State of Maine v. Bethany RinguetteState of Maine v. Bethany Ringuette
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Bethany Ringuette appeals from a judgment of conviction of gross sexual assault (Class A),
[¶2] On the first issue, we affirm the court‘s sentence because the court properly set the basic sentence at twenty years, in compliance with the statute. See
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the court‘s findings of fact made after trial. See State v. Murphy, 2015 ME 62, ¶ 2, 124 A.3d 647. Between February and May 2019, Travis Walker made the victim engage in a sexual act with him on three occasions while the victim was under the age of twelve. During the relevant period, Walker and Ringuette were friends and had a dating relationship. The first time that Walker sexually assaulted the victim, Walker called Ringuette using social media on his phone asking Ringuette to convince the victim to engage in a sexual act with Walker. During that conversation, Ringuette told the victim that performing the sexual act “is the right thing to do” and although that conversation alone did not convince the victim, Walker ultimately made the victim engage in the sexual act. The victim later told a Child Advocacy Center interviewer that “[Ringuette] said it was okay.” Ringuette was not involved on the second occasion that Walker forced the victim to engage in a sexual act with him. The third time that Walker forced the victim to engage in a sexual act with him, Ringuette was present in the room. Ringuette had her phone out and told the victim that she was timing the encounter and showed the victim what to do. In an interview with the police, Ringuette told police officers that Walker had sought her approval for his conduct with the victim and Ringuette was “open to it.”
[¶4] The State filed a criminal complaint against Ringuette on July 24, 2019. The grand jury returned an indictment on October 10, 2019, charging Ringuette with one count of gross sexual assault (Class A),
[¶5] Following a three-day bench trial, the court found Ringuette guilty of gross sexual assault and not guilty of sexual exploitation of minor. After trial, Ringuette moved for findings of fact and for a new trial. The court granted the motion for findings of fact and denied the motion for a new trial. On March 31, 2022, the court sentenced Ringuette to five years of incarceration followed by ten years of supervised release.
[¶6] At sentencing, Ringuette objected to the court‘s setting her basic sentence at twenty years, arguing that section 1252(4-E) did not apply to her because she had been convicted under an accomplice liability theory, rather than as the principal. The court determined that the statute did apply to Ringuette and, at step one of its Hewey analysis, set her basic sentence at twenty years. See
II. DISCUSSION
A. Scope of Review
[¶7] Because Ringuette appealed from the conviction and the Sentence Review Panel granted leave for Ringuette to appeal from her sentence, we are authorized to review both the legality and the propriety of the sentence on appeal. M.R. App. P. 20;
B. Accomplice Liability and Sentencing
[¶8] Ringuette contends that the court erred when it applied section 1252(4-E) to her sentence and set the basic sentence at twenty years, because she was convicted as an accomplice, rather than as principal, of gross sexual assault.
[¶9] When sentencing a person convicted of a felony in Maine, the sentencing court is bound by the analysis prescribed in State v. Hewey and codified at
[¶10] Section 1252(4-E) states, “If the State pleads and proves that a crime under section 253 was committed against a person who had not yet attained 12 years of age, the court, notwithstanding subsection 2 [of section 1252], shall impose a definite term of imprisonment for any term of years. In determining the basic term of imprisonment as the first step in the sentencing process, the court shall select a term of at least 20 years.” As alleged and proved in this case, “[a] person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person” and “[t]he other person, not the actor‘s spouse,
[¶11] Title
[¶12] A principal and an accomplice are not subject to different Hewey analyses in arriving at a final sentence.4 See State v. Carrillo, 2021 ME 18, ¶¶ 42-43, 248 A.3d 1935 (“Here, whether [the appellant] acted as a principal or an accomplice in [the victim‘s] murder neither makes any difference to [the appellant‘s] conviction nor works any change to the statutory sentencing range applicable to that conviction.“); Nguyen, 2010 ME 14, ¶ 15, 989 A.2d 712 (“[A]n accomplice is guilty of the crime as if he acted as a principal, and a guilty verdict rendered on either theory is thus indistinguishable.“).
[¶13] Ringuette was convicted pursuant to section 253 under an accomplice liability theory because section 57 makes her legally accountable because of her aiding in and encouragement of Walker‘s illegal acts. See
[¶14] Because we hold that a principal and an accomplice are not subject to different processes or analyses when a sentencing court applies the Hewey analysis, the sentencing court did not err when it set Ringuette‘s basic sentence at twenty years, complying with the legislative mandate in section 1252(4-E). We therefore affirm Ringuette‘s sentence of imprisonment. We remand for the court to determine the appropriate length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed and to articulate its analysis and the factors that led to its decision. Cook, 2011 ME 94, ¶¶ 29-32, 26 A.3d 834.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed as to the term of imprisonment imposed. Remanded to the sentencing court to determine the appropriate length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed and to articulate its findings.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Bethany Ringuette
Joshua Avery-Youngblood, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), District III, South Paris, for appellee State of Maine
Oxford County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2019-30399
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