STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. DEMETRIAS MARTIN, Appellant.
No. 21–0102
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
January 26, 2024
Submitted September 13, 2023
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tamra Roberts, Judge.
A defendant appeals the mandatory minimum term imposed with his sentence for first-degree robbery. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, for
MCDERMOTT, Justice.
Demetrias Martin was convicted of first-degree robbery. At his sentencing hearing, the district court considered results from an assessment tool designed to estimate Martin‘s risk of reoffending. That tool, the Iowa Risk Assessment Revised, indicated that Martin scored as “high” risk for violent recidivism and “moderate/high” risk for continuous victimization, resulting in an assigned recommended level of correctional supervision of “intensive.” Martin argues that the district court‘s reliance on these conclusions from the risk assessment, without any information about how the tool actually arrived at them, was an abuse of discretion.
I.
In March 2019, Martin was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with a requirement to serve at least 70% of his sentence under a statutory mandatory minimum. Martin appealed, challenging this conviction and sentence on several grounds. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. But because of a retroactive amendment to the robbery sentencing statute passed in June 2019, it determined that Martin was eligible for resentencing with a potential mandatory minimum as low as 50%. See
The amendment to the sentencing statute added factors for the district court to consider whеn determining the mandatory minimum to impose: “all pertinent information including the person‘s criminal record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had on the victim or other persons.”
An updated presentence invеstigation report filed about three weeks later included the following paragraph under the heading “Addendum Update“:
On November 03, 2020, [t]he defendant was assessed utilizing the Iowa Risk Assessment Revised. The Iowa Risk Assessment Revised is a brief actuarial instrument used to estimate offenders’ level of risks associated with them violently reoffending and their continuous victimization. The defendant is noted to have scored a High risk for violent recidivism, and a Moderate/High risk for continuous victimization, with an Intensive level of recommended correctional supervision.
At the sentencing hearing two months later, Martin‘s lawyer made several statements about this risk assessment information. He conceded that “the statute tells the Court that they can take it into consideration.” But he argued against the district court‘s consideration of the risk assessment because he lacked information about how the assessment tool arrived at the prоffered conclusions. He stated:
I don‘t think that the way our Seventh Judicial District does the Risk Assessment really qualifies as providing my client with any due process. Just because it‘s statutorily authorized doesn‘t mean that it‘s, necessarily, the way it‘s being used, appropriate.
. . . [W]hen we‘re talking about sentencing, . . . the defendant . . . has the right to be sentenced based upon accurate information and he has the right to
challenge facts and circumstances that might impaсt his sentencing. You know, what we have here is just a conclusory statement, just that he‘s high risk. I don‘t have the ability to cross-examine anybody as to why that is, what criteria were used, or standard, or questions, . . . what answers were given, whether it was norm to local populations. I don‘t have any way to respond to that at all. It‘s just a conclusory statement, and I don‘t feel that it‘s fair for that to be considered.
. . . And so I raise the objection to using that simply because I think to do my duty and to be an effective defense attorney I have to point out that I don‘t have any way to challenge that, and it appears to be a big part of what the Court might consider. . . . [I]t‘s unfair to use that to determine . . . the length of thе sentence . . . because I don‘t know what -- what went into it.
Neither Martin nor the State presented any evidence at the sentencing hearing. Martin argued for the 50% mandatory minimum. The State again argued for the 70% mandatory minimum.
In explaining its sentencing decision, the district court noted that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report and the risk assessment addendum. The district court described how it would treat the risk assessment:
I understand the factors that [Martin‘s lawyer] has pointed out. And the Court can only weigh the Validated Risk Assessment minimally because the Court doesn‘t have the factors on which that assessment has relied either to make [its] own determination of whether or not that‘s appropriate. However, I have taken it into consideration, as required by the code, but I don‘t think that I‘m weighing it heavily by any means since I don‘t know what factors it relied on either, other than what‘s, I guess, in the instrument that they use.
The district court explained that “the bulk of the reason” for the sentence it would impose on Martin—twenty-five years with the same 70% mandatory minimum as before—centered on his crime‘s negative impact on the victim and the community.
Martin appealed the district court‘s sentence. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the sentence. We granted Martin‘s request for further review.
II.
At the time of sentencing, the court shall determine when a person convicted of robbery in the first degree . . . shall first become eligible for parole . . . based upon all pertinеnt information including the person‘s criminal record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had on the victim or other persons.
Martin argues on appeal that despite a lack of evidence that the risk assessment had been “validated,” the district court nonetheless considered it based on an erroneous belief that it had to consider it. “Although the district court was under the impression it was required to consider this cоnclusory statement,” Martin writes, “it was not required to, especially absent evidence that the assessment was validated or without evidence of what the assessment specifically measured.” The district court‘s failure to reсognize that it had discretion not to consider the risk assessment in fashioning the sentence, according to Martin, requires us to reverse and remand so he can be resentenced.
We turn to the issue preserved for appeal: Whether the district court abused its discretion by considering the risk assessment information “without evidence of what the assessment specifically measured.” When the sentence challenged on appeal was within the statutory limits, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Iowa 2020). Referring to risk assessments specifically, we have said that “if we need further evidence to determine if the sentencing factor is improper, the defendant must object to the factor and ask to make the appropriate record before sentencing.” State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2019) (emphasis added). Martin‘s lawyer argued at his sentencing hearing that he lacked sufficient information about the risk assessment to challenge it, but he offered nothing furthеr to support this contention. Martin needed to do more than object at the sentencing hearing for us to find that the district court‘s consideration of the risk assessment was an abuse of discretion. The district court does not abuse its discretion by considering risk assessment information in a presentence investigation report where a defendant has notice of the risk assessment and fails to present evidence exposing some actual unsoundness in it. See id.
As the State points out, Martin could have called the presentence investigation report‘s author to testify at the sentencing hearing about the risk assessment; he did not. The presentence investigation report was made available to Martin‘s lawyer about two months before his sentencing—well in advance of the statutory deadline. See
Nothing prevents defendants from attacking—or, should they choose, defending—a conсlusion generated by a risk
We thus affirm the district court‘s sentence and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.