STATE of Maine v. Christal N. GAGNIER.
Docket No. And-14-336.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Argued: May 12, 2015. Decided: Aug. 18, 2015.
2015 ME 115 | 123 A.3d 207
Norman R. Croteau, District Attorney, and Lisa R. Bogue, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Auburn, for appellee State of Maine.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Christal N. Gagnier appeals from a judgment of conviction for tampering with a victim (Class B),
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] “A defendant is entitled to an instruction [on a defense] when the evidence is sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain.” State v. Doyon, 1999 ME 185, ¶ 7, 745 A.2d 365 (quotation marks omitted). Because the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that the evidence did not generate the defense of duress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Gagnier. See State v. Delano, 2015 ME 18, ¶ 25, 111 A.3d 648; State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 18, 736 A.2d 1047.
[¶3] The basis for Gagnier‘s argument that she was entitled to a jury instruction on duress is her contention that she committed the crimes because she was fearful of her husband, Michael Gagnier. Much of the evidence on which Gagnier relies consists of her own trial testimony.1
[¶4] Gagnier testified that Michael, who had been an acquaintance of her mother, began to sexually assault her when she was twelve years old. All of them were living out of state at the time. Some time after the assaults began, the relationship between Michael and Gagnier‘s mother became intimate. Soon after, B.G., Michael‘s then-three-year-old daughter from another relationship, came to live with Gagnier, Gagnier‘s mother and Michael.
[¶5] In 2007, when Gagnier was nineteen, Gagnier‘s mother accused her of “stealing her men” and locked Gagnier in her room, allowing her to leave only for school and work. When Gagnier called Michael for help, he and Gagnier‘s mother fought and the mother left. Gagnier saw her mother again three months later but has not had any contact with her since then. Gagnier married Michael later that year because “he had always been there to save [her]” and she thought he loved her.
[¶6] After they were married, Michael became increasingly angry, which frightened Gagnier. He showed signs of delusions and carried a firearm because he thought “people were coming.” Gagnier did not disclose Michael‘s escalating conduct to others because she was afraid of how he would react. Michael‘s family pressured Gagnier to seek his involuntary commitment. She initially resisted these efforts, believing that if she upset him, she “would be punished severely for it,” but eventually, Michael was involuntarily committed for one month. After he was discharged and eventually returned home, he began to regularly sexually assault B.G. and physically assaulted her in the guise of punishment. Michael also physically and sexually abused Gagnier. He hit her; struck her with a belt, leaving welts; threatened her verbally; once fired a pellet gun near her head; and regularly choked her, which often prompted her to feign a loss of consciousness because she was afraid he would kill her. He also told Gagnier and B.G. that he had people on the street and at school watching them. Because Gagnier was afraid of Michael, she did not call the police.
[¶7] In June 2012, B.G. disclosed Michael‘s abuse of her to a friend, who then told Gagnier that a report had been made to the Department of Health and Human Services. When Gagnier told Michael about the report, he became infuriated: he began crying and choked Gagnier, telling her that he and Gagnier were in this together and that she should not say anything to officials. Michael went into another room, from which Gagnier heard Michael yell at B.G. Michael ordered Gagnier and B.G. to give DHHS officials a false explanation about why someone would lie to them. DHHS caseworkers arrived at the residence later that day, but Gagnier did not disclose Michael‘s sexual abuse of B.G. because she was terrified of Michael.
[¶8] Later in 2012, Gagnier tested positive for chlamydia and received a prescription for azithromycin, a schedule Z drug, see
[¶9] In February 2013, B.G. again disclosed Michael‘s sexual abuse, this time to the leader of a church retreat she attended. After she returned home, a social worker and a detective came to the residence, and B.G. told them about the abuse. While at the residence, DHHS officials collaborated with Gagnier to create a safety plan for herself, B.G., and her children. Michael was arrested and later confessed to his criminal conduct.
[¶10] While Michael was in custody and unable to make bail, he told Gagnier that he would not be in jail very long. He also told her to tell B.G. not to make statements that would incriminate him. Gagnier believed that if she did not relay Michael‘s message to B.G., he would “get [her]” when he was released. While Michael was being held in jail, Gagnier drove B.G. to an interview with investigators, and she told B.G. that Michael loved her and that she should not be too hard on him.
[¶11] In June 2013, Gagnier was indicted for (1) tampering with a victim
[¶12] The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. After a sentencing hearing held in June 2014, the court sentenced Gagnier on the tampering charge to a prison term of seven years, with all but three years suspended, and three years of probation. The court imposed concurrent sentences of one year and a $400 fine on the charge of furnishing scheduled drugs and 364 days on the child endangerment charge. Gagnier timely appealed pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
[¶13] Gagnier argues that the evidence generated a defense of duress pursuant to section 103-A and that the court therefore erred in failing to instruct the jury on that issue. We review the record in the light most favorable to Gagnier, see Delano, 2015 ME 18, ¶ 25, 111 A.3d 648, to determine if it would have allowed the jury to find facts to make duress a “reasonable hypothesis.” Doyon, 1999 ME 185, ¶ 7, 745 A.2d 365. “Whether a jury should be instructed on a particular defense in a criminal case almost always depends on whether the evidence presented at trial generates the defense.” State v. Neild, 2006 ME 91, ¶ 9, 903 A.2d 339 (quotation marks omitted). Duress is a defense but not an affirmative defense, which means that when it is generated by the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating it beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 1985). Because of this statutory framework, when the evidence generates the issue of duress, a court commits error by denying a request to instruct the jury on that defense. See Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 18, 736 A.2d 1047.
[¶14] When we view the evidence relevant to Gagnier‘s claim in the light most favorable to her, as we must do here, and if Gagnier‘s version of the facts is true,
[¶15] The Legislature has defined the defense of duress as follows:
1. It is a defense that, when a person engages in conduct that would otherwise constitute a crime, the person is compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to that person or another person or because that person was compelled to do so by force.
2. For purposes of this section, compulsion exists only if the force, threat or circumstances are such as would have prevented a reasonable person in the defendant‘s situation from resisting the pressure.
[¶16] When the basis for a duress defense is a threat, that threat “must be real and specific, and the specific harm that is feared must be imminent.” Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 19, 736 A.2d 1047. For threatening conduct to be imminent, it must be “ready to take place, near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one‘s head, menacingly near.” State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349, 351 (Me. 1984) (holding that a duress defense was not generated when the defendant was told that he would be “very sorry” if he did not commit the robbery). In contrast, “[a] veiled threat of future unspecified harm is not sufficient to raise the defense of duress.” Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 19, 736 A.2d 1047 (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the threatened harm is not “imminent” when the threatened person has “the opportunity to escape that [threatened] harm” or “to seek help or to report [the] threat to the authorities.” Larrivee, 479 A.2d at 351. Further, the effect of the threat must be viewed objectively, such that under section 103-A(2), it “would have prevented a reasonable person in the defendant‘s situation from resisting the pressure” arising from the threat.
[¶17] Against these legal standards, we consider each charge to determine whether the evidence generated a defense of duress for any of them.
A. Tampering with a Victim
[¶18] The State alleged that Gagnier committed the crime of tampering with a witness3 when, while Michael was incarcerated, she encouraged B.G. to lie to authorities. Gagnier argues that she did so because Michael told her to convey that message to B.G. and that because of Michael‘s history of violence and abusive behavior, she perceived that she would be in danger if she did not comply. When Gagnier reportedly told B.G. not to be “hard” on Michael, however, Michael was in jail
[¶19] We have long recognized that in cases involving domestic violence and abuse, competent evidence may be presented to explain the nature of an abused person‘s perceptions of danger posed by an abusive partner. For example, in State v. Anaya, the defendant, charged with murder for the death of her abusive domestic partner, raised issues of self-defense and provocation. 438 A.2d 892, 893-94 (Me. 1981). There, the evidence recounted a history of violence inflicted by the decedent on the defendant, and specific evidence was presented that on the night of the homicide, the couple argued, and the decedent “pushed the defendant around.” Id. at 893. We held that in light of that evidence, the court erred by excluding expert testimony of “battered wife syndrome” to show that “abused women often continue to live with their abusers even though beatings continue, and that a certain substrata of abused women perceive suicide and/or homicide to be the only solutions to their problems.” Id. at 894.
[¶20] Gagnier argues here, as she did in the trial court, that the pattern of physical abuse inflicted on her by Michael created a context in which her apprehension of danger was heightened and that she felt compelled to comply with Michael‘s instruction.4 Even in such circumstances, however, section 103-A requires a defendant who seeks to invoke the duress defense to produce some evidence that the threat in fact is imminent. Therefore, although Gagnier presented evidence of long-standing abuse that Michael perpetrated against her, the evidence nonetheless must be sufficient to allow a finding that she was faced with an actual threat of imminent harm originating with Michael, which irresistibly caused her to encourage B.G. to lie to investigators. No evidence of such a threat was presented during the trial, and the court therefore did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to consider duress as a defense to the tampering charge.
B. Aggravated Furnishing of Scheduled Drugs
[¶21] The charge of aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs arose from evidence that Gagnier provided her prescription medication to B.G.5 Gagnier argues that she was entitled to a duress instruction based on evidence that when
[¶22] Additionally, the evidence could not support a claim that Gagnier had no option but to give her medication to B.G. Because of Michael‘s employment, Gagnier had the opportunity to take B.G. to the hospital while Michael was working, to notify the school nurse about B.G.‘s medical condition, or to tell B.G. to consult with the nurse. Even though Gagnier knew that B.G. might need medical treatment, the evidence established that she had reasonable options other than giving B.G. unprescribed medications. The evidence therefore did not generate a claim based on the provisions of section 103-A that a reasonable person in Gagnier‘s position would have been unable to resist Michael‘s influence and exercise independent judgment. See Larrivee, 479 A.2d at 350-51. Thus, without addressing the availability of other defenses such as competing harms,
C. Endangering the Welfare of a Child
[¶23] The availability of a duress instruction on the charge of endangering the welfare of a child requires consideration of the factual basis for the charge.7 The indictment alleges that Gagnier committed this crime “on or about between” August 24 and 28, 2012. These are the same alleged offense dates accompanying the drug charge, which suggests that the State‘s theory is that Gagnier endangered B.G.‘s welfare by illegally providing her with prescription medication. In fact, the State argued this theory at trial, and during her closing argument, Gagnier herself contended that the two charges were predicated on the same evidence. To the extent that the evidence supporting the child endangerment charge is co-extensive with the drug furnishing charge, the evidence did not generate a duress defense for the same reasons that it was not generated as to the drug charge.
[¶24] In addition to pressing its theory that furnishing drugs was a form of criminal endangerment, however, the State took a broader view of the endangerment charge both in its argument to the court that Gagnier was not entitled to a duress instruction and in its closing argument to
[¶25] For the duress defense to be generated by this broader factual view of the endangering conduct, the evidence must have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that during the entire time she was subject to a duty to protect B.G., Gagnier was never free from a threat of imminent serious bodily injury or death posed by Michael that induced her inaction. Putting it conversely, the duress defense was not generated if, looking at the entire period of time when she knew that Michael was abusing B.G., Gagnier indisputably had even one opportunity to take steps to protect B.G.‘s health, safety, or welfare — just as B.G. herself twice reported her own victimization.
[¶26] The record is not sufficient to have allowed a fact-finder to conclude that Gagnier was subject to a threat of imminent harm at all times when she otherwise had at least one opportunity to seek protection or help for B.G. The evidence showed, for example, that Michael worked regularly and that there were times when he would briefly stop at home after work but then leave for the night. Occasionally he did not stop at home and sometimes was out until as late as 5:00 a.m. Also, Gagnier regularly attended doctor‘s appointments and took classes three or four days each week. Thus, although, as the trial court recognized, there is evidence that Gagnier was engaged in an abusive relationship and harbored a generalized fear of Michael, the evidence does not generate a factual contention that Gagnier was deprived of her free will at every moment. The defense of duress is narrowly drawn and requires production of evidence of specific threats of impending harm that is of substantial magnitude, rather than generalized fear, as well as the absence of any reasonable opportunity to resist, escape, or seek help. Here, the evidence did not generate that defense on a broadly-viewed theory of child endangerment.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶27] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gagnier, we conclude that the jury could not have found facts necessary to find that her conduct was the product of duress within the meaning of
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.