State of Iowa v. Yvette Marie Louisell

590 quite I, weighs

It that one factor Amendment or article section 17 of is true the seriously significantly Seats’s favor —his Iowa' Constitution. family and home environment.

troubled acknowledged con-

The court and district IV. Conclusion. point, as it had to. I sidered this believe reasons, For the foregoing respectfully I alone, does render though, this factor affirm resentencing dissent and would the an sentence unconstitutional under LWOP below.19 this the circumstances of case. Other courts have reached similar conclusions.18 JJ., ZAGER, join and WATERMAN a case stands considerable present this dissent. from the botched robberies com distance year fourteen olds that were by mitted at -,

involved in 567 U.S. 132 2465, 420, at

S.Ct. at 183 L.Ed.2d the a client

impulsive stabbing of committed teenage a model who later became an Louisell, inmate, v.

exemplary State 865 (Iowa 590, 591, 2015 WL 3930172 Iowa, Appellant, STATE of 2015), the fatal blow with the tire iron and fight by struck in a was someone v. defendant, Ragland, other than the LOUISELL, Appellee. Yvette Marie 110. N.W.2d at No. 14-0175. deference we must on Given the afford legislature’s the one hand to the determi- Supreme Court of Iowa. sentencing options nation of and on the June 2015. other hand to the trial court’s exercise discretion, I would not find this Eighth sentence violates either the applying principles affirming

18. A number of courts the life-without-parole but sentence agreed Miller have that life without planned school shooter who the attack appropriate juve- can be an sentence for some complete showed lack of remorse at despite family nile their defendants troubled sentencing); Rafferty, 2015 WL at Palafox, life. Cal.App.4th home See (affirming the LWOP *29 defendant’s sen- Cal.Rptr.3d (affirming at 793-94 life despite fact tence that he "came from a murders without committed home” broken and was sixteen old sixteen, despite when defendant he was "the murders, gun- time of the he not the was alcohol, family’s drugs, gangs, issues with do- man, and he under the was influence of a violence, activities"); delinquent mestic gunman). much older man who was the Brooks, (affirming 139 So.3d at life 573-74 parole despite very family without difficult One final note: Seats has not raised a history dropped defendant who out of supplemental argument that he entitled parents school at fourteen and whose dealt legislation, because the 2015 Smoot, drugs); and used 134 So.3d at 5-6 which enacted before his sentence juvenile (upholding defendant’s life-without- Nevertheless, became final. case this is to despite sentence defense counsel’s anyway be remanded for another resentenc- presentation of evidence that the defendant concludes, ing, majority as the believe I "came from broken home" and lived in a Lane, group apply period youth); district the 2015 law for home for a of his (considering my part, WL the reasons stated *15-16 concurrence Louisell, upbringing” part defendant’s “tumultuous dissent 865 N.W.2d at 603.

amici curiae ACLU of Iowa and ACLU Foundation.

HECHT, Justice.

Recent decisions of this court have ex- constitutionality of plored the criminal sen- juvenile tences for general- offenders. See (Iowa ly Lyle, State v. 854 N.W.2d 378 2014); Ragland, v. State 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa Pearson, 2013); v. State 836 N.W.2d (Iowa Null, 2013); State v. 836 N.W.2d (Iowa 2013). Today we consider the nature and extent of a court’s in discretion a offender convicted in of murder committed 1987. Because we conclude the district court lacked au- thority impose a determinate sentence twenty-five years, but did have authori- ty to impose sentence of life eligibility parole, with we vacate the sentence and remand with instructions. Background I. Facts and Proceed- ings. jury convicted Yvette Louisell murder, stemming from the stabbing death of Keith Stilwell. At crime,

the time she committed the Louisell years was seventeen five and months old and was student at Iowa State Universi- (ISU). ty family Louisell’s chaotic background and heavily home environment influenced and shaped seventeen-year-old prior to the homicide. Louisell’s mother suffered from General, Attorney Thomas J. illness, mental and her father was often Mullins, Darrel L. Attorney Assistant Gen- family absent from the home. When he eral, Holmes, H. Stephen County and At- present, he and Louisell’s mother torney, appellant. another; were often violent one Loui- Allen, Johnston, E. Gordon and Mat- memory parents fight- sell’s first is of her (until withdrawal), Shimanovsky thew L. three, ing. ageAt ingested Louisell LSD Urbandale, for appellee. knowing she found the house—not what Wilson, Rita Bettis and Randall C. Des it experienced was—and hallucinations. Moines, four, age and Ezekiel R. Edwards and Ste- At Louisell’s mother left Watt, York, York, home, that, ven M. New par- New and soon after Louisell’s years, Needing money the next few to earn because she During divorced. ents feared ISU would her scholarship lines several revoke moved across state Louisell poor performance, academic Louisell times and was shuttled between different seeking answered an advertisement a mod- Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, and homes el for art classes at a local art institute. Eventually, grandmother Ohio. initially employment She declined because legal guardian primary became her posing the institute informed her that nude figure. Louisell attended nine parental requirement position. was a of the How- and never attended the different schools ever, eventually she decided she needed years for two consecutive until same school money agreed pose nude for junior high school her senior of the one institute’s classes. After she Michigan. despite Yet these difficult institute, for a posed few sessions circumstances, participated pro- Stilwell, one of the students at the insti- gifted students and even grams tute, befriended Louisell and hired her to skipped grade elementary in school. in privately model his home. See Louisell adversity Louisell Unfortunately, Corr., Dep’t v. Dir. Iowa 178 F.3d her childhood did not throughout faced Cir.1999). (8th 1019, 1021 Stilwell was dissipate high once she reached school and physically handicapped and could walk stability. Her fa- somé locational obtained only by using canes. See id. Louisell remarried, did not more ther but become agreed private to the sessions because Stil- occasion, supportive. particular On one well—an older student twice Louisell’s her chase her stepmother Louisell watched age compensate to her at four —offered father with a knife and became so afraid of hourly wage paid times the the institute that she hid all the other further violence her. Additionally, in

knives the house. because home, After in several sessions Stilwell’s younger peers was than her and be- she to con- Louisell decided she did want felt developmentally, hind them Louisell Ac- modeling privately tinue for Stilwell. isolated from them. cordingly, upcom- she informed Stilwell an During that ing session would be her last. ad- Despite this considerable cumulative session, trial, at final Louisell contended versity, graduated early high Louisell from despite Stilwell cornered her with knife-— initially con- age school at sixteen. She go- handicap his announced he was —and templated attending college Michigan in or ing Reacting to have sex with her. instinc- Indiana, However, finan- close to home. tively, she claimed she wrested the knife reasons, accepted a full tuition cial she him in self-de- from Stilwell stabbed in scholarship immediately enrolled prevent raping to him from her. fense ISU, program summer enrichment hun- took She left Stilwell’s home and Stilwell’s dreds of miles from home. After Louisell appre- wallet with her. She was later ISU, she found the sudden inde- arrived attempting to use Stilwell’s hended while college student overwhelm- pendence of at a local purchase credit card to make a academically ing. began struggle She to jury rejected mall. A Louisell’s version zero, and, with her self-confidence near defense, justification events and her re- heavily using mari- drinking started guilty of turning finding a verdict from her emotional stress. juana escape first-degree murder. continued, fall semester As the conviction, she was sen- slip hope- continued to and she felt After Louisell’s grades pa- imprisonment tenced to life without less. in role,1 only subsequently sentence authorized Iowa commuted Louisell’s LWOP (1987) for that crime.2 along Code section 902.1 with the of thir- sentences sentence — unsuccessfully pursued appeal a direct She ty-seven juvenile other offenders —to life subsequent applications post- and two imprisonment possibility with the in court. Her convictioh relief state habe- sixty years prison. Ragland, See petition as filed federal was also (reproducing at 110-12 one of 836 N.W.2d Louisell, 1021-22, denied. See 178 F.8d at commutation orders its Governor’s custody has 1024. She remained state Yet, entirety). the district court denied twenty-six years since her convic- an illegal Louisell’s motion to correct sen- currently tion and is incarcerated at the tence, concluding prospec- Miller had Iowa Correctional Institution for Women appealed. tive effect. Louisell (ICIW) Mitchellville, Iowa. appeal pending, While Louisell’s was we Supreme the United States that, applied held as to one of the other Eighth prohib- Court held Amendment thirty-seven imposed LWOP sentences on juveniles its sentences for who LWOP offenders, the Governor’s commu- offenses; they commit nonhomicide must tation elevated form over substance. See opportunity be afforded “some realistic at 121. explained although id. We Florida, v. obtain release.” Graham technically available to the af- 48, 82, 2011, 2034, U.S. 130 S.Ct. sixty years fected after in prison, inmates (2010). Seeking L.Ed.2d ex- the commuted sentences were “the func- Eighth tend Amendment pro- Graham’s equivalent parole” tional of life without juveniles tections to include convicted they provided because no meaningful op- homicide, Louisell filed a motion to correct portunity for release. Id. 121-22. We an illegal sentence 2011. While the also determined that Miller retro- pending, motion was the United States actively. Id. at 117. Supreme mandatory Court struck down sentencing impose schemes that LWOP decision, Following our Ragland we failing while to afford offenders— summarily vacated Louisell’s sentence and even those convicted homicide—an indi- remanded the case to the district court for sentencing vidualized determination based an sentencing hearing. individualized At on specific factors the Court identified. hearing, presented testimony Louisell Alabama, -, -, Miller v. 567 U.S. tending and exhibits to show she has been 2455, 2468, 2475, -, 132 S.Ct. during twenty-six years rehabilitated her 407, 423, L.Ed.2d (identifying in prison. example, For the record shows five factors courts must consid- completed Louisell numerous educational er); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 n. 6 programs prison, courses and in- while factors). (adopting the Miller cluding degree an associate’s in 1998 and a mandatory degree magna bachelor’s LWOP sentence cum laude —with fell category within the of sentences Miller honors—in 2009.3 She learned at least one Terry made invalid. helper partici- Governor Branstad trade —electrician’s —and counselors, opinion, acronym 3.According 1. In this we use the LWOP to one of Louisell's referring when to a sentence of life without Louisell is the second woman in ICIW's history degree to receive a bachelor's while incarcerated. language 2. The from the 1987 version of this today. statute remains in effect See Iowa 902.1(1) (2015). Code musical, so, artistic, doing the court resentenced in numerous other Louisell to pated prison. at the Fur- religious activities a definite of twenty-five years term ther, author who published Louisell is served, thereby credit for time discharging other incarcerated mentors and tutors prison immediately her from and releasing women. her to correctional supervision, as if on parole, years. for no more than two

Key in- Louisell’s 1988 murder players Recognizing possibility an appellate in at the hear- weighed trial might conclude the district court ing. county attorney prosecuted who authority lacked to impose a definite term she believes Louisell has Louisell testified murder, the court punished enough served time and has been Goode, imposed an alternative sentence of sufficiently. Judge pre- Allan who life trial, possibility criminal with the of parole sided over Louisell’s 1988 opined twenty-five years. authored a letter which he Loui- Under this alternative positive sentence, make contributions to sell could the court determined Louisell is released from community she were parole, now but left to the prison.4 discretion board’s when Louisell paroled. should in fact be at the presented other evidence circum- resentencing hearing detailing the appealed The State requested also awaiting her she be re- stances stay an immediate the district court’s the rec- prison. example, leased from For resentencing order. granted stay We confirming ord includes a letter she has appeal clarify and retained the the dis- employment an offer of as an received sentencing authority trict court’s in this evi- apprentice electrical trimmer. Other evolving area of law. presented dence was to the court describ- system standing ready to ing support Scope II. of Review. help society Louisell reenter should she be prison. the ev- discharged Together, from Illegal sentences can be chal overarching By an idence created theme: lenged any at time. Iowa P. R.Crim. accounts, inmate all Louisell is model 2.24(5)(a); Hoeck, State v. 843 N.W.2d rehabilitation; grown who has achieved (Iowa Pearson, 2014); 70 836 N.W.2d at to a impulsive youngster from a naive and illegal 94. A sentence is it amounts to mature, accomplished, intelligent and Hoeck, punishment. cruel and unusual woman; accepted responsibility full 70; State, N.W.2d at Bonilla v. the crime as a she committed (Iowa 2010). N.W.2d Because in 1987. appeals asserting pun cruel and unusual testimony consid- hearing After the require constitutional anal ishment claims ering presented, the Louisell the exhibits ysis, typically our review is de novo. acknowledged significant district Hoeck, 70; Ragland, 843 N.W.2d uncertainty statutory and constitutional N.W.2d at 113. regard

with to the court’s au- appealed has not from the thority Ragland. The after Miller and sentence, and we therefore do not new carefully court then the considered evi- illegal consider whether it is or cruel and thoroughly in the record ana- dence Rather, appeal brought by lyzed each of factors. After unusual. this the Miller Chet Culver. Judge sell made to then-Governor 4. Goode wrote the letter in 2009 to Judge passed away in 2010. support application Loui- Goode an for commutation custody principles, us to decide whether from these requires the State —violates asserts, legislature the the authority to im- State because court had the district has not authorized such a sentence. sentence or a sentence pose determinate Louisell became eli- setting the date when dispositional The three State identifies challenges review gible We would, view, alternatives that its com- legality of a sentence for correction of port with the court’s constitutional role: legal Ragland, errors. See 836 N.W.2d at (1) uphold sixty years un- sentence 113. (2) order; der the commutation Governor’s parole ineligibility sever from Iowa Code

III. The Parties’ Positions. 902.1(1)(2015), leaving section intact Loui- making sell’s life sentence but her immedi- A. The The State concedes State. and, therefore, ately eligible af- original LWOP sentence was un- fording prison her release from at such Ragland, constitutional under Miller and parole may time as board of deter- asserts her corrected sentence of a but mine; along or move downward twenty-five years term of determinate charging punishment scale to a expressly prison must be vacated because it is not legislature authorized for a differ- authorized statute and is therefore ille- ent homicide offense. that gal. State insists no set facts impose authorizes a district court already As we have held the commuted sentence not found the Iowa Code. The offering parole eligibility sentence after murder, sentence for sixty years in prison is unconstitutional contends, prison. State is life imposed because it was without individual- factors, ized consideration of the Miller argument separa- The State rests its on Ragland, 836 the State’s powers principles. tion of Our state con- proposed dispositional option first is a powers “[t]he stitution instructs option nonstarter. The State’s second government of Iowa into shall be divided functionally similar to the district court’s separate departments three ... and no alternative of life in sentence person charged pow- with the exercise of serving twenty-five years. properly belonging ers to one of these instances, immediately both Louisell would departments any shall function exercise be because she has appertaining to either of the others.” twenty-five years served more than Const, Ill, § According Iowa art. to the prison, parole and the board make would State, legislature power the has exclusive the determination whether and when prescribe punishment to for criminal con- she will be released on The State victions, judicial while power is limited to proposed disposi- characterizes its third judgments imposing prescribed pun- the “invasive,” tional alternative as and it words, ishment. In other the State con- discourages implement- therefore us from only “give tends court can effect to the ing that alternative. See Commonwealth written, law as not ... rewrite the law Brown, 676, 259, v. 466 1 Mass. N.E.3d accordance with the court’s view of the (2013) (refusing 264-66 to create “an en- preferred public policy.” Wagner, State v. hoc”). tirely penalty new scheme ad 1999). (Iowa 83, 88 dis- Louisell, trict court’s determination that B. According Louisell be Louisell. to the twenty-five years sentenced to in prison legislature court should not defer to the as with credit for time urges served—and accord- the State because deference would ingly, discharged that she now be merely perpetuate illegal her LWOP sen- theoretically presented would be ’stances here tence. While she should therefore preferred the State’s parole-eligible under be affirmed. and under the district court’s disposition Addressing the separation-of- State’s sentencing option, she contends alternative powers argument, judi- Louisell notes the receiving parole of ever is

the likelihood apply cial function is to constitutional prin- given board’s stead- negligible ciples to decide controversies —not simply grant juvenile to offenders re- fast refusal point them out. And although we must Graham, lease, even after the decisions in respect powers legislative and Miller, such, Ragland and were As filed. departments, executive Louisell contends any sentence other than the argues, she judicial department has inherent pow- leading district court’s first alternative to justice er to do when the other depart- discharge deprive immediate would her of adopt ments fail to and meaningful opportunity to reenter soci- regimes compatible I, with article section ety leave her stuck in limbo 17 of our constitution. Deference to the incompatible spirit with the departments particular other in this Null, Pearson, con- Ragland. would, view, prevent text sen- Ragland, we concluded an individual- tencing judges exercising from their dis- sentencing hearing including ized consider- nullify right cretion and her to be free un- ation of the Miller factors “cures the punishment. from cruel and unusual aspects [mandatory constitutional applied juvenile statutes as of- LWOP] legislature until amended

fenders Analysis. IV. pro- to establish a different constitutional A. Determinate Term of Ragland, at 119 n. cedure.” 836 N.W.2d Twenty-Five begin Years Prison. We “until phrase 7. Louisell seizes on the by noting principle the well-established legislature,” and notes the amended imposed statutory without sentences 902.1 to legislature did amend section illegal authorization are and void. v. State sentencing proce- establish a constitutional Ross, (Iowa 2007); 729 N.W.2d offenders convicted of dure Freeman, State v. 705 N.W.2d legislative murder in the two (Iowa 2005). upheld princi have this “We sessions held after Miller was decided.5 ple illegal even in cases which the sen Thus, asserts, tence was more lenient than that allowed to craft a new sentence forced by law and when correction of the sentence because section 902.1 calls for LWOP and would result in an increase the sen down, constitutionally infirm. It comes Allen, tence.” State v. 601 N.W.2d asserts, judicial she choice between (Iowa 1999) curiam); (per see State v. punishment discretion or a we know is (Iowa Draper, 457 N.W.2d 605-06 judicial cruel and unusual. Louisell insists 1990) (increasing drug sentences for viola day, must rule the discretion dis- tions to five when the district court trict court’s conclusion it had discretion to years); three impermissibly imposed depart from the strict letter of the uncon- Ohnmacht, stitutional statute and craft an State v. 342 N.W.2d 842- appropriate (Iowa 1983) (reinstating prison determinate sentence under the circum- involving resentencing, only homicides. 5. At the time of Louisell’s ed of class felonies “A" legislative legislative legislative one had concluded without A second session without session subject prior passage legislation addressing ended to the sub- of individual- action on this sentencing appeal. ized of offenders convict- mission of this prison convicted of five in for Louisell’s first- a defendant time because conviction, robbery statutorily part was not that first-degree degree murder sentence he re- suspended sentencing for the order must be district court’s ceived). Sentencing judges Freeman, exercise dis- vacated. See 705 N.W.2d at 287 statutorily a mandated (“A pursuit cretion sentence is void if the statute does not opportunity maximum goal: “provide [it].”); to Draper, authorize ] stated, for the rehabilitation (“Simply when a defendant community of the protection and for the departs upward or downward— — by further offenses the defendant from legislatively from the authorized sentence (2013). § Iowa Code 901.5 and others.” offense, pronounced a sen- given for may goal, judges this implementing But in Ohnmacht, nullity....”); tence is a authorized only impose punishment (“A authority N.W.2d at 842 court has no constitutional con- legislature within mitigate punishment by providing for a “[Legislative determinations of straints. statute.”). not authorized sentence punishment great are entitled to defer- Eligibility B. Life with for Pa Braegger, ence.” State v. 773 N.W.2d Twenty-Five role After Years. We turn (Iowa 2009). 872-73 now to the district court’s alternative sen currently of Iowa does not The Code prison parole eligibility tence of life in term-of-years a authorize a sentence for twenty-five years. after To determine first-degree convicted of mur- defendant whether that sentence was within the dis der, even that defendant committed discretion, again trict court’s look we juvenile. crime as a Several sections with- the relevant statutes. mandate that class “A” chapter 902 felons, originally Louisell was sentenced specifically those convicted of under murder, receive more severe the 1987 edition of the Code of Iowa. At time, persons establishing sentences than convicted of lesser the section sentences read, example, crimes. For Iowa Code section for “A” entirety: class felonies its 902.1(1) that a “A” states convicted class Upon plea guilty, a a verdict of custody felon shall be committed into guilty, special upon or a verdict which Additionally, life.6 section 902.3 excludes judgment of of a “A” conviction class “A” from indeterminate class felonies sen- rendered, felony may be the court shall tencing, reinforcing the idea life judgment enter a of conviction and shall punishment is the intended for such custody commit the into the defendant Finally, § crimes. Iowa Code 902.3. sec- department of the director of the Iowa tion “A” 902.4 excludes class felons from of corrections for the rest of the defen- the universe of felons whose sentences Nothing dant’s life. the Iowa correc- may year be reconsidered within one pertaining judg- tions code to deferred § their conviction. 902.4. Id. ment, sentence, suspended deferred statutory sentence,

Because there was no authori- or reconsideration of sentence ty twenty- “A” felony, the determinate sentence of to a class and a sentences), notably punished § 6. Lesser offenses are less nies receive life with id. 707.3 severely. example, term-of-years For sen- ("Murder degree in the second class "B" murder, prescribed second-degree tence is felony.... per- maximum sentence [T]he felony. Compare a class "B” Iowa Code son convicted under this section be a shall (defining first-degree § 707.2 murder aas period fifty of confinement of not more than 902.1(1) (indicat- felony), "A" class and id. years.”). ing all individuals convicted "A” of class felo-

599 (2013). felony sum, § of a “A” person convicted class Iowa Code 902.1 parole not be released on unless 2011 amendment left the statutory shall intact, language fully but governor commutes the sentence to renumbered it as 902.1(1). section The years. of amendment also a term added providing juve- subsections that all (1987). § 902.1 In 2011—after Iowa Code nile offenders of class “A” felo- convicted Graham was decided but before the deci- except first-degree murder —shall be nies— legislature sion in Miller was filed—the eligible parole for after serving twenty-five 902.1, adding amended section language (c). 902.1(2)(a), years. §Id. renumbering subsections. Sentencing confronting courts un 181, § Iowa Acts ch. 147. After the 2011 may constitutional statutes amendment, section 902.1 provided: remedy choose the of in appro severance Upon plea guilty, of of verdict 4.12; Bonilla, priate cases. Iowa Code special or a verdict which a guilty, upon at 701-02. Severing N.W.2d constitu “A” judgment of conviction of a class tionally infirm provisions appropriate “is rendered, felony may be the court shall it substantially impair legisla does not judgment enter a of conviction and shall purpose, tive if the enactment remains ca custody into the commit defendant pable fulfilling of the apparent legislative department of the director of the Iowa intent, and if remaining portion of the of corrections for the rest of the defen- enactment can given be effect without the Nothing dant’s life. in the Iowa correc- provision.” Dog invalid Am. Owners pertaining to judg- tions code deferred Ass’n, Moines, City Inc. v. Des of ment, sentence, suspended deferred (Iowa 1991). Because sentence, or reconsideration of sentence Louisell could not be sentenced to manda felony, to a class “A” and a LWOP, Miller, tory Null, Ragland, person felony convicted of a class “A” Pearson mandate the final clause of sec parole shall not be released on unless 902.1(1) tion a person convicted of a —“and governor commutes the sentence to felony class ‘A’ shall not be released on years. of term parole governor unless the commutes the Notwithstanding 2. a. subsection years” sentence to a term of severed. —be person felony, convicted of a “A” class Bonilla, (severing See 791 N.W.2d at 702 age eighteen and who under the the same clause section 902.1 on review at the time the offense was committed of a offender’s LWOP sentence for eligible serving shall be for offense). felony kidnapping a class “A” a minimum term of confinement of twen- approach The district court took this ty-five years. Louisell, resentencing correctly noting that person paroled pursuant purporting b. If a to the within 902.1 clause section person categorically preclude parole juve this subsection the shall be sub- ject procedures to the “A” same set set nile offenders convicted of class felo 901B, 905, 906, chapters chap- out in nies must be severed. adopted

ter and rules under those correctly court also conclud- district chapters persons on parole. 902.1(2)(c) ed subsection must be severed person c. A convicted of murder in in Louisell. That subsection degree providing person the first in violation of section convicted murder “[a] eligible ... shall not be degree 707.2 shall not be the first subsection,” pursuant to this pursuant this subsection. 600. As, noted, it too employ

must be severed because would cate we have we the reme gorically exclude Louisell from the uni dy severing statutory provisions of in this juvenile (1) verse of offenders entitled to a context the excised statute not does for meaningful opportunity parole. See substantially impair legislative pur at -, at U.S. S.Ct. (2) pose, capable fulfilling remains of 424 (holding Eighth 183 L.Ed.2d at (3) intent, apparent legislative can be prohibited sentencing “a Amendment given effect without the language. excised in prison scheme that mandates life with Ass’n, Dog Am. See Owners 469 N.W.2d at juvenile possibility out of for offend conclude 418. We the leaner section 902.1 ers.”). remaining after severance of the constitu severing tionally provisions comports After from section 902.1 the infirm with above, provisions two discussed we now these The legislative purpose criteria. of 902.1(2)(a). confront section This subsec- prescribing the most severe sentences for juvenile tion makes offenders convicted offenders convicted of murder the first class “A” eligible felonies for after a degree including juveniles main — —is minimum twenty- term of confinement of Although tained. sentencing courts must 902.1(2)(a). § years. five Iowa Code have discretion to decide of here, course, problem is that all manda- fenders convicted of the most serious of tory juveniles minimum sentences for vio- eligible parole, offenses shall be for I, late article section 17 of the Iowa Con- legislature’s power prescribe the sen 400; Lyle, stitution. see preserved. tence of life in Simi also A. Bierschbach Stephanos Richard & larly, remedy the severance respects the Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punish- legislature’s intent in establishing the most ment, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 439-40 substantial penalty under available Iowa (noting mandatory minimum sentences are law and consistent prevailing consti sledgehammers” “crude that not do “tailor tutional principles for murder. blameworthiness”). punishments to moral The third criterion affecting our determi Accordingly, Lyle requires that the final nation of remedy whether the severance 902.1(2)(a) clause of providing subsection employed should be augurs also favor of mandatory for a minimum term of confine- application its constitutionally here. After ment also be severed for purposes of sen- provisions’ infirm are severed from section tencing Louisell. With strikethrough add- 902.1, given the statute can be effect. ed to parts, illustrate the severed Louisell, the court had discre provide: subsection would “Notwithstand- impose tion to a life eligibili sentence with ing person subsection convicted aof ty parole.7 felony, class “A” and who was under the age Having eighteen provisions the time the severed the offense was section eligible committed shall be 902.1 affected parole after the constitutional infir- serving a-minimum mity, -term of confinement of we conclude the district court had twenty-five years.” discretion, See Iowa considering Code the Miller — 902.1(2)(a). factors, to sentence Louisell in pris- to life Miller, however, ler, at -, "giv- As the Court noted in 567 U.S. 132 S.Ct. at Graham, Roper, en [the Court] all said in L.Ed.2d at 424. The State does contend culpabil- about children's [Miller] diminished exercising district court erred in discre ity heightened capacity change, we impose making tion to a sentence appropriate sentencing ju- think occasions for veniles to will be [LWOP] uncommon.” Mil- eligibility parole. Although for court’s discretion allowed it on with to conclude the or- district court’s under Louisell should be parole-eligible does not eligible effectively be der Louisell would analysis. noted, end our As we have Loui- immediately she has al- for because parole the sell asserts district court’s of a choice twenty-five years, served more than ready determinate sentence and discharge from sentencing the court’s discre- we conclude prison because, be upheld reality, should presented under the tion circumstances parole her for eligibility illusory, is was of wheth- question here limited to the that, emphasizes real. She since eligible is for The dis- er Louisell Null, decided, Ragland, and Pearson were court had to conclude trict discretion only Iowa’s thirty-eight juvenile one of of- im- eligible parole should be for Louisell originally fenders sentenced to has LWOP mediately, excising but after the unconsti- granted parole. only been of one statutory provisions detailed tutional prisoners granted parole these was condi- above, we conclude the district did tionally hospice to released care for cancer remaining not have discretion under the treatment, parole and the board reserved sentencing framework to decide parole right for commenced after the to revisit its decision if eligibility her health serving specific twenty-five term of improved. Rodgers, Grant Dying Inmate Bonilla, prison.8 See N.W.2d Kristina Fetters Granted Hospice-Only (severing mandatory from a at 702 LWOP (Dec. Parole, 2013), 3, Moines Reg. Des only necessary that which was to sentence http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/ constitutionally permissible pun- ensure index.php/2013/12/03/board-grants-fetters- ishment). Accordingly, vacate we also parole-to-hospice-only/article.10 aspect of the sentence and remand this entry prison of a sentence of life for data, contends, This historical Louisell eligibility parole.9 with for give us little the confidence that existing system Meaningful Opportunity parole establishes for Pa- C. meaningful opportunity parole ju- role. Our conclusion that the district appeal legisla- pending, imposed 8.While this the ized at the time the district court it. passed governor Furthermore, ture Senate File express opinion we no as to signed the bill into law. See Governor’s constitutionality of this new statute. 24, 2015), Approval (April Transmission http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/linc/ available emphasize holding today our 9. We addresses 86/external/govbills/SF448.pdf. Senate File scope of the district court's discretion sentencing judges authorizes to consider impose an individualized after sentence select, as the a list factors and considering question the Miller factors. The case, court did in a minimum district this sentence with whether the of life in making juveniles term of confinement before particular case eligibility is in this convicted murder illegal, disproportionate, or cruel and unusual Legis. S.F. parole. 2015 Iowa Serv. Eighth under either Amendment or article 2015). (West any person The bill I, of the Iowa Constitution nei- section 17 felony prior was convicted "who of class 'A' appeal. ther raised nor decided in this on, to, immediate] or after the effective [bill's age eigh- ... date and who was under passed away hospice care. 10. Fetters while in at the committed.” teen time offense was Ta, Finney & Linh Daniel P. Freed Inmate However, although § 5. new statute Id. Dies, Fetters, Juvenile, Convicted Kristina as appear to authorize a of life would sentence 28, 2014), Reg. (July Des available Moines twenty-five years if Louisell http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/ today, resentenced we the sub- were conclude sequent legislation our consid- does not affect news/crime-and-courts/2014/07/27/kristina-fe of whether that sentence was author- eration tters-dies/13238853/. serving venile offenders life sentences. In it is unclear what Supreme Court words, posits juveniles precisely by requiring other meant in Graham provide who committed class “A” felonies less ser- meaningful the state to “some kidnapping opportunity ious than murder —such as or to obtain release based on robbery repeatedly maturity denied demonstrated and rehabilita- —are severity, based on offense there is no re- tion.” 560 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. at opportunity pa- alistic for her to receive 176 L.Ed.2d at It did not indi- 845-46. role, extensively no matter how she has cate when such an opportunity must be provided provide been rehabilitated. Without a realistic guidance regarding or meaningful opportunity, and a scholar has the nature or structure of such a second- suggested, Instead, “the fact that a teen who was opportunity. look or back-end reckless, impulsive, and without moral the Court left it to the states “to explore grounding!] an adult who becomes has the means and compli- mechanisms for (and wholly 75, none of these traits” 2030, is ance.” Id. at 130 S.Ct. at 176 wrongly) ignored. H. Pillsbury, Samuel L.Ed.2d at 846. Talking Cruelty: Eighth About The Null, (footnote 836 at 67-68 omit-

Amendment and Juvenile Offenders ted). After Null, Since we have not had occa- Alabama, Loy. Miller v. 46 L.A. L. Rev. explore sion to fully more the meaning of (2013). 885, question 926 whether phrase “meaningful opportunity” in although pa- now Louisell— sure, this context. To meaningful be role—has been denied it in violation of Graham, opportunity must be realistic. law not appeal.11 before us this 82, 2034, 560 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. at 176 L.Ed.2d at 850. But we must leave for Although question whether day question another repeated whether wrongfully Louisell has been parole denied cursory parole deprive juvenile denials of ripe juncture, is not for our at decision this offenders who have shown demonstrable we reaffirm that under both the United rehabilitation maturity and of a meaningful States Constitution and the Iowa Constitu or realistic opportunity for release. . tion, juveniles convicted crimes must be “meaningful opportunity afforded a codified, to ob presently As the Iowa Code tain release based on demonstrated matu and the Iowa Administrative enu- Code rity and rehabilitation” —if a parole merate factors the board considers discretion, judge, exercising making parole determines when decisions. Iowa Code Graham, 906.5(3) parole (2015); should be § available. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 205-8.10(1). at U.S. 130 S.Ct. at These codified factors do not 845-46; L.Ed.2d see closely also track the Miller pertinent factors -, U.S. at 132 S.Ct. at parole 183 to the eligbility offend- (concluding judges ers, they sentenc- nor do L.Ed.2d account for the mitigating ing juveniles convicted of murder must be youth attributes of that constitutionally are able to consider mitigating factors and required de- sentencing considerations. One parole termine whether should opined be avail- scholar has ... par- “[w]ithout able); Null, assessment, 836 N.W.2d at 67-68. In ticularized youth sentenced to Null, acknowledged we terms, long prison possibili- even with the note, however, 11. We that our statutes can son be released without detriment to the currently provide and administrative community’’ rules or to themselves. Iowa Code (2015) added); board of shall an inmate (emphasis when 906.4 see also probability “there is reasonable per- that the Iowa Admin. Code r. 205-8.1. ty parole, justices will continue to be denied the All concur except n MANSFIELD, ‘meaningful opportunity WATERMAN, to obtain release’ ZAGER, JJ., promised by Graham and Miller.” Laura who part concur Cohen, Youth, Parole, in part. Freedom’s Road: dissent and the Promise Miller v. Alabama and MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in Florida, Graham v. L. Cardozo Rev. part and dissenting part). (2014) added). 1031, 1055-56 (emphasis “And, possibility if the of parole does not join I the court’s opinion well-reasoned afford an inmate a expectation true of with exception IV.B, of part where I release, why it render valid an oth- respectfully IVA, part dissent. 1059; erwise invalid sentence?” Id. at recognizes see court legislature’s right Bierschbach, A. Proportion- sentences, also Richard determine appropriate subject Parole, ality However, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. constitutional constraints. IV.B, that, part the (asserting just disregards 1761-62 court as the the lesson part of IVA and possibility of commutation resentences Louisell it- clemency or self, giving instead of effect to current does not law. provide meaningful opportunity I wrong believe it is give not to release, the 2015 possibility of that is legislation effect, its intended wrong meaningful). remote is not apply

not to it to Yvette Louisell’s case.12 As by majority footnote, noted the in a our V. Conclusion. general assembly recently amended the relating law to sentencing juveniles of con- The district court did not authority have victed of first degree murder. The law to sentence Louisell to a determinate term provides: now twenty-five years of in prison for murder degree. Although the first the district defendant [A] convicted of murder the authority court did have upon consider- degree first 707.2, violation of section ation of the Miller factors to resentence and who age was under the eighteen of Louisell to eligibility life at the time the offense was committed parole, the court authority did not have shall receive one of the following sen- the time of resentencing to order com- tences: eligibility

mencement of Louisell’s for pa- (1) Commitment to the director of the begin serving role to after twenty-five department of corrections for the rest of prison. Accordingly, we vacate the possibility defendant’s life with no of order entry and remand for governor unless the commutes of the in prison sentence of life with eligi- years. sentence to a term of bility parole. (2) custody Commitment to the of the DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VA- department director of the of corrections CATED AND CASE REMANDED for the rest of the defendant’s life with WITH INSTRUCTIONS. possibility serving of record, 12. my One initial comment: While transcript present review of trial in the but the part the record for the most appeals opinion confirms the affirming court of her convic- facts, background court's statement presents of support tion additional facts that largely presented Louisell, guilt. has Louisell's version Louisell's See State v. No. 88- 1601, stabbing (Iowa 24, of the 1987 death of Ct.App. Apr. Stilwell. The 462 N.W.2d 307 1990). jury rejected finding guilty this version in deny her This is not to Louisell’s difficult first-degree of upbringing, murder. We do not have the prison. or her achievements in recently in Nebraska had colleagues Our of confinement as deter- minimum term through similar issues. to sort the court. mined Supreme responding to the United States custody to of the Commitment Alabama, 567 in Miller v. Court’s decision department of corrections of the director U.S. -, 183 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. life with of the defendant’s for the rest (2012), legislature eliminated the Nebraska possibility mandatory juveniles who com LWOP 448) (S.F. Legis. Serv. no. 76 2015 Iowa provided mit murder 2015) (to (West codified at Iowa Code be sentencing range forty years to life. 902.1). § Castaneda, v. 287 Neb. See State (2014). The Nebraska Thus, legislature has now estab- had to address the Supreme Court then sentencing options with- three lished —life of a defendant who had been sen case parole, and life with parole, life with out before Miller but whose tenced LWOP after service of a term parole eligibility pending still at the time of the appeal was § to “a applies 1. This law years. Id. at 760. The defen 2013 amendment. Id. A’ convicted of a class person who was be argued dant his LWOP sentence should on, to, felony or after the effective prior given and he should be struck down Act and who was under the of this date second-degree murder as it sentence for at the time the offense was age eighteen he committed the offense. existed when Hence, terms, Id. its committed.” Id. at 760-61. The state maintained the Louisell. law defendant should be resentenced under the course, Generally, criminal defendants legislation. Id. at 760. 2013 on the law that was in are sentenced based agreed The court with the state. Id. the time the crime was commit effect at post facto 761-62. The court found no ex 4.13(2) However, Iowa Code section ted. violation because the new law was amelio- punishment that if the for an provides rative —it reduced the sentence for first- reduced, “if punishment then not offense is degree murder. Id. And the court found already imposed imposed shall be accord application sup- that of the new law was to the statute as amended.” Iowa ing by principle legal ported Nebraska 4.13(2) (2015); see State v. Chris Code interpretation similar to Iowa Code section (Iowa 1994) man, 61, 57, 63 514 N.W.2d “[wjhere 4.13(2), that provided which reducing (holding legislation that where by mitigating criminal statute is amended after the punishment became effective of a punishment, after the commission sentenc crime was committed but before judgment, final prohibited act but before legislation applied). leg new The ing, the that punishment provided 2015 amendment amounts to a islature’s amendatory Legislature act unless the has prior mandatory in the life-with reduction specifically provided otherwise.” Id. at (LWOP) Thus, out-parole (internal omitted). sentence. quotation 762 marks juvenile homicide respect any Thus, to defendant that the court directed the defen- sentenced, yet who has not been or whose felony first-degree dant be resentenced for sentence has been vacated and has sentencing legisla- LWOP murder under the 2013 4.13(2) resentenced, Id.; yet Taylor, been section v. 287 tion. see also State (al (2014) 771, 386, the fact apply would to mention Neb. 842 N.W.2d 780-81 —not noted) ready legislation through analysis that 2015 itself the same for an- (going who had convicted says retroactively. that it See 2015 other defendant been (S.F. 448) parole pre- § 5. and sentenced to life without Legis. Iowa Serv. no. 76

605 commit- first-degree for a murder enforced.” Id. The court Miller concluded that Ramirez, remand, juvenile); as a State v. 287 the trial “[o]n ted court should hold 356, 694, 842 N.W.2d 711-13 an sentencing Neb. individualized hearing pur (same). 408; suant to [the 2014 Id. at law].” see State, 954, also Falcon v. 162 So.3d 963 similarly Florida has determined that its (Fla.2015) (concluding Miller should apply juveniles, passed law for new retroactively any defendant whose Miller, to response apply to defen- sentence is invalidated the retroactive dants whose sentences became unconstitu- application of Miller should be resen- Horsley tional as a result of Miller. See v. tenced under the 2014 legislation Florida (Fla.2015). State, 393, 405, 408 So.3d State, pursuant Horsley); to Cruz v. Horsley, In the defendant had been sen- 117, So.3d 118 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2015) (ap to life in without pr tenced e-Miller plying the Horsley analysis to a defendant possibility who had been sentenced life without felony mandatory murder under a sentenc- parole pr e-Miller remanding for re- 2014, at 395-96. ing scheme. Id. sentencing consistent with the 2014 Flori legislature legis- Florida enacted curative legislation); State, da Mares v. So.3d response lation in with an effec- Miller 65, (same); 65 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2015) July date of 2014. Id. at 394-95. tive State, (Fla.Dist. Maize v. 164 So.3d Horsley a motion to correct filed his sen- (same); State, Ct.App.2015) Davis v. tence, which had become unconstitutional So.3d 67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2015) (same); following Miller. See id. 396. State, (Fla. Moran v. 164 So.3d 68-69 appellate intermediate court certified the (same). Dist.Ct.App.2015) question of how it should resentence Hors- ley Supreme Washington to the Florida Court. Id. at has reached the same con- Following clusion. legislature its fix”- “explicitly enacted “Miller ap- Supreme The Florida Court determined plies to acts that retrospectively occurred reviving that rather than partially re- McNeil, before its enactment.” In re law, writing previous version of the 582, 588-91, Wash.2d 334 P.3d 548 sentencing court resentence Hors- (en baric). The fix sentencing authorized a ley legislation. under the 2014 See id. at range twenty-five years of to life without It reviving prior 405-08. decided that at Id. 334 P.3d 548. Petition- statute legislative consistent with ers who had been convicted and sentenced light intent in of the new at law. See id. argued they before Miller that could rejectéd It that ap- 405-06. also idea receive a sentence that was both on the plication legislation of the 2014 would vio- books at and constitutional the time of clause, savings late the state constitution’s crimes, their which was determinate precludes application which retroactive twenty-year at sentence. Id. 334 P.3d criminal at It statutes. Id. noted Washington Supreme 548. The Court savings that the clause was meant to “re- unanimously disagreed and found the new quire in the statute effect at the time of 548; applied. law Id. at 334 P.3d id. govern the crime to the sentence an of- J., 596-97, (McCloud, 334 P.3d 548 con- Yet, fender receives.” Id. the case curring). law, sentencing “the statute analysis effect at the time of the crime is unconsti- The same utilized the Ne- braska, Florida, Washington supreme tutional under Miller con- and the federal stitution, cannot, event, existing If any so it be courts here. Louisell’s years, resentencing must be resen- or is invalid she remand for ac-

sentence tenced, resentencing place should take I cordance with the 2015 law. can see legislation. under the 2015 arguments approaches. reasonable for both The district court’s alternative sentence majority engages analysis in no on parole eligibility twenty-five life with after Instead, simply says it points. these legisla- is authorized under the 2015 way, providing authori- conclusory without So, by affirming backup tion. that sen- ty reasoning: or tence, we upholding would be a sentence appear the new statute would [Although legislature approved. has spar- to authorize a sentence of life with twenty-five years if ole after However, the district court did not have today, we conclude the were resentenced the benefit of the 2015 law when it im- subsequent legislation does not affect posed Normally, Louisell’s sentence. our consideration of whether that sen- prudent and fairer course action would tence was authorized at the time the be to remand the case to the district court imposed court it. district under the legisla- contradicts If This sentence itself. tion. At that point, .district wasn’t sentence authorized options, would have a number of but would it, imposed the time the district court presumably select one that makes Louisell being today. then she is resentenced And paróle summary, available for now. I applies. this means the law We do not simply think we can resentence performing surgery should not be on the Louisell ourselves based on our edits to a sentencing unconstitutional 1987 law now superseded law. Instead, legislature spoken.

that the has range we should follow the of sentencing ZAGER, JJ., join WATERMAN and options provided sentencing the 2015 in part this concurrence and dissent in law. part. question The close for me is not whether we can sentence Louisell on our own to life parole. Clearly, we cannot do this. are not a

We court. The close

question for me is whether we should af-. backup

firm the district court’s sentence of

life with eligibility twenty-five

Case Details

Case Name: State of Iowa v. Yvette Marie Louisell

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Jun 26, 2015

Citation: 865 N.W.2d 590

Docket Number: 14–0175

Court Abbreviation: Iowa