STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NATHAN RAY TESCH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-0343
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
Filed April 13, 2022
Nathan Tesch claims he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Iowa and federal Constitutions and challenges the relevance and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his theft conviction. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to
We are asked to decide whether the State violated Nathan Ray Tesch‘s constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A safe was stolen from a Spencer clinic. The State charged Tesch with fourth-degree theft and third-degree burglary, with a trial information filed on October 16, 2019, and January 22, 2020, respectively. The charges were later consolidated.
Tesch filed two motions to dismiss “for lack of speedy trial.” In the first, he alleged
On appeal, Tesch argues “[he] was denied his right to a speedy trial even in light of the COVID-19 crisis.” In his view, “the delay in his trial of over one year was excessive and a violation of his speedy trial rights under the federal [C]onstitution and state constitution.” He also challenges the relevancy and sufficiency of evidence supporting the value of the stolen safe.
A. United States Constitution
The United States Constitution provides, “[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”
The district court determined (1) Tesch would “be brought to trial . . . just over 10 months from the date of his arrest“; (2) “we are in the midst of a worldwide pandemic which resulted in the court system being closed for jury trials for an extended period of time“; (3) Tesch asserted his right to a speedy trial, which “obviously . . . weigh[ed] in [his] favor“; and (4) on the prejudice component, there was “no record that any evidence or witnesses . . . disappeared” and there was “really no evidence that the defendant . . . faced unnecessary lengthy incarceration due to this charge.” The court concluded, “The bottom line is, the need to protect the public health during this ongoing pandemic outweighs Tesch‘s, or any other individual‘s, right to a speedy trial under the US Constitution at this time.”
On the first factor—the length of the delay—the State concedes “the delays in Tesch‘s case trigger[ed] the Barker analysis” and the delays were “presumptively prejudicial.” See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). But the State asserts the “delay of just over one year was short and does not weigh heavily in the four-part analysis.” We agree. As the district court stated,
We turn to the reason for the delay. The Supreme Court has identified several types of delays and assigned different weights to each. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Specifically,
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Id. Tesch argues the following are “neutral reasons” attributable to the State: (1) the supreme court‘s suspension of jury trials, (2) the State‘s failure to bring him to trial following the quarantining of a witness for exposure to COVID-19, and (3) the State‘s failure to transfer him to Clay County to attend depositions. We disagree.
[B]ecause significant logistical issues—including a backlog of cases—are expected even when trials restart, the court finds good cause to extend the speedy trial deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b) beyond ninety days. Accordingly, for any case in which an indictment or information has been or is filed prior to September 14, 2020, the ninety-day deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b) and rule 2.33(2)(c) shall be expanded to 120 days, and shall be restarted with September 14, 2020 as Day 1. For any case in which an indictment or information has been or is filed prior to September 14, 2020, the one-year deadline in rule 2.33(2)(c) shall commence from June 22, 2020 or the date of filing, whichever is later.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Preparation for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services ¶ 13 (May 22, 2020). The court again extended “the ninety-day deadline in rule 2.33(2)(b)” restarting the days “with February 1, 2021 as Day 1.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services ¶ 13 (Nov. 10, 2020). The court extended “the one-year deadline in rule 2.33(2)(c),” recommencing it “from February 1, 2021.” Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently addressed its authority to enter these orders. See State v. Watson, 970 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Iowa 2022). The court discussed one component of
Other courts also have upheld their authority to act in the face of the pandemic. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021) (“[W]e hold that neither [the defendant] nor the state are responsible for the delay in commencing the trial when that delay occurred solely because of public-safety concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic and when the district court was prohibited from holding a jury trial by order of the Chief Justice.“); State v. Brown, 964 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Neb. 2021) (finding “delays caused by the [supreme] court‘s sua sponte good cause continuations for reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic” were a “‘valid reason’ for purposes of the constitutional analysis“); Commonwealth v. Murphy, No. 0197-21-2, 2021 WL 3501732, at *1, *5 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2021) (finding “the pandemic [and resulting emergency stay in trials] was a ‘valid reason’ that ‘justified appropriate delay’ under the third [Barker] category of reasons for delay“). In light of this nationwide authority, we agree with the district court that the pandemic-related orders were “valid reasons” for the delays in bringing Tesch to trial and did not weigh against the State.
The delay caused by the quarantine of a witness for exposure to COVID-19 also was a valid reason for the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[A] valid
Tesch is judicially estopped from raising his final reason for the delay—“the neglect of the State to bring [him] to Clay County for depositions.” See Godfrey v. State, 962 N.W.2d 84, 100 (Iowa 2021) (noting “the rule of ‘judicial estoppel’ prevents a party from changing its position after it has successfully urged a different position to obtain a certain litigation outcome“). When the State sought to have certain depositions scheduled remotely, Tesch resisted, requesting “the option of rescheduling depositions at a future time when the COVID-19 pandemic [was] not causing interruptions in school and businesses.” That is what the district court ordered. The court stated depositions would “only be conducted telephonically or by video conference if [Tesch] file[d] a written waiver [of] of his right to be personally present for those depositions” and, in the event he did not, “those remaining depositions” would “be canceled, and rescheduled for a date mutually agreed to by the parties.” Because Tesch received the relief he requested, he cannot raise a contrary position on appeal.
The third Barker factor—a defendant‘s assertion of his right—is clearly satisfied. That said, Tesch waived his speedy trial rights for the first four months, reducing the weight of this factor in his favor.
We are left with the prejudice to the defendant. As the district court noted, Tesch‘s pretrial detention was not entirely related to this charge and he failed to identify missing witnesses. As for his claim of anxiety and concern, the claim lacked specificity. See United States v. Flores-Lagonas, 993 F.3d 550, 564–65 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding defendant had not made a showing of actual prejudice as
On our de novo review of this constitutional issue, we agree with the district court that the State did not violate the speedy trial provision of the United States Constitution.
B. State Constitution
The Iowa Constitution states: “In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an individual the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”
III. Value of the Safe
The evidence regarding the value of a new safe was irrelevant without evidence of depreciation, original costs, and condition of stolen safe. [In addition, t]he evidence was insufficient to prove the replacement value of the sixteen-year-old safe exceeded three hundred dollars.
“Evidence is relevant when it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable then it would be without the evidence.‘” State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001) (quoting
The jury was instructed: “The ‘value’ of the safe means its higher value by any reasonable standard at the time of the theft. Reasonable standard includes, but is not limited to, the property‘s actual value, its replacement value, or its market value within the community.” The clinic‘s office manager testified the replacement value of the safe was $619. Under the instruction, the evidence was relevant.
“[W]e will uphold a verdict if substantial record evidence supports it.” State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). “Value testimony is liberally received, with its weight to be determined by the jury.” State v. Savage, 288 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1980) (citations omitted). The office manager‘s testimony amounted to substantial evidence supporting the value element of the crime. See id. at 505 (stating “other persons having the requisite knowledge might also be presumed to be competent to establish value, even if not the owner“).
We affirm the jury‘s finding of guilt and Tesch‘s judgment and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant‘s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.