State of Louisiana v. John ShallerhornState of Louisiana v. John Shallerhorn
JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Pro Tempore Judge Madeline Jasmine)
JASMINE, J., PRO TEMPORE, DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY Brad Scott Assistant District Attorney, Appeals Division ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE 619 S. White Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/RESPONDENT
Barksdale Hortenstine, Jr. ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 2601 Tulane Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, Louisiana 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/DEFENDANT
WRIT GRANTED, RELIEF DENIED
AUGUST 19, 2022
SCJ TFL
Relator, a pre-trial detainee charged with one count of first degree murder in violation of
On February 26, 2021, relator was arrested for several offenses, including first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, on March 10, 2021, the State filed notice “that for any charges for which the grand jury returns an indictment ..., the [s]tate will elect to forego capital punishment.”1
On June 17, 2021, an Orleans Parish Grand Jury returned a true bill charging relator with one count of first degree murder in violation of
On March 21, 2022, the State filed a memorandum in opposition tо defendant‘s motion to waive trial by jury. On April 20, 2022, the trial court, following oral argument, denied relator‘s motion seeking to waive a jury trial. The court recognized that the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Serigne, 2016-1034, pp. 6-7 (La. 12/6/17), 232 So.3d 1227, 1231, held that where the defendant did not face thе prospect of the death penalty,2 he may validly waive a jury trial. However, the trial court distinguished that case from the matter at hand, finding that with respect to defendant‘s first degree murder charge the state, at a later date, сould change its mind and opt to seek the death penalty.
Following the trial court‘s ruling, relator lodged his objection; noticed his intent to take writs; and requested a return date. The trial court stayed the proceedings pending resolutiоn of the writ and set a return date of May 19, 2022. On May 17, 2022, the trial court, pursuant to relator‘s motion, extended the return date until June 2, 2022. Relator timely filed the writ application
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the trial court‘s decision, is a legal detеrmination and, as such, subject to a de novo standard of review.3
“Trial by jury may be knowingly and intelligently waived by the defendant except in capital cases.”
Louisiana Constitution Article I, §17(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons ....” Similarly,
The State, in its оpposition, asserts that notwithstanding that it filed notice that it would not pursue the death penalty in connection with defendant‘s first degree murder, because defendant was charged with a capital offense, the case must be tried before a jury. In support, the State cites State v. Goodley, 398 So.2d 1068, 1070-1071 (La. 1981), in which the Court held that a unanimous jury verdict was required to convict a defendant charged with a capital offense, even when the state stipulated that it would not seek the death penalty. The Court reasoned:
[T]he Legislature determined that for crimes that were so serious as to validly carry the death penalty, certain special procedural rules were additionally required, among which was the requirement of a unanimous jury to render a verdict. This determination is not based on an after the fact examination of what crime the defendant may eventually be convicted of, nor is it based on an after the fact examination of what sentence he receives. Rather, the scheme is based on a determination by the Legislature that certain crimes are so serious that they require more strict procedural safeguards than other less serious crimes. It was determined that in charged capital offenses a unanimous [jury] verdict for conviction, not just sentencing, is necessary and there is no attendant provision giving the state the authority to alter that scheme on its own motion by simply stipulating that the deаth penalty will not be sought in a certain case.
Goodley, 398 So.2d at 1070-1071 (emphasis added).
A case relied upon by the defense in support of its position of entitlement to waive a jury trial is Serigne, 2016-1034, 232 So.3d 1227. In Serigne, the defendant was indicted for an aggravated rape committed during a periоd when that crime was punishable by death. Later, after the U.S. Supreme Court held the death penalty was unconstitutional for a non-homicide offense, the defendant waived his right to trial by jury. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convictеd of aggravated rape. On appeal, this Court reversed the conviction after finding that the court erred by authorizing the waiver of a trial by jury because he had been charged with a capital offense even though the deаth penalty was not sought and was in fact an unconstitutional punishment by the time he went to trial. State v. Serigne, 2014-0379, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/2/16), 193 So.3d 297, 306 (“We find that binding Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent requires a finding of reversible patent error as Lionel Serigne was charged by indictment with a capital offense and he was therefore precluded from waiving a jury trial.“) However, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and reversed, determining that a defendant “who never faced the prospect of the death penalty” may validly waive his right to a jury trial. Serigne, 2016-1034, pp. 6-7, 232 So.3d at 1231.
As discussed below, Serigne may be distinguished from relator‘s case. As an initial matter, relator “faced the prospect of the death penalty” when the State charged him with a capital offense, at leаst until the state notified the defense that it did not intend to seek that punishment.4 Moreover, in Serigne, as in other cases discussed below, the defendant was seeking reversal of his conviction based on the allegation that the trial court had erred in granting the pretrial motion he himself had filed concerning his preferred trier of fact.
As a general matter, there exists no right to a bench trial under the United States Constitution. State v. Bazile, 2012-2243, pp. 9-10 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719, 728-729,5 citing
In Louisiana,
Like Serigne, the cases cited to by the defense recognizing the valid wavier of the right to a jury are ones in which the defendant waived the jury and then challenged the waiver (granted pursuant to his own motion) on appeal after the court convicted him, claiming in essence (and in hindsight) that he had been denied the right to a jury trial because the district court had granted his pretrial motion. Seе State v. Lewis, 2009-846, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 33 So.3d 1046, 1054, writ denied, 2010-967 (La. 11/24/10), 50 So.3d 825 (rejecting claim that defendant could not waive a jury and holding “because the [s]tate did not pursue the death penalty, the [d]efendant would not be punished as a capital offender under [La.] C.Cr.P. Art. 782, thus allowing him to waivе his right to trial by jury.“); State v. Singleton, 05-622, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/31/06), 922 So.2d 647, 653 (“we find that since the state did not seek a capital verdict [on an aggravated rape charge], defendant was entitled to waive his right to a jury trial“).7 Those claims were rejected by the appellate courts, which found, on appeal, that the law authorized the waiver under the circumstances and accordingly upheld the defendants’ convictions by the bench. In essence, in such circumstances, the appellаte
Notably, however, our Supreme Court grantеd writs and reversed in a pretrial posture after the district court granted the defendant a bench trial within forty-five days of the originally-set trial date and the state objected. In State v. Landrieu, 2017-0950 (La. 6/9/17), 220 So.3d 732, the Court found that the district court had erred by granting a bench trial, notwithstanding thаt the case had moved to a different section of court and hence trial was not set to commence within forty-five days of the most-recent defense motion.9 The Court initially noted that as set out in Bazile, supra, a defendant‘s right to waive a trial by jury was not “unbridled,” id., p. 1; 220 So.3d 732, and found that thе district judge‘s ruling granting the bench trial10 invited relitigation of earlier pretrial rulings, which went to the “heart of the policy considerations articulated in Bazile.” Id., p. 2; 220 So.3d 733.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the State‘s notice that it would not pursue a death verdict, the charge remains “рunishable” by death. To find reversible error stemming from the court‘s failure to authorize waiver of a jury in such a case would be tantamount to encouraging gamesmanship by the accused. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court‘s denial of relator‘s motion to waive jury trial and be tried by the court.
WRIT GRANTED, RELIEF DENIED