State of Louisiana v. Kendall Gordon
2024-KA-0244
La. Ct. App.Jan 9, 2026Check Treatment STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0244
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL
KENDALL GORDON * FOURTH CIRCUIT
* STATE OF LOUISIANA
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KKH
HERMAN, J. DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority and would affirm the trial court’s
decision to deny Kendall Gordon’s petition for wrongful conviction compensation.
In reviewing an application for compensation for wrongful conviction
pursuant to La. R.S. 15:572.8, an appellate court “must afford great weight to the
findings of the trier of fact and apply the manifest error standard.” State v. Ruano,
2019-0709, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d 44, 46 (citing State v. Ford,
50,525, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 1242, 124); see also Ballard v.
State, 2024-0606, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/25), 414 So.3d 800, 810, writ denied,
2025-00450 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So.3d 789. In reviewing for manifest error, the
appellate court’s role “is not to decide whether [it] would have reached the same
conclusion, but rather to determine whether the trial court’s judgment was
reasonable based on the record as a whole.” State v. Walter, 2024-0420, p. 11 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 4/29/25), 414 So.3d 1009, 1016–17 (citing Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 4,
294 So.3d at 46; Ford, 50,525, p. 8, 193 So.3d at 1248-49).
La. R.S. 15:572.8(A)(2) requires proof of factual innocence by clear and
convincing evidence for the petitioner to be entitled to compensation. Therefore, to
meet this burden of proof, Gordon had to show that it was “highly probable or
much more probable than not” that he did not commit the crime for which he was
convicted nor any other crimes based upon the same set of facts. Jones v. State,
2022-01455, p. 6 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 341, 345; La. R.S. 15:572.8(B).
Moreover, this Court has acknowledged that implicit in the Legislature’s
inclusion of the factual innocence requirement is its intent that “compensation will
not be awardable in every matter in which post-conviction relief has been granted.”
Ruano, 2019-0709 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d at 47 (citing In re Williams,
2007-1380, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/20/08), 984 So.2d 789, 793). I find that the
record supports the trial court’s conclusion to decline Gordon compensation under
La. R.S. 15:572.8.
The DNA analysis expert, David Hansen, testified that he could not
“outright exclu[de]” Gordon as a contributor to the DNA recovered from the
firearm, the cartridges, the white tee-shirt collar, the armpit of the black tee-shirt,
or the plastic glove. Thus, the DNA evidence did not exonerate Gordon as a
perpetrator.
Additionally, while the majority states that it is “with near certainty” that
Darceleen Commodore’s initial identification of Gordon “was in error,” we find
that there are credibility issues regarding Darceleen’s recantation. Hours after the
crime, Darceleen described Gordon and identified him as one of the perpetrators
via photographic lineup. She also knew Gordon from the neighborhood and had
met him a few times prior to the incident. Subsequently Darceleen indicated that
she had misidentified Gordon as perpetrator, however, she also testified that there
were “threats from the street” regarding her identification of Gordon. Although
Darceleen insisted that there were no direct threats made against her and that it did
not affect her testimony, we cannot say that the trial court was unreasonable in
concluding otherwise.1
1 Notably, both the trial judge at the criminal trial and the trial judge at the compensation hearing
apparently found Darceleen’s recantation not credible.
Furthermore, the majority appears to question whether the trial court applied
the appropriate standard of review because it failed to provide reasons for
judgment. However, there is nothing in La. R.S. 15:572.8 that requires the trial
court to provide reasons for judgment on an application for compensation for
wrongful conviction. Moreover, the record shows that subsequent to receiving
testimony and evidence on the petition for compensation, the trial court heard
closing arguments and took the matter under advisement for several months prior
to rendering its decision to decline compensation. The record thus suggests that the
trial court reached its conclusion after due consideration.
Considering that the DNA test results did not outright eliminate Gordon; the
credibility issues surrounding Darceleen’s recantation; and the vast deference
bestowed upon the trial court in findings of fact, I cannot find that the trial court
was manifestly erroneous in concluding Gordon failed to establish he is factually
innocent by clear and convincing evidence. I find that the trial court’s decision was
reasonable based on the record as a whole. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial
court’s judgment denying Gordon’s petition for compensation.