State of Iowa v. Donald Joseph King

AP- OF COURT OF strategy or tactics DECISION trial concern actions VACATED; DISTRICT COURT fully if a record were PEALS explain could counsel AFFIRMED. Clay, JUDGMENT those issues. developed to address will resolve the at 494. “We only when the rec- appeal on direct claims It is a rare case adequate.” Id.

ord is alone is sufficient to the trial record

which appeal. State v. claim on direct

resolve a (Iowa 2006).

Straw, of in- raised several claims has

McNeal ap- of counsel in this assistance effective Iowa, Appellee, STATE of trial counsel he asserts peal. Specifically, (1) failing in: to introduce ineffective trial, testimony Wey from ei- favorable KING, Appellant. Joseph Donald recording of a through transcript ther 13-1061. No. by police, byor interview conducted prior witness; (2) failing presenting him as Supreme Court of Iowa. challenge the value of the sto- adequately (3) trial; equipment len construction 2015. June testimony from Jones at failing object Rehearing Aug. Denied dealing drugs; implicating trial McNeal compel a motion to failing to file deadlines, or seek a con- discovery, extend discovery provid- of late

tinuance because by the In our de novo review of

ed State. record, the record we conclude before to reach the merits of inadequate

us

McNeal’s ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel develop need to these

claims. McNeal will through possible postconviction pro-

claims

ceedings.

IV. Conclusion. ba- issuing judge had substantial concluding probable there was

sis for warrant and support

cause to the search properly court denied district suppress. The search

McNeal’s motion trailer did not violate the Fourth I, section

Amendment or article Additionally, the rec-

Iowa Constitution. inadequate to reach the

ord us is before ineffeetive-assistance-

merits of McNeal’s vacate the decision

of-counsel claims. We and affirm the appeals

of the court of

judgment of the district court. use, City, for stain from the Douglas, purchase, posses- Conrad Sioux Rees any appellant. drug. sion of Miller, General, Attorney Thomas J. King moved into an apartment in Sioux Trout, Attorney Martha E. Assistant Gen- City employment. and found In Septem- eral, Jennings, County Patrick A. Attor- 2012, however, ber October he tested Campbell, A. Assistant ney, and Mark positive for methamphetamine. He was Attorney, County appellee. an placed inpatient drug-treatment into program and returned apartment to his CADY, Chief Justice. upon completing program January appeal, In this we consider the constitu- King required to continue tionality of a warrantless search of the drug-treatment program outpa- on an parolee by parole home officer that basis, tient required and he was to find prosecute used to uncovered evidence employment. He was also required to posses- of the crime of convict the monitoring bracelet, wear an electronic a controlled substance as a sion of habitual which would probation allow his to officer offender. We must determine whether the track his movements. justi- search was unconstitutional or was State, by special fied needs of the January On Scarmon met with King balancing governmental on a based probation During at the office. the meet- against the search interests served ing, King complained outpatient about the parolee protected interest of the treatment program and seemed to be los- I, under article section 8 of the Iowa Con- ing parole. his motivation to succeed at review, On our we find the stitution. expressed might He the notion that it be parole search officer did not violate prison. easier to return to days I, of the Iowa article section 8 Constitu- following meeting, monitoring sys- affirm judgment tion. We and sen- signaled King tem had not left his tence of the district court. days. apartment King for two was re- quired drug to attend treatment to Background I. Facts Proceed- for employment during look this time. ings. monitoring system signaled The also King parole Donald was released on might subjected the bracelet have been to from a correctional institution in Iowa on tampering. Scarmon was concerned that a serving June 2012. He was sentence King verge relapse was on the of another of incarceration at the correctional institu- drugs might parole. into abscond from being tion after convicted of the crimes of January On Scarmon and another (meth- of a possession controlled substance officer, Hruska, Todd made a home amphetamine), possession of a controlled King. visit to check on When Scarmon and (methamphetamine) with substance intent apartment, King Hruska arrived at the deliver, to degree. and theft the second present was and allowed them inside. assigned supervise The officer to King lived alone. checked the Scarmon King while on was Emmanuel Scar- by King. It monitoring bracelet worn did release, King mon. As a condition to his any signs tampering. not show Scar- required sign was to a “Parole Order and mon then administered a breath test Agreement.” agreement The contained terms, King consuming if had been including numerous a consent-to- determine provision agreement beverages. and an alcoholic The test did not de- ab- 1X0 King not constitute a of his constitu- any alcohol. did waiver presence

tect apart- resisted the mo- right. had not left his tional State that he explained days he either argued last few because tion. It the search was valid ment over a “con- “special needs” search or as been sick. as had agreement. sent” search under the experience learned from had Scarmon motion, The district court overruled always parolees trust could not that he ultimately ruling sup- that the search was questions. his answers to provide honest ported special-needs under the doctrine. agree- provision The search verify if help for him to a means ment was trial, King At a bench was convicted by parol- to him provided the information substance, mari- possession of controlled He also utilized home ees was correct. juana, offense, as a habitual offender. third parolees gen- were to make sure King district court sentenced consistent erally living in an environment fif- of incarceration not to exceed period ques- rehabilitation when goal with the suspended, years. teen The sentence was during would surface and concerns tions King placed probation for two A search was supervision. the course years. King -appealed judgment signs of means to discover an effective sentence based on the denial of his motion hamper activity could inappropriate suppress. sought by parole. the success II. Standard of Review. King’s check he should Scarmon decided any activity detri- signs for bedroom We review de novo claims based on presence the parole, including mental suppress the district court’s failure to evi He was drug drugs paraphernalia. obtained in violation of the state dence use, drug includ- King’s history of aware of Kern, v. 831 N.W.2d constitution. State drugs drug use intravenous use of ing (Iowa 2013). 149, 164 After informed parole. while on Scarmon Analysis. search, King did III. intention to

King of his refuse, the offi- but instead led not I, Article section 8 of the Iowa Scarmon to his basement bedroom. cers expresses right of the “[t]he Constitution sunglasses a case locat- promptly observed ... people against to be secure unreason headboard of the bed. He ed on the searches,” requires able seizures and two small the case and discovered opened particularized to be and issued warrants marijuana rolling papers. bags Const, only upon probable cause. Iowa violating his King arrested Scarmon added). I, § (emphasis art. The federal call to the placed police. Hruska parole. counterpart right to Iowa’s is found in the Amendment to the United States subsequently charged with one Fourth King was Const, marijuana, U.S. amend. IV count of third of- Constitution. possession (“The ... fense, right people to be secure felony, “D” as a habitual class sei against the unreasonable searches and charge offender. This was based on violated, zures, shall not be and no War marijuana in his bedroom Scar- found issue, probable upon mari- rants shall but King suppress mon. moved to the ”). provisions juana He cause.... The text of both prosecution. as evidence in the people, to all includ applies protection its claimed the search of his bedroom I, may totally be detached ing people article who sunglasses case violated section behavior, Constitution, any of criminal suspicion and his consent from of the Iowa in right applied often agreement although most the search under the HI engaging people suspected adapt law to sonableness of searches to over time See United States v. criminal behavior.1 challenges given new to the people and 259, 265-66, Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. government that were not contemplated at 1060-61, 108 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. provision the time the was framed. It (1990) (examining meaning 232-33 allows the right to take on a new shape people” “the in the context of Fourth over time in response to new understand- v. protections); Amendment Katz United ings of those times when States, 507, 511, 389 U.S. 88 S.Ct. permitted search, to conduct a reasonable (1967) (“[T]he Fourth 19 L.Ed.2d including people the search of or places for protects people, places.”). Amendment purposes primarily unrelated to the en- Overall, right protects people against See, forcement of criminal e.g., laws. New searches, carefully warrantless craft T.L.O., Jersey 325, 335-36, 469 U.S. exceptions. ed 733, 739-40, 730-31 right The declaration of the con- (1985) (examining the reasonableness of ownership people pro- text of its searches). warrantless school These fu- jects a It powerful statement. identifies ture can expand circumstances both importance right our founders types of warrantless permitted by prominence right society. and the just right, as it could diminish the States, Boyd v. United type number or of exceptions over time. 624-35, 524, 529-35, 29 L.Ed. Cline, See State v. (describing 749-52 detail the de- (Iowa 2000) (declining adopt good- right velopment importance and its faith exception to the exclusionary rule founders), abrogated to the on other Constitution), under the Iowa overruled on grounds by Hayden, Warden U.S. Turner, grounds by other State v. (Iowa 2001). 606 n. 2 Over Yet, L.Ed.2d approximately the fifty years, last new of right speak thrust does abso- needs of the to conduct war- lutes, Naujoks, but reason. See State v. primarily rantless searches unrelated to (Iowa 2001) (“The 101, 637 107 N.W.2d challenged law enforcement have essential the Fourth Amend- shape right through what has be- a impose ment ‘is to standard of “reason- special-needs come known as the doctrine. upon ableness” the exercise discretion T.L.O., 2, at 469 U.S. 332-33 & n. 340- ....”’ by government (quoting officials (Iowa 41, 2, 742, 708, 105 S.Ct. at 737-38 & n. Loyd, 711 83 State v. 1995))). 2, approach permits This the rea- L.Ed.2d at 728-29 & n. 708, 712-13, 649, regarding

1. The assertion of and claims 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 656- States, (1987); right primarily Wong arise in the criminal context 57 Sun v. United 371 471, 487-88, remedy: suppres- due to the sole means of U.S. 83 S.Ct. 9 441, against prosecution (holding sion evidence a an L.Ed.2d 455 evidence exploitation illegal accused that was obtained in or because of an obtained at of an against ac- unconstitutional search or seizure of the search and seizure cannot be used cused, home, Cline, searched); things. person their Linkletter v. see also State v. 617 634, Walker, 618, 1731, 277, (Iowa 2000) (“There 381 U.S. 85 S.Ct. N.W.2d 291 is sim- 1740, 601, (1965) (“We meaningful remedy ply 14 L.Ed.2d 611 also no available to one affirmatively exclusionary illegal found that the rule who has suffered an than other only remedy prohibiting benefiting was ... effective for the the State from from its violation.”), protection rights under the Fourth Amend- constitutional overruled on other Turner, ment....''), abrogated grounds by grounds by on other State v. 630 314, 320-22, (Iowa 2001). Kentucky, 479 U.S. 606 n. Griffith beyond spe ‘special needs’ normal law enforce Special-Needs Doctrine. A. may justify first surfaced under from the departures doctrine ment cial-needs jurisprudence Camara federal probable-cause require our warrant and usual Court, Municipal 873-74, ments.” Id. at 107 S.Ct. at Camara, 18 L.Ed.2d placed at 717. The conditions 97 L.Ed.2d if a test to determine articulated Court liberty “are meant probationers on the a would be for what reason warrant that the serves as a probation to assure search. for an administrative needed genuine rehabilitation and that period 1732-33, 532-33, 539-40, 87 S.Ct. at at community pro is not harmed 937-38, (finding at L.Ed.2d being large,” requires which bationer’s necessary entry when only warrant was justifies supervision the exercise of in order to inform was refused inspectors are fol probation ensure the conditions search, of the limits of the the homeowner lowed. Id. at 107 S.Ct. at authorized, and the inspector was that the ultimately L.Ed.2d at 718. The Court held mu to enforce the necessity of the search requiring a warrant would remove code). was followed nicipal Camara supervisory power probation from the offi 7, 105 T.L.O., & n. U.S. at 340-42 place judge, it in the warrant cer 7,n. L.Ed.2d at 733-35 & at 742-43 & quick responses interfere with to viola special- applied n. in which the Court tions, and reduce the deterrent effect that if public to determine school needs test the searches would create. Id. at a warrant to conduct needed officials 97 L.Ed.2d at 719. Even the doctrine of school lockers. The probation supervision dissent found fell concurring opin its name from the derived category justify a special-needs within Blackmun, who stated: ion of Justice the examination of the reasonableness of exceptional circumstances “Only in those ultimately probation-related searches and needs, beyond the normal special in which probable-cause concluded the threshold re enforcement, make the war need for law quirement for a warrant should be lowered im probable-cause requirement rant and supervision because rehabilita advances ais court entitled to substitute practicable, “by allowing probation agent tion of interests for that of the balancing its sign intervene at the first trouble.” Id. 105 S.Ct. at Framers.” Id. 3172-73, 107 S.Ct. at (Blackmun, J., concurring at 741 L.Ed.2d (Blackmun, J., at 722-24 dissenting). Jus in judgment). probation tice Blackmun observed that the Wisconsin, 868, In v. 483 U.S. Griffin officer monitors with the compliance condi (1987), 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 S.Ct. liberty placed probationer’s tions on the special-needs doc Court considered hpme and that a search of the for viola probationary in the context of a trine may necessary be that tions ensure so, doing application In the basic search. 883, 3173, compliance. Id. at 107 S.Ct. at for the first time. of the doctrine surfaced spe 97 L.Ed.2d at 723. He concluded the 873, at at Griffin, 483 U.S. S.Ct. apply cial-needs doctrine should not 3168, at 717. The ac 97 L.Ed.2d Court Griffin’s case because the search of his home, knowledged probationer’s “[a] that search, probation home was not a normal else’s, anyone protected by like tipa from to uncover police but involved requirement Fourth Amendment’s ” violation; evidence of a new criminal be ‘reasonable.’ Id. On the other therefore, hand, probationer Griffin’s status as a recognized opera it that “a State’s justify special exception. ... should not probation system presents tion of a

H3 885, 3174, at at might Id. at 107 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed.2d be reasonable even absent 624, suspicion. 725. such at Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1417, 103 L.Ed.2d at 664 (quoting United 1989, special- extended the Court Martinez-Fuerte, 543, States v. 428 U.S. drug testing by needs doctrine to cover 560, 1116, 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d pursuant regulations railroads to federal (1976)). expectations reasonable Railway Labor Skinner Executives’ privacy employees were found to be Ass’n, 1402, 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. employees diminished because the worked (1989). per- L.Ed.2d 639 These tests were industry in an highly regulated that was specific mitted when rules were violated safety everyone. ensure the Id. at supervisor suspicion a had a reasonable 109 S.Ct. at 103 L.Ed.2d at 666.3 specific based on observations the em- ployee the influence of Safety again was under alcohol.2 was paramount con- Id. at at S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d cern of the Court in Treasury National 219.301(b) (citing Raab, § at 655-56 Employees 49 C.F.R. Union Von (1987)). The Court held the 109 S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 685 in regulating had an interest railroad em- The search in Von Raab involved ployee safety conduct to ensure testing by both drug Customs Service for traveling public employees, and the among groups use three employees: presented special directly and this interest need drug those involved in interdic- tion, beyond firearms, normal law enforcement that might carrying those and those justify a departure handling from warrant re- classified material. Id. at 660- 620-21, quirement. Id. at at 109 S.Ct. at at 103 L.Ed.2d 699. at program 103 L.Ed.2d 661-62. The Court The designed for deterrence tests, found standardized nature of the and could not prose- be used criminal the minimal administering discretion of cution without consent from the tested them, practical and the . employee, setting difficulties of rail- it outside the needs of supervisors obtaining road a warrant from normal law enforcement and within the magistrate dissipates special-needs while evidence all test.' weighed against necessity requiring 103 L.Ed.2d at 702. The Court 622-24, a warrant. Id. at found imposition of the warrant re- quirement bring 663-64. The would normal or routine although employment Court noted that other cases indi- decisions to a constitutional magnitude cated warrantless search must be based compromise and could the mis- “ probable quan- cause or at least ‘some sion of the Customs Service warrants if ” tum suspicion,’ of individualized if the providing any were needed without addi- protection interests are minimal then the tional to personal privacy of Though performed by compa- they the railroad deterrent unless violators know that are nies, there were sufficient "indices the Gov- likely By ensuring to be discovered. endorsement, encouragement, ernment’s employees they upon ... know will be tested participation” implicate the Fourth Amend- event, triggering the occurrence of a the tim- Skinner, 615-16, ment. 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. ing employee predict of which no can 1412, at L.Ed.2d at 103 658-59. certainty, regulations significantly the in- crease the deterrent effect of the administra- industry’s experience per- 3. The railroad ... penalties prohibited tive associated with the shows, confirms, suasively and common sense conduct. customary that the dismissal sanction that Skinner, 629-30, employees drugs at threatens who use or alcohol 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. at 1420, duty while on cannot serve as an effective L.Ed.2d at 103 1X4 666-67, analysis at 109 the Court used in Id. S.Ct. Vernonia employees.4 Acton, 646, Further, School District 515 U.S. 1391, at 702-03.

at 103 L.Ed.2d 47J 2386, (1995), 564 to 115 S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d to government’s need the Court found testing very drug examine of students outweighed pri- the searches conduct First, useful. the Court considered the those carried fire- who vacy interests privacy nature of the interest intruded interdiction, drug engaged arms and by legitimacy upon the search clearly outweigh not but the need did 654, privacy expectation. Id. at 115 handling of those classi- privacy interests 2391, at S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d at 575. The 678, 668, at 109 information. Id. fied second factor considered was the com 704, 1392, 1397, 103 L.Ed.2d at at S.Ct. plained-of character of the intrusion. Id. drug reasoned that use 710. The Court 658, 2393, at 115 at at S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d drugs agents job prevent whose was to urinalysis on a (recognizing intrudes country might create a entering from function). traditionally private shielded that would interfere conflict of interest Finally, analyzed the court “the nature and execution of their with the successful immediacy governmental concern at customarily using and that those duties here, efficacy issue and the of this means impaired percep- firearms could not risk 660, meeting it.” at Id. S.Ct. at by drug use. Id. judgment tion or caused 2394, at 132 L.Ed.2d 579. Rather than a 1393, 670-71, at L.Ed.2d at 109 S.Ct. interest, minimum level of the Court found However, found no evi- at 705. the Court governmental interest needed to be dence whether those with access “clas- important enough outweigh actually sified” information had access to the extent interest and of the intrusion. might sensitive information that merit the 661, 2394-95, Id. at 115 S.Ct. at mandatory testing and could not find the L.Ed.2d at 579. The the drug Court found overly category reasonable. Id. at broad problem among community students in the 678, 1397, at 103 L.Ed.2d at enough permit was severe random war- acknowledged 710. The dissent rantless, urinalysis suspicionless of stu has been particular “whether search participated who in sports. dents Id. at depends largely upon ‘reasonable’ ... 664-65, S.Ct. necessity prompts social search.” dissented, 582. Justice suggest O’Connor 109 S.Ct. at Id. ing suspicion-based searches were not (Scalia, J., dissenting). L.Ed.2d at 712-13 context, impracticable particular in the However, it did not find sufficient social rendering suspicionless the blanket drug necessity require testing of Cus- 671, 679-81, unreasonable. Id. at handling classi- employees toms Service 2399, 2403-04, 132 L.Ed.2d at (“Protec (O’Connor, J., fied material without evidence of real dissenting) evenhandedness, drug problem among privacy, use them. tion of primarily narrowly specifi- advise 4. A warrant serves intrusions are defined cally ... citizen is authorized law and doubtless are well known to that an intrusion employees.” covered permissible scope and limited in its and to interpose magistrate Raab, a neutral between the Von 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at (citation omitted) citizen and the law enforcement officer "en- (quoting 103 L.Ed.2d at 703 competitive States, gaged enterprise in the often Johnson v. United ferreting present (first But out crime.” in the con- 92 L.Ed. text, Skinner, justifying toxicologi- quote); "the circumstances 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at (second testing permissible quote)). cal of such 103 L.Ed.2d at and the limits

H5 by probation officer, then now the touchstone of the and is even when conduct- Amendment.”). Fourth ing the search for law pur- enforcement poses rather than probationary purposes. Miller, 305, In 520 117 Chandler U.S. 874-75, 3169, 483 U.S. at 107 at S.Ct. 97 1295, (1997), S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 513 L.Ed.2d at 717-18 (majority opinion). The Supreme placed Court boundaries on the special-needs other cases shape and modi- warrantless, special-needs exception as to fy special-needs how exceptions are suspicionless searches. The State of Geor- evalu- gia drug testing applied. wanted to mandate for ated and While several of the political require- candidates similar to the opinions permit suspicionless searches, employees ments railroad in Skinner those are by limited the findings of mini- patrol agents and border Von Raab. privacy rights invaded, mal that are Skin- Chandler, 308-09, 520 U.S. at 117 at S.Ct. ner, 624, 1417, 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at 103 1298, However, at 137 L.Ed.2d 519-20. 664, L.Ed.2d at and the requirement found precedents “[o]ur Court estab- governmental important need has to be lish that proffered special need ... enough to privacy override the rights of must important enough be substantial — individual, Chandler, 318, 520 U.S. at acknowledged pri- override the individual’s 1303, 117 S.Ct. at 137 L.Ed.2d at 526. interest, vacy sufficiently vital to suppress Moreover, only concerns that have the Fourth Amendment’s normal require- made it through the important- Court’s ment of individualized suspicion.” Id. at concern test are drugs in schools or relate 318, 1303, 117 137 L.Ed.2d at 526. to the safety public and individuals. need, In special order to find a there must Acton, 664-65, 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. at be an indication of dangers, concrete not 2396, 132 L.Ed.2d at (majority opin- ones, merely hypothetical justify de- ion); Raab, 668, Von U.S. 109 S.Ct. parting prescriptions from the basic 1392, (majority L.Ed.2d at 704 opin- 318-19, Fourth Amendment. Id. at ion); Skinner, 620-21, 489 U.S. at 1303, S.Ct. at 137 L.Ed.2d at 526. 662; S.Ct. at 103 L.Ed.2d at see also “[Wjhere public the risk to safety is sub- Sitz, Dep’t Mich. State Police v. real, stantial and ... searches calibrated 444, 454-55, 2481, 2487-88, U.S. 110 S.Ct. ” may to the risk rank as ‘reasonable.’ 110 L.Ed.2d (upholding a 117 S.Ct. at 137 L.Ed.2d at warrantless, suspicionless sobriety check- 529. point using empirical data to support its Overall, the pertinent prec- most federal efficacy). need and edent special-needs area for the present Griffin,5 applied case is we special-needs Griffin special-needs exception Court held the doctrine in a ap- involving case the search of a plied to a search a probationer’s home school locker school officials. State v. Although Knights, United States v. probationers 534 U.S. may rantless searches of be rea- (2001), context); 122 S.Ct. special-needs sonable outside the California, Samson, and Samson see also 547 U.S. at (2006), 165 L.Ed.2d 250 both con- (holding 165 L.Ed.2d at 256 a condition constitutionality sidered the of searches of of release "can so diminish or eliminate a homes, probationer prisoner’s both did so under a expectation released reasonable straight analysis reasonableness suspicionless under that a a law Amendment, utilizing special- Fourth enforcement officer would not offend the analysis Amendment”). Thus, needs similar to that done in Fourth an examination Griffin. Knights, 534 U.S. at apply special- S.Ct. at 590- of these cases would not to our (deciding 151 L.Ed.2d at analysis. that war- needs (Iowa 2003). In doctrine in the context of the search

Jones, needs N.W.2d parolee by of a initiated so, apartment from the federal of an we borrowed doing officer, making any spe- the three-factor without adopted parole his jurisprudence if the doctrine would the doctrine. test to determine cific reference to State 1970). (Iowa of the lock- Cullison, warrantless search support the analysis, we at 146. Under the case, ers. Id. rejected the theories used to we (1) of the the nature considered minimize protections the constitutional (2) stake, character of the the interest at maintain parolees and held that parolees intrusion, and immedia- the nature people afforded all safeguards the same at stake and the concern cy of involving evi- against warrantless con- to meet the ability of the search the of new crimes. Id. at 538. The dence up- applied these factors cern. Id. We began as a search conducted Cullison random search hold a warrantless by a officer to parole-related parole visit at 150. lockers. Id. school parolee determine the reason the failed up for work. Id. at 534. After show special-needs the applied have not We returning apart- and then to the leaving of school lock- beyond the search doctrine ment, officer asked to search a doctrine, parole the the have evaluated ers. We apartment room of the to investi- however, of the search of locked in the context by police gate any parole officers for other violations. Id. parolee of a the home in- drugs suspi- had suspected parolee 535. The officer “became who Kern, generally parolee objected side the house. See after the to his cious” Yet, we did not assess at 165-72. request opened to have the locked door circum- beyond specific the doctrine told him there was and after the id. at 170-72. of the case. See stances something in the room that he did not police revealed offi- These circumstances him officer want to see. Id. primary the search for cers conducted knew at the time that there had been gathering using evidence purpose of area, burglaries recent and he Id. at 171. prosecution. a criminal sought police the assistance of a officer Thus, evaluating through the case entering searching assist in the room. clause, and seizure we lens of our search the search violated the Feder- Id. We held the doctrine as a means to did not see al it Search and Seizure Clause because carry officers to enable law enforcement probable was not based on cause. Id. at gathering evidence of out their duties special-needs 539-40. The doctrine Moreover, Id. at 170. activity. criminal time, fully developed at the and the of the case did not the circumstances any blurred line facts of case between any that the warrant demonstrate reason carry officer to out a search against unrea- requirement right and a search law mission seizure would have sonable search and personnel for evidence of enforcement of the search. Id. frustrated Nevertheless, activity. criminal id. did not view the Accordingly, at 172. we criticism of expressed we no constitutional requiring a means to excuse doctrine as apartment by the search of to obtain a law enforcement officers suspicious until the officer became officer the Iowa Constitu- search warrant under of the contents of locked room tion. Id. police obtained the assistance of a officer earlier, pursue suspicion. (pro- Thirty-three years we addressed tecting parolee’s constitutional safe- underpinnings special- some of the

H7 only separate rather, to a new and as related to guards parolees, “as but to an crime”). question expressly swer the left open by those decisions. See at (reserving id. 505 (Iowa Ochoa, In 260 State N.W.2d question of a by parole search a officer 2010), by police we held that a search of a part as of ordinary duties for day); another a occupied by parolee motel room Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170-71 (explaining unreasonable under the search seizure any special-needs require doctrine “would of the Iowa clause Constitution when that the search aby parole officer be solely parolee’s based on the status. designed to fit special parole” needs of Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 289-91. Notwith- before concluding such a situation did not standing, acknowledged properly we “[a] case); Baldon, exist that State v. limited, nonarbitrary warrantless search of (Iowa 2013) N.W.2d (noting no by parole might the home a officer con- evidence was introduced about a need for ceivably supported ‘special be under the parole officer to search consistent with needs’ doctrine.” Id. at 288. general Ochoa, parole); mission of (Iowa Short, State v. 851 N.W.2d at (noting N.W.2d that properly “[a] 2014), with “an we were confronted investi- limited, nonarbitrary warrantless search of gatory by law enforcement search related by parole the home a might officer con probation- to new crimes” at the home of a ceivably supported be ‘special under the Short, at 477. er. We held doctrine”); Gullison, needs’ 173 N.W.2d at requirement applica- “the warrant has full (Stuart, J., dissenting) (arguing the bility to home probation- searches of both majority question did not answer the parolees by ers and law enforcement.” Id. a parole-officer whether search part as at by 506. We declared search law ordinary duties fits within a warrantless- adequate enforcement without an warrant exception). analyze the parole We violated the search and seizure clause of by considering search issue fac three Constitution, the Iowa acknowledged but tors identified Jones. the search not a probation- involved “was ary again search.” Id. 505. We 1. Nature the privacy interest. question by reserved the whether searches The first factor considers the nature of the probation part or officers as a of privacy upon' by intruded the search. ordinary permissible. their duties would be Jones, In considering 666 N.W.2d at 146. time, At empha- Id. the same we factor, principle this we start with the requirement sized the warrant cannot parolees expectation pri have the same overcome notions of be reasonableness vacy persons in their homes as con protections sought. detached from the probation victed of and not on crimes at 502. Cullison, parole. N.W.2d Application. Ochoa, (majority B. opinion); facts issue see also Yet, bring directly point equal footing this case us to that at 290-91. fully in time when we recognized now confront wheth under our Iowa Constitution special-needs er the of govern predominantly doctrine exists in the context of the justify mental concerns that a warrantless search and seizure law enforcement Kern, search includes the search of the home of a officers for evidence of crimes. See parolee by parole officer for the 831 N.W.2d at 170-71. Unlike carrying parole. people out the mission of not on from a sentence of We this, resulting prior do not to overturn or alter our crimi prior incarceration from conviction, opinions concerning parolees searches and seizures nal are under the su- case, pursuant King to a In this did not choose to pervision of agreement. See Iowa Code by refusing written maintain his interest (2013); Iowa Admin. Code r. § 906.1 access to his residence or bedroom of 45.1(2). agreements require These Instead, 201— complied his residence. he and oth to submit by allowing the terms of permitted intrusions not governmental er apartment showing officers into his parole. not on Iowa Ad people against them to his to conduct the search. bedroom (describing 201—45.2 stan r. min. Code course, compliance Of these acts of did not parole permitting of and conditions dard ground an independent establish to search imposed conditions to be special additional based on waiver of his constitutional Baldon, generally See agreement). the Baldon, rights. at See 829 N.W.2d 802-03. (tracing the use at 789-802 829 N.W.2d independent grounds No such existed. clauses). of consent-to-search and effect However, compliance place the acts of did followed, agreement is not If a term of the on government King the and different parolee revoked and the parole the can be footing government pa than the and the out to confinement to serve the returned Cullison, rolee which the search was of the sentence. Iowa Admin. remainder at refused. See 173 N.W.2d 535. The Thus, expectation the of Code r. 201-—45.4. conducted, King enjoyed by parolees parole can officers and did not privacy a home expense by people not faced refuse, come at an the search to the pursuant terms of words, parolees In not other parole. Further, parole agreement. the unlike expectation privacy the full of can share Cullison, parole agreement the served to if nonparolees only parolee the afforded the expectation privacy diminish by parole agreement the chooses to violate by in relation officer parolee to his a reasonable search and refusing permit him placing on notice that such a search possible price the of revocation paying risk Thus, might occur. we must decide if the parole. government interests of the under these Cullison, parole agreement the did strong enough prevail circumstances are parolee permit pa- the the require not legitimate privacy the interests of a over apartment, to search the nor role officer parolee any who has failed to refuse or in parolee notice that such a give did it way signal a lack of to a consent search at might search occur. 173 N.W.2d parolee had notice could occur. This (“Teeters by an instrument which executed approach protect long continues honestly, he to conduct himself agreed standing protections and historical tied to law, hours, keep reasonable re- obey the I, a home under article section 8 intoxicants, use of frain from excessive Constitution, recognizes Iowa but these Montgomery all times in Coun- remain at protections can at altered times be Thus, ty.”). parolee maintained the provisions parolees comply un must enjoyed by expectation privacy same parole agreements der to maintain their required not out on people Thus, legitimate conditional freedom. justify state to the warrantless search on exists, privacy if al expectation even grounds permitted other under the consti- it parole agreement tered as relates tution, simply parolee. his status as a officer, to the and our task is to Because no such See id. 537-38. right determine whether the has been vio grounds sup- and no other grounds existed by considering competing lated inter search, ported the a warrant was neces- Lowe, at stake. ests See State sary for the search be constitutional. (Iowa 2012) (evaluat Id. at 540.

H9 juvenile legitimate expectation adopted reformatory of when for the ing whether a addressing if there York, existed before system in New with the addition of upon an unreasonable intrusion had been sentencing.6 indeterminate 1 Cohen it). proceed to the We therefore second 1:12, 1-19; Petersilia, § 26 Crime & Just, factor to consider the character spread quickly at 488. It to other posed by policy behind the intrusion states, longer juveniles. no restricted to Jones, search. 1:12, § Today, Cohen at 1-19. most states 2. Character the intrusion. and the federal have statutes is embedded in policy regulations providing relationship between the supervisory supervision methods of and enforcement parolee, officer and the as well as vary widely, making comparisons goal sys- of our the historical jurisdictions among and between of limited parole. generally Morrissey tem 1:21, 1-30; utility.7 Petersilia, § See id. Brewer, 471, 478-79, Just, 26 Crime & at 494-96. 2593, 2598-99, 33 L.Ed.2d provided system Iowa first “for a of (1972). history helps A of review this parole” reform and an act 1907 with the character of the intrusion in this reveal pertaining to “Indeterminate sentences case. reformatory.” ch. Iowa Acts theory parole originated The of in Alex- (codified §§ at Iowa Code 5718-a4 to -a26 system supervising ander Maconochie’s (1907 Supp.)). The Act one of converted colony in Australia in the penal the British penitentiaries reformatory. the state into a 1840s, prisoners where earned marks and § reformatory Iowa Code 5718-a4. The progressed through gradations of servi- for all available female convicts and tude earn their 1 Neil to ticket-of-leave. ages first-time male convicts between six Cohen, P. The Law Probation and Pa- thirty teen and who were not convicted of (2d ed.1999) 1:11, § role at 1-17 to -18 specified §§ heinous crimes. Id. 5718- 1850s, In the Ireland Cohen]. [hereinafter a5, -a27. The Act also established inde adapted penal system the idea into their for the terminate sentences first time Crofton, leadership under Walter all and treason. Id. except crimes murder postrelease who introduced the element of § parole 5718-al3. The board of was also 1:11, 1-18; § supervision. Id. Joan delegated “power established and to Petersilia, Reentry Parole and Prisoner States, regulations” establish rules and for releas & the United 26 Crime Just. - (1999) 5718-a14, §§ ing persons parole. Id. [hereinafter Petersilia]. system it to America in It parole made 1876 a18. allowed challenge timing important separation-of-powers a 6. The here is an consider- form of —the analysis. ation in constitutional The Iowa Court deferred to a decision the state su- passed Constitution was in 1857. The Fourth delegation judicial preme permitting court Amendment to United States Constitution powers legislative indeter- in the creation of officially adopted was ratified in sentencing permissible under the minate as concept parole 1792. Even the would have constitution, stating .state further that it did foreign been to the statesmen who debated present question under the Federal Con- protec- the search and created seizure Illinois, Dreyer stitution. 83- striving against we tions are to balance 28, 32, (1902) 47 L.Ed. society. needs (examining parole passed in an Illinois statute 1899). Supreme In the first case to reach U.S. involving parole question Court the—in In parole Supreme ... outside the United States go upon

prisoners buildings, ... but to Court had occasion to examine the Iowa penitentiary parole legal in the cus- Morrissey, while in a chal- system parole remain ... and under the the wardens tody of lenge parole method of revoca- Iowa’s parole and the said board of control of tion. Part of the examination included a time, any to be taken subject, at back description officers and their penitentiary. within the and confined role: further § The board was 5718-al8. part officers are when the to determine empowered system designed administrative to assist citi- sufficiently law-abiding become a had parolees guidance. and to offer them he or could be released zen and when she The conditions of serve dual §Id. 5718-a20. parole. from they prohibit, absolutely either purpose; on, treated as Early Iowa courts conditionally, behavior that is deemed pardon.” Kirkpatrick v. “a conditional the indi- dangerous the restoration of Hollowell, 927, 931, 197 Iowa 196 N.W. society. through vidual into normal And considered “a condi Parole was requirement reporting pa- to the release before ex experimental tional and seeking guidance role officer and Applegate, Addis v. piration of sentence.” permission doing many things, before 168, 176 171 Iowa 154 N.W. provided the officer is with information J., concurring). (Salinger, opportunity about the and an extraordinary leg of the Iowa session puts advise him. The combination amended the Code sections on islature parole position officer into the in which charitable, correctional, penal and institu try guide he can the parolee into Extraordinary Acts Sess. tions. 1923 Iowa development. constructive 55, §§ ch. 481 to 506-a1 (unpublished) (1924) (codified §§ at Iowa Code 3782- 478, Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 92 S.Ct. at (1924)). Among provisions, other 2599, 492-93. Just a few created, as we now know it was probation later, months we observed the similarities (as parole” the name “court but under probation parole between and al- —that dealing with opposed parole” to the “board probation parole though place take already prison). the release of those sentence, opposite prison ends of a with 3786, 3788, (pro §§

See Iowa Code judicial probation resulting from action be- “parole by commitment” viding for before prison parole resulting fore from ad- of those not convicted previously the board following action prison, ministrative “both felony suspend for the court to of a and imposition follow conviction of sen- probation It parole). sentence and is this Wright, tence.” State v. parole pa or court called “bench —also (Iowa 1972). role”—that the Iowa courts referred to as legislature The Iowa revised the crimi- favor, forgiveness.” grace, “a matter of January nal code effective 1978. 1294,1298, Bechly, 211 Pagano v. Iowa (codified in 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 scat- (comparing sus N.W. (1979)); tered sections of Iowa Code id. ch. pended parole pardon, sentence and to a provision § replaced ch. 529. One pro within the conditions and limitations statute); legal custody parolees depart- by vided see also Cole Holli- (Iowa 1969); parolees. supervision mental Prior day, 171 N.W.2d revision, Boston, pro- 247.9 234 Iowa 14 the Iowa Code section State v. (1944). paroled prisoners vided that shall “[a]ll remain, compliance with those legal on in the custo- conditions of each of parole, while superintendent dy persons supervision. of the warden under See id. r. offi- parole 45.4, the control of the chief under (requiring parole .6 officer rec- 201— (1977). § 247.9 The new cer.” Iowa Code revoke, continue, ommend when to or dis- “[e]very person while provided statute charge parole). Today, legislature our has supervision on shall be under the statutorily defined as services, of social which department person the release of a who has been regulations governing prescribe shall custody committed of the director § parole.” Iowa Code 906.5 persons department of the Iowa of corrections (1979). person’s reason of the commission of Department the Iowa of Social offense, public which release occurs reorganized, establishing Services prior expiration person’s of the Iowa Department Iowa of Corrections. term, subject supervision by time, 217A At that Code ch. department district of correctional ser- functions were transferred to the vices, imposed by and is on conditions of corrections. newly department created department. the district Today, parole § officers are still 906.1. § Iowa Code 906.1. corrections, department part judicial working out of the local district supervision component services. Iowa department of correctional necessarily involves intrusion govern- (2013).8 § 906.2 Code they ment into the lives of parolees as society. Griffin, assimilate back into granting parole, the board When 483 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. at grant does not an inmate “the But, L.Ed.2d at the intrusions based liberty every to which citizen is absolute policy parole, on the entitled, only ... but the conditional liber parolees rehabilitation of the and maintain- ty properly dependent on observance of ing public safety, pur- are unrelated to the special parole Morrissey, restrictions.” pose gathering evidence of criminal be- havior already that has occurred for the liberty L.Ed.2d “Conditional” crimi- purpose enforcing through of laws that in order to remain in the com means Kern, prosecution. nal See 831 N.W.2d at re-incarcerated, munity being of instead 170-72; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 286. The parolee comply the must both stan parole officer needs to be able to evaluate parole required conditions of of all dard parolee’s compliance the with all the condi- parolees, special imposed conditions of parole agreement tions the to determine depending particular on the needs of that needed, 45.2(1) any if if assistance is to evaluate r. case. Iowa Admin. Code 201— conditions); parolee ready discharge, the is or to r. 201— (listing standard id. 45.2(2) parole necessary. revoke if Iowa Code imposition pa for the (providing conditions). 906.2, .15; §§ parole A Iowa Admin. Code r. 201— rolee-specific special can obligation prosecutions officer has the to monitor the 45.4. While criminal re- duty any parole independent to create and review 8. The board of is from the board has corrections, department ap- with members parole programs procedures. Id. pointed by the and confirmed Governor However, 904A.4(3); § §id. 906.3. the board However, § the senate. Iowa Code 904A.3. rulemaking power over the of corrections has majority the are the of members of board parole system. of the Id. administration "knowledgeable expected to be in correction- 906.5(4). 904.105(6)-(7); § § id. procedures § al and issues.” Id. 904A.2. subject any, conduct to condi- an individual upon suit from surrenders condi- parolee that is also criminal con- parole tions of tional release from our penal one of state duct, intrusions are often considered a the institutions.” Id. We did not address how supervision and an necessary part the question answer would affect a pa- to the ingredient essential success search, parole pursuant a parole agree- 17:7, Cohen, § at 17-11 to -12. role. ment, objec- that was divorced from the intrusions, goal the Without reasonable of law tives enforcement and confined to difficult, would if parole be special parole needs of officers in su- impossible, accomplish. not See id. parolees. pervising See id. at 537-38. 17:16-:17, §§ (discussing at 17-27 to -29 exclusionary necessity rule and the A distinction exists between revocation). parole in relation pursue searches to purposes of law particular The character of the intrusion enforcement and pursue pur those to case, course, at issue in this is the poses carrying out the mission of parole. parolee by search of the residence of a Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170. The special Yet, parole officer. intrusion this needs of are divorced from gen case was much different than we confront- eral interests of the state law enforce ed Cullison. See N.W.2d at 534-35. Charleston, Ferguson ment. See City Cullison, only not refused 67, 79-80, 532 U.S. 121 S.Ct. 1289- permit his officer to search the (2001) (requiring L.Ed.2d room, locked but the warrantless search special the nature of the need be “divorced that followed was conducted with the aid of general from the State’s interest in law a law enforcement officer pursued enforcement”). Thus, special role of suspicion with a might the room con- parole officers in carrying objec out the tain evidence of a independent new and policy tives and becomes critical crime. at 535. initial intrusion analysis. to the California, See Samson v. officer in the apartment, howev- 843, 858-59, er, was consistent with pa- the mission of (Stevens, part analysis role and was not J., dissenting). Griffin, As identified in found the search of the home to be uncon- special probation role of Instead, stitutional. See id. at 538. “ongoing supervisory derived from the re only intrusion ran afoul of the Iowa Consti- that, not, lationship one or at least —and tution when the search became intertwined entirely, not adversarial —between the ob with the state’s interest in law enforce- ject of the search and the decisionmaker” ment after parolee placed limits on the present other searches. 483 U.S. at Thus, search area. See id. at 539-40. 879, 3171, 107 at S.Ct. 97 L.Ed.2d at 721. Cullison did not address the constitution- Indeed, objects not all parole of a search ality searches, all parole holding and its subject are investigation to criminal out preclude parole does not all searches. See parole, including side of limiting conditions (Stuart, J., Rather, id. at 544 dissenting). alcohol consumption persons and analysis we confined our in Cullison to parolee may Yet, whom the associate. for nonconsensual warrantless special-needs the analysis apply, parolee’s of “the the living quarters in connec- reasons for the tion with search must be the prosecution the of a new interest independent supervising the reintegration parolees criminal action.” at 535 (majority “not, opinion). question society, we an- into or at principal least not swered rights, ly, was “what constitutional if general the law goal enforcement

123 Samson, plain protection by at view. But the afforded 547 U.S. detecting crime.” 2203, at 264. the Amendment varies different set- 859, at omitted.)). (Citation Therefore, tings.” time, an intrusion At the same scope the officer must limit the I, article section 8 must under permissible only necessary the search to those areas narrowly purpose defined. The be compliance specific parole ensure with the safeguard seizure clauses “is to search and officer conditions the has reason- security of individuals privacy the only suspicion able have been violated and arbitrary by governmen invasions against person to the extent a reasonable would Camara, officials,” at U.S. tal appropriate support- find under the facts at 18 L.Ed.2d at ing suspicion. re exceptions to the warrant traditional “specifically are established quirement suspicion “[Reasonable Katz, well-delineated,” 389 U.S. objective based on an standard: whether 514, 19 L.Ed.2d at to maintain S.Ct. at the facts available to the officer at the time impractical. when a warrant is safeguards of the would lead a stop person reasonable Ochoa, Thus, 792 N.W.2d at 278-79. See by action to believe that taken pa exception permitting special-needs an appropriate.” officer was State v. Kin must contain measures to role searches (Iowa 1997). kead, 97, 100 570 N.W.2d unfettered discretion protect against light This determination is made “in Samson, the state. 547 U.S. totality confronting of the circumstances 165 L.Ed.2d at 264. For officer,” including specific, articulable requirement, to meet this parole searches facts and the rational inferences drawn every point the intrusion must serve Tague, from them. State N.W.2d it policy applies mission and as (Iowa 2004). 197, 204 The standard is law particular parolee, general unparticularized hunch or sus more than a enforcement. demanding showing than picion, but less Walshire, cause: State v. probable The character of the intrusion (Iowa Kinkead, 2001); N.W.2d scope of the search. shaped is also upheld have 570 N.W.2d at We only actions scope is limited to those reasonable-suspicion standard vehicular parolee’s compli to ensure the reasonable stop investigatory purposes, contexts conditions with the ance with cause to effect a requiring probable while scope If the goal of rehabilitation. Tyler, 830 seizure. State v. broad, too it can parole search becomes 2013). (Iowa cause “[Reasonable on the form of a search that serves take may investigate conduct which is exist goals beyond parole. the mission of subject legitimate explanation to a Kern, (describing N.W.2d at 170 wholly out to be lawful.” State v. turns police presence shifts the when (Iowa Richardson, beyond parole goals). Addi 1993). with tionally, intrusions into certain areas case, extended into within the home In this the search the house or containers and included interest at stake. the bedroom of heighten can Ross, sunglasses case located on the search of a See United States Thus, 822-23, 72 the headboard of the bed. L.Ed.2d (“[T]he 572, beyond inspection a visual Fourth Amendment search extended 592 view and into a more every drugs plain to the owner of for provides protection beyond the parolee personal space its contents from container conceals 124 general light). principle initial encounter. See We have established a

area Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 745 — 47 that there must be a nexus between the ly v. State (Iowa 1983) requirements object (explaining place searched and the Hoskins, plain exception view search. State v. 711 N.W.2d to establish (Iowa law). 2006). This includes and seizure This intrusion 728 nexus “the search invasive, involved, nature of the items the extent of the search more but not made opportunity the defendant’s for conceal necessarily policy from the be detached ment, and the normal inferences as to The hind the search. concerns likely where the defendant would be prompt general search need Groff, conceal the items.” State 323 enough to be broad to achieve the (Iowa 1982). Thus, N.W.2d Scar- enough but narrow parole, of drug-addic mon’s search evidence arbitrary depart search not or from the be relapse tion needed to be limited to those parolee mission. A knows his home and areas that normal containers infer subject to search under ences, past experience based on his agreement, policy prompting and the knowledge King, would lead him to be jeopardized could be if the need search King lieve conceal drugs para would area is too constrained. Further search phernalia. sunglasses A within case fits more, King lived alone. The search did parameters methamphet conceal upon not intrude interests of amine paraphernalia, suspected and its persons. other relapse drug. Additionally, the container case, the search of the sunglasses As to plain was in view within the bedroom. commonly it is documented and under private More within areas the bedroom drugs paraphernalia stood that and their were not entered. small, everyday are often hidden con policy behind searches can Finch, 02-1148, tainers. See State No. not be achieved if the search is so con (Iowa 22828750, at *2 Ct.App. 2003 WL strained that it ability would exclude the 2003) (Altoid Lowe, tin); Nov. see also search those common areas where the ob (fruit can); State v. N.W.2d ject commonly of the search would be most Maxwell, (Iowa 2008) approach found. This is consistent with Eubanks, (cigarette pack); State v. requirement applicable the nexus to all (Iowa 1984) case); N.W.2d (makeup and serves to both constrain the Meksavanh, 12-1878, State v. No. , scope of the search and make the search (Iowa 3749356, at *2 Ct.App. July WL 30 enough goal. broad to serve its See Hos 2014) shade, drawer, (lamp purse, dresser kins, (permitting at 728 logical car); floor of backseat of State v. Sim consideration). inferences in nexus mons, 12-0567, No. 2013 WL (Iowa 2013) (cover *1 Ct.App. Apr. Overall, aof the character of the intrusion is Hoosman, speaker); 09-0067, State v. No. parolee modified when the does not refuse (Iowa *2 Ct.App. WL the search.9 It is also modified when the 2010) (fake soda, case, Apr. can of CD discretion to search is narrowed room); laundry ball of lint in State v. mission of and divorced from the Palmer, general No. objectives. WL law enforcement (Iowa 2006) (flash *1 Ct.App. Jan. on a also takes less intrusive char- here, Because the issue was not we raised would have had on the search. do not determine the effect a refusal nature directly specific The of the concerns of it is confined to areas when acter gave that in the rise to the search supported concern that related to the related to a suspicion this case reasonable parole The of policy to search. decision of of drug complet- use and loss interest in pro- from that separate policies is search by parolee. the concerns ing parole These in a discovery of to use evidence mote the by surfaced from information obtained the Ac- independent prosecution. new and parole supervisory officer his role. No to the na- proceed consider cordingly, we or law enforce- law enforcement officers the immediacy of the concerns of ture and information was The con- ment involved. of that led to the search parole officer objec- the purposes cerns related to and apartment. King’s King’s parole, not tives the enforcement concerns governmental Nature Even though parole of criminal laws. the policy. general The efficacy in- suspected parole officer that violations case concern at in this governmental stake activity, cluded unlawful the concern by with the compliance parolees involves the search not formulated motivated recidi- parole prevent of their to conditions parole the the upon or acted officer for policies rehabilitating parol- vism. primary purpose enforcing the law. maintaining public safety are both ees and an The absence of relation adversarial through the of the enforced mechanism parolee parole the the ship between the condi- supervision identify is important officer this case parole. the imposed for duration of tions government. ing Only the concerns of the to release parole instructed The board officer, parole through ongoing the rela who can “with- persons those be released tionship parolee, possesses with the the community to the or to the out detriment knowledge imposed of both conditions 906.4(1). § pa- person.” Iowa Code particular parolee on a the conduct respon- then role officer is tasked with the level signaling a violation that rises to “keep person’s of each sibility to informed suspicion viola parole a reasonable encourage condition” reha- conduct and pursued to be parole tion that needs public safety. and ensure bilitation If risen to a officer. such conduct has 906.2; 17:7, § § at 17-10 see also Cohen law offi involves level enforcement (“The ... to -11 officer has with approach cials who officer of a primary responsibility supervision wrongdoing suspicions of new criminal parolee’s progress. ... rehabilitative This pursue, want to matter has moved they responsibility ... owes a caseworker con scope government’s beyond pose to ensure that who public [those] compliance and into cern of safety permitted public threat to are This factor of law enforcement. realm ”). Ultimately, pa- remain free.... prior pa case distinguishes this from our prevention concern is the role officer’s involved, varying search cases rolee through future crime rehabilitation and law law enforcement officers degrees, Kern, until supervision close that rehabilitation purposes. enforcement 1:20, § 1 Cohen (involving achieved. See at 157 law enforcement N.W.2d 17:1, § legislature expressly at 17-2. The no searching suspicion but officers approval officers “use all suitable offi directed warrant with the of a encourage person part way through to aid and methods cer who arrived (in Ochoa, search); improvement per- in the at 262-63 bring about conducting suspi- volving police Iowa Code officer son’s conduct condition.” Cullison, cionless, search); § warrantless 906.2. (involving parole recognize at 535 and We there are other less intru- searching suspicion probation of a sive means for officers to discov- police officer activity). parolee violating criminal This factor er whether or not a is a specific new provision in parole agreement prohibit- the into the does not transform case those ing drug use. The collection of a magistrate, it sub- involving a detached but body drug testing stance from the for sought helps reduce the evil to be eliminat means, one such as the of facts this case and seizure by ed the search clause when However, a supervision disclose. the of by the to search is made a law decision parolee requires latitude and real-time re- Griffin, enforcement officer. See A sponses. response geared to the discov- at at 97 L.Ed.2d at 719 S.Ct. ery drugs present of a house can a more a officer is an (“Although probation comprehensive problems view of the impartial magistrate, po neither is he the by parolee need to be addressed a officer....”). for the lice There was no evidence parole officer. A picture pre- different the officer this case was by sented for the officer the discov- by goals purposes motivated of law ery drugs in the a parolee home of than enforcement. drugs from the detection of in the blood or specific, The articulable concerns of the parolee, urine of a including a means to giving rise to a officer reasonable Thus, gauge severity relapse. a a suspicion support search derived from provide search can a better vehicle than supervision information associated with the drug testing legitimate to meet the con- parolees. specif- The concerns involved government. cerns of ic parolee, behaviors and comments of the an evaluation of the likelihood violations balance the three fac conditions, particular parole agreement tors from Jones is critical to finding our triggering and a in the form of event special narrowly need to allow pa tailored factor, monitoring bracelet alert. This re- rolee searches. See 666 at 145-46. quiring particularized spe- concern with Overall,

cific suspi- articulable facts and reasonable question every case must be search, cion support helps prevent legitimate expec- whether the balance of arbitrary discretionary searches under the hand, privacy, tations of on the one search and seizure clause. the State’s interests in conducting search, other, justifies relevant on the immediacy con- dispensing with proba- the warrant and general cerns were derived from the mis- requirements ble-cause that are other- parole supervision. sion of The supervi- by wise dictated [Search Seizure parolees requires sion of intervention “at Clause]. sign the first of trouble” and “at an earlier Samson, stage of suspicion.” Id. at 547 U.S. at S.Ct. (Blackmun, J., balance, L.Ed.2d at 723 165 L.Ed.2d at 267. On dissenting). suggests that we conclude special “[RJesearch officers have a more can supervision intensive reduce re- need to search the home parolees as cidivism.” Id. at by parole agreement 97 authorized and not (majority opinion). L.Ed.2d at More- refused when pro- done to over, delays in searching goals parole, can reduce the mote the divorced from the enforcement, deterrent effect provided prompt goals of law supported by searches. Id. at suspicion 97 reasonable based on knowledge L.Ed.2d at 719. arising supervision parole, out of the I, necessary law under article section 8. Sec- only areas seizure limited to those ond, I specif- degree examine to which officer address majority opinion princi- to those parole reasonably suspect- conforms ic conditions Third, ples. suggest I ap- of this alternative ed been violated. The facts to have proaches problems the in presented to this narrowly tailored stan- satisfy this case emphasize I Finally, importance case. the application do not address the dard. We narrowly significance the of interpreting probationers to or how of this standard case. by this might be affected scope of the search others expectations privacy held Principles Accordingly, we I. of Search and Seizure in the same home.

living court. Law. judgment affirm the the district Require- A. of the Overview Warrant

IV. Conclusion. begin I with a ment. brief review special-needs excep adopt a We search language provi- of our and seizure to tion authorizes officers I, sion in article section which states: home of a without search the in right The to be secure people purposes parole supervision. warrant for houses, ef- persons, papers their and judgment and sentence We affirm fects, against unreasonable seizures the district court. violated; shall not and no be AFFIRMED. probable shall issue warrant but affirmation, cause, supported oath WATERMAN, MANSFIELD, and describing place to be particularly ZAGER, JJ., join opinion. this searched, persons things and the MANSFIELD, J., separate files a seized. be WATERMAN, in concurring opinion which Const, I, § art. J., APPEL, J., Iowa dissenting joins. files a HECHT, opinion in which WIGGINS and I, warrant clause of article section 8 The JJ., join. number of substantive constitutional has a First, proba- there must be requirements. MANSFIELD, (concurring spe- Justice Second, cause for search. Id. ble cially). particularity must with warrant describe opinion. I would join I the court’s While Third, the to be searched. Id. place set sustain the search for the reasons also particularity must describe with warrant Baldon, my in forth dissent State v. things to be seized. persons (Iowa 2013) (Mans 785, 835-47 requirements these substantive Each of field, J., I dissenting), the court has realize importance. independent constitutional has view. in the taken a different I concur requirement probable gateway analysis applica court’s well-reasoned of course serves to limit cause special-needs tion doctrine. general and avoid searches.

discretion however, WATERMAN, J., joins requirements, special particularity this They constitutionally concurrence. are also essential. Even proportionality requirements. are APPEL, (dissenting). Justice present, gateway probable cause when I dissent. respectfully article requirements of proportionality I, that when survey regard I 8 serve ensure begin I with a what section warranted, is limited the search principles as first search and search is cardinal (1904); underlying nature of scope by the see also United States instance, Re, respect problem. For with Di U.S. 228- place, ample probable Yet, a warrant 92 L.Ed. passenger a “silver in color found, cause to search incriminating when evidence is gambling train evidence of infrac car” for is a temptation manipulate there tions authorize the search of a does not or distort facts search seizure law State, nearby Long caboose.” “red uphold order the search and sustain 447, 451 S.W.3d (Tex.Crim. resulting why criminal That conviction. (internal App.2004) quotation marks omit Johnson, Supreme the United States ted). items, a As to warrant to held a Court warrantless search was inval drugs not authorize the officer to does though likely id even there was ample card, checks, security seize social or oth probable support cause to the search. 333 Pitts, er v. People items of identification. 13-15, 368-69, U.S. 68 92 S.Ct. L.Ed. (Colo.2000)(en 1218, 1220, 13 P.3d 1223-24 noted, at 440-41. As Justice Frankfurter banc). safeguards liberty frequent of have “[T]he genius gateway propor ly forged

The involving been controversies govern tionality requirements very is that the not nice v. people.” United States satisfy requirements Rabinowitz, ment these be 56, 69, 430, must 339 U.S. 70 S.Ct. magistrate. fore a (1950) neutral and detached 436, 653, (Frankfurter, 94 L.Ed. 662 Short, 474; See State v. 502 J., dissenting), grounds overruled on other (Iowa 2014). This risk of eliminates the ex 768, California, 752, v. Chimel 395 U.S. post explanations facto conform the 89 23 L.Ed.2d “ ultimately nature of evidence found (1969). procedure ‘[T]he of ante regarding compli the decision ensures justification cedent ... is central to the ” ance with is constitutional norms made Fourth Amendment.’ Katz v. United before a not person “engaged in the often States, 507, 515, 389 U.S. 88 S.Ct. competitive enterprise ferreting of out (1967) 586 Os (quoting States, crime.” Johnson v. United States, 323, 330, born United 10, 14, 367, 369, U.S. L.Ed. (1966)). L.Ed.2d by Judge As was Huf- noted result, aAs whenever warrant re- ago, requirement stedler some time “The quirement is to be inapplicable, found probation] that [a officer articulate his rea many important govern- restrictions on making sons for a search he before power mental only are lost. Not is the a substantial deterrent to im is gateway requirement probable cause pulsive arbitrary official conduct and a risk, so too proportionality require- is the against justi real safeguard after-the-fact Further, requirement ment. that the Fitzharris, fications.” Latta v. 521 F.2d government (9th Cir.1975) explain the (Hufstedler, basis for J., dis search before it occurs order to avoid senting). risk of ex post expla facto hoc is, course, post explanations totally is nations It lost. That very is real. Short, why in reinvigorated we is principle fundamental of search and what sei zure “warrant validity preference” law that sometimes called the of the search is not approach what it to search and seizure up. affected turns As we law under I, 497; stated long ago, “No amount of incrimina article section 8. 851 N.W.2d at see source, ting evidence, Tomkovicz, generally Divining whatever its will James J. supply place McClurg Designing warrant.” [a] the Future the Search Brenton, 123 Iowa 98 N.W. Avoiding Incident Arrest Doctrine: In- power might ment whenever it be used. Irrationality, Infidelity, stability, I, section like While the text article (advocating Ill. L. Rev. 2007 U. Amendment, it challenging, the Fourth as the preference approach the warrant is clear that the search and seizure stric search and seizure interpretation of best are limited criminal matters. tures law). like the concepts, Other constitutional fed Related B. Provisions Constitutional self-incrimination, right against con eral Arbitrary Limit to Search and Seizure criminal express pro tain limitations to Power. Histori- Exercise Government Const, ceedings. U.S. amend. V. No authority to en- cally, the Crown’s claimed I, such limitation is contained article for violations gage sweeping searches I, 8. Article section 8 is not a section policies toward colo- British mercantile changes constitutional chameleon col- cause of the American nies was central presents government or when the invader Ochoa, 792 Revolution. See State v. a civil card than a identification rather (Iowa 2010). The focus of badge underly-. law enforcement. legality famous Paxton’s Case was ing motivation of official is assistance, gave customs writs of “which determining not and cannot be factor. authority to search open-ended officers years ago, As Brandéis us taught Justice for of customs violations.” homes evidence greatest dangers liberty “The lurk in Maclin, (citing Tracey Complexity Id. zeal, of by insidious encroachment men Amendment: A Historical the Fowrth understanding.” but without well-meaning (1997)). Review, 77 L. Rev. 946 B.U. States, Olmstead v. United his famous James Otis delivered When 564, 573, L.Ed. 72 957 Case, calling spe- in Paxton’s defense (1928) J., (Brandeis, dissenting); overruled “ characterizing cific warrants ‘the Katz, by 389 U.S. at grounds on other “ ” among of one’s house’ as ‘the freedom 512, 19 88 S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d English essential branches of liber- most officers, event, proba- like any ” Cuddihy, ty,’ (quoting id. William J. officers, tion have least two functions. Origi- Origins Fourth Amendment: may the state Parole officers serve interest (2009) 602-1791, at 377-78 Meaning, nal complete parole assisting Cuddihy]), the rhetoric moved [hereinafter reintegrated be into the successfully and the court ses- young lawyer attending a They pur- also another community. serve Adams, declare, sion, John later persons con- pose, ensuring that however: “ Independence and there the Child ‘[t]hen crimes, likely who more victed of are ” born,’ at 272 Jacob (quoting id. W. activity than members engage in criminal Landynski, and Seizure Search not commit generally, do public Study A in Constitution- Supreme Court: States v. additional crimes. See United (1966) Interpretation 37 [hereinafter al 112, 120-21, 122 Knights, U.S. Landynski]). is from the his- What clear (2001) tory that relat- provisions constitutional in concern of the state (recognizing dual designed to ed to search and seizure were search). residence probationer’s context of government power. on Nei- be limitation rec- purposes These officers two I, article section 8 nor the Fourth ther conjoined are ognized Knights in twins enabling extending Amendment is an act surgically separated. Or- easily cannot be reach government. dinarily, jurispru- in and seizure dence, subjec- into the inquire law search and seizure we do The focus of government officials. tive motivation of eliminating arbitrary govern- exercise of Simmons, ing, See State N.W.2d 96 Yale L.J. [hereinaf- (Iowa 2006). said, a That home visit ter (noting balancing, Aleinikoff] as a likely function more reflects the of assist- “method of interpretation, constitutional rehabilitation, parolee’s ing appears in a while a ... majority opinions first 1940’s”). search in specific private areas of a early resi- late 1930’sand As not- likely pursuant scholar, more to be leading dence is to the ed reasonableness parole officer’s law enforcement engages function. balancing relativistic ef- recent, “ideologically-driven forts reflects Freestanding C. The Reasonableness choices, judicial not a rendition of orig- Clause as Ahistorical and Antithetical inal understanding.” Davies, Thomas Y. to the Constitutional Values War Correcting History: Search-And-Seizure rant We Clause. discussed relation Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless ship between the reasonableness clause Original Arrest Standards and the Under- Short, warrant and the clause Law,” standing “Due Process simply at 501-02. It cannot be (2007); Miss. L.J. see also Aleini- clause the reasonableness is a free koff, 96 Yale L.J. at 948-49. provision trumps standing the war Otherwise, rant clause. Categorical balancing warrant present tests superfluous. would be clause See Rabi A methodology. troublesome constitution- nowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 S.Ct. at 94 al vision of search employing and seizure (“One L.Ed. at cannot wrench categorical balancing ‘unrea zealously pro- fails to sonable searches’ from the text and con tect the rights citizens because it is not text and historic content the Fourth based transparent preestablished Amendment.”). Indeed, meaning constitutional norms. Untethered to such reasonableness, norms, certainly the time of categorical balancing the is based on a adoption Fourth Amendment quasi-legislative process to the in which the court Constitution, from United States which ar pragmatic policy makes determinations derived, I, likely ticle section 8 was was that paternalistically relieve gov- classes of in the Blackstonian activity used sense and awas ernment from central the restric- Short, stand in “lawful.” See 851 tions on government power contained at 501. the requirement I, warrant of article sec- tion 8. emphasize Those that reasonableness requirement Further,

over the warrant not, often use categorical or balancing test balancing applicabili- to determine the upon tests based reasonableness run the ty of the warrant requirement being to broad risk of no test at all. An amorphous categories persons. of The categorical doctrine based on reasonableness threat- allowing reasonableness test to ens to engulf courts search and seizure law. See pragmatic T.L.O., make assessments of the New Jersey need 469 U.S. 369- for government against action balanced the S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d (1985) of citizens in determining (Brennan, interests ap- J., the 752-53 concurring in plicability of search part and seizure require- dissenting Rabinowitz, and in part); explicitly ments is not mentioned in the 339 U.S. at 94 L.Ed. at I, (“It text of article section or8 the Fourth no criterion say of reason to categorical Amendment. The reasonable- that the district court find [a must search] reasonable.”); ness was not relatively test invented until Ry. see also Skinner v. La- Aleinikoff, recently. Ass’n, See T. Alexander bor Execs.’ Age Constitutional Law in the Balanc- of

(1989) J., Lucas at the first Iowa constitution- (Marshall, dissenting) (noting stated that deemed most probable cause al convention he the warrant that absent “ standards, ‘to secure the concept important right the of reasonableness is to subject meaning, spot ground of man a little of where he “virtually poor devoid judicial majori- shifting him a and have cottage whatever content could build a home problems of the ties, about the from family, concerned for himself and free the fear ” term”); that supple day, give being choose out of doors.’ Id. at 275 of turned Amsterdam, Anthony Perspectives G. (quoting Fragments the Debates of of Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. Fourth Iowa Constitutional Conventions (stating reliance on reason- (1900)). In McClurg, at 159-61 to turn and sei- ableness threatens search declared, “At door we the closed law into “one immense Rorschach zure home, hovel, it even blood- palace be blot”). Short, N.W.2d at generally law, by till hounds must wait authorita- reason- (criticizing freestanding 501-02 process, it open.” tive bids Iowa theory). ableness-clause 372, 98 at 882. N.W. Security as Central of the Home D. There something about home Oh, Protection. Search Seizure in the generates poetic language context the Elder! words Pitt searches and seizures. The notion of cottage, may, man in his poorest “The may “home home” seem trite to sweet all the forces of the defiance to bid some, in our cul- legal but it is universal frail; roof may may It be its Crown. surprise protection ture. It is no it; shake; may through the wind blow against government the home intrusion enter; may rain en- may storm prime pur- been one of the has declared may ter; King England but law. In the poses seizure enter; cross all force dares not his case, first search and seizure substantive ruined tenement.” threshold States, Supreme Boyd Court United Ochoa, at 270 Nelson (quoting broadly noted Lasson, History Development B. protect against Fourth Amendment is to the United the Fourth Amendment home sanctity of “the of man’s invasions (1937)); see also States Constitution from “govern- of life” privacies Short, at 495-96. 851 N.W.2d 616, 116 employes.” ment and its U.S. concept the home one’s castle The of as 630, 524, 532, 746, L.Ed. 751 6 29 S.Ct. English that a central of law part

was (1886), grounds by abrogated on other to the new world. See brought colonists Hayden, U.S. 87 Warden v. 387 Short, at 501. In his oration 1647-48, 782, 1642, 789 18 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Case, pronounced that in Paxton’s Otis (1967). recently in As stated more United “ among was ‘the freedom of one’s house’ Court, States District States v. United English of most essential branches ‘the of home is the chief “physical entry ” 377-78). at liberty.’ (quoting Cuddihy Id. wording against which the evil argued that John Adams remembered Otis Amendment is directed.” 407 U.S. Fourth in the case was that the writ of assistance 2134, 297, 2125, 313, 32 L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. “ principles the fundamental ‘against 752, (1972); Kyllo v. 764 see also United ” Ochoa, law, privilege 792 house.’ 2038, States, 27, 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 533 U.S. 34). Landynski at at (quoting 271 N.W.2d (2001); 2045, 94, v. L.Ed.2d 104 Welsh 150 750, Wisconsin, 740, 466 U.S. 104 concept a home one’s castle The as (1984); Iowa, 2091, 2098, 80 L.Ed.2d Iowa Robert came to too. Governor York, 589-90, New Payton events, U.S. In a remarkable turn of Justice 1371, 1381-82, 63 L.Ed.2d Harlan’s “reasonable expectations priva- (1980); Ochoa, 792 at cy” scope somehow became the test of the And, of the Fourth Amendment. in one of Expectation E. The Role of of Priva- great ironies of Fourth Amendment cy Determining Applicability it jurisprudence, was used now as a tool to Requirement. Katz, In Warrant Justice reduce the reach Fourth Amendment surprised everyone, perhaps Harlan even protections! legal The test became himself, penned when he a concurring in the boomerang hands of a later Su- off opinion simply took and has had a preme Court. 360-62, life of its own. 389 U.S. at may S.Ct. at 19 L.Ed.2d at 587-88 It well be the time has come (Harlan, J., Katz, concurring). reasonable-expeetations-of- abandon the Supreme United States court privacy Although overruled test. with born the best case, a highly the Olmstead formalistic pedigree, intentions and excellent it opinion which held legal parole eaves- has been on now for a number did dropping years. violate the Fourth reasonable-expectations-of- .not The physi- Amendment it privacy because involved no converting test runs the risk Olmstead, cal trespass. at U.S. search and seizure law into a mere notice (majority requirement. Indeed, 48 S.Ct. at 951 L.Ed, California Katz, opinion); overruled at Carney, 389 U.S. Supreme the United States Court declared, 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 583 improbably, pervasive public opinion). (majority concurring opin- regulation In his of automobiles and their drivers ion, Harlan shortcomings licensure, Justice noted in through registration, equipment trespass theory in regulation, traditional search and puts and rules of the road driv- Katz, jurisprudence. seizure 389 U.S. at “on ers passenger notice” com- 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 588 partment, nothing has which to do with J., (Harlan, concurring). registration, He stated that equipment or rules of the road, protected Fourth Amendment also may be searched without a warrant. expectations of privacy.” 386, 391-92, “reasonable 2069- Harlan plainly Justice never intended replace

his formulation previous all probably time has come to revoke search and seizure law. His phrase reasonable-expectations-of- designed supplement existing law privacy No required. test. warrant protections extend search and seizure approach better to privacy provided is that include government eavesdropping. Court, the Oregon Supreme which has Short, (ex- generally 851 N.W.2d at 504 declared that the issue is not the plaining that the expectation reasonable of one reasonably expects, the privacy but to designed standard was not to right di- which one enjoy. has to State v. protections). Tanner, lute and seizure 312, 757, In 304 Or. 745 P.2d 7 762 n. White, (1987) (en banc); v. United States Justice Harlan Short, see 851 made it clear that all significant- Alternatively, intrusions analysis 504. could fo- ly jeopardizing Fourth Amendment liber- on right cus the text: the of citizens be to ties require should a warrant. houses, in “secure” their ef- papers, and 745, 786-87, 1122, 1143, 91 S.Ct. 28 fects. See Thomas Clancy, K. Fourth 453, J., (Harlan, L.Ed.2d 478 dis- Amendment: Its History Interpretar senting). Ochoa, (2008); 47 tion 792 N.W.2d at 277.

133 area, geographic tion within the there was be consistent with approach an would Such way specific no to determine which resi of the reasonable-ex- original problem. experiencing dence was See in Katz. See test 389 pectations-of-privacy 1735, U.S. at 18 387 87 19 L.Ed.2d at 88 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed.2d at 939-41. A search incident to occur simulta necessarily arrest must Exceptions Re Warrant F. arrest, neously after pas with the require the warrant quirement. While sage required time to obtain warrant. law, seizure central to search and ment is considering exceptions In to the warrant well-recognized excep have there been requirement, there is a distinction between it, and seizures including tions mere impracticability inherent incon- exigent from arising to arrest and incident Obtaining always venience. a warrant when, instance, crime is for circumstances that it imposes inconvenient in the sense or, safety of the health and indi ongoing If some burdens on law enforcement. imminently are threatened. We viduals enough mere were to excuse inconvenience however, stated, repeatedly war- have requirement, there be warrant would se “virtually ‘per are un rantless searches Instead, impracti- little left it. inherent spe subject only ... to a few reasonable that, cability requires given the nature of cifically established well-delineated ” problem policy being and the ad- Baldon, v. 829 N.W.2d exceptions.’ State vanced, simply get one cannot warrant (Iowa 2013) (quoting Schneckloth prior cause to the probable based Bustamonte, U.S. v. search. (1973)). L.Ed.2d however, jeal exceptions, must be question impracticability These of inherent “carefully drawn.” ously guarded in a obtaining a warrant was considered (Iowa Strong, v. study State The sur probation Wisconsin. 1992). vey requirement that a found warrant unduly probation offi would not burden recognized exceptions have of course We Schneiderman, P. cers. Howard Conflict I do not requirement, the warrant the Bench and the ing Perspectives from they proposition with the ex quarrel Home Searches— Field on Probationer However, Municipal v. as Camara ist. Reconsidered, 1989 Griffin Wisconsin Court, an to the warrant re exception (1989). L. There is no Wis. Rev. gov generally requires that quirement reason think a different result would simply it is inherent demonstrate ernment of parole. occur the context to obtain a warrant ly impracticable Grace, Waiver, Rejection of Act of governmental G. accomplish compelling Custody 523, 536-39, Theories 87 S.Ct. or Constructive mission. U.S. 1727, 1735-36, Finally, important it to note 940-41 Parolees. 18 L.Ed.2d (1967). instance, rejected impossi it that we have the theories For would be to search and prior Terry- parolees to a are not entitled to obtain a warrant ble they because are arresting protections seizure type pat down without sus Ohio, 1, 20, custody,” have “waived” Terry “constructive U.S. pect. rights, or are on their search and seizure Camara, grace.” only through have “an act it would been Ochoa, Ochoa, upon N.W.2d at 290-91. to obtain a warrant based 792 impossible theories, rejected noting that specific we all these cause at a location be probable although power have the cause, may an the state certainly while there was infesta parol- the parolee, ably prudent fact imprison investigate a officer” to fur Buie, community Maryland 325, is the ther. v. is released into ee factor for search and overriding seizure (1990).

analysis. something id. It See is more than a hunch, something probable than but less Analysis Majority Opinion II. cause. See Tague, State v. Light in of Search and Seizure (Iowa 2004) (detailing reasonable Principles. standard); Lerner, suspicion Craig S. Rea Hunches, Suspicion sonable and Mere Unfortunately, majority opinion does (2006) (same). Yand. L. Rev. 459-60 apply many-of in principles not the above a subjective An officer’s belief that he or she straightforward fashion. constitution- suspicion has sufficient justify the intru a simply al value of warrant —not satisfy sion determination, is insufficient to the reasonable probable cause but also the suspicion Terry, standard. See 392 U.S. at proportionality requirements and the re- 20 L.Ed.2d at 905-06. justification quirement before fact— majority not opinion considered. The on However, here, there was no more than occasion, citing Supreme United States hunch, a especially after the officers precedent, Court flirts with a version determined the ankle bracelet was func rejects though ultimately “reasonableness” tioning properly King had a reason in protean its most rendition a footnote. able explanation why he been had Further, majority not does seem to his days. residence for the last two My recognize importance the constitutional view is consistent with a number of cases. And, the house-as-a-castle doctrine. it instance, For People Thornburg, pro ironically uses concept reasonable bation pornographic officers recovered expectations aas sword to cut at DVDs in a search of a probationer’s bed protection core of search and seizure Ill.App.3d room. 324 Ill.Dec. the home. Although N.E.2d 14-15 majority “special While the uses needs” visit, pursuant probation home agree to a result, support its it glides over the ment, raising was not cited as a constitu namely, critical question, whether is in- it tional problem, the search the bedroom herently impracticable to obtain a warrant was invalid because it lacked reasonable just Further, inconvenient. it not does Id., suspicion. 324 Ill.Dec. 895 N.E.2d address the fact that officers have at 19. In United States v. Payne, functions, two including a law enforcement Appeals United States Court for the function. Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s two majority scope drug seeks limit the of prior anonymous convictions and an powers tip officers in several suspicion. did amount to reasonable ways. (6th Cir.1999). requires It suspicion.” “reasonable 181 F.3d One suspicion is particu Reasonable a tool of court noted that factor determining larity help that can cabin con whether search was based reasonable Baldon, duct. (Ap suspicion 829 N.W.2d at parol or a hunch was whether J., Ochoa, pel, specially concurring); 792 ee had a explanation reasonable for his whereabouts, at 273. suspicion present Reasonable which certainly which, said to when exist “articulable facts in this case. See Commonwealth Ed wards, (Pa.Su taken together with the rational inferences 874 A.2d facts, from those per.Ct.2005). would warrant a reason parolee mine the status of the in his III. Alternative Constitutional Vi- or effort. a sions. her rehabilitation When in begins places officer look into my In Approach A. in Cullison. areas, residence outside common such as easier, view, have far far it would been bedrooms, however, the law enforcement simpler, and far more consistent objectively predominates function and a norms, to and seizure constitutional search required. warrant is Cullison, rule in simply follow the State v. (Iowa 1970). Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 support theory There is for this in case- rejected stripping diluting rights we A law. number of cases hold that a home may on best be parolees based “what visit a officer is not a search. rationalization, soeio-juristic as a described See, LeBlanc, e.g., United States v. i.e., protection public and construc- (5th Cir.2007); Fitzharris, F.3d custody.” ap- an tive 536. Such 250; Moody, 521 F.2d at v. State sound, “constitutionally proach was not 517, 148 A Mont. P.3d 666-67 reasonable, necessary.” fair or Id. We in home visit areas which visitors are theory the “‘dilution’ further stated likely is commonly entertained to be con nowhere, begins being best ends parole, purposes ducted for benevolent illusory Plainly, and evasive.” Id. Culli- namely, assisting parolee in completing son, balancing rejected categorical a we reintegrating into communi id. test based “reasonableness.” See A ty. private visit areas of the resi dence, however, likely The case flies is more to be law majority opinion this Thus, directly against precedent. enforcement function. under this Cullison cases, precisely authority It does what Cullison cautioned line of to conduct a it in a against, namely dilutes search home visit in areas residence in which protections parolees upon customarily based seizure visitors are allowed does not “soeio-juristic rationalization.” See id. It carry authority to with it the conduct a error to do so. private areas of the residence. Guzman, Or.App. See State Differentiating B. The Home Visit: (“[T]he authority P.2d Between Parole Officers’ Functions of a home visit under the condi to conduct Rehabilitation and Law Enforcement. encompass tions of does not probation majority opinion pragmatic The evinces a search.”). authority to conduct for benevolent role of concern visit, however, cannot be as a home used officers, doubt, like officers. No probable cause subterfuge avoid in Knights per- officers an support burden that must be met probationer’s a search of a resi- forming investigative purpose search. “Once the dence, perform a dual function rehabili- from a home behind the search shifts visit ensuring tating parolees while also quest to be used in a evidence at 120- the law is enforced. See U.S. [government] prosecution, criminal 122 S.Ct. at only upon may premises securing enter the Ordinarily, separate it difficult to dual probable full supported a warrant for the purposes, and Cullison stands Young, No. cause.” Commonwealth try that we should not do so. proposition A. 1999 WL CRIM. But is an alternative constitutional there 30, 1999). (Mass.Super.Ct. Mar. *3 vision, vision. a home visit is Under Suspicion. A C. Lack of Reasonable not a of the home search. simply requires third constitutional vision visit is to meet with the deter- suspicion concept reasonable Iowa, Appellee, STATE of case, have some teeth. this the facts particu- supporting suspicion, reasonable larly ankle issue after the bracelet was

resolved, rather thin. were The difference Hillary TYLER, Appellant. Lee suspicion between and a hunch reasonable No. 13-0588. describe, perhaps,

is difficult but this case, falls what the evidence short of Supreme Court Iowa. a required support warrantless search. given general particularly This is so our June 2015. admonition, years expressed ago, we Rehearing Aug. Denied give the search and seizure provisions of I, article section 8 “a broad and liberal preserv-

interpretation for the State v. Height,

ing ... liberty.” Iowa N.W. Interpretation

IV. Narrow of This

Case.

Finally, majority I that the opinion note extremely apply limited. It does not

the activities of law It enforcement. does reasonableness,

not freestanding endorse a

hungry beast that could threaten the war-

rant It requirement. is limited to search drugs the underlying when crime for parolee

which the is a drug convicted particularity require-

offense and when the

ment of suspicion reasonable has been de- present.

termined to be It reserves the

question right of whether has importantly, refuse the search. Most

this case should be seen as a wholesale

adoption “special of so-called needs” as

developed by the cases of ever-expanding Supreme United States Court. above,

For the reasons stated I dissent. HECHT, JJ., join

WIGGINS and this

dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: State of Iowa v. Donald Joseph King

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Jun 26, 2015

Citation: 867 N.W.2d 106

Docket Number: 13–1061

Court Abbreviation: Iowa