STATE OF MAINE v. ANDREW P. BILODEAU
Docket: Ken-19-357
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
June 25, 2020
2020 ME 92
JABAR, J.
Decision: 2020 ME 92. Argued: June 9, 2020. Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. Reporter of Decisions.
JABAR, J.
[¶
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶ 2, 179 A.3d 910. On November 18, 2017, Bilodeau was fifty-five years old and licensed to drive in the State of Maine. Bilodeau suffers from disabilities that affect his eyesight, impairing his depth-perception. He also suffers from cerebral palsy, which impairs his reaction time, especially in his lower extremities. When he drove, Bilodeau used two feet to operate the pedals, placing his left foot on the brake pedal and wedging his right foot between the transmission tunnel and the gas pedal. He primarily relied on steering—rather than braking or accelerating—to navigate around obstacles on the road.
[¶ 3] On the evening of November 18, 2017, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Bilodeau drove his car up Northern Avenue in Augusta. Northern Avenue intersects with Kendall Street at the crest of a hill, and Kendall Street is crossed by a pedestrian crosswalk where it meets Northern Avenue. As Bilodeau drove toward the intersection, the victim was crossing Kendall Street in the crosswalk. It was dark outside. The victim‘s wife was walking several feet behind her husband.
[¶ 4] Bilodeau‘s car struck the victim, who hit the windshield of the car and was propelled up and over the roof, landing in the street behind the car. Bilodeau continued on for a short distance, then pulled to the side of the road. When Bilodeau struck the victim, Bilodeau‘s car was almost entirely
[¶ 5] In the minutes following the incident, Bilodeau gave three statements to police. In each conversation, he told much the same story: he saw something or someone in the crosswalk, but did not trust his legs to brake in time. Instead, he turned the wheel and continued forward, believing that he had time and room to maneuver around the obstacle.
[¶ 6] Bilodeau was indicted by a grand jury on March 23, 2018, and charged with one count of manslaughter (Class A),
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] On appeal Bilodeau raises two issues. First, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶ 8] Bilodeau contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal that he lodged at the close of the State‘s case-in-chief, and by denying the motion when he renewed it post-trial. Contrary to Bilodeau‘s contentions, a jury could rationally have found each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the State at trial, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying the motion. See State v. Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751.
[¶ 9] “A person is guilty of manslaughter if that person . . . [r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.”
[¶ 10] “On appeal, we review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by viewing the evidence in the light
[¶ 11] The facts of the case were largely undisputed at trial. Bilodeau admitted that he was driving the car that struck the victim, and it is undisputed that the crash killed the victim. However, Bilodeau contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted recklessly or with criminal negligence, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. See
[¶ 12] Contrary to Bilodeau‘s contentions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bilodeau acted recklessly or with criminal negligence. Bilodeau told law enforcement immediately after the accident that he saw someone or something in the crosswalk as he approached. He confirmed this fact in his own trial testimony. Bilodeau did not attempt to brake. Instead, he piloted his car into the oncoming lane and through the crosswalk in an attempt to bypass the victim. Testimony by an accident reconstructionist with the Maine State Police suggested that Bilodeau did not swerve in a last-ditch attempt to avoid the victim, but rather moved gradually into the oncoming lane. Bilodeau‘s car entered the crosswalk straight-on, perpendicular to the path of the crosswalk. The jury could reasonably infer that braking was an alternative and appropriate reaction, given Bilodeau‘s speed.
[¶ 13] These facts could reasonably support a conclusion that Bilodeau made a deliberate choice to try to avoid the victim by driving around him, even after he saw the victim in the crosswalk. They do not suggest a panicked swerve made without time to stop the car. On this record, a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bilodeau either failed to be aware of the risk to the victim or consciously disregarded that risk, and that Bilodeau‘s failure or disregard grossly deviated from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent person. See State v. Carisio, 552 A.2d 23, 24, 27 (Me. 1988) (affirming conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver purposely ran a stop sign, believing she had sufficient time to avoid victim‘s vehicle); State v. Gammon, 529 A.2d 813, 815-16 (Me. 1987) (affirming conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver saw victim‘s car stopped in roadway 500 feet ahead but failed to slow below the speed limit before colliding); State v. Hanks, 397 A.2d 998, 1000 (Me. 1979) (affirming conviction for vehicular manslaughter where defendant‘s car had mismatched and bald tires, causing it to leave lane of travel and strike oncoming car), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1985). The trial court did not err in denying Bilodeau‘s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State‘s case and again when he renewed the motion post-trial.
B. Motion for New Trial
[¶ 14] Bilodeau also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, arguing that statements made by the State during its
[¶ 15] “We review the trial court‘s decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion and any findings underlying its decision for clear error.” State v. Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶ 44, 143 A.3d 800. However, where the defendant argues that the State made improper comments during its closing argument, and the defendant did not object to those statements at trial, we review for obvious error. State v. Robinson, 2016 ME 24, ¶ 25, 134 A.3d 828; see also State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727 (articulating the obvious error standard in the context of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct). Obvious error is that which is plain and likely to have affected the defendant‘s substantial rights, while also likely affecting the outcome of the trial:
If a defendant demonstrates on appeal that there was prosecutorial misconduct that went unaddressed by the court, we will consider whether the error is plain—that is, whether the error is so clear under existing law that the court and the prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection. If there is error that is plain, we will then consider whether the defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that the error affected her substantial rights, meaning that the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. When a prosecutor‘s statement is not sufficient to draw an objection, particularly when viewed in the overall context of the trial, that statement will rarely be found to have created a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
[¶ 16] In his amended motion for a new trial, Bilodeau argued that the State improperly stated in its closing that Bilodeau “should not have been driving because of his physical disability.” He further contended that “[i]t is inappropriate to argue that a disabled person should not be driving after the government approves it [by granting the person a license].”2 Bilodeau did not cite any law to support these claims. He renews these arguments on appeal, again failing to cite any law in support of his contentions.
[¶ 17] Contrary to Bilodeau‘s arguments, neither the fact that the State of Maine issued him a driver‘s license nor the fact that he was disabled serves as a defense to criminal liability. The Maine Criminal Code does not provide any statutory defense to manslaughter related to a defendant‘s physical disability or preclude the State from presenting evidence of that disability.
[¶ 18] Bilodeau has not demonstrated that the court erred in permitting the State to refer to Bilodeau‘s disabilities in its closing argument. See Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727. He has not identified any constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, or case law to suggest that the State‘s arguments were improper. It was through Bilodeau‘s own direct testimony that evidence of his disability was presented to the jury. The State‘s reference to that evidence in its closing argument was clearly relevant to an element of the charged crime and failed to generate any objection from Bilodeau. In sum, Bilodeau cannot show that the trial court‘s decision to allow the State to refer to his disability in its closing argument constituted error, much less obvious error. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶ 19] The State presented evidence upon which a jury could rationally have found all elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not obviously err in allowing the State to refer to Bilodeau‘s disabilities in its closing argument.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Kevin P. Sullivan, Esq. (orally), Sullivan Law, P.C., Gardiner, for appellant Andrew P. Bilodeau
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Frayla Tarpinian, Dep. Dist., Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2018-508
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY