Lead Opinion
Seventeen-year-old Desirae Pearson was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of first-degree burglary for her actions at two separate homes on Thanksgiving night in 2010. The district court sentenced her to serve concurrent sentences for the convictions arising from each transaction — one count of first-degree robbery and one count of first-degree burglary — but ordered those two sentences be served consecutively. Because each first-degree robbery conviction carries a sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment subject to a seventy percent mandatory minimum, Pearson received a fifty-year sentence and will be ineligible for parole until she serves thirty-five years. Pearson argues her sentence is cruel and unusual as applied to her under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate Pearson’s sentence and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Pearson was born in August 1993. According to her presentence investigation report, when she was six or seven years old, Pearson was hit by a car and hospitalized for several days. Though subsequent neurological and psychiatric testing did not reveal any particularized concerns, Pearson’s parents believed they saw changes in her behavior following the accident, especially with regard to anger management.
Prior to her arrest in the present matter, Pearson arguably had a penchant for simple misdemeanor theft and engaging in physical altercations. In 2002, she entered into an informal adjustment agreement following an allegation of fifth-degree theft.
At the time of her arrest, Pearson lived with her parents, her two sisters, and her two young nephews. She has two older brothers and two older stepsiblings who lived outside the home. Her father’s police record contained two convictions for operating while intoxicated. Her mother’s record was clean. Pearson’s parents perceived her as one who “is angry and fights,” but indicated she is a “smart girl” they would like to see remain at home to finish high school and have a career. Pearson’s parents perceived that Pearson
Prior to her arrest, Pearson was in eleventh grade at the local alternative high school. The presentence investigation report indicated Pearson spent much of her free time “running around with her friends.” She indicated that many of her friends were negative influences, and she claimed they were a significant reason she got into trouble. While Pearson did not acknowledge having a drug problem, she admitted to smoking marijuana daily as well as taking prescription drugs during the year prior to her arrest. Though she does not believe she has an alcohol problem, she admitted to consuming alcohol on the day of her arrest. A predisposition report in a previous juvenile court matter indicated, however, that in 2008 evaluators at the University of Iowa hospitals diagnosed Pearson with mild to moderate child-onset conduct disorder, alcohol abuse, cannabis abuse, mathematic disorder, and a reading disorder.
On November 25, 2010, Pearson and her boyfriend, Devon Lukinich, armed themselves with BB guns that looked like handguns and went on a robbery spree in Burlington and West Burlington. At the time, Pearson was seventeen years and three months old. Lukinich was also approximately seventeen years old. Pearson and Lukinich wore bandanas to conceal their faces and gloves to guard against leaving fingerprints. Pearson also wore a parka with a fur-lined hood pulled over her head.
Around 9:15 p.m., Pearson and Lukinich were allegedly involved in an altercation with a Burlington resident that led to a 911 call. Though Pearson and Lukinich had fled the scene by the time police arrived, the resident relayed information about Pearson’s vehicle to police, who then put out the description of the vehicle to officers in the area.
Around 9:45 p.m., Pearson and Lukinich knocked on the door of Zachary Moore. When Moore opened the door, Pearson pointed her BB gun at Moore and told him that he was being robbed. Lukinich then informed Moore that Pearson was not joking and that he would shoot him if Pearson would not. Lukinich told Moore he was looking for the “weed money” as well as two individuals. Moore testified he laid on the floor while the pair took his laptop, television, iPod, a handheld videogame game system, a small global positioning device (GPS), and some cash.
After reconnecting his landline telephone, which had been disconnected by Pearson and Lukinich when they rummaged through his apartment, Moore called the police. When police arrived, Moore found his cell phone with the battery disconnected on his front step. Moore testified he believed Lukinich was in control of the robbery because Lukinich checked the other rooms of Moore’s home while Pearson sat on the couch, was the one who unhooked the television, and was the only one who spoke after they entered the apartment.
Pearson and Lukinich returned home to unload their loot.
Later that night, Pearson and Lukinich entered the home of Joan Wright, an eighty-one-year-old woman, and her son, Ronald Wright. At the time, Joan was in
Just moments after they left the Wrights’ home, police apprehended Pearson and Lukinich in their car. At the time, Pearson was driving. After securing warrants to search the vehicle, police found pill bottles bearing the names of Joan and Ronald. They recovered Ronald’s shotgun and cash matching the amount stolen from Moore and Joan. They also discovered two BB guns, BBs, two bandanas, a stocking, and two pairs of gloves. When the officers first viewed the BB guns in the trunk of the vehicle, the officers thought the weapons were real handguns. One of the BB guns bore a strong resemblance to a Glock model 80 handgun and the other to a Taurus PT 1911 handgun.
On May 4, 2011, a jury found Pearson guilty of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary for her actions at Moore’s house. The jury also found her guilty of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary for her actions at the Wrights’ house.
Roughly two weeks later, Pearson wrote a letter to the district court in which she admitted the facts of each crime in substantially the same way they were presented at trial. According to Pearson, she took some pills, “chilled” at home for a while, and went to her family’s house. She and Lukinich then shoplifted two stores before Lukinich suggested they go to an elderly woman’s home, presumably for the purpose of committing a theft. While they were hiding in the bushes outside the woman’s home, Pearson wrote, Lukinich saw someone in Pearson’s car. Pearson stated they yelled at the man and started shooting at his house. They got into the car and, as they pulled away, a man came out of a house with a gun. Lukinich leaned out the window and continued firing shots.
According to Pearson, Lukinich then suggested going to another house where marijuana was located. Pearson indicated that Lukinich told her to knock on the door, that she told the person who answered the door (Moore) “to get down,” and that Lukinich stated he would shoot the man if she would not. Pearson admitted to taking cash and a laptop while looking for marijuana. She stated Lukinich stole the television and the iPod. She then admitted to dropping the stolen items off at home before going to McDonald’s to get strawberry milk shakes.
After driving around for some time, the pair stopped to check out another house (the Wrights’). Pearson wrote that Luki-
After expressing remorse for her actions, the victims, and her family, Pearson admitted that she deserved punishment for her conduct, but requested that she receive a lesser sentence than the maximum she was facing. She wrote, “I always thought that going to prison could not happen to me because I would never do anything serious enough for it to happen.” Pearson continued, “I know now it can ' happen to anyone if you don’t think before you act, if you are under the influence, and if you think you won’t get caught.”
In mid-July, Pearson wrote a second letter to the district court. In this letter, Pearson stated she was “not the person who committed those crimes” because at the time she “was influenced and on drugs.” Pearson asked for “a second chance to live [her] life other than behind bars.” She also expressed remorse for the victims and asked for “another punishment instead of spending 25 years in prison.”
Pearson and Lukinich appeared for sentencing on July 22. Ronald Wright gave an impact statement in which he stated his mother spent two months in rehab following surgery. He also expressed his opinion that Pearson and Lukinich should receive at least half of their potential total sentence. A victim coordinator read Joan Wright’s impact statement aloud. Joan’s statement informed the district court that her injuries sustained during the robbery required the implantation of a metal plate in her shoulder, secured by twenty to twenty-five screws and pins.
The State asked the district court to order concurrent sentences for Pearson for the robbery and burglary at Moore’s home and concurrent sentences for the robbery and burglary at the Wrights’ home. The State further requested that the sentences stemming from each transaction run consecutively to result in a total of fifty years.
Pearson’s attorney acknowledged the mandatory mínimums and argued Pearson should be sentenced to concurrent sentences totaling twenty-five years. Pearson’s attorney cited the United States Supreme Court’s statements that juveniles are less deserving of the most severe punishments due to their lessened culpability and that juveniles “must have some mean
In sentencing Pearson to fifty years, the district court found that while her file reflected a troubled family life, a troubled history, the lack of a support structure, and negative influences, these circumstances did not justify her criminal actions. The court considered Joan’s serious injuries and the fact that the victims did not feel safe in their homes. The court emphasized Pearson and Lukinich had “thrown their futures away,” stating, “It’s a tragedy in terms of your futures. There is no doubt that it’s a waste of your lives, but it’s the unalterable choice that you have made.”
The district court continued,
I understand the argument that as young people you may not have had wisdom and the ability to distinguish what the result of your actions were going to be, but it doesn’t dimmish in any way the results of your actions.
The district court then observed Pearson had prior experience with the court system, stating, “[T]he court system has been trying for years to provide Miss Pearson with the support, the education, the training, the life skills necessary to turn her life around. She hasn’t done so.”
The district court found Pearson had committed a series of bad choices. The court recognized that Pearson was one month shy of her eighteenth birthday at the time of sentencing and that her record indicated five curfew violations as well as a number of other matters processed by the juvenile court system. It further noted that she had been expelled from the traditional school system in ninth grade, that she worked at McDonald’s, and that she had parents and siblings in the area. The district court found that Pearson had a recurring issue with assaults since the age of fourteen and that she and her family had been provided with numerous services to address and resolve underlying issues. The court expressed its belief that Pearson and others who wrote statements in her favor wanted to blame her friends, alcohol use, drug use, a bad family relationship, and poor parenting, but that “the bottom line is that you are responsible for your actions and you’re responsible for your choices.” The court continued, “What is clear is that you knew what you were doing, you understood the impact that it was going to have on your victims, and you did it.”
The district court interpreted Pearson’s second letter requesting a punishment other than a twenty-five-year sentence as asking for an alternative form of punishment to a prison sentence, to which it stated, “That’s not the reality here. There is no alternative. The only question before the court today is whether the four sentences will run concurrently or consecutively.” The court found Pearson’s second letter signified Pearson did “not understand the significance of the crime that [she had] committed and the impact,” based on the fact she had been repeatedly informed each conviction carried a twenty-five-year sentence.
The district court also expressed concern the judicial system was providing “repeated opportunities to young offenders to avoid the ramifications of their actions.” The court continued, “I think people truly
In addition, the district court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s statements about juveniles with regard to their “immature decision-making and their ability to change and rehabilitate.” The district court indicated its belief that juveniles should have “the opportunity to do those things, and the benefit of having some meaningful opportunity to ultimately be released.”
Finally, after the court recognized that a potential release date is often a motivating factor to an inmate, it stated the primary purpose of Pearson’s sentencing was protection of the public, not rehabilitation. The court stated, “I don’t believe that the focus here today should be on the rehabilitation of the defendants, but rather the protection of society in these particular cases.” The district court explained,
The question of whether Miss Pearson will be able to contribute to society in any meaningful way is not really the issue that the Court finds determinative, particularly in the face of the fact that Miss Pearson has previously received any number of rehabilitation attempts in the past to set her on the correct path without success.
After sentencing Pearson, the district court concluded by saying it did not take the sentencing of juveniles to lengthy prison terms lightly. It also expressed its hope Pearson would take advantage of the rehabilitative and educational programs offered in prison so that she could ultimately return to the community at the appropriate time.
Pearson appealed, and we transferred her case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals upheld Pearson’s sentence. The court of appeals determined Pearson’s actions fell “squarely within the well-defined parameters” of the robbery statute. The court of appeals agreed with the findings of the district court that Pearson was nearly an adult when she committed her crimes, that she had a history of assaultive behavior, and that she had failed to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities. The court acknowledged Pearson would have to spend the majority of her life in prison, but held her sentence was not disproportionate to her crimes, finding the district court had properly considered Pearson’s age.
We granted further review.
II. Standard of Review.
A challenge to a sentence as illegal may be brought at any time. State v. Bruegger,
III. Discussion.
A. Positions of the Parties. Pearson argues her sentence is unconstitutional as applied to her under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Pearson notes that she was only seventeen years old at the time of the crimes and that under the district court’s sentence, she is not eligible for parole until she is almost fifty-three years old. She argues the district court was not interested in rehabilitation, but rather solely in incapacitation. Pearson argues that she never took the lead in any of the robberies
Pearson also argues a seventy percent mandatory minimum for first-degree robbery is not in line with other offenses subject to seventy percent mandatory mín-imums as applied to her. She asserts the aggregated seventy percent mandatory mínimums lead to punishment far harsher than that imposed in other jurisdictions for similar crimes.
The State responds that the thirty-five-year minimum sentence is not grossly disproportional under the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Rummel v. Estelle,
B. Analysis. At the outset, we consider the applicability of the United States Supreme Court’s approach in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. -,
In addition, we emphasized the district court must recognize that “ ‘[¡Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults’ and that as a result, ‘their actions are less likely to be evidence of “irretrievably depraved character.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at -,
Here, the district court sentenced Pearson to consecutive terms totaling thirty-five years imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We think in light of the principles articulated in Miller and Null that it should be relatively rare or uncommon that a juvenile be sentenced to a lengthy prison term without the possibility of parole for offenses like those involved in this case. Otherwise, we would be ignoring the teaching of the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases that juveniles have less culpability than adults, that the few youth who are irredeemable are difficult to identify, and that juveniles have rehabilitation potential exceeding that of adults.
Though Miller involved sentences of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, its reasoning applies equally to Pearson’s sentence of thirty-five years without the possibility of parole for these offenses. 567 U.S. at -,
We have no occasion to consider whether Miller’s principles must be applied to all juvenile sentences. Instead, we need only decide that article I, section 17 requires an individualized sentencing hearing where, as here, a juvenile offender receives a minimum of thirty-five years imprisonment without the possibility of parole for these offenses and is effectively deprived of any chance of an earlier release and the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.
Nothing in Bruegger is to the contrary. In Bruegger, we considered whether the sentence imposed upon an adult amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
We also note that the district court here did not have the benefit of Miller or Null when it sentenced Pearson. Our review of the district court’s handling of Pearson’s sentencing convinces us the district court did not consider the principles underlying Miller. For example, the district court indicated it understood the argument that Pearson, as a young person, may lack the ability to appreciate the results of her actions, but then stated that argument “doesn’t diminish in any way the results of [her] actions.” It is true that Pearson’s youthfulness does not lessen the results of her actions insofar as the impact they had on the lives of the victims, yet under Miller and Null, a juvenile’s culpability is lessened because the juvenile is cognitively underdeveloped relative to a fully-developed adult. Miller, 560 U.S. at -, -,
The district court declared, “[T]he bottom line is that you are responsible for your actions and you’re responsible for your choices.” The court further stated Pearson did “not understand the significance of the crime that [she had] committed and the impact.” While it is true that juveniles lack the maturity to fully understand the consequences of their actions, under Miller and Null .this too is a mitigating factor. Miller, 567 U.S. at -,
Finally, the district court stated, “I don’t believe that the focus here today should be on the rehabilitation of the defendants, but rather the protection of society in these particular cases.” Yet, under Miller, Graham, and Null, rehabilitation is an important factor and to predict that a juvenile cannot be rehabilitated is very difficult. Miller, 567 U.S. at -,
In sum, the district court emphasized the nature of the crimes to the exclusion of the mitigating features of youth, which are required to be considered under Miller and Null. Accordingly, we vacate Pearson’s sentence and remand the case to the district court for application of the Miller standards as described in Null and this opinion.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we vacate the sentence imposed by the district court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
ZAGER, J., also writes a separate dissent.
Notes
. Under Iowa Code section 714.2(5), theft of property not exceeding $200 in value is fifth-degree theft. It is classified as a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 714.2(5) (2001).
. Police later recovered Moore’s iPod and laptop in the basement but as of the time of the trial they had not recovered his television. No mention was made at trial as to the recovery of the portable gaming system or the GPS.
. The jury found Lukinich guilty of the same crimes.
. At trial, Joan's surgeon testified that Joan would not regain full strength or full mobility in her shoulder.
. In Bruegger, the particular circumstances were a broadly framed underlying crime, Bru-egger’s young age when he committed the prior offense, and a geometric increase in penalty due to the enhancement resulting from the juvenile adjudication.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion but write separately to emphasize that, although the holding in this case is properly limited to its facts, neither the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. -,
An obvious correlation exists between the life-without-parole context of Miller and Graham
Indeed, limiting the teachings and protections of these recent cases to only the harshest penalties known to law is as illogical as it is unjust. In Null, we thoroughly examined recent advances in neuroscience, which illustrate the decreased culpability of the juvenile offender. See Null,
Nor could it be. As the background of this case demonstrates, a juvenile’s impetuosity can lead them to commit not only
Thus, the juvenile offender’s decreased culpability plays a role in the commission of both grievous and petty crimes. Notably, even Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion sensed Milleds reasoning applies well beyond the context of homicide and calls into question a number of current practices, such as trying juveniles as adults and sentencing juveniles according to mandatory mínimums. See id. at -,
The court’s holding is limited to the bizarre facts of this case — both Pearson’s senseless and violent, though nonhomici-dal, crime spree and the district court’s approach during sentencing. After all, Pearson somehow faced more time in prison without the possibility of parole than all offenders except a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder. See Iowa Code § 902.1(2) (Supp. 2011). Consequently, Pearson’s constitutional claim prevails under even the narrowest step forward in our jurisprudence.
Thus, wisely, the decision today takes a modest, incremental step, one with which I totally agree. Yet, our understanding of adolescent neuroscience and our approach to juvenile justice are rapidly evolving. Children are indeed different for the purposes of criminal sentencing. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -,
. Graham v. Florida,
. Roper v. Simmons,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The sentence in this case is a harsh one. Its severity results from a combination of two things: (1) the general assembly’s decision to require persons who commit first-degree robbery to serve seventeen and one-half years in
The severity of this sentence is only partly related to the defendant’s age. This sentence would have been harsh even if the defendant had been legally an adult, rather than just seventeen years and three months old, at the time she went on this crime spree with her eighteen-year-old boyfriend.
Needless to say, I am not a member of the general assembly, nor am I the trial judge. I do not get to decide the proper sentence in this case. In addition, the defendant has not argued that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
Thus, the only question before us is whether the sentence violates the United States or Iowa Constitution because it is “cruel and unusual.” For the reasons stated herein, I agree with the court of appeals that the sentence is not so “grossly disproportionate” as to render it unconstitutional. See State v. Oliver,
I. Some Key Facts.
The majority has accurately described the facts of this case. However, I would like to emphasize a few points.
The guns wielded by Pearson and her boyfriend Lukinich during the robberies appeared to be real handguns to the victims and initially to the police. Only later when the police picked the guns up did they learn the guns were C02 powered BB guns.
The first robbery victim described a terrifying scene. He opened the door; Pearson pointed one of the guns at him and told him he was being robbed. Lukinich then pointed his own gun at the victim and said, “If she don’t shoot you, I will.” The victim was forced to lie down on the floor while Pearson and Lukinich rummaged through the house and grabbed numerous items.
The main victim of the second robbery turned out to be an elderly woman. While getting ready for bed, she heard noises in the night and went downstairs with her walker. She was confronted by Pearson and Lukinich, both wielding what appeared to be handguns. She yelled for her son who lived with her. As soon as she called out, Lukinich pushed her against the wall, causing her shoulder to fracture in several places. Pearson and Lukinich then left the house with a shotgun, cash, and prescription medicine they had taken.
Both of these victims submitted written victim impact statements, which were read by the victim coordinator at sentencing. The first victim stated, “I truly believe that they [Pearson and Lukinich] should both remain behind bars for the extent of my life and theirs.” The second victim asked that each of the defendants be imprisoned for fifty years. The State requested consecutive sentences for each defendant on the two robberies.
The presentence investigation does not indicate that Pearson came from a troubled family background. Into her high school years, she lived at home with her
Pearson’s juvenile record dates back to elementary school.
After Pearson was convicted of the two robberies (and two burglaries) arising out of these home invasions, and while she was awaiting sentencing, she wrote two letters to the judge. In the first letter, she confessed her crimes and requested “a lesser sentence than what I am facing.” However, just before sentencing, Pearson sent the court another, shorter letter in which she asked not to go to prison, i.e., “a second chance to live life other than behind bars.”
The district court certainly was aware of Pearson’s youth. In fact, Pearson’s attorney briefed and argued Graham v. Florida,
The district court commented on what it perceived to be Pearson’s “troubled” family life and history, and “very negative influences” on her. It noted that efforts by the juvenile court system to rehabilitate her had apparently been unsuccessful. It also indicated that it did not believe Graham was applicable because “we are not discussing a life sentence for Miss Pearson.” Ultimately, the court decided to make the robbery/burglary sentences for the second home invasion consecutive to the robbery/burglary sentences for the first home invasion. The district court commented, “I don’t believe that the focus here today should be on the rehabilitation of the defendants, but rather the protection of society in these particular cases.” It also pointed out the seriousness of the injuries to the second victim.
II. Because This Case Does Not Involve a Sentence of Life Without Parole (LWOP). or Its Practical Equivalent, Graham and Miller Do Not Apply.
As I’ve already indicated, I carry no particular brief for the sentence Pearson
Any fair reading of Graham and Miller requires us to acknowledge this point. In Graham, the Court held that “for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.” 560 U.S. at -,
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
Id. at -,
In Miller, the Court decided that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. at -,
In short, Graham and Miller have a lot to say about youth and immaturity, much of which would be obvious anyway to an experienced Iowa trial judge. But they have nothing to say about this case, because it does not involve an actual or de facto life sentence. The observations about juvenile offenders in Graham and Miller are there only to justify restricting the most severe form of imprisonment— life without parole — for these offenders.
The majority here rewrites those cases. Yet it does not manage even to be consistent with today’s decision in State v. Null,
Regardless of the outer limits of the majority’s rulings, it is clear the court has
For example, recently the Illinois Court of Appeals was confronted with a challenge to a lengthy prison sentence for a sixteen-year-old girl who had aided and abetted her twenty-year-old boyfriend in murdering an uncle who had molested her. People v. Pacheco,
In People v. Perez, the California Court of Appeal recently rejected a Graham/Miller challenge to consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for forcible lewd acts committed when the defendant was sixteen years old.
As the Colorado Court of Appeals recently stated:
Lehmkuhl has cited no post-Graham decision, nor have we found one, that has determined that a sentence affording a defendant a chance to be paroled within his natural lifetime violates Graham’s requirement that defendants be given a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.
People v. Lehmkuhl, — P.3d -, -,
We can now look forward to a flurry of new proceedings as the State, defense attorneys, and our own judicial system sort through the unresolved issues raised by the majority opinion. For example, if a sentence of thirty-five years without parole implicates G'raham and Miller, as my colleagues believe, then the current sentencing law governing juveniles who commit class “A” nonhomicide felonies would appear to be in constitutional jeopardy. That law was enacted by the legislature in 2011 in response to Graham. See 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 131, § 147 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2) (Supp.2011)). It provides that any juvenile who commits a Class “A” felony other than first-degree murder shall automatically receive a life sentence but shall be eligible for parole “after serving a minimum term of confinement of twenty-five years.” Id. Certainly, a twenty-five year mandatory term of imprisonment would prevent the offender from “living a more normal adult life.” If so, my colleagues seemingly have doomed one of our legislature’s enactments.
We can get a good sense of how many new proceedings this decision could generate by looking at data from the Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning within the Iowa Department of Human Rights. According to these data, as of May 31, 2013, there were 425 inmates serving time in Iowa prisons for offenses committed before the age of eighteen. See Iowa Dep’t of Human Rights, Div. of Criminal & Juvenile Justice Planning, Current Inmates Under 18 at Time of Offense (May 31, 2013), available at http://www. humanrights.iowa.gov/cjjp/images/pdf/ Prison_Population_Juveniles_05312013.pdf. Only thirty-six of these individuals had committed Class “A” felonies. Id. Thus, the vast majority of these individuals are serving prison terms of various lengths but not LWOP terms. Thanks to the current decision, they may now have a ticket to court and a potential resentencing.
Of course, a court should not refrain from rendering a decision because it may have far-reaching effects. But before we kick start a process that could overturn approximately 400 prison sentences, and put ourselves at odds with every other state and federal appellate interpretation of Graham and Miller, we owe it to the public to explain clearly what we are doing and why the law requires it. The majority opinion falls short.
To be sure, the majority includes the same escape hatch as in Null — namely, that it is applying the principles of Miller under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. While this may protect the majority from having its reasoning reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, it fails to explain why all other state courts to apply the same principles have reached a different conclusion. As noted, one of the central principles of Miller is that it applies only to the most severe penalties. .Miller did not constitutionalize every sentencing proceeding whereby a juvenile is sent to prison.
The concurrence in this case, while intended to bolster the majority opinion, only exposes its flaws. In a backhanded way, the concurrence expresses the view that Miller applies to all “lesser crimes”— not merely “lengthy” prison sentences or “consecutive mandatory minimum” sentences. Thus, the concurrence says,
[Djenying juveniles who commit lesser crimes the protections afforded in Miller, denies them their rights under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 no less than denying a juvenile who commits a considerably more serious crime the very same protections.
But if “denying” Miller to a juvenile who commits a lesser crime violates the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17, then Miller must apply to all juveniles who commit crimes. In any event, this novel and even broader interpretation of Miller only adds to the uncertainty engendered by the majority opinions in this case and Null. If the justices joining the majority in these two decisions cannot agree on what they stand for, how are the bench and bar to follow them?
Appellate judges do not have a monopoly on understanding the problems of youth. The average Iowan surely knows that juveniles are generally less “culpable” than adults. And the complex juvenile justice system that our elected representatives have enacted reflects this. See Iowa Code ch. 232 (2013).
Our duty as judges is to leave it to the legislature to determine both crimes and the range of punishments; “culpability” is basically their call. We are authorized to step in only in the rare case, such as mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders, where the punishment is “cruel and unusual.”
III. The Defendant’s Sentence Is Not Unconstitutional Under Brueg-ger/Oliver.
This then leads to the question whether the sentence is unconstitutional under the proportionality analysis set forth in State v. Bruegger,
We first must decide whether the sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the crimes. If the sentence does not create an inference of gross disproportionality, no further inquiry is necessary. Oliver,
Although it is a close question, I am unable to reach the conclusion that the sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed as to be unconstitu
I agree with the court of appeals: “Certainly arguments can be made that the seventy percent mandatory minimum is longer than our society finds acceptable....” State v. Pearson, No. 11-1214,
IY. Unresolved Questions.
I do not address the separate question, not raised on appeal, whether the consecutive sentences were an abuse of sentencing discretion by the district court. See, e.g., State v. August,
WATERMAN and ZAGER, JJ., join this dissent.
. Another serious issue, not raised by Pearson on appeal, but touched upon in some of the correspondence with the district court, is that Pearson is African-American. Twenty-five percent of Iowa’s prison population is African-American, as compared to 2.9% in the general population. Iowa Dep't of Human Rights, Div. of Criminal & Juvenile Justice Planning, Iowa Prison Population Forecast FY 2011-2021 (2011), at 29, available at http:// www.humanrights.iowa.gov/cjjp/images/pdf/ Forecast201 l.pdf. This is due in large part to the number of African-Americans serving "70 percent” sentences. Id. at 2.
. As noted by the majority, Pearson’s parents believed that her behavior changed after she was hit by a car when she six or seven years old and hospitalized for several days. However, the University of Iowa hospitals ran both neurological and psychiatric exams that did not detect anything amiss.
. In addition to the discussion here, I refer the reader to the out-of-state cases cited in part II of my dissent in Null.
. The court explained:
[T]he Supreme Court in Roper [v. Simmons,543 U.S. 551 ,125 S.Ct. 1183 ,161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)], Graham, and Miller was only concerned with the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole, which are the two most severe punishments allowed under the United States Constitution. We agree with the State "[i]t would be a great stretch to say that Graham meant to require legislatures and courts to treat youths and adults differently in every respect and every step of the criminal process.” As we have covered this topic in a broad manner, we now look at defendant’s specific arguments.
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Defendant next argues the automatic imposition of any adult sentence on a juvenile defendant as a result of the automatic transfer statute violates the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. As stated earlier, when taken to its logical extreme, defendant’s argument would make any statute unconstitutional which imposes on a juvenile transferred to adult court the same mandatory minimum sentence applicable to an adult for the same offense. We disagree.
Defendant reads Roper, Graham, and Miller too broadly. The Supreme Court did not hold in Roper, Graham, or Miller the eighth amendment prohibits a juvenile defendant from being subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence as an adult, unless the mandatory minimum sentence was death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant was sentenced to neither of these. The minimum 20-year term defendant faced in this case does not compare with the death penalty or a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The sentencing range applicable to defendant in this case is not unconstitutional pursuant to Roper, Graham, and Miller, and the sentence defendant received violated neither the eighth amendment nor the proportionate penalties clause.
Pacheco,
.• The majority does not respond to the substance of this argument. Instead, in Null, citing yet another law review article, the majority dismisses it as a "slippery-slope-type argument.” I believe the implications of a judicial decision are a fair topic for discussion.
. Some of these persons may have received term-of-years sentences that amount to de fac-to life sentences, as arguably occurred in Null, but I suspect that is not a large group.
. The majority tries to defend itself from the charge that it has muddied the waters by including a footnote in Null that muddies the waters even more. Thus, the majority points
. The concurrence says it would be "illogical” to limit Miller to the harshest penalties and cites Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Miller for that point. But Chief Justice Roberts was making that point by way of criticizing the Miller decision as fundamentally wrong. See Miller, 567 U.S. at-,
[N]o high court has articulated a rule that all minors who commit adult crimes and who would otherwise be sentenced as adults must have the opportunity for some discretionary reduction in their sentence by the trial court to account for their youth.*106 Perez’s sentence, albeit long, still leaves plenty of time for him to be eligible for parole. It passes constitutional muster.
Perez,
. After indicating that Miller applies to lesser crimes, the concurrence seemingly pulls back and says that the majority opinion “is limited to the bizarre facts of this case.” I do not see any such fact-based limitation in the majority’s opinion. The concurrence further describes the majority opinion as a "modest, incremental step.” I do not believe those words fairly describe an opinion that significantly departs from just-decided United States Supreme Court precedents and that may overturn many existing prison sentences.
. As she puts it:
There is no argument that individuals convicted of robbery in the first degree should not be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years[,] that the court can run various sentences as concurrent or consecutive sentences or that, in most instances involving adult offenders, a mandatory minimum sentence of seventy percent is cruel or unusual_ As stated above, defendant here asserts that the imposition of the seventy percent mandatory minimum sentence under section 902.12, particularly when applied in consecutive terms of imprisonment, is a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions as that prohibition is applied to this defendant in this specific instance.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join with Justice Mansfield’s well-reasoned dissent. I write separately to renew my objection to the application of Graham v. Florida,