provided because the aggravated assault statute employs the term “use of a dangerous weapon,” which is defined as “use of a firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which, in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
[¶10] At the end of the court‘s instructions to the jury, Hall requested an additional instruction concerning the definition of “serious bodily injury.”
[¶11] During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for further definition of “serious bodily injury,” including as to the meaning of “extended convalescence necessary for the recovery of physical health,” and for instruction as to whether the use of any weapon would warrant a conviction of aggravated assault.
[¶12] Later, the jury reported that it was having difficulty reaching a verdict on the fourth count, namely, attempted kidnapping with the intent to secret and hold the victim in a place where she was not likely to be found, but it had reached verdicts on the first three counts. The State and Hall agreed that the jury could deliver its verdicts on the first three counts and then the court would, if the jury found Hall guilty of the attempted kidnapping charge alleged in Count 3, declare a mistrial on Count 4. The jury found Hall guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 3 (aggravated assault, assault, and attempted kidnapping), and the court declared a mistrial on Count 4.
[¶13] After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Hall to ten years’ incarceration
[¶14] Although the State did not confirm the dismissal of Count 4, it appears to have been the intent of all involved that Count 4 be dismissed after the mistrial was declared. Thus, we regard the lack of a formal dismissal as an oversight that can be corrected on remand, and we treat the judgment entered by the court as a final judgment ready for our review.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶15] Hall argues that (A) the evidence does not support the convictions and (B) the court‘s jury instructions were inadequate. We consider each argument in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Convictions
[¶16] “When reviewing a judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We defer to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences drawn by the fact-finder, even if those inferences are contradicted by parts of the direct evidence.” Hansley, 2019 ME 35, ¶ 19, 203 A.3d 827 (quotation marks omitted).
1. Aggravated Assault
[¶17] As charged here, “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if that person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes . . . [b]odily injury to another with use of a dangerous weapon.”
[¶18] The undefined term at issue with respect to the aggravated assault conviction is “physical health.” In reviewing the language of a statute to determine the elements of a crime, “we first look to the plain language of the provisions to determine their meaning.” State v. Hastey, 2018 ME 147, ¶ 23, 196 A.3d 432 (quotation marks omitted). “In considering the plain language of a statute, we construe any undefined words and phrases according to their common meaning.” State v. Murphy, 2016 ME 5, ¶ 7, 130 A.3d 401. “Physical” means “of or relating to the body . . . often opposed to mental,” Physical, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (2002), or “Having a physiological basis or origin,” Physical, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016).
[¶19] Thus, finding Hall guilty of aggravated assault based on section 208(1)(B) required a finding that the stun device, in the manner in which Hall used it, was capable of causing death or either of the following:
- “serious, permanent disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,” or
-
extended convalescence necessary for recovery of bodily, physiological health.
[¶20] Had the State charged Hall with aggravated assault pursuant to
[¶21] As to the weapon at issue here—the stun cane device—the jury received evidence that included the following:
- The manufacturer‘s information indicated the device‘s capacity to deliver up to 1,000,000 volts.
- Tested in the laboratory, the device, after having been disassembled and reassembled, delivered between 850 and 2,000 volts, with the highest voltage being delivered upon initial activation.
- The scientist who tested the device used extensive safety precautions to protect himself from the device, which was “very dangerous” even at the measured voltage of 240.
- The victim experienced repeated contacts with the device, resulting in multiple burns on her body that did not heal for three weeks.
From this evidence,3 the jury could rationally have found that the stun device used in the assault was a dangerous weapon capable, in the manner it was used, of causing either (1) “serious, permanent disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ” or (2) “extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health.”
2. Assault
[¶22] “A person is guilty of assault if . . . [t]he person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.”
3. Attempted Kidnapping
[¶23] Pertinent here, a person is guilty of attempted kidnapping if the person engages in conduct that in fact constitutes a substantial step toward “restrain[ing] another person with the intent to . . . [h]old the other person for ransom or reward,” with awareness that it is practically certain that the person‘s conduct will result in the restraint and holding for ransom and reward.
B. Jury Instructions
[¶24] Hall argues that the court erred in denying his requested instructions regarding the meaning of (1) physical health and (2) the use of a dangerous weapon.
1. Instruction on the Meaning of “Physical Health”
[¶25] Hall contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that “extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health“—part of the definition of “serious bodily injury,”
[¶26] “We will vacate a judgment based on a denied request for a jury instruction if the appellant demonstrates that the requested instruction (1) stated the law correctly; (2) was generated by the evidence; (3) was not misleading or confusing; and (4) was not sufficiently covered in the instructions the court gave. In addition, the court‘s refusal to give the requested instruction must have been prejudicial to the requesting party.” State v. Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 16, 38 A.2d 1278 (citation omitted).
[¶27] As noted above, Hall was charged with aggravated assault based on the use of a dangerous weapon—a weapon that, “in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
[¶28] “Physical health” is not defined by statute. “Not every statutory phrase requires explanation,” however. State v. Smith, 618 A.2d 208, 210 (Me. 1992). The focus is on “whether the jury would have reasonably understood the common sense meaning of the term.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The jury is ordinarily entrusted to determine the common meaning of words, see State v. Siracusa, 2017 ME 84, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 531; when a term is not defined in a statute, a jury can generally determine the meaning of the term by common sense, see State v. Deering, 611 A.2d 972, 974 (Me. 1992).
[¶29] Here, the statutory terms were “sufficiently covered” by the instruction that the court gave, which provided the statutory language regarding physical health—a term for which the jury could determine the meaning by using common sense.4 Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 16, 38 A.2d 1278. Furthermore, Hall has not shown prejudice arising from the court‘s refusal to give the requested instruction. See id.
2. Instruction on the Use of a Dangerous Weapon
[¶30] Hall contends that the court erred in instructing on the use of a dangerous
[¶31] Use of an electronic weapon may also constitute the use of a dangerous weapon if it meets the statutory definition regarding the use of a dangerous weapon. “‘Use of a dangerous weapon’ means the use of a firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which, in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
[¶32] The existence of a separate crime—not charged here—for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly using an electronic weapon on another person,
[¶33] The court did not err in its instructions, and the jury could rationally reach its findings based on the instructions given and the evidence presented at trial.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. Remanded for further proceedings to dismiss Count 4.
David Paris, Esq. (orally), Bath, for appellant Christopher Todd Hall
Kathryn L. Slattery, District Attorney, and Kyle M. Myska, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District 1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-420
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY