State of Louisiana v. Kendall Gordon
2024-KA-0244
La. Ct. App.Jan 9, 2026Check TreatmentSTATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0244
VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
KENDALL GORDON *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 555-162, SECTION “H”
Honorable Camille Buras, Judge
******
Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet,
Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge Nakisha Ervin-
Knott)
LEDET, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.
HERMAN, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.
ERVIN-KNOTT, J., DISSENTS FOR REASONS ASSIGNED BY JUDGE
HERMAN.
Leo J. Palazzo
Mario A. Arteaga, Jr.
732 Behrman Highway
Suite F & G
Gretna, LA 70056
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Elizabeth Baker Murrill
Louisiana Attorney General
J. Taylor Gray
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
Assistants Louisiana Attorney General
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
Jason Rogers Williams
Orleans Parish District Attorney
Brad Scott
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
ON REMAND—TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED
January 9, 2026
RLB
On writ application by the State, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded
SCJ
this case for reconsideration1 citing our failure to apply the manifest error—clearly
wrong standard of review in our original opinion.2 On remand, we confirm our
reversal of the trial court’s judgment for the reasons set forth below.
Standard of review
The Supreme Court cited the well-accepted principle that, “Appellate courts
review wrongful conviction compensation rulings for manifest error.”3 The
Supreme Court proceeded to hold that our court had reviewed the case erroneously
using a de novo standard and remanded the case.4
Application of standard of review
In 2010, Kendall Gordon (“Gordon”) was convicted of armed robbery and
second-degree murder of Patrice Comadore (“Patrice”). His conviction was
1 The Supreme Court’s writ disposition is found at State v. Gordon, 25-0268 (La. 9/24/25), __
So.3d __.
2 This court’s original opinion is found at State v. Gordon, 2024-0244 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/25),
writ granted, decision rev'd, 2025-00268 (La. 9/24/25).
3__ So.3d__, citing Jones v. State, 22-01455, p. 5 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 341, 345.
4 Although our original opinion failed to express the applicable standard of review, the trial court
opinion was reviewed under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard as is shown in the
review below.
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vacated based upon the “Joint Agreement and Motion to Vacate Conviction” filed
the Orleans Parish District Attorney and Gordon in 2021. In that pleading, the
prosecutor’s office agreed that, “This Office now believes there is clear and
convincing evidence which creates a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Gordon did not
commit the offense for which he was convicted…” Gordon filed his petition for
compensation for his wrongful incarceration in August 2022. The petition was
denied by the trial court which held that, “Petitioner has failed to meet the burdens
required in La. R. S. 15:572.8(A)(2), specifically, that he has failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is factually innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted.” Our court disagreed with the trial court’s finding and
determined that it was clearly wrong and manifestly erroneous based primarily, but
not exclusively, on the following facts:
1) The State investigated and prosecuted Gordon almost entirely
based on Darceleen Comadore’s (“Darceleen’s”) eyewitness
identification of Gordon.5 Darceleen withdrew that
identification almost immediately. Darceleen testified that “a
day or two after” her initial interview, she contacted the
detective in charge of the investigation to alert him to her belief
that Gordon was not involved in her sister’s death. She made it
clear that she had misidentified the assailant. She has been
consistent in that recantation ever since.
2) We know with near certainty that Darceleen’s identification
was in error. The person she identified in her initial statement
had fallen on top of her during the commission of the crimes.
In that process, the person who fell on her transferred blood
onto her clothing and telephone. She had heard a gunshot and
concluded the person had been shot. While the bloody person
was in direct contact with Darceleen and for some minutes
thereafter, the bandana that had covered his face fell away and
she was able to see him. From the very first interview, and in
5 Darceleen is the sister of the deceased victim, Patrice Comadore, and was present at the scene
when her sister was murdered.
2
every subsequent setting in which she testified, Darceleen
described this person as the “younger” of the two perpetrators.
Her initial interview with police was four hours after she
witnessed her sister’s murder. At that time, she thought she
recognized the younger man as Gordon. She realized her error
one or two days later and notified police that she was incorrect
in her belief that she had seen Gordon. The record contains four
transcripts of Darceleen’s testimony. While there are some
discrepancies in the transcripts, she is consistent in relating that
she only identified the younger of the two men. Except for her
initial contact with police, she is absolutely consistent in stating
that Gordon was not the younger of the two perpetrators.
3) Ballistic testing proved that the same gun killed Patrice and
Jessie Bibbins (“Bibbins”), a likely suspect in the crimes for
which Gordon was convicted.6 Police found two spent shell
casings at the crime scene. Those casings matched the caliber
of the bullets that killed both Patrice and Bibbins. Bibbins was
found dead about a mile from the crime scene. Gordon turned
himself in to police within 48 hours of the crime and he had no
gunshot wounds.
4) Genetic testing alone does not positively exonerate Gordon.
However, it is significant that no DNA identified as Gordon’s
was found at any site related to the crime. To the contrary, the
DNA recovered from various items at the scene of the murder
and on or near Bibbins’ body ranged between 7 and 468 times
less likely to come from Gordon than from Bibbins and another
unknown male. None of the DNA samples show a likelihood
that Gordon was the contributor.
Under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, appellate courts may not
set aside a trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly wrong in
light of the record reviewed in its entirety. The Louisiana Supreme Court gave its
most recent guidance for applying this standard in civil cases in Hayes Fund for
First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain,
LLC, 14-2592, p. 8 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So.3d 1110, 1115. In its decision, the court
wrote, “In all civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of factual
determinations is the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which precludes the
6 The evidence suggests that Bibbins is a more likely participant in the crimes as set forth in our
original opinion.
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setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly wrong in
light of the record reviewed in its entirety.”
Our court has applied the same standard in wrongful incarceration claims,
which are a unique mix of criminal and civil concepts. In Ballard v. State, 24-
0606, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/25), 414 So.3d 800, 810, writ denied, 25-0450 (La. 6/3/25),410 So. 3d 789
, we wrote:
In reviewing an application for compensation for wrongful conviction
and imprisonment pursuant to La. R.S. 15:572.8, an appellate court
“must afford great weight to the findings of the trier of fact and apply
the manifest error standard.” State v. Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 4 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d 44, 46 (citing State v. Ford, 50,525, p.
5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 1242, 1247). “Further, ‘[t]he
issue is not whether the trial court's findings are right or wrong, but
whether they are reasonable on the record as a whole.’” Id.
As we reviewed the trial court’s ruling in the instant case, we were required
to add a third layer of inquiry: did the trial court review the facts using the
appropriate burden of proof? In order to prevail in a wrongful incarceration case,
the plaintiff must prove its case by marshalling “clear and convincing scientific or
non-scientific evidence” La. R.S. 15:572.8(A)(2). We are hampered in our effort
to learn how the trial court concluded that Gordon did not meet this burden
because there are no written reasons for judgment. In Ballard,7 our court adopted
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s definition of the clear and convincing standard,
which it described as follows: “The clear and convincing standard requires a party
to prove the existence of a contested fact is highly probable, or much more
probable than its non-existence.” Talbot v. Talbot, 03-0814, p. 10 (La. 12/12/03),
864 So.2d 590, 598. 7 Ballard at414 So. 3d 800
, 810.
4
We agree with the State’s argument that the DNA results are not dispositive;
however, the DNA findings, in combination with all the evidence in the record,
does make it “much more probable than not” that Gordon is factually innocent of
the crime for which he was convicted. As shown above and in our original
opinion, there is affirmative evidence that another person committed the crime for
which Gordon was convicted. Bibbins had prior suspicious contact with the
Comadore household and was shot by the same gun that killed Gordon’s supposed
victim. There is an absence of any physical or scientific evidence that Gordon was
ever in the victim’s home. The only witness identification tying Gordon to the
crime was withdrawn within days and the recantation is supported strongly by
other facts in the record.
To a large degree, the analysis of the standard of proof applied by the trial
court and the question of whether that court’s decision was manifestly erroneous
and clearly wrong merge. The evidence supporting Gordon’s factual innocence,
and the absence of contradictory facts in the trial court record naturally and
logically lead one to conclude that the trial court’s findings are not reasonable, but
are clearly wrong and manifestly erroneous. Applying the manifest error rule, we
again reverse the trial court’s judgment that denied Gordon’s recovery.
ON REMAND—TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED
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