STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS ROGELIO LEDEZMA
2024 KA 0258
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT
DEC 27 2024
The Honorable F. Hugh LaRose, Presiding Judge
Sherry Watters
Louisiana Appellate Project
New Orleans, Louisiana
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT DEFENDANT—Rogelio Ledezma
Kristine Russell
District Attorney
Joseph S. Soignet
Shaun George
Alissa Lebouef
Assistant District Attorneys
Thibodaux, Louisiana
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE State of Louisiana
BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND LANIER, JJ.
WELCH, J.
The grand jury of Lafourche Parish charged the defendant, Rogelio Ledezma, by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of
BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2021, Tabitha Summers reported to the Lafourche Parish Sheriff‘s Office (“LPSO“) in Cut Off, Louisiana that she witnessed the defendant shoot her boyfriend, Beau Plaisance, in the head. Officers with the LPSO and the Louisiana State Police immediately responded to and secured the scene, which was a residence located several houses away from the sheriff‘s office. Officers conducted a search of the residence and discovered the body of the victim near the back door. During a secondary search of the residence, law enforcement officers apprehended the defendant as he climbed down from where he had been hiding in the attic and arrested him. Once in custody, the defendant provided a voluntary statement to the police.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ONE AND TWO
In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction; therefore, the defendant argues he should have been convicted of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense, requiring a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See
The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in
When analyzing circumstantial evidence,
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
The responsive verdict of manslaughter is defined under
A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender‘s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person‘s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]
The existence of “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of the offense but, rather, are mitigating factors which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Dearmas, 2022-0494 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 9, 14, writ denied, 2022-01839 (La. 5/23/23), 360 So.3d 1254; State v. Mellion, 2021-1116 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 41, 45, writ denied, 2022-00732 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 1186, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 319, 214 L.Ed.2d 141 (2022). If a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act. Mellion, 342 So.3d at 48. Provocation and time for cooling off are determinations made by the trier of fact under the standard of the ordinary person with ordinary self-control. Dearmas, 356 So.3d at 15. Thus, an appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the mitigating factors had not been established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Dearmas, 356 So.3d at 18.
In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness‘s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 23, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802. Provocation testimony is an issue of credibility. Mellion, 342 So.3d at 47. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly,
In Louisiana, a legal presumption exists that a defendant is sane at the time of the offense.
The State is not required to offer any proof of the defendant‘s sanity or to offer evidence to rebut the defendant‘s evidence. Instead, the determination of whether the defendant‘s evidence successfully rebuts the presumption of sanity is made by the trier of fact viewing all the evidence, including lay and expert testimony, the conduct of the defendant, and the defendant‘s actions in committing the particular crime. Lay testimony concerning the defendant‘s actions, both before and after the crime, may provide the jury with a rational basis for rejecting even unanimous medical opinion that a defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. Garnett, 384 So.3d at 391. When a defendant who affirmatively offered the defense of insanity claims the record evidence does not support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard for review by the appellate court is whether or not any rational factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude the defendant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence he was insane at the time of the offense. Garnett, 384 So.3d at 391.
At trial, Tabitha Summers, the girlfriend of Beau Plaisance (the victim) at the time of the incident, testified that she was living at the Plaisance residence in October 2021.2 Summers denied that Plaisance was verbally, physically, or sexually abusive to her or her children. According to Summers, Plaisance was a drug user, and she had seen him last use drugs “[p]robably that morning.” Summers testified she was friends with the defendant (who she called “Xavier“) and smoked methamphetamine with him once. The night prior to the incident, the defendant was visiting the Plaisance residence and thought he heard a noise in the attic. The defendant armed himself with a shotgun to check it out. Summers testified she woke up around ten o‘clock the next morning. While she was cooking breakfast, the defendant came to the Plaisance residence to talk to her. Summers testified the defendant appeared normal that morning, but later, the defendant approached her wearing a camouflage hat and jacket, a blue wig, her work
Beau looks at [the defendant] and says, dude, what you doing? That‘s my gun. And he walks towards [the defendant] and [the defendant is] fumbling with the gun and normally the -- none of the guns were on safety. I‘m not sure why this one was at this time. You could see him fumbling trying to press the trigger three or four times real quick[,] and it doesn‘t go off till he looks down. And when he looks down, Beau grabs the barrel of the gun and points it at the wall and next thing I know, the gun goes off.
Summers testified she saw Plaisance on the floor. She asked the defendant why he shot Plaisance, to which the defendant responded, “[B]ecause of what Beau was doing to y‘all.” Summers said she and her son ran to the LPSO. Summers testified Plaisance did not attack the defendant, nor did he have a weapon.
Deputy Brandon Baudoin, a patrol deputy and SWAT team member with the LPSO, testified he responded to the scene within five to ten minutes of the complaint and established a perimeter to ensure no one left the scene.3 An initial search of the residence revealed Plaisance‘s body near the partially opened back door. The SWAT team performed a secondary search of the house after failing to locate a suspect, at which point the defendant climbed down from the attic.
Sergeant Terry Poincot, a detective with the LPSO, testified he was the crime scene investigator in this case. Sergeant Poincot testified he noticed a gun cabinet was partially opened, and a shotgun with apparent blood stains was placed haphazardly inside the cabinet, unlike the other guns. According to Sergeant Poincot, Plaisance‘s body had been moved from where he was killed due to the presence of drag marks and blood smears leading to the back door. Sergeant Poincot testified that while he was processing the scene, the defendant climbed down from the attic and was taken into custody.
Sergeant Gerard Lotz, a detective with the LPSO, advised the defendant of his Miranda4 rights and interviewed the defendant after he waived his rights. An audio recording of the interview and a transcription of the interview were published to the jury. In the interview, the defendant admitted to shooting Plaisance. The defendant said that after he shot Plaisance, he put the gun back in the gun cabinet and moved the victim‘s body towards the back door because he planned to bury him.
Dr. Dana Troxclair, accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, testified she performed Plaisance‘s autopsy on October 5, 2021. Plaisance died from a single shotgun wound to the head. Dr. Troxclair‘s autopsy report indicated the firearm was fired near Plaisance as there were seared edges and soot surrounding the wound. Toxicology analysis revealed high levels of methamphetamine and amphetamine in Plaisance‘s system.
Dr. Sarah DeLand, accepted as an expert in forensic psychiatry, testified that she was a psychiatrist on the sanity commission who examined the defendant at the court‘s request. Dr. DeLand‘s examination of the defendant took place in September 2022, almost a year after the offense. Dr. DeLand reviewed medical records from Lady of the Sea, St. Anne, and St. Charles Parish Hospitals. She testified the hospital records revealed that the defendant had suicidal ideation and paranoia. According to Dr. DeLand, the defendant suffered from substance-induced psychotic disorder and substance-induced bipolar disorder, though she could not rule out underlying psychotic or bipolar disorders. Dr. DeLand testified mental illnesses wax and wane and psychosis occurs in episodes. With respect to the defendant, Dr. DeLand testified the offense “was likely motivated by psychotic symptoms in the form of paranoid delusions and that ... could cause him to have problems distinguishing right from wrong.” The defendant was thereafter convicted of second degree murder by a unanimous jury.
Responsive Verdict of Manslaughter
On appeal, the defendant asserts the responsive verdict of manslaughter should be entered as the killing was committed in the heat of blood. Specifically, he argues “there was a tussle over a shotgun that [the defendant] brought out as an impulsive act in the heat of the situation, due to his delusion that the others were in need of protection.”
A reduction of second degree murder to manslaughter requires the killing be “committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.”
The jury‘s verdict reflects that it clearly found the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See Dearmas, 356 So.3d at 18. We find that the jury‘s determination was not irrational based on the evidence presented at trial. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in sudden passion or heat of blood to justify the lesser verdict of manslaughter.
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
We next address the defendant‘s argument that he proved his insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence, requiring a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant notes the State did not offer any proof, much less any expert witness, to refute Dr. DeLand‘s testimony at trial. The State was not required to offer expert testimony to rebut the defendant‘s evidence of insanity, as lay testimony may provide a rational basis for rejecting an expert opinion. See State v. Harris, 99-0820 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 304, 308. However, the defendant argues Summers’ testimony corroborated his claim of insanity.
As discussed, the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. See
Considering Dr. DeLand‘s testimony as a whole and all of the other testimony presented at trial, we cannot say the jury was irrational in rejecting Dr. DeLand‘s opinion. See State v. Thames, 95-2105 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 480, 487, writ denied, 96-2563 (La. 3/21/97), 691 So.2d 80. The most significant evidence of ability to distinguish right from wrong in many insanity defense cases is evidence of the accused‘s attempts to hide evidence of the crime. See State v. Armstrong, 94-2950 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d 307, 313. The defendant in this case went to great lengths to attempt to cover up his crime. After shooting and killing Plaisance, the defendant placed the shotgun back in the gun cabinet and moved Plaisance‘s body in an attempt to hide it. The defendant admitted his intention was to bury the body, but he was unable to do so before the police arrived. When the police arrived on the scene, the defendant hid in the attic to avoid detection. All of these actions, designed to conceal and misdirect, clearly indicated the defendant knew killing Plaisance was wrong. See Mitchell, 231 So.3d at 735-36. Furthermore, after being taken into custody, the defendant was aware of his rights, specifically stating that he had the right to not answer questions and, moreover, was aware of his actions at the time of the offense. The defendant eventually provided a detailed account of the incident that was consistent with the evidence obtained by the police.
Based on the defendant‘s actions at the time of the offense and statements in the interview shortly thereafter, the jury could have rationally inferred the defendant
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues his life sentence is excessive. The
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of
For the defendant‘s conviction of second degree murder, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See
In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court opined that a trial court would be duty bound to reduce a sentence if the punishment mandated by the Habitual Offender
In State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676-77, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the issue of when Dorthey permits a downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law. The Johnson court held that to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence was constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional. That is, because of unusual circumstances, this defendant is a victim of the legislature‘s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676.
While Dorthey and Johnson involve the mandatory minimum sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Law, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held the sentencing review principles espoused in Dorthey are not restricted in application to the penalties provided by
Mandatory sentences have been upheld repeatedly as constitutional and consistent with the federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel, unusual, or excessive punishment. See State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 207, 212, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 410. There is no need for a trial court to conduct a presentence investigation or to justify a sentence under
We find there is nothing particularly unusual about the defendant‘s circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory sentence under
PATENT ERRORS
Pursuant to
The transcript further reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the defendant‘s conviction and sentence. We remand to the trial court to correct the commitment order to reflect that the defendant‘s sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. We advise the defendant that
DECREE
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE COMMITMENT ORDER.
WELCH, J.