State of Indiana v. Emareion T. Jones
Supreme Court Case No. 25S-CR-15
Indiana Supreme Court
June 30, 2026
Opinion by Justice Massa; Justice Slaughter concurs; Justice Molter concurs in result; Chief Justice Rush concurs in result in part and dissents in part with separate opinion in which Justice Goff joins.
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. Argued: October 2, 2025. Direct Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court, No. 79D01-2312-F5-000244, The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge.
When police officers responded to an alleged incident of domestic violence they found Emareion Jones’ DNA on a firearm. He was charged with Felony Domestic Violence, Misdemeanor Unlawful Carrying of a Handgun, and Felony Unlawful Carrying of a Handgun by a felon whose prior felony conviction occurred within the past 15 years. The handgun charges informed Jones that either of his two prior felony convictions from Texas – including one for Felon in Possession – provided the predicate offense necessary to sustain the charges. Despite the clarity of his charging information and probable cause affidavit, Jones moved to dismiss the gun counts, which the trial court granted.
The trial court found the charges were not sufficiently pled, did not constitute an offense, and were unconstitutional. On the same day, in an unrelated case, the trial court dismissed the same two charges against defendant Augustine Gomez for the exact same reasons. The State appealed both cases, and we consolidated them for purposes of oral argument.
In an opinion handed down today, State v. Gomez, 25S-CR-00014, we reversed the trial court on all three findings and remanded for further proceedings. For the same reasons explained therein, we reverse the trial court here and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
Lafayette police officers responded to a domestic violence call from Jones’ girlfriend. Upon arrival, she informed police that Jones had a purple firearm. When Jones was found elsewhere walking in the apartment complex, he denied possessing a firearm, explaining that he was a convicted felon who couldn‘t have one. Officers later returned to the apartment complex after an employee found a purple handgun in a location that was “consistent with Jones’ route of travel from the apartment to where police located him.” App. Vol. II at 15. A DNA sample supported the theory that the gun discovered belonged to Jones. On December 13, 2023, the State charged Jones with three crimes. At issue are
Count II, Class A Misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun, stated:
On or about July 1, 2023, in Tippecanoe County, State of Indiana, Emareion T Jones did knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun, while being a person convicted of a federal or state offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year.
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to wit:
I.C. 25-47-21.5(b) andI.C. 35-47-2-1.5(e) , and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
Id. at 13. Count III, level 5 Felony unlawful carrying of a handgun, read:
On or about July 1, 2023, in Tippecanoe County, State of Indiana, Emareion T Jones did knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun, while being a person convicted of a federal or state offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year, and while having a previous conviction for a felony in the previous fifteen (15) years, to wit: on October 28, 2014, Emareion Jones was convicted of Felon Possessing a Weapon, a Felony in the District Court of Harris County, State of Texas, under Case Number 14151311010 and/or on February 6, 2017, Emareion Jones was convicted of Aggravated Assault–Family Member, a felony, in the District Court of Harris County, State of Texas, under Case Number 154322301010;
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to wit:
I.C. 35-47-2-1.5(b) andI.C. 35-47-2-1.5(e)(2)(B) , and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
- An October 28, 2014 conviction for Felon Possessing a Weapon, a Felony, in the District Court of Harris County, State of Texas, under Case Number 14151311010.
- A February 6, 2017 conviction for Aggravated Assault – Family Member, a Felony, in the District of Harris County, State of Texas, under Case Number 154322301010.
Id. at 15. The trial court dismissed Counts II and III under
The trial court entered final judgment under
Discussion and Decision
Applying Gomez, we find the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Counts II and III.
I. Count II is Sufficiently Certain and Constitutes an Offense
Jones argued, and the trial court found, the charging information lacked specificity because it does not reference any Texas statutes nor a comparable Indiana statute and does not detail an alleged conviction punishable by a term of one year. At the end of the day all that is important is that the “information enable[] an accused, the court, and the
We first find that Count II is “sufficiently certain,” per
Next, we find under
For both these reasons, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Count II.
The trial court also dismissed Count III because it found the charging information was not “sufficiently certain” under
For Count III the State charged Jones with level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun. The base offense of someone who violates
Like Count II, we find that Count III is sufficiently certain and constitutes an offense. The charging information states that Jones has two prior Texas convictions, which were punishable by up to one year of imprisonment and includes the conviction dates which were within fifteen years of the Indiana offense.
As stated above, Jones’ charging information references his two prior Texas felony convictions. Even though the charging information did not state the Texas statutes corresponding with his prior offenses, we have never required such specificity in a charging information. The charging information states the name of the offenses, as well as the county they occurred in and their cause numbers. It also states that Jones committed his offenses on February 6, 2017, and October 28, 2014, both within 15 years of the present Indiana offense. We cannot find that the charging information for Count III insufficiently identified the basis for the charge. The State met its requirements to sufficiently put Jones on notice that the crime he was being charged with was enhanced due to his prior out-of-state felony convictions, both committed within the last 15 years. Lampitok, 817 N.E.2d at 636.
As applied above, the State correctly enhanced this charge to a level 5 felony because the information states that Jones has two prior felony convictions: October 28, 2014, Felon Possessing a Weapon, and February 6, 2017, Aggravated Assault–Family Member. As these were prior felonies committed within fifteen years of the offense in Indiana, Count III is appropriate. The charging information states allegations that align with the elements of a criminal statute, therefore, it is not facially deficient. Hernandez, 220 N.E.3d at 71.
III. Count III was Incorrectly Dismissed for Constitutional Reasons
In Gomez, the trial court applied the wrong part of
Like in Gomez, for Count III, the predicate offense statute is the handgun statute, which allows a charge to be enhanced to a level 5 felony if the person “has been convicted of a felony within fifteen (15) years before the date of the offense.” As the handgun statute only refers to a general type or class of offense, i.e., a “felony,” the State need only allege that Jones has been convicted of a prior felony within 15 years.
We find the State properly enhanced Jones’ charge to a level 5 felony because Jones has a prior felony conviction for Felon in Possession of Weapon from 2014 and Aggravated Assault on a Family Member in Texas from 2017. As Jones’ prior conviction states that he was convicted of a felony in another state within fifteen years of his Indiana offense, he therefore may not carry a handgun in Indiana. The State lawfully charged Jones under
Conclusion
The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Counts II and III. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and our holding today in Gomez.
Slaughter, J., concurs.
Molter, J., concurs in result.
Rush, C.J., concurs in result in part and dissents in part with separate opinion in which Goff, J., joins.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Shay J. Hughes
Lafayette, Indiana
State of Indiana v. Emareion T. Jones
Supreme Court Case No. 25S-CR-15
Indiana Supreme Court
June 30, 2026
This case is a companion to State v. Gomez, No. 25S-CR-14 (Ind. June 30, 2026), also decided today. For the reasons explained in my separate opinion there, I agree with the Court‘s conclusion that Count II, the Class A misdemeanor charge, is sufficiently certain and states facts constituting that offense. But Count III, the Level 5 felony charge, suffers from the same pleading defect as Gomez‘s Count III.
When the State invokes
For these reasons, I concur in result as to Section I of the lead opinion and respectfully dissent from Sections II and III.
Goff, J., joins.