State of Iowa, Appellee, vs. Eric Lamont Harris, Appellant
No. 23-1285
In the Iowa Supreme Court
Submitted September 12, 2024—Filed October 4, 2024
Eric Harris seeks review of the district court‘s refusal to dismiss a criminal prosecution based on a violation of the speedy-indictment rule. Reversed and Remanded.
May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Sometimes, there is a question about what event starts the forty-five-day clock. The answer depends on whether the case is governed by the newly amended version of
The amended rule is explicit about when the forty-five-day period starts. It says that “the 45-day period commences for an adult only after the defendant has been taken before a magistrate for an initial appearance or a waiver of the initial appearance is filed.”
The pre-amendment rule is not as explicit about when the forty-five-day period starts. But that gap has been filled through our opinions in State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa 2017), and State v. Watson, 970 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 2022). Williams and Watson explain that under the pre-amendment rule, the forty-five-day period starts when the poliсe either arrest the defendant or issue a citation in lieu of arrest, which our law treats as equivalent to an arrest.
Here, the parties agree that the pre-amendment rule governs. The question on appeal is whether the district court should have dismissed the prosecution because the trial information was filed on the forty-sixth day after the police arrested the defendant. The answer is yes. It is yes because, under the pre-amendment rule, the fоrty-five-day period began when the police arrested the defendant.
The district court erred by denying the motion to dismiss. We reverse.
Eric Harris was at the hospital on the night of March 25, 2023. After hospital staff cleared Harris medically, police arrested him on suspicion of arson and other crimes. The arrest happened at 11:58 p.m. on March 25.
The next day, March 26, Harris had his initial appearance before a magistrate.
On May 10, the State filed its trial informаtion. The parties agree that—for speedy-indictment purposes—May 10 was the forty-fifth day after Harris‘s initial appearance. But it was the forty-sixth day after the police arrested Harris on March 25.
On May 15, Harris moved to dismiss. Harris relied on the pre-amendment version of
The district court denied Harris‘s motion. The court read our decision in Williams to mean that the forty-five-day period ran from the date of Harris‘s initial appearance, not from the date when the police arrested Harris. And so, the court reasoned, the May 10 trial information was timely.
Harris asked our court to grant discretionary review. We granted Harris‘s request, and we rеtained the case. “We review interpretations of the speedy indictment rule for errors at law.” Watson, 970 N.W.2d at 307 (quoting State v. Smith, 957 N.W.2d 669, 675 (Iowa 2021)).
II. Merits.
A. Rule 2.33. The parties agree that this case is governed by the pre-amendment version of
a. When an adult is arrested for the commission оf a public offense, . . . and an indictment is not found against the defendant within 45 days, the court must order the prosecution to be
dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown or the defendant waives the defendant‘s right thereto.
Although the rulе has many components, most of them are not disputed here. For example, the parties agree that although the State filed a trial information rather than an indictment, that doesn‘t matter. The parties agree that for purposes of this rule, a trial information is equivalent to an indictment. See id. at r. 2.5(5).
The parties only disagree about one issue: was the trial information filed within forty-five days as the rule requires? The answer depends on what event started the forty-five-day period. If the forty-five-day period started with Harris‘s arrest at the hospital on March 25, then the May 10 filing occurred on the forty-sixth day—and was one day late. But if the forty-five-day period started with Harris‘s initial appearance on March 26, then the trial information was filed on the forty-fifth dаy—and was timely.
B. Williams. This is not the first time we have considered when the forty-five-day period begins. It was one of the two issues that we addressed in Williams. Those two issues were: (1) In what cases does the speedy-indictment rule apply? and—relevant here—(2) If the speedy-indictment rule does apply, what event is the starting point for the rule‘s forty-five day period? Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 860-65, 867.
As to the first issue, we concluded that thе speedy-indictment rule only applies if two events occur: (1) the defendant is lawfully arrested by the police, and then (2) the defendant is taken before a magistrate. “Once the arrested person is before the magistrate,” wе said, “the arrest process is complete, the person is no longer under the control of the arresting officer, and all the rights under the law available to defendants become applicable, including the right to
As to the second issue, we concluded that if the speedy-indictment rulе does apply, its forty-five-day period begins when the police arrested the defendant. Id. “[T]he time for bringing the indictment,” we said, “runs from the initial arrest.”1 Id.
C. Watson. As this last quote shows, the Williams court tried to make it clear that the forty-five-day period begins when the police arrest the defendant. Id. (“Thus, while the time for bringing the indictment runs from the initial arrest . . . .“); id. at 858 (“We conclude the speedy indictment rule is properly interpreted to commence upon arrest . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 867 (“The rule is triggered from the time a person is taken into custody . . . .” (emphasis added)). In practice, though, Williams left room for uncertainty about when the forty-five-day period starts. Compare State v. Khan, No. 20-0869, 2021 WL 3661411, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021) (date of arrest), with id. at *2-4 (Greer, J., dissenting) (datе of initial appearance). We tried to eliminate that uncertainty through our opinion in Watson.
In Watson, the police issued citations in lieu of arrest to the defendant. 970 N.W.2d at 304. For purposes of speedy indictment, though, the issuance of those citations was equivalent to an arrest. Id. at 308 (citing
Although the police issued the citations on July 5, the initial appearance didn‘t occur until September 21. Id. at 305. The state then filed its trial information on October 6. Id.
Watson moved to dismiss. Id. Watson noted that the state‘s October 6 trial information was filed over ninety days аfter the July 5 citations. Id. And so, Watson argued, the trial information had been filed well after the forty-five-day period had expired. Id.
The district court read Williams to mean that the forty-five-day period ran from Watson‘s initial appearance on September 21, not from the issuance of the citations on July 5. Id. at 308. Therefore, the district court reasoned, the October 6 trial information was timely. Id.
We reversed and remanded for dismissal. Id. at 310-11. We said that the district court had “misread [Williams‘s] holding as measuring the forty-five-day period from the date of the initial appearance rather than the date of the arrest.” Id. at 308. We clarified that—under Williams—the forty-five-day period runs from “the date of the arrest,” not the date of the initial appearance. Id. So because the citations issued to Watson were equivalent to an arrest, the forty-five-day period ran from the issuance of the citations to Watson, not his initial appearance. Id. And because the state filed its trial information more than forty-five days after the citations were issued, the trial information was late, and the prosecution had to be dismissed. Id. at 308-09.
D. Application to Harris. Having reviewed Watson and Williams, we now apply them to Harris‘s case. The police arrested Harris on March 25, and his initial appearance was on March 26. So the speedy-indictment rule applies, and its forty-five-day period began on March 25, the date that the police arrested
E. Counterarguments. We have considered all of the State‘s counterarguments. We mention two of them here: (1) the State‘s suggestion that Watson should be limited to cases involving citations, and (2) the State‘s suggestion that we should reinterpret the pre-amendment rule to match the amended version. Wе address each in turn.
1. Watson as a citation case. The State contends that Watson should only apply to cases involving citations in lieu of arrest, not actual arrests. We disagree. As explained, for purposes of speedy indictment, the citations in Watson were equivalent to an arrest. 970 N.W.2d at 308. So we see no good reason to limit Watson to citations.
Plus, the citations are not what makes Watson important here. Watson is important here because it explains Williams. Watson explains that under Williams, the forty-five-day period runs from the date the police arrest the defendant, not the date of the initial appearance. Id.
2. Retroactive amendment. The State also suggests that we should reinterpret the pre-amendment rule so that it will have the same meaning as the amended rule. And sо, the State argues, the forty-five-day period should start with Harris‘s initial appearance—as the amended rule requires—and not with Harris‘s arrest, as we interpreted the pre-amendment rule to require in Williams and Watson.
We disagree. To put it simply, because the parties agree that the pre-amendment rule governs this case, we do not think the case should be governed instead by the amended rule, which has not merely clarified Iowa‘s
Also, although we acknowledge that the language of the pre-amendment rule is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, this court has already chosen among them. We chose a reasonable interpretation in Williams when we said, “[T]he time for bringing the indictment runs from the initial arrest . . . .” 895 N.W.2d at 865. Then we reaffirmed that same reasonable interpretation in Watson. We decline to choose a different interpretation now, as the pre-amendment rule fades intо legal history. Rather, we follow Williams and Watson, and we conclude that the forty-five-day clock started when the police arrested Harris.
III. Disposition.
To recap,
Postscript: In the interest of clarity, we add two final notes. First, we again emphasize that the amended version of
Second, we note that the amendment of
Effective Date. The rеvised Chapter 2 Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure filed in conjunction with this order are effective July 1, 2023, subject to Legislative Council review as provided by
Iowa Code section 602.4202 . This includes criminal cases filed after that date and criminal cases already pending on that date. However, judicial districts or individual district judges may, in the exercise of their discretion, exempt any case that was pending before July 1, 2023, from one or more of the revised rules.
Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Adopting Revised Chaрter 2 Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure (Oct. 14, 2022).
Reversed and Remanded.