STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Justin Joseph HUTTON, Appellee.
No. 09-0512.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
April 15, 2011.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
HECHT, Justice.
After being charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
After receiving a report of someone passed out in a Ford Bronco in a parking lot, Ankeny police officers found Justin Hutton parked at a Quik Trip shortly after 2:00 a.m. on December 20, 2008. When they spoke with Hutton, the officers suspected he was intoxicated. He admitted he had been drinking and failed several field sobriety tests. A preliminary breath test indicated Hutton‘s blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. He was arrested and taken to the police station.
Although Hutton held a commercial driver‘s license (CDL), he had been driving a noncommercial vehicle just prior to his arrest. At the station, an officer requested Hutton submit to another breath test and read Hutton an implied consent advisory. Hutton agreed to take the test, which indicated his blood alcohol concentration was .205.
The State charged Hutton with OWI, first offense, in violation of
The State sought discretionary review, arguing the district court erred in concluding the advisory misstated the law. We granted review and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed, determining the advisory did not misstate the law, and remanded for further proceedings. We granted Hutton‘s application for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
We review Hutton‘s claim that the advisory he was given violated
III. Discussion.
In his motion to suppress, Hutton argued the breath test results should be suppressed because the consent advisory inaccurately represented the consequences of his decision to submit to the test or not. Contending the advisory was misleading, Hutton asserted it violated
A. Interpretation of Section 321.208.
The relevant statutes have been in flux since 2005. Prior to 2005, a CDL was subject to revocation for one year for offenses committed while operating a commercial vehicle.
Effective July 1, 2005,
In short, when Hutton was arrested in December 2008,
If you hold a commercial driver‘s license the department will disqualify your commercial driving privilege for one year if you submit to the test and fail it, you refuse to take the test, or you were operating while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or controlled substance or a combination of such substances.
(Emphasis added.) Although the advisory read to Hutton warned him that his CDL would be revoked for a year if he consented to the test and failed it,2
Hutton argues that
The State contends the advisory did not misstate the law. The State maintains that test failure is a ground for CDL disqualification and that any omission in the statute to refer explicitly to test failure is the result of “inartful drafting.” The State cites recent amendments to the relevant code sections which explicitly provide for revocation of a CDL for failing a breath test and asserts these amendments indicate the legislature sought to clarify its intent.3 The State also emphasizes language from our opinion in Massengale, contending we equated “failing” a breath
Although we may consider former and subsequent versions of a statute to ascertain the legislature‘s intent, we only do so when the statutory language is ambiguous. State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1999); see also State v. Spencer, 737 N.W.2d 124, 129 (Iowa 2007). A statute is ambiguous if reasonable minds could disagree as to its meaning. Spencer, 737 N.W.2d at 129. Ambiguity may arise either from the meaning of particular words or “from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.” Id. (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001)).
We do not find the relevant statutory language to be ambiguous in this case. Iowa law has consistently and clearly distinguished between driving with a blood alcohol content that exceeds the statutory threshold and driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Accordingly, we conclude the version of
B. Did the Advisory Violate Iowa Code Section 321J.8?
As described above,
Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude the inclusion of the additional and inaccurate warning that Hutton‘s CDL would be revoked if he took and failed the test did not preclude achievement of the statutory purpose. Hutton does not contend the inclusion of this additional warning rendered the advisory confusing or obscured the meaning of the accurate warnings. Hutton, despite being warned that the range of grounds for sanctions was greater than it really was, consented to the test. Accordingly, the circumstances do not support an argument that the excess verbiage in the advisory induced Hutton to consent to the test. Just as in Voss, “there is no evidence in the record that [Hutton] was confused about the consequences of his decision.” Id. Under these circumstances, we conclude
C. Did the Advisory Violate Hutton‘s Due Process Rights?
Hutton contends our decision in Massengale requires suppression of his breath test results because his substantive due process rights were violated when he received the misleading and inaccurate advisory.
Massengale, like Hutton, held a CDL but was arrested for driving a noncommercial vehicle while intoxicated. Massengale, 745 N.W.2d at 500-01. He was read an implied consent advisory that failed to inform him that his decision to submit to the test would have any consequences on his commercial license. Id. at 502. We determined that, although it satisfied the requirements of
Hutton asserts the advisory read to him is analogous to the misleading advisory in Massengale because it contained incorrect information and thus did not reasonably further the government‘s purpose of providing him the information necessary to make a reasoned and informed decision. We do not agree. While it is optimal to
Further, we do not think our decision in Massengale stands for the proposition that any flaw in an implied consent advisory constitutes a due process violation. The advisory read to Massengale omitted any and all information about the consequences of his decision on his CDL. We noted that “[w]e cannot be confident Massengale‘s decision to submit to testing was unaffected by the State‘s misleading and inadequate advisory.” Id. at 504. In contrast, the advisory read to Hutton communicated the information required by
D. Did the Incorrect Advisory Render Hutton‘s Consent Involuntary?
Hutton also claims that because the advisory misstated the law, it rendered his consent involuntary. To review Hutton‘s claim, “we evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not the decision was made voluntarily.” Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 219. “[T]o be valid, [the driver‘s consent to testing] must be voluntary and uncoerced.” State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1994); see also Bernhard, 657 N.W.2d at 473 (“The ultimate question is whether the decision to comply with a valid request under the implied-consent law is a reasoned and informed decision.“).
As we have discussed above in the context of Hutton‘s other claims, we are confident Hutton was not induced to consent to the test by the inclusion of the incorrect excess verbiage in the advisory. The excess verbiage should have discouraged Hutton from submitting to the test as he did. Accordingly, we find no grounds to conclude Hutton‘s consent was coerced or uninformed. “[N]ot every inaccurate depiction by law enforcement officers that might bear on a subject‘s election to submit to chemical testing is a basis for suppressing the test results.” Bernhard, 657 N.W.2d at 473. This is especially true under these circumstances.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except WATERMAN, MANSFIELD, and ZAGER, JJ., who take no part.