STATE OF MAINE v. ANTOINNE BETHEA
Docket: Pen-18-401
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
December 19, 2019
2019 ME 169
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Argued: November 5, 2019; Reporter of Decisions
[¶1] Antoinne Bethea appeals from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter (Class A),
A. Facts
[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶ 2, 179 A.3d 910.
[¶3] On Easter weekend 2017, the victim and a friend traveled to Bangor. The victim‘s eight-year-old son lived in Bangor with his mother—the victim‘s ex-wife—and Bethea. While they were togethеr that weekend, the son told his father that Bethea had been cooking “white stuff” in the apartment and that the white stuff gave him a headache. The victim‘s friend understood the “white stuff” to be crack cocaine.
[¶4] After hearing this story from his son, the victim sent several text messages to his ex-wife. Bethea interpreted those text messages as threatening. Bethea and the victim‘s ex-wife drove to her father‘s home, where Bethea retrieved a handgun he had kept hidden there. When Bethea and the victim‘s ex-wife returned to their apartment, they saw the victim and his friend standing in the driveway. The victim and his friend were waiting for the victim‘s son to change his clothes inside. Bethea and the victim spoke briefly
[¶5] Shortly after Bethea returned outside, he started a fight with the victim. During the fight, the victim‘s friend saw Bethea reach for his handgun. The friend then jumped on Bethea, and the three fell to the ground. While they were on the ground, Bethea discharged his firearm twice. The shots struck the victim, causing his death.
[¶6] Bethea quickly left the scene and сut off his dreadlocks. Bethea also gave an acquaintance an object wrapped in a sock, which the acquaintance buried in the woods. The object inside the sock was the handgun used in the shooting, which law enforcement eventually recovered.
B. Procedural History
[¶7] On April 18, 2017, Bethea was charged by criminal complaint with murder. See
[¶8] The court used a written questionnaire as part of its voir dire of potential jurors. Following best practice, see State v. Roby, 2017 ME 207, ¶ 3 n.2, 171 A.3d 1157, the court and counsel initially met more than a week
18. Dо you believe or feel African-American men are more likely to commit crimes when they come to Maine than people of other races visiting Maine?
21. Have you ever experienced or witness[ed] anyone being treated badly because of his or her race?
22. Have you ever had any positive or negative interactions with a person of another race?
23. Do you have any negative views of people of the African-American race?
24. Have you, or any of your family members or close friends[,] ever used derogatory words to describe a person of another race, such as [the N-word] in referring to African-Americans?
[¶9] In response to Bethea‘s request, the court amended its questionnaire to include two additional questions. With the amendments, the questionnaire used by the court, with answer choices of only “YES” or “NO,” asked the following questions about race:
22. Would the fact that Mr. Bethea is an African-American/black male from New Haven, Connecticut have any effect on your ability to be a fair and impartial juror?
23. Would the fact that the deceased . . . was an Africаn-American/black male from New Orleans, Louisiana have any effect on your ability to be a fair and impartial juror?
24. There may be additional evidence that other people involved in this case are African American/black and/or from out of state. Would any of these facts have any effect on your ability to be a fair and impartial juror?
25. Do you havе any negative views or have you had any negative experiences with people who are African-American/black?
26. If you answered “yes” to question 25 above, would that affect your ability to be fair and impartial if you are selected as a juror in this case?
[¶10] Prior to individual voir dire, the court excluded any potential juror whose answers to these questions indicаted that he or she might not be impartial on race-related issues. During individual voir dire, the court asked each potential juror to explain in more detail his or her affirmative responses to other questions on the questionnaire. The court permitted the attorneys for the State and for Bethea to ask follow-up questions to the potential jurors. During oral argument on this appeal, Bethea‘s counsel indicated that the court did not restrict the scope of the follow-up questions that could be asked or prohibit the attorneys from asking any particular question.
[¶11] Before trial, the State informed the court of its intent to offer three photographs depicting the victim and the victim‘s son. Bethea objected on relevancy and Rule 403 grounds, and the court ruled that the State could select one photograph to admit.1 When the victim‘s son testified, the State moved to admit en masse the State‘s Exhibits 1 through 55, one of which was the photograph at issue. The court asked Bethea if he objected to any of the offered exhibits. Bethea responded that he had no objection. The State showed the photograph to the victim‘s son, who identified himself and his father as the two individuals shown. Following this use of the photograph, it was not displayed or referenced again during the trial. On appeal, Bethea contends that the photograph was irrelevant to any issue at trial and, alternatively, that the court abused its discretion in admitting the photograph over his Rule 403 objection.
[¶12] During the Stаte‘s rebuttal in closing argument, the prosecutor said: “[The victim‘s friend] testified last week that the defendant went up the stairs, and when he went up the stairs, he showed the gun.” In fact, it was
[¶13] Following Bethea‘s objection, as part of its overall instructions, the court instructed the jury as follows:
[T]he opening statements and the closing arguments of the attorneys are not evidence. In their arguments, they have suggested to you particular ways that you might want to analyze the evidence, and they have argued various conclusions and inferences that you might want to draw from the evidence. But the opening statements and the closing statements themselves are not evidence.
If, once you begin your deliberations, your memory of the evidence is different from their memory, it is your memory that controls. And I understand that counsel in this case may disagree about what the other one may have said to you in closing arguments. So, again, I want to emphasize for you that it is your memory that controls—
your memory of the evidence that controls your decision in this case.
[¶14] By its verdict at the end of the seven-day trial, the jury acquitted Bethea of murder but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The court sentenced Bethea to twenty-six years’ imprisonment with all but eighteen years suspended, followed by four years of probation. Bethea timely appealed the resulting judgment. See
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Voir Dire
[¶15] Bethea asserts that the trial court‘s conduct of voir dire was not sufficient to identify racial bias among potential jurors and that he was therefore denied his constitutional right to a fair trial.3 Specifically, Bethea contends that the court abused its discretion in declining to include on the juror questionnaire the five questions he requested becausе (1) the State presented evidence related to his dreadlocks and (2) Bethea testified that he attempted to
[¶16] We review the trial court‘s conduct of voir dire for an abuse of discretion, affording the trial court “considerable discretion over the conduct and scope of juror voir dire.” Roby, 2017 ME 207, ¶ 12, 171 A.3d 1157. “[T]he purpose of voir dire is to detect bias and prejudice in prospective jurors, thus ensuring that a defendant will be bе tried by as fair and impartial a jury as possible.” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting State v. Lowry, 2003 ME 38, ¶ 7, 819 A.2d 331). The trial court is not required to conduct voir dire precisely in the manner requested by a defendant so long as the voir dire process is “sufficient to disclose facts that would reveal juror bias.” Lowry, 2003 ME 38, ¶ 11, 819 A.2d 331; see State v. Collin, 1999 ME 187, ¶ 8, 741 A.2d 1074.
[¶17] The court‘s conduct of voir dire here was “sufficient to disclose facts that would reveal” racial bias among potential jurors. Lowry, 2003 ME 38, ¶ 11, 819 A.2d 331. Thе juror questionnaire included five questions designed to uncover racial bias. These questions overlapped significantly with those proposed by Bethea. Question 25, which the court added in response to
[¶18] The trial court‘s decision to not ask Bethea‘s proposed questions 21 and 24 was appropriate because the court‘s voir dire process, taken as a whole, adequately probed potential jurors for racial biases. “The key consideration on review is not whether any particular question was asked—or who asked it—but whether the voir dire questions, taken as a whole, (a) adequately explore the potential that jurors may have knowledge, bias or predisposition that could compromise their objectivity and qualifications for hearing the case, and (b) encourage and permit jurors to give honest responses to such questions.” Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 2-4G at 2-17 (2018-2019 ed.).
B. Photograph of Victim with Son
[¶20] Bethea next argues that the court erred or abused its discretion in admitting a photograph of the victim and his son while the victim was alive. Bethea contends that the photograph served only to garner sympathy for the victim and therefore was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
[¶21] Because the issue was addressed before trial, we consider Bethea‘s objection to the photograph properly preserved here, even though he offered no objection when the photograph was admitted together with the State‘s other
[¶22] A photograph is admissible if (1) it is an accurate depiction;4 (2) it is relevant; and (3) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶ 10, 892 A.2d 456. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . [t]he fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
[¶23] As part of his trial strategy, Bethea suggested that the victim and his friend had come to Maine not to visit the victim‘s son but to engagе in illegal drug dealing. The photograph showed the victim with his son on the weekend
[¶24] We likewise conclude that the court acted within its discretion in overruling Bethea‘s Rule 403 objection. The photograph did not play a significant role at trial. It was shown to the victim‘s son on the first day of trial and never seen or referenced again. The trial court reasonably determined that, in the context of a seven-day trial, the photograph would have little or no prejudicial effect. Betheа has failed to demonstrate that the court‘s decision was an abuse of discretion.
C. Prosecutor‘s Misstatement
[¶25] Bethea argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor recited a fact not in evidence during closing rebuttal argument. Bethea objected to the prosecutor‘s misstatement. “When an objection has been made to a prosеcutor‘s statements at trial, we review to determine whether there was actual misconduct . . . and, if so, whether the trial
[¶26] In reviewing a judgment entered after a jury‘s verdict, we generally defer to the determination of the trial judge, “who has the immediate feel of what is transpiring, that a curative instruction will adequately protect against” the jury‘s consideration of a misstatement by the prosecutor. Id. ¶ 32. “Only where there are exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutоrial bad faith will a curative instruction be deemed inadequate to eliminate prejudice.” Id. (quoting State v. Bennett, 658 A.2d 1058, 1063 (Me. 1995)); see State v. Winslow, 2007 ME 124, ¶ 24, 930 A.2d 1080.
[¶27] Any prejudice to Bethea caused by the prosecutor‘s misstatement was remedied by the trial court‘s appropriate curative instruction, which emphasized the jury‘s responsibility to rely on its own recollection of the evidence. See State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 34, 211 A.3d 205 (holding that a similar curative instruction was suffiсient to remedy any prejudice to the
[¶28] There is no indication that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in bad faith. Nor did the prosecutor‘s misstatement create the sort of “exceptionally prejudicial circumstances” that could not be remedied by a curative instruction. Winslow, 2007 ME 124, ¶ 24, 930 A.2d 1080. When making the statement at issue, the prosecutor was explaining to the jury that the friend‘s testimony was mostly consistent with Bethea‘s. The prosecutor detailed six other facts to which both the friend and Bethea testified. Therefore, even without the statement at issue, the prosecutor‘s point still stood that the friend and Bethea gave corroborative testimony in sevеral important respects. For these reasons, the trial court‘s curative instruction adequately remedied any prejudice to Bethea.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-1381
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY