STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS CHADDRICK PIPER
2018 KA 1796
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT
SEP 27 2019
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana Docket Number 04-15-0203 Honorable Michael R. Erwin, Judge Presiding
Hillar C. Moore, III Dale R. Lee Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana
Meghan Harwell Bitoun New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Chaddrick Piper
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, AND CRAIN, JJ.
The defendant, Chaddrick Piper, was charged by bill of information with domestic abuse battery (involving strangulation) (count 1), a violation of
FACTS
Breah Monday and the defendant had an on-and-off relationship for several years. They had one son together. In 2013 and 2014, while living together in Baton Rouge, the defendant and Breah were involved in several altercations, wherein the defendant physically attackеd Breah. In October of 2013, the defendant was arrested and charged with domestic abuse battery (involving strangulation) of Breah. In April of 2014, Breah obtained a protective order against the defendant. In December of 2014, the defendant was again arrested for domestic abuse battery of Breah, as well as violation of a protective order. He pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to incarceration.
While the defendant was incarcerated, Breah married another man. On February 3, 2015, the defendant was released from jail. The defendant‘s mother picked up the defendant and brоught him to South Harrells Ferry Road to an apartment that he
The defendant testifiеd at trial. The defendant testified that Breah invited him into the apartment. He also denied that he held her underwater in the bathtub or that he choked her.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 and 2
In these related assignments of error, the defendant argues, respectively, the trial court‘s failure to hold a Prieur1 hearing violated due process; and the trial court erred in considering evidence of prior crimes.
Prior to trial, the State filed notice of intent to introduce evidence of other crimes, bad acts, or wrongs, pursuant to
In the first assignment of error, the defendant argues in brief that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial Prieur hearing to determine the admissibility of the other crimes evidence. This other crimes evidence, according to the defendant, was weak and contained several “evidentiary holes.” The defendant suggests trial testimony about these other crimes was highly prejudicial to him. In his second assignment of error, the defendant further contends that the trial court erred in considering the other crimes evidence because such evidence was not independently relevant to show motive, opportunity, knowledge, or absence of mistake. According to the defendant, the trial court failed to determine whether the evidence was relevant and whether its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice to him. See
The State cannot introduce evidence of other crimes without first conducting a pretrial hearing at which it must prove the defendant сommitted the other crimes and that they are admissible under Article 404(B). State v. Taylor, 2016-1124 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283, 292. However, not every violation of pretrial procedures (including Prieur violations) requires reversal, and before a defendant can complain of such a violation, he must show prejudice. State v. Sanders, 93-0001 (La. 11/30/94), 648 So. 2d 1272, 1284, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1246, 116 S. Ct. 2504, 135 L.Ed.2d 194 (1996); State v. Pardon, 97-248 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/15/97), 703 So. 2d 50, 57, writ denied, 97-2892 (La. 3/20/98), 715 So. 2d 1207.
The defendant herein did not object to any of the other crimes evidence the State sought to offer. The defendant did not file a motion in limine or a motion to exclude the evidence, an answer to the State‘s notice of intent, or any motion whatsoever, to traverse the State‘s intent to use other crimes evidence at trial. In his mоtion for discovery filed April 23, 2015, the defendant requested notice of the State‘s intention to use other crimes evidence and for a hearing on the admissibility of the evidence. Five months later on September 25, 2015 (about four and one-half months before trial), the State filed its
At trial, the defendant made no objections during the testimony as to the incidents constituting the other crimes evidence, except one. When Breah was asked about one of the incidents in November between her and the defendant, she provided a somewhat wandering narrative, to which defense counsel objected, stating: “Judge, at this time I have to object. The reason I‘m objecting, we‘ve kind of covered the issue about the 404, and I‘ve allowed her to kind of get into it a little bit. But, I mean, to me, she‘s kind of drawing it out.” As indicated, counsel‘s stated basis for objecting to Breah‘s testimony was limited to her verbosity in “drawing it out.” Defense counsel did not object to the other crimes evidence on the grounds articulated on appeal, namely that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of the other crimes and that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.
To preserve the right to appeal the introduction of testimony, the defendant must make a timely objection and state the specific grounds of objection.
Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preрaration, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.
Generally, evidence of criminal offenses other than the offense being tried is inadmissible as substantive evidence becausе of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. In order to avoid the unfair inference that a defendant committed a particular crime simply because he is a person of criminal character, other crimes evidence is inadmissible unless it has an independent relevancy besides simply showing a criminal disposition. State v. Lockett, 99-0917 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So. 2d 1128, 1130, writ denied, 2000-1261 (La. 3/9/01), 786 So. 2d 115. The trial court‘s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Galliano, 2002-2849 (La. 1/10/03), 839 So. 2d 932, 934 (per curiam). When seeking to introduce evidence pursuant to
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
We find nоthing improper in the trial court‘s determination that the other crimes evidence was admissible. All of the other crimes evidence was introduced at trial through Breah, who was both the victim in these proceedings and the victim in her past confrontations with the defendant. Such testimony was not impermissible other crimes evidence to show bad character or a criminal disposition; rather, it had independent relevance to the issues of motive, opportunity, and intent. See
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the appellate record is incomplete as to the trial court‘s ruling оn the admissibility of the other crimes evidence.
The defendant pоints out in brief (and as already noted above) that defense counsel made the following objection: “Judge, at this time I have to object. The reason I‘m objecting, we‘ve kind of covered the issue about the 404, and I‘ve allowed her to kind of get into it a little bit. But, I mean, to me, she‘s kind of drawing it out.” According to the defendant, this language suggests that some discussion or argument occurred prior to the trial court‘s ruling on the
As discussed in the previous assignments of error, the evidence against the
At the beginning of trial on February 11, 2016, the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the other crimes evidence (“From reading the motions, I‘m going to allow the evidence to come in.“) but provided nothing more. The defendant filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal on this issue, wherein this court issued the following order to the trial court:
This matter presently pending before this court, the record on appeal is missing the following necessary transcript: the transcript of February 11, 2016 specifically relating to any hearing, argument, and ruling on the State‘s Motion for Admission of Evidence in Accordance with C.E. Article 404(B), if any.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court of the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, supplement the record on appeal with the transcript of February 11, 2016 specifically relating to any hearing, argument, and ruling on the State‘s Motion for Admission of Evidence in Accordance with C.E. Article 404(B), or cause the record to be supplemented with a certificate that the transcript cannot be prepared on or before March 1, 2019....
The trial court replied to this court with the following order:
On February 19, 2019 the Court of Appeal, First Circuit ordered this court to supplement the record on appeal with the transcript of February 11, 2016 specifically relating to any hearing, argument, and ruling on the State‘s Motion for Admission of Evidence in Accordance with C.E. Article 404(B). The transcript from the trial on that date has already been submitted in this matter. There were no other hearings and therefore, no other transcripts to provide in this matter. In the transcript already on record, this court states, “All right. From reading the Motions, I‘m going to allow the evidence to come in.” (See copy of transcript, page 3, attached). This is the only reference to the State‘s Motion in the entire transcript. Therefore, the record cannot be supplemented.
Based on the foregoing, the appellate record before us is not incomplete. Moreover, as in the instant case, an incomplete record may be adequate for full appellate review. Also, there exists a presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings. The defendant herein has not shown any prejudice from any allegedly missing portions from the record. See State v. Hawkins, 96-0766 (La. 1/14/97), 688 So. 2d 473, 480.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The defendant does not challenge the domestic abuse battery conviction.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See
In his brief, the defendant argues he cannot be guilty of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling because the home at issue was his own home, and he was in the process of moving out of it. The defendant notes he had belongings at the apartment, including clothes, two televisions, and a washing machine, and as such, had a proprietary interest in the home. There was no evidence, the defendant suggests, that he forced his way in, or that Breah denied him entry or asked him to leave.
There is no forced entry requirement in unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. When the defendant rang the doorbell, Breah asked a few times who it was, but the defendant did not answer. Breah reached to open the door because she thought it was a friend or neighbor. Before she opened the door, the defendant walked in. Breah is four feet ten inches tall and explained at trial that she was too short to reach the door‘s peep hole. Breah indicated that when she saw the defendant, she did not say anything because she was in “shock.” The defendant had been in jail for previously attacking Breah; she thought the defendant was still in jail when the door opened, and she had no idea the defendant was being released that day. When the defendant walked into the apartment, he locked the door. As Breah backed away, the defendant told her that today she was going to die. Breah made clear at trial that she had not given the defendant permission to enter the apartment. The following exchange with Breah on redirect examination reveals her state of mind when the defendant showed up at the apartment:
Q. How did you feel when you -- when he opened that door and you saw Mr. Piper?
A. My heart was in my stomach. I never -- I knew I was going to see him again, but I didn‘t expect it to be like
this and how it happened. I was terrified. I was shaking. I was just trying to think of my next move. I was scared. I was trying -- Q. And when he walked in and made that statement to you, how did you feel?
A. Petrified.
Q. Did you believe him when he said you were going to die?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. Because of our history and I knew that he was going to be mad, and he felt like I took everything from him because of a previous conversation. I already know that‘s how he felt, I ruined his life.
That the defendant had some of his belongings at the apartment is of no moment. Breah had a protective order against the defendant that was in effect from April 24, 2014 to April 24, 2015. The defendant signed the protective order on April 28, 2014, acknowledging that he understood, accepted, and agreed to comply with all conditions and orders therein. The order provided that the defendant not contact Breah or go within 100 yards of her. It further ordered the defendant not to go to Breah‘s residence or household. The defendant admitted at trial that he knew he had the protective order against him, but went to the apartment anyway. The defendant also knew that Breah married another man, or at least was seeing another man, while the defendant was in jail. Corporal Edward Nicholson, with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff‘s Office, testified that he interviewed the defendant, who told the corporal that he knew he had a protective order against him, and that he knew he was not supposed to be at the apartment. Corporal Nicholson also indicated that he believed Breah was the only person on the apartment lease at the time of the instant offense. In any event, it is clear that when the defendant went to the apartment, he was aware that he no longer lived there and was not allowed to be there.
In State v. Butler, 2006-645 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/27/06), 948 So. 2d 296, 298-300, the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The victim had filed a restraining order against the defendant, who was the father of the victim‘s young daughter. The victim testified she and the defendant were planning to marry the following summer. The defendant argued his entry into the apartment was authorized because the victim did not ask him to leave immediately. The fifth circuit found the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally entered the victim‘s home without authorization. According to the court, while the victim acknowledged she did not immediately ask the defendant to leave, she testified she did not authorize the defendant‘s entry into her home. In addition, there was a restraining order against the defendant at the time of his entry into the victim‘s аpartment. See and compare State v. Spain, 99-1956 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/15/00), 757 So. 2d 879, 882-84. (The relevant question is not whether defendant could generally enter the victim‘s residence, but whether this particular entry was authorized).
Herein, based on the evidence, a trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was not invited into the apartment by Breah, and that with a restraining order against him, he had no right to be there or around Breah. While the defendant testified that he was invited into the apartment and that he never choked Breah, the trial court determined otherwise and accepted the veracity of Breah‘s version of the events. As the trier of fact, the trial court was free to accept or
When a case involves circumstantial evidence, and the trial court reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant‘s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. See State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness‘s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So. 2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S. Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). The trial court‘s finding of guilt reflected the reasonable conclusion that, based on the testimonial and physical evidence, the defendant committed an unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. In finding the defendant guilty, the trial court rejected the defendant‘s theory of innocence. See Captville, 448 So. 2d at 680.
After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence supports the trial court‘s findings of guilt. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, and the uncontested domestic abuse battery (by strangulation). See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
This assignment of error also lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
In his fifth assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating him a habitual offender. Specifically, the defendant contends the habitual offender sentencing was in error because thе trial court failed to inform the defendant of his rights after the defendant admitted to the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information.
This assignment of error has merit. If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony, the district attorney of the parish in which the subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction. See
At the sentencing hearing, the following exchange between the trial court and the defendant took place:
Q. Mr. Piper, your lawyer says that you want to go ahead and admit that you‘re a third-felony offender rather than have the hearing; is that correct, sir?
A. Yes, sir.
The trial court found the defendant to be a third-felony habitual offender, then sentenced him on each count. Generally, the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent is not considered reversible error where the State has offered competent evidence of the defendant‘s status as a habitual offender at a hearing. State v. Cousin, 2017-1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/17), 240 So. 3d 954, 962, writ denied, 2018-0184 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So. 3d 1049. When the defendant‘s guilt, however, is proven by his own stipulation or admission without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error. Cousin, 240 So. 3d at 962. The language of the Habitual Offender Law must be strictly construed. In this regard, an implicit and integral aspect of the requirements of
In this case, while the defendant stipulated to his prior convictions (and presumedly his identity), the State offered no competent evidence of the defendant‘s status as a habitual offender at the hearing. The State, in fact, offered no evidence at all. Accordingly, there was no proof introduced of the defendant‘s identity as to the alleged predicate offenses. Thus, on the record before us, we are constrainеd to find that the admission by the defendant without prior advisement of his right to remain silent, as well as the absence of any documentary proof by the State requires reversal of the habitual offender finding. See Cousin, 240 So. 3d at 962. Cf. State v. Cook, 2011-2223 (La. 3/23/12), 82 So. 3d 1239 (per curiam) (where the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the trial court adjudicated the defendant as a habitual offender on the basis of not only his stipulation, but also the documentary evidence introduced by the State at the hearing).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s habitual offender adjudication and sentences are vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.2
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AND SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.