STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Robert DOWNEY, Appellant.
No. 15-1585
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Filed April 14, 2017
894 N.W.2d 603
reasonable care under our tort law. Likewise, I think it is incumbent upon our judicial officers to more closely examine scenarios like the facts and circumstances presented here. I would reverse the district court grant of summary judgment to the State and remand for further proceedings.
Hecht, J., joins this dissent.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and Jude Pannell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
WIGGINS, Justice.
A defendant appealed his conviction and sentence following a bench trial on one count of making a false statement on an application to acquire a weapon рermit in violation of
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On January 14, 2015, James Downey submitted an application to acquire a weapon permit to the Johnson County sheriff‘s department. The purpose of the application was to obtain the state‘s permission to purchase a handgun as required under Iowa law. See
Downey then signed and dated the application. The paragraph above his signature states,
I certify that all information, including supporting documentation, provided in this application is true and correct, and I understand that I may be convicted of a class “D” felony pursuant to
Iowa Code section 724.17 if I make what I know to be a false statement of material fact on this application or if I submit what I know to be any materially falsified or forged documentation in connection with this application.
At the end of the first page of the application, below Downey‘s signature, the application stated, “Answer all questions on reverse side.” On the reverse side of the application, a heading provides, “All of the following questions must be answered.” Ten questions fоllowed with
The second question on the reverse side of the application asked,
Have you ever been convicted in any court of a felony, or any other crime involving a firearm or explosives for which the court could have sentenced you to imprisonment for more than one year, even if you received a shorter sentence including probation?
Downey answered “No” by checking the box next to that question. Aftеr Downey submitted the application, the Johnson County sheriff‘s office ran a background check. The background check revealed the state convicted Downey of operating while intoxicated (OWI) third offense, a class “D” felony. The sheriff denied his application on January 19.
Thereafter, Captain Wagner of the shеriff‘s office began an investigation into what the sheriff‘s department believed to be a false answer to the second question on the application in light of the background check revealing Downey‘s felony OWI conviction. As a result of the investigation, the State charged Downey with making a false statement on an application to acquire a weapon permit. After a bench trial, the district court found Downey was guilty of the offense of making a false statement on an application to acquire a weapon permit in violation of section 724.17. The district court sentenced Downey to five years in the custody of the department оf corrections, suspended the sentence, and placed him on two years of probation.
Downey appealed. We transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Downey‘s conviction and sentence. Downey asked for further review, which we grantеd.
II. Issue.
Downey raised various issues on appeal. We find that the issue interpreting section 724.17 is dispositive of this appeal.
III. Scope of Review.
We review issues of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006).
IV. Analysis.
The United States Supreme Court determined the Second Amendment protects the rights of District of Columbia residents to keep and bear arms in a person‘s home for the purpose of self-defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2821-22, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). Two years later, the Court extended this right to all residents to whom the Constitution applied. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3050, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010).
As with all federal constitutional rights, our state constitution can provide greater rights to Iowans. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264-68 (Iowa 2010). The framers of the Iowa Constitution chose not to include any language in оur constitution concerning the right to bear arms. However, our legislature has expanded the rights of gun owners in chapter 724 of the Iowa Code beyond the right to keep and bear arms in a person‘s home for the purpose of self-defense as recognized in Heller. See, e.g.,
This case requires us to interpret one of those expanded rights found in section 724.17. Section 724.17 outlines the requirements for an application for an an- nual
The application for an annual permit to acquire pistols or revolvers may be made to the sheriff of the county of the applicant‘s residence and shall be on a form prescribed and published by the commissioner of public safety. The application shall require only the full name of the applicаnt, the driver‘s license or nonoperator‘s identification card number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant. The applicant shall also display an identification card that bears a distinguishing number assigned to the cardholder, the full name, date of birth, sex, residence address, and brief description and colored photograph of the cardholder, or other identification as specified by rule of the department of public safety. The sheriff shall conduct a criminal history check concerning each applicant by obtaining criminal history data from the department of public safety which shall include an inquiry of the national instant criminal background check system maintained by the federal bureau of investigation or any successor agency. A person who makes what the person knows to be a false statement of material fact on an application submitted under this sеction or who submits what the person knows to be any materially falsified or forged documentation in connection with such an application commits a class “D” felony.
In 2010, the genеral assembly amended section 724.17 and replaced the word “state” with the phrase “require only.” 2010 Iowa Acts ch. 1178, § 13 (codified at
Downey maintains that by using the phrase “shall require only,” the legislature intended to prohibit the DPS from requesting additional information beyond the full name of the applicant, the driver‘s license or nonoрerator‘s identification card number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant. The State contends that the phrase “shall require only,” sets the floor for what the application must at least include, but does not limit nor forbid the DPS from including morе questions on the application.
“Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, we give words used by the legislature their ordinary and common meaning by considering, among other things, the context in which they are used.” State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 2007). Considering the ordinary and common meaning of the phrase “shall require only” and the context in which the legislature usеd it, the phrase is clearly narrower than the phrase “shall state.” “Require” is commonly defined as “to demand as necessary or essential” or “impose a compulsion or command on.” Require, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002). “Only” commonly means “solely” or “exclusively,” but
Additionally, when “only” is used as a modifier, it should be placed as close as possible to thе word or words it modifies. Great care must be taken when using the adverb as the placement of the word can affect the entire meaning of a sentence. Texas Law Review Manual on Usage & Style 72 (12th ed. 2011). It is a general rule that “[o]nly’ emphasizes the word or phrase that immediately follows it.” The Chicago Manual of Style 5.182, at 250 (16th ed. 2010).
In the case of In re N.V., the state urged us to construe the transfer sections of the Iowa Indian Child Welfarе Act broadly “to provide the court with discretion to deny the parents’ demand to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court because they did not present good cause to excuse their untimely transfer request.” 744 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 2008). The statute at issue provided in relevant part that “the court shall find good cause to deny the petition only if one or mоre of the” circumstances contained in the statute are shown to exist.
We found that by using “the word ‘only,’ the legislature made it clear that only those causes listed in section 232B.5(13) constitute good cause to deny the request for a transfer to a tribal court.”
Similarly, in this case, we find that the word “only” in section 724.17 modifies the words that follow it in the statute—the full name of the applicant, the driver‘s license or nonoperator‘s identification card number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant. See
This interpretation is аlso consistent with the legislative scheme of chapter 724. Section 724.10 concerns an application to carry a concealed weapon. It provides in relevant part,
A person shall not be issued a permit to carry weapons unless the person has completed and signed an application on a form to be prescribed and published by the commissioner of public safety. The application shall require only the full name, driver‘s license or nonoperator‘s identification card number, residence, place of birth, and date of birth of the applicant, and shall state whether the applicant meets the criteria sрecified in sections 724.8 and 724.9. An applicant may provide the applicant‘s social security number if the applicant so chooses.
In section 724.10(1) the legislature authorized the DPS to require additional in-
Accordingly, we hold, the legislature did not authorize the questions on the reverse side of the application to acquire a weapon permit nor did it require Downey to answer the question concerning his prior felony conviction. Next, we must determine if Downey can be guilty of violating section 724.17 when he answered the felony question in the negative. We think not.
The Iowa legislature has the power to define a crime. State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 1978). When the legislature enacted section 724.17, it decided that only the items the DPS could require an applicant to provide on an application to acquire were the full name of the apрlicant, the driver‘s license or nonoperator‘s identification card number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant.
For these reasons, we find section 724.17 does not criminalize Downey‘s act of falsely answering an unauthorized question on the application to acquire a weapon permit.
V. Disposition.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court finding Downey guilty of violating section 724.17 of the Iowa Code, and remand the case back to the district court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.