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State of Iowa v. Tony Gene Lukins
846 N.W.2d 902
Iowa
2014
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*1 speech far removed like when it sounds Iowa, Appellee, STATE being sought, dignity of the office

from the or chilled. suppressed is not has delivered the the Constitution While LUKINS, Tony Appellant. Gene just all with a few speech to

freedom of words, history purpose of simple No. 12-2221. pow- immense and words are

those iconic Supreme of Iowa. Court erful, long-standing solidified a and have country, including in this people May 2014. officials, officials. public to criticize public course, greater mean civil- this does not Of would not better

ity public discourse Moreover, democracy. no

serve Nevertheless, protective

absolute. in the speech line of free

constitutional is drawn at actual public

arena of officials arena, speech cannot

malice. Within defamation until

become actionable It was not in this

line has been crossed.

case.

IV. Conclusion. support the record failed to

We conclude actual malice. Ber-

sufficient evidence of prove meet burden to

trand failed to malice element of defamation.

the actual the oth-

Accordingly, we need not address appeal. judgment

er on issues raised the case dismissed.

must be reversed and OF THE

JUDGMENT DISTRICT REVERSED; DIS-

COURT CASE

MISSED. justices except

All concur APPEL and

MANSFIELD, JJ., part. who take no *2 flashing

turned on his cruiser’s Rohr- stop. The truck did not lights. highway, baugh pursued the truck onto *3 of more speeds where the truck reached point, hour. At one eighty per than miles pave- back onto the jerked the truck was Brinton, Bordwell R. Johnson of David into a ditch. After the veering ment after Johnson, Clarion, appellant. for & it travelled a short straightened, truck was Miller, General, Attorney J. Thomas stop. distance and came to a Attorney Assistant Pettinger, Jean C. truck and imme- Rohrbaugh went Schreurs, General, County Micah J. and been diately suspected the driver had Attorney, appellee. for drinking. He smelled alcohol and noticed ZAGER, Justice. bloody speech the driver had slurred and driver, Lukins, Tony The stated he chin. Tony operating Lukins was arrested for “had a few of beers at the bar.” a .207 registering while intoxicated. After County jail, on a test at the O’Brien breath by Rohrbaugh to being requested After to the Lukins made several statements tests, sobriety agreed field perform arresting indicating officer his desire to completing to do so. After three of the great the breath test. After a deal retake tests, sobriety Rohrbaugh asked four field discussion, the officer denied Lukins’s While get squad Lukins to into his car. trial, Prior to Lukins moved to request. removed items from off the Rohrbaugh arguing the breath-test result suppress seat, passenger front Lukins stumbled and was because he had road. fell down into the ditch beside the been denied his to an inde- car, got squad After Lukins into the Rohr- pendent chemical test. The district court baugh preliminary breath test. conducted motion, denied Lukins’s and after a bench confirming preliminary After breath testimony, trial on the minutes of it con- test indicated Lukins’s blood alcohol con- while intoxicat- operating victed Lukins limit, Rohrbaugh legal tent was above the ed, offense. Lukins and appealed, second him intoxicat- operating arrested while we to the court of transferred case county jail him transported ed and to the appeals. appeals The court of reversed his Primghar, in Iowa. conviction, holding the district court erred jail, Rohrbaugh At the read Lukins the denying suppress. in his motion to implied advisory consent review, sought State further which we Breathalyzer Lukins consent to a test. below, granted. For the reasons set forth Lukins, a cut on bleeding who was from we affirm the decision of the court of chin, Breathalyzer consented to the appeals judgment and reverse the The Datamaster result of district court. .207, legal test was over Rohrbaugh limit After informed Background of .08. I. Facts and Proceed- result, ings. following Lukins of this conver- jail’s security captured sation was 9, 2012, February Around 1:40 a.m. on cameras: Timothy wit- Rohrbaugh Chief of Police * stop a black truck run a I don’t mean to be an a* or pickup nessed LUKINS: re-check, Sutherland, sign following anything, get Iowa. After but can I distance, ... Rohrbaugh anything the truck a short ? * A really

ROHRBAUGH: what? LUKINS: That seems *ing f* * high. For four f* *ing beers that ... I’m way bleed- LUKINS: or, seems ... actually, sorry, I’m a six ing. ... pack, really that seems high. A rain check? ROHRBAUGH: know, A re-check. You with LUKINS: get LUKINS: Can I please, re-blow

this blood and that. Rohrbaugh? your ROHRBAUGH: You want blood ROHRBAUGH: It isn’t going to be checked? different. at to- (looking gesturing LUKINS *4 LUKINS: You don’t think so? machine): No, Breathalyzer ward the I re-check? get can ROHRBAUGH: No. (tapping

ROHRBAUGH the breath-test try LUKINS: Can we it?

machine): A re-check of this? ROHRBAUGH: No.

LUKINS: Yeah. Rohrbaugh then transferred Lukins to a And ROHRBAUGH: what’s blood deputy county at the jail. Lukins asked different, gonna make it or ... ? deputy, just LUKINS: I don’t know. I’m ... get LUKINS: Can I re-breathalyzer bleeding I didn’t know I was test, by way? point-two-oh? For a * *ing you pulled f* bad until me over [referring to his blood-alcohol content]. my I looked at hand. call; That’s my DEPUTY: that’s up I ROHRBAUGH: don’t think we need to the officer. to do another check because I don’t No second test or independent chemical bleeding any- think the blood or the had performed. test was offered or thing your to do with breath. 5, On charged by March Lukins was Well, no, just I LUKINS: was ... I trial operating information with while in don’t know what really the heck to toxicated, offense, second under Iowa Code check, you to tell the truth. 321J.2(l)(a) 321J.2(1)(b) sections 1 After Rohrbaugh read Lukins advisories (b) (2011). 321J.2(l)(a), § See Iowa Code license, about the revocation of his driver’s trial, Prior to Lukins filed a motion to Lukins returned to the issue of the test: suppress results. Lukins re-blow, by LUKINS: Can I ask for a argued county jail his statements at the way? implicated right to obtain an indepen going ROHRBAUGH: It isn’t to be dent chemical test under Iowa Code sec Lukins, different. tion According 321J.11.2 once cases, however, judgment 1. Lukins received a deferred a number of we have re- intoxicated, offense, operating while first "statutory right independent ferred to a to an November 2005. See, Bloomer, e.g., test.” State v. 618 N.W.2d 550, (Iowa 2000); Wootten, 553 State v. 577 question permis- 2. some There is whether the 654, (Iowa 1998) (explaining N.W.2d phrasing of sive Iowa Code section 321J.I1 record was unclear about when the detainee "right" upon confers a detainees to have an independent “first knew of his independent chemical test. See Iowa Code 753, test”); Epperson, State v. (providing person 321J.11 have "[t]he (Iowa 1978) ("Regarding defendant’s an chemical ... adminis- claims, statutory he had a to have an person’s expense” (emphasis tered at the own test.”). party chemical Neither added)). We have never addressed this issue. review, which sought re The State further officers were right, implicated he granted. him his to obtain we advise quired to offi chemical insisted, so, was to do cers’ failure of Review. II. Standard of his a denial The district court denied Lukins’s Lukins was not Because interpreta based on its suppress motion to ob opportunity a reasonable provided tion of Iowa section 321J.11. We ar he tain an at law a review for correction of errors breath test should results of the gued the sup on a ruling district court’s motion resisted. The State suppressed. be press interpretation based on the stat the district court issued hearing, After a Madison, ute. State motion. The district ruling its on Lukins’s (Iowa 2010); Fischer, 707-08 recording video on the court found based 2010). could not reason- requests that Lukins’s requesting an inde- ably be construed as III. Discussion. The district court instead pendent test. *5 Lukins second

concluded Right the to an In- A. Invocation of Breathalyzer machine. Accord- using the dependent Test. Iowa Code section court, the district these statements ing to 321J.11, part, provides: in relevant to invoke Lukins’s statu- inadequate were breath, blood, person [whose tory right independent to an being examined to determine urine Therefore, court denied Lu- the district alcohol have concentration] blood Breathalyzer the suppress kins’s motion to independent an chemical test or tests results. person’s at the own ex- administered proceeded the matter On November in addition to administered at pense the minutes of testimo- to a bench trial on peace the direction of a officer. guilty found Lukins ny. The district court § Iowa 321J.11. Code intoxicated, of- operating while second sentenced Lu- fense. The district court case, In we address whether Lukins day. the kins same adequately invoked his to an chemical test. The State ruling on the mo- appealed Lukins According do to argues Lukins did not so. suppress, tion to and we transferred State, statements indicate he Lukins’s The court of appeals. case to the court of only using to take a second test sought reversed, in- holding Lukins had appeals machine, Breathalyzer opportunity an to chemical voked his statutorily which he was not entitled. Lu- reasoned that appeals test. The court hand, kins, state- on the other contends his right, once Lukins invoked the officers ments should have been con- him of were to inform by officers as a for an strued chemical test. Be- obtain an point so, independent chemical at which cause the officers had not done they have informed him of his stat- should Breathalyzer of the test should results ap- utory right The court of suppressed. have been argues for a new trial. test. He their failure to do so peals remanded Therefore, upon we chemical test raises this issue in this case. purposes appeal assume for of this that Iowa detainees. statutory Code section 321J. 11 does confer open of the Those cases left requires by standard Rohrbaugh. which to results obtained determine whether a detainee’s statements to law enforcement were ade- likens this case to those in which quate to invoke his or her rights under interpreted have Iowa we Code Iowa Code section 804.20. See State v. provides peace That offi- 804.20. statute Hicks, (Iowa 2010) (not- person cer must “arrested or permit ing the use of two frameworks to assess liberty of the ... person’s restrained invocation). adequacy of a detainee’s call, consult, and a member of the see Hicks, after his operating arrest for person’s family attorney per- or an intoxicated, while the detainee made re- choice, son’s or both.” Id. 804.20. Un- peated requests to make a telephone call case, like the statute before us in this we go so that he could home. Id. at 96. The have delineated under thoroughly police officer requests. denied the See id. section 804.20 a officer’s obli- statute, interpreting at 97. In we re- the detainee’s gation explain jected the unambiguous-request standard implicates when a detainee his or her requests used for counsel certain telephone to make a call and the standard Amendment, cases under the Fifth disap- used to determine whether a detainee has proving of its focus “on the grammatical adequately right. invoked that clarity request.” of the detainee’s See id. Department In Didonato v. Iowa (noting at 94-95 the scholarly debate the Transportation, operat after his arrest for unambiguous-request engen- standard intoxicated, ing while a detainee asked to dered). We held that it would be better *6 friend, call a but the officer denied liberally suspect’s “to construe a invocation opportunity telephone him the to make the right.” of this Id. at 95. We therefore 1990). 367, (Iowa call. 456 368 N.W.2d held statement that may reasonably be Despite affirming the detainee’s license invoking construed as the right detainee’s revocation, explained we that “when a re family to communicate with or counsel is quest phone to make a call is made” an adequate. Id. cannot the even “if request officer refuse to call a Id. at 371. distinguishes the is friend.” The State the line of cases friend, If suspect requests impli- the to call a under Iowa Code section 804.20 as counsel, implicated cating right “the statute is and the officer the fundamental to then a in purpose plainly implicated should advise for what which is case. phone permitted signaled call is under” Iowa The State is correct —we concerns Code section 804.20. Id. later reaffirmed that We about detainees’ access to counsel de- Garrity, this rule. 765 pended ability clearly See on their to (Iowa 2009) See, 592, the invoke their (holding grammatically right. N.W.2d v. peace e.g., (citing Effler, officer should have informed id. State 769 N.W.2d (Iowa 2009) J., suspect scope (Appel,- specially of the of individuals to whom placed suspect concurring) (noting commentary a call could be when re critical of quested unambiguous-request to call an individual outside of that standard be- scope). explained important have also the de it constitutional We cause “makes rights linguistic finery”)). tainee’s and officer’s statements and con turn on cases, duct, surrounding overriding though, as well as circum concern in those stances, objectively. are considered State was that the detainees lacked crucial Moorehead, (Iowa knowledge right v. 699 N.W.2d about their to communi- 2005). family lawyer, cate with a member or thus only the chemical test is available more difficult.

making invoking submits to the officer’s Didonato, (holding at after the detainee See test that the statute does not requested or requests to call a that when a detainee on the entitle the detainee a second test must inform the detainee friend the officer Breathalyzer machine. See State call telephone for which a purposes 2000) Bloomer, 550, 553 Iowa section 804.20 permitted). is Code (explaining a detainee is entitled an officer to inform require peace does not after the detainee “has test of his or her to make the detainee test”). to a Under submitted Hicks, 791 at 94. telephone call. circumstances, be unex- these it would not Garrity, In we observed nevertheless that pected attempts that the detainee’s oral he or she has a may a detainee be aware legally or her are inaccu- invoke his call; however, telephone to make a similarity rate. The of circumstances be- may that a stat- the detainee be unaware knowledge tween the detainee’s of his or may whom a call be ute limits to such statutory right telephone call and his at 597. For that made. See 765 N.W.2d statutory right or her reason, suggests calling if the detainee chemical test indicate the standard in- scope of individuals someone outside voking be similar as well. should statute, peace offi- authorized cer, statutory scope, knows the must who Holding may statements that be clarify scope to the detainee the of individ- construed, invoking as the de call be telephone uals to whom statutory right tainee’s made under Iowa section 804.20. Code adequate promotes chemical test con also id.; Hicks, See see also 791 N.W.2d at 95 A sistency this area of the law. detain (concluding a reasonableness standard ee under best will be accorded ensures detainees 321J.11 to telephone their to make a “within a time the cir reasonable under call). short, shortage absence Wootten, cumstances.” See 577 N.W.2d at knowledge part on the detainee’s warrant- only 656. A need use reason officer *7 enabling ed the detainee to invoke his or methods, circumstances, able under the her rights legally requests. inaccurate im convey drunk-driving suspect to a the consent plied warnings. See State Gar may It is clear that a detainee be (Iowa 2008). cia, 216, 756 N.W.2d 222 similarly or her un rights unaware And, course, any may statement that be First, der Iowa section 321J.11. Code as reasonably invoking construed as the de right with the to a call under telephone statutory right telephone tainee’s to a call 804.20, Iowa Code section an officer need Hicks, adequate to do so. See 791 suspect not advise a of his or her A N.W.2d at 95. reasonableness standard chemical test. State v. currently many thus governs interactions Wootten, 654, 1998); 655 detainees, ap between officers and and to Epperson, ply a different rule or standard here would (Iowa 1978). Also, like the detainee un existing be inconsistent with this frame telephone may aware of to whom a call be work. placed, the detainee who submits to the addition, police requested previously gave strong officer’s blood alcohol test In we in- may vague obligation have some notion that he or indication of an officer’s she is entitled to an chemical form a detainee of his or her under know, however, that test. He or she not Iowa Code section 321J.11 once directly cannot stand mute Although deny we did not the request. is invoked. issue, in explained (explaining we Gins- N.W.2d at 371 that address Cf. Transporta- when a for a Department phone v. Iowa call is made berg requests purpose an the statute’s is not if tion that when detainee “met the chemical officers should officer stands mute and refuses the re- Rather, quest”). to the detainee information about if an convey imprecise state- ment, construed, statutory right implicates to the inde- detainee’s statute, pendent test. See 508 N.W.2d then officer should inform the (Iowa 1993). case, that officers detainee of his or her to an indepen- dent treated a detainee’s for blood chemical test under Iowa Code sec- urine test as a refusal to submit to a tion 321J.11. Cfid. Holding

breath test. Id. the detainee’s Applying the standard set forth refusal, not a we instructed request was above, implicated Lukins his statutory “requested that when he that his blood or chemical test. At breath, urine be to his tested addition conversation, the outset of the explained should have peace officer asked, get I ... a re-check ?” In “[C]an that, after the breath test had fact, during on several occasions his con completed, been would be [the detainee] Rohrbaugh, versation with Lukins asked able to have other substances tested.” Id. Clearly for a “re-check” or a “re-blow.” here; however, Ginsberg control does not these entreaties do closely track with context, it in this as in the shows language of Iowa Code section 321J.11. 804.20, context of Iowa section we Code But this requests scenario is similar to the officers disapproved imped- have by the detainees in Didonato and Garrity. ing rights granted by detainees’ access to cases, In both those request detainees legislature. to make telephone ed calls to individuals to those considerations in whom Iowa With 804.20 did not mind, calls, why we see no reason a detainee authorize and we held their state string together implicated Garrity, should be a ments that statute. precise mirroring (holding formulation of words 765 N.W.2d at 597 an officer must statutory language in order to invoke his inform a detainee of the individuals to permitted or her whom a call is when the detain Therefore, requests under ee to call someone outside the Didonato, permissible scope); Code section 821J.11 a detainee’s state statute’s liberally (holding be *8 ments should construed. 456 N.W.2d at when detain Cf. Hicks, 791 (stating N.W.2d at 95 under ee asks to call a friend the officer must a invo inform the detainee the for which suspect’s purpose Iowa Code section 804.20 permitted). cation of his or her should be liberal a call is As with the statutori construed). cases, in ly ly impermissible requests And like under Iowa Code those 804.20, any section can not entitled under Iowa statement that be Lukins was Code reasonably an to construed as section 321J.11 take second crack at Nevertheless, independent adequate Breathalyzer chemical test to the machine. statements, construed, invoke detainee’s to such a test his indi test, if under Iowa section 321J.11. As with cated he wanted another even he Code mistaken, unsure, in or unaware of the phone requests officers who fielded call was Didonato, in test would be legally way an officer who fields a which the additional statements, like those of imprecise request independent for an test conducted. His 910 Sess.) (“The inability failure or to obtain Garrity, in Didonato detainees ... preclude an additional test does not implicate the statute. adequate

were relating to the the admission of evidence sec- implicated Code When Lukins taken at the direction of a law enforce test 321J.11, should have in- Rohrbaugh tion officer....”); § ment Mont.Code Ann. 61- he was entitled to an formed Lukins that 8-405(2) (Westlaw through the current at “own ex- chemical test independent Sess.) (“The inability 2013 failure or Breathalyzer to” the test. pense addition ... independent obtain an test does not § Rohr- 321J.11. Because Iowa Code admissibility in evidence of preclude so, he violated Lukins’s baugh did not do given peace test at the direction of an chemical statutory right to officer.”); Ohio Rev. Ann. test. 4511.19(D)(3) (West, Westlaw current Remedy. question remains B. 1 94 Gen. through Files 130th Rohrbaugh Breathalyzer test whether (2013-2014)) (“The failure or ina Assemb. suppressed must be because conducted bility to obtain an chemical test additional statutory right was denied his ... preclude shall not the admission of Iowa Code relating evidence to the chemical test or provides 321J.11 failure “[t]he tests taken at the of a law enforce inability person of the to obtain an or officer.”). important, ment More courts chemical test or tests does statutory interpreting language similar to the admission of evidence of preclude suppression ours have held of the officer’s adminis- the results of the test tests remedy is the minimum at the direction of the officer.” tered when the detainee is denied his or her opinion appeals suggest- An of our court of statutory right to an denying ed that detainee’s See, Killen, e.g., Lockard v. Town of independent chemical test was not a “fail- 679, (Ala.Crim.App.1990) 565 So.2d 682 “inability ure” or to obtain” the so the (rejecting reading a literal of the words prevent suppression statute would not un- inability” holding “failure or results of like Casper der circumstances these. See law enforcement test must be 799, Dep’t Transp., v. Iowa State, 87, suppressed); Ward v. 758 P.2d fact, Ct.App.1993). the court (Alaska 1988) (concluding when “the reasoned, appeals officer’s police deprive a defendant of his or her suppressed have to lest the test would be statutory right to an independent blood test be test, the of the breath results defendant’s id.; meaningless. See see also rendered excluded”); State, test must be Unruh (Habhab, J., specially id. at 803 concur- (Fla.1996) 242, (concluding 669 So.2d (“Nothing prevent ignoring ring) would remedy was the suppression appropriate Afterward, request.”). leaving while indepen when a detainee was denied an open question suppression, test); dent 352 Mont. Schauf Casper’s reasoning. court cast doubt on (2009) (explaining 216 P.3d “the Wootten, (noting See at 655-56 proper result is of the results *9 case,” Casper “was a license revocation not test”); Koenig of the law enforcement v. case). a criminal 333, Dep’t Transp., N.D. 810 N.W.2d of (N.D.2012) (“If Several states have statutes with lan- 336 an individual is denied See, nearly e.g., guage statutory right independent identical to ours. an this [to 28.35.033(e) (West, test], § Alaska Stat. Ann. or chemical results of tests blood through Reg. 2014 at the direction of law en- Westlaw current 2d administered

911 suppressed profit be or the “would allow the to from forcement their dismissed.”); own misconduct in preventing State v. Hil an arrestee charges may be test”). from ditch, 435, 376, obtaining such a do not 584 P.2d 377 We Or.App. (1978) legislature believe the intended grant to (holding by a denial law enforce a right permitting detainees while officers opportunity ment of a reasonable to obtain deny to the without evidentiary independent an test is neither a “failure” consequence. “inability” nor an to do so and therefore evidence); Blaine v. suppressing City of addition, remedy is con Suess, 722, 789, 612 P.2d Wash.2d remedy sistent with the ordered when the (1980) trial could not rem (concluding new statutory right detainee’s under Iowa Code law enforcement’s denial of edy suspect’s section 804.20 is denied. that stat Under requested independent and therefore ute, the suppression of results of the test dismissal). remanding for by obtained law enforcement is remedy the when a detainee’s to a fa- make tele weight persuasive authority The of phone call is violated. See State v. McA to interpreting require vors our statute teer, 1980) 924, (Iowa (af suppression of the test directed law firming a district court’s enforcement when law enforcement denies breath test results when a detainee was an statutory right a detainee his or her to member); her call family denied According Vietor, v. State authorities, statutory these the terms “fail- 1978) (holding when a detainee’s “inability” contemplate ure” and do not lawyer call a is denied “evidence of his denying statutory officer’s a detainee’s refusal to take a chemical test shall be to an chemical test. See trial”). inadmissible at a later criminal Durkee, 584 So.2d 1082-83 State reasons, For all these we hold “evidence of (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (concluding the the results of the test or adminis tests statutory terms should not be understood tered at the direction of the officer” encompass the law enforcement official’s suppressed must be when a detainee’s Unruh, wrongdoing); accord 669 So.2d at statutory right test un legislature, 245. We do not believe the section 321J.11 denied. der is using statutory terms “failure or ina- Accordingly, Iowa Code 321J.11. bility,” require intended to admission by denying district court erred Lukins’s test in cases officer’s where suppress Breathalyzer motion to re statutory officer denied the detainee by Rohrbaugh. sults obtained right granted by legislature. C. Harmless Error. State suppress There are also other reasons to sup it was harmless error not to contends Not results Breathalyzer results. “In press Lukins’s Breathaly- law enforcement’s suppressing error, is cases of nonconstitutional reversal deny zer results would officers to permit appears complaining par if it impunity with a detainee’s for an miscarriage justice has ty suffered recog- chemical test. As was affected.” injuriously have been in Casper, suppressing nized the re- Moorehead, Prejudice 699 N.W.2d at 672. meaningless” sults “would render the de- affirma presumed “unless the record tainee’s tively Id. at 673. establishes otherwise.” 802; chemical test. 506 at see Hilditch, (making remaining also 584 P.2d at 377 The State contends the evi- noting proved guilty driving similar and also it Lukins was observation dence *10 that the defendant was convict- stop sign, possibility He ran a under the influence. error.”). officer, the and away pursuing theory containing legal from ed under a sped strong- a ditch. He smelled careened into However, Lukins was convicted alcohol, speech, and ad-

ly of had slurred after a bench trial on the minutes of testi bar, though Lukins drinking at a mitted mony, ordinarily which means “we have a beers. He also fell just he drank six said exposition written of the fact finder’s rea the road while into the ditch beside down Moorehead, soning the verdict.” Rohrbaugh to remove items waiting for Nevertheless, at the district seat of the N.W.2d 673. passenger from the State, oper of According finding guilty car. to the court’s order Lukins squad intoxicated, offense, affirm evidence is sufficient to Lukins’s ating second is while conviction, of despite admission explained fact have findings. devoid of We where, here, results. stipulates that as a defendant to a bench trial on the minutes of testimo argument the State’s problem with must, ny, other among the district court First, charged was is twofold. Lukins “ things, specially ‘find the facts and on vehicle either operating with motor record,’ separately state its of conclusion[s] an alcoholic under the influence of “[w]hile law, render an verdict as appropriate beverage drug or other or combination of required by Iowa Rule of Proce Criminal substances,” such Iowa [2.17(2) Sayre, dure State v. 321J.2(l)(a.), § ].” having an alco- “[w]hile (Iowa 1997) more,” (citing Iowa of .08 or id. hol concentration 321J.2(1)(6). 16(2) (now P. P. The district court’s ver- R.Crim. R.Crim. 2.17(2))). dict, however, fact, findings did not indicate under which these of Without provision guilty. it determined Lukins was way determining we have no what facts multiple We have held that when there are find upon the district court relied Lu- erroneous, guilt, for bases one which guilty kins while intoxicated. operating if jury’s we must reverse verdict does Moorehead, (review 699 N.W.2d at 673 Cf indicate basis was accepted. which ing findings the district court’s fact Smith, See State reasoning determine district court’s under (Iowa 2007) (reversing convictions “be- verdict). lying may its The district court by the general cause verdict returned erroneously have relied on the admitted jury guilty did not reveal the basis for its results, or it have relied on all the verdict”); Heemstra, suggesting other circumstances Lukins (Iowa 2006) (“Because 549, 559 we have no operating was while intoxicated. The dis guilt indication as to which basis trict court’s order is unclear. Under jury accepted, we must reverse and re- circumstances, we must reverse and re trial.”). Thus, if mand a new even we mand. by assumed the evidence highlighted supports op- State Lukins’s conviction for IY. Conclusion.

erating while on the he intoxicated basis obligation An officer is under no to in- was under the influence of alcohol or statutory form detainee of his or her drugs, had been convicted jury, remand would be because Wootten, 577 N.W.2d at 655. But

the verdict did not reveal its basis. See (“A Smith, con- 739 N.W.2d at 295 verdict statements can be only legally based on facts one strued as a for an supporting theory negate adequate for a conviction will not chemical test are to invoke the *11 test un- right independent quest repeat to an the breath test. detainee’s Upon 321J.11. Iowa never der asked for different test to measure right, invocation of the the offi- detainee’s his intoxication. I disagree with the ma- the detainee of his or her must inform jority’s cer conclusion that Lukins’s state- right according to the terms of Code ments “can be reasonably construed as a this was not done in section 321J.11. As for chemical test case, statutory right Lukins’s ... adequate to invoke the detainee’s test was violated. Violation to an independent test under Iowa Code suppression of the right requires of this section 321J.11.” To the contrary, Lukins by law enforcement. test results obtained affirmatively rejected the offer a blood deny- district court therefore erred in The test and never asked for a urine test or ing suppress. Lukins’s motion to Since we any other form of test. Lukins made clear guilt cannot determine what basis of was what he wanted was another breath test. verdict, court’s we used for the district factually It is inaccurate to conclude he reverse and remand for a new trial. invoked He did no thing. such OF OF AP-

DECISION COURT AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT OF PEALS The district court reviewed the booking AND DISTRICT COURT REVERSED and, applying video the same test as to- REMANDED. CASE day’s majority, correctly determined Lukins never invoked his indepen- justices except All concur testing: dent WATERMAN, J„ CADY, C.J., and Defendant’s inquires statements MANSFIELD, J., who dissent. cannot be construed as a re- WATERMAN, (dissenting). Justice quest for an respectfully major- I dissent because the A booking recording review of the in its erroneously of a ity requires suppression entirety shows that it was the Defen- valid breath test that showed perfectly dant’s desire to have a second chance to Lukins’s blood alcohol level was more than provide sample a breath on the Data- legal one-half limit. two and times jail facility. master machine at the Nei- remedy a majority does so to violation ther 321J.11 Iowa Code section nor that did not occur. Lukins never asked statutory provision grants other a De- test; rather, for an fendant a to a second on law merely requested Breathaly- he a second enforcement’s Datamaster machine. majority acknowledges, zer test. As the fact, conversation, during part one repeat no Lukins had the officer asked Defendant whether he the breath test. requesting was a blood and the responded negative Defendant in the question

To the extent Lukins’s initial “no, I stating get can a re-check.” While (“Can re-check, ambiguous get was I the Defendant did ask for a “re-check” chief, anything?”), Rohrbaugh, occasions, or a on multiple “re-blow” clarified by specifical- what Lukins wanted quantity requests of those does not him, ly your want asking ‘You blood answered, “No, change their nature or the officer’s checked?” Lukins can I The court construes each as a get Rohrbaugh tapped a re-check?” duties. said, test on the Data- “A second Datamaster re- thereby implicating master Section responded, check of this?” Lukins ‘Yeah.” They discussing sup- continued Lukins’s re- 321J.11. This conclusion is further

ported by lawyer family the Defendant’s or member. See id. at 290 804.20). officer left jailer, arresting (discussing purpose once the has of section We scene, re-[B]reathaly- I aget of “can have never previously equated the disclo- by way.” zer test requirements separate sure under these statutes. I would not start now. Cases I would affirm the district court. under inapposite section 804.20 are be- today, any request After to retake the cause that helps protect statute a detain- require breath test will disclosure of the ee’s constitutional to counsel and options chemical test privilege against self-incrimination. See blood or urine under section 321J.11 contrast, By id. at 294-95. section 321J.11 (2011). a new require This is disclosure implicate does not either of those constitu- ment, precedent applying at odds with our but, rather, merely tional provides a that statute. have construed We section narrowly, concluding 321J.11 a detainee test: a right only has successfully completes the detainee after The person may have an independent requested by the test an officer. See chemical test or tests administered at Bloomer, State v. person’s expense own in addition to (Iowa 2000). Bloomer, the defendant any administered at the direction of a asked for a consenting urine test without peace officer. inability The or failure to the breath test. He Id. had no person obtain an of taking to the urine test without the breath chemical test or preclude tests does not plainly Id. We stated officers are the admission evidence the results required to advise a detainee of the the test or tests administered at the option under section 321J.11 to an inde the peace direction of officer. pendent presented test when with such added). Iowa Code 321J.11 (emphasis (“The request. Id. officer ... was not legislature The thereby specified that the information.”). convey breath test results remain admissible not- here, Similarly, all Lukins did was ask to withstanding the “failure inability of the retake the breath which he was not person to obtain an independent chemical Bloomer, entitled to retake. Under test.” Id. majority The overrides that deny officer could improper Lukins’s re command from our elected branches quest without further disclosing what oth suppressing Lukins’s breath test results. testing options er were available to him. Suppression is the remedy under Bloomer, majority departs giv from 804.20, not here. ing expansive section 321J.11 an interpre by requiring tation additional disclosures. Today’s decision uncertainty. creates decisis, I would adhere to stare rather If, hindsight, what Lukins said is effectively than overruling Bloomer. See enough trigger a new advisory consent Walker, testing options, about any number of sce- (Iowa 2011) (“Stare decisis is a valuable question narios when detainees test results legal doctrine which stability lends to the could lead to of otherwise val- (internal law....” quotation marks omit id breath tests. We have emphasized ted)). need for clear rules when citizens suspect-

The majority relies on our ap- decisions ed of driving drunk are detained for test- 804.20, plying Iowa Code section ing the stat- under statutory implied Iowa’s consent ute governing a detainee’s procedures: to call a advantage primary objective rule has the that the bright-line implied [A] guidance clear to law enforce- consent statute is the removal of providing dan Clarity gerous as to what the personnel. ment and intoxicated drivers from requires generally good thing. *13 is roadways law Iowa’s in safeguard order to See, It is beneficial when the law especially the traveling public. e.g., Severson police interactions between the governs 1169, 1174, Sueppel, v. 260 Iowa (Iowa 1967) (“It citizens. Law enforcement officials N.W.2d is obvi many quick have to make decisions as to purpose ous the Implied of the Consent requires what the law where the stakes Law is to reduce the on our holocaust high, involving public safety are on one highways part of which is due to the ledger and individual side driver who freely imbibes too of intoxi clear, on the other. A teachable rule is cating liquor.”); Dep’t Shriver of high priority. approach, flexible [A] Transp., 430 N.W.2d contrast, likely 1988) by is to lead to uncer- (reiterating primary pur that the in tainty particular cases. pose chapter “promote behind 321J is to public safety by removing dangerous Dep’t Transp., v. Iowa Welch of highways”). drivers from the (Iowa 2011). 590, 601 Welch, initially In who re- Id. at I interpret require- motorist 594. would changed fused his ments of section 321J.11 to further mind eleven minutes later and asked to goal public safety. of take the test. Id. at 592-98. The legislature has in specified great refused. Id. at 593. Our court affirmed detail the disclosures officers are the revocation of his license. Id. at 602. required to make to suspected motorists of unanimously “a We held motorist’s driving. drunk See Iowa Code 321J.8 to take the chemical test need not be (implied-consent advisory). Officers are previously honored after he or she has voluntarily welcome to disclose additional following implied refused that test a valid motorists, information to but it is not our advisory.” consent Id. We noted “Iowa’s so, place as a court to them to do require existing, clearcut ‘one refusal’ rule reduces pain on evi- compelling the time and cost burdens on law enforce- dence of intoxication. applied ment.” Id. at 601. The rule as reasons, join For these I am unable today’s majority’s opinion anything but majority. Rather, predict case-by-case clearcut. I adjudication particular over whether com- CADY, C.J., MANSFIELD, J„ join ments detainees intoxicated constitute this dissent. independent testing. uncertainty, resulting sup-

This and the

pression of otherwise valid breath test re-

sults, purpose chap- will undermine the safety. public

ter 321J — construing provisions chap- various 321J, continuously

ter we have affirmed

Case Details

Case Name: State of Iowa v. Tony Gene Lukins
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: May 16, 2014
Citation: 846 N.W.2d 902
Docket Number: 12–2221
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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