STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM FRANCES SILVIA, Appellee.
No. SC17-337
Supreme Court of Florida
[February 1, 2018]
The issue in this case is whether William Frances Silvia‘s original, valid waiver of postconviction proceedings and counsel precludes him from claiming a right to relief under Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). This Court has jurisdiction. See
This Court fully explained the facts underlying Silvia‘s sentence of death in its opinion on direct appeal. Id. at 963-64. On direct appeal, Silvia argued, among
In 2012, Silvia waived his right to postconviction proceedings and counsel. See Silvia v. State, No. SC12-1863, 2013 WL 5035694, *1 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2013) (123 So. 3d 1148). Upon review in 2013, this Court “conclude[d] that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging Silvia‘s postconviction counsel and dismissing postconviction proceedings.” Id. at *2. Silvia does not dispute in this case the validity of his original waiver.
Three years after this Court affirmed the dismissal of Silvia‘s postconviction proceedings, the United States Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, and this Court decided Hurst on remand. After Hurst, Silvia filed a Successive Motion to Vacate Death Sentence claiming a right to Hurst relief. The postconviction court concluded that Silvia was not “seeking to reinstate his previously waived postconviction proceedings because he had changed his mind” but was “seeking to avail himself of a newly established constitutional right he did not possess at the time of the waiver.” The court determined that Silvia “could not knowingly and
The issue in this case is whether Silvia‘s waiver of postconviction proceedings and counsel precludes him from claiming a right to Hurst relief. Although there is certainly a difference between a defendant who changes his mind after validly waiving postconviction proceedings and a defendant who asserts a right to relief under Hurst, we conclude that this distinction does not afford Silvia any basis for claiming Hurst relief that would entitle him to a new penalty phase.
In Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 2016), an analogous case, a defendant waived the right to a penalty phase jury and then attempted to claim a right to relief under Hurst. This Court denied relief, explaining that a defendant “cannot subvert [a] right . . . by waiving that right and then suggesting that a subsequent development in the law has fundamentally undermined his sentence.” Id. at 40. In Mullens, this Court held that Hurst does not apply to defendants who validly waived their right to a penalty phase jury, writing:
If a defendant remains free to waive his or her right to a jury trial, even if such a waiver under the previous law of a different jurisdiction automatically imposed judicial factfinding and sentencing, we fail to see how Mullens, who was entitled to present mitigating evidence to a jury as a matter of Florida law even after he pleaded guilty and validly waived that right, can claim error. As our sister
courts have recognized, accepting such an argument would encourage capital defendants to abuse the judicial process by waiving the right to jury sentencing and claiming reversible error upon a judicial sentence of death.
Id. at 39-40 (emphasis omitted).
In this case, Silvia does not challenge the validity of his postconviction waiver. In fact, in reviewing Silvia‘s waiver in 2013, this Court made clear:
In addition, Silvia indicated that he understood that by waiving postconviction proceedings early in the process—before a motion was filed—he was losing permanently his right to take advantage of any changes that may occur in the law, that he was waiving his right to federal review, and that because his attorneys had not yet completed their discovery, it was unknown what issues could be raised. Silvia acknowledged that he understood everything his attorneys had done to date and that his attorneys could discover information that would be beneficial to him in postconviction. Silvia indicated that he understood that the issues in his case were not fully developed, that his attorneys could not proceed further in their investigation without his cooperation, and that his attorneys could discover information that would be beneficial to him. He nevertheless indicated that he did not wish his attorneys to proceed with any further discovery and that he was voluntarily waiving his postconviction counsel and proceedings.
Silvia, 2013 WL 5035694, at *2 (emphasis added). Further, at the time of Silvia‘s postconviction waiver in 2012, Ring, which provided the underpinnings for Hurst v. Florida, had been decided for over a decade and almost all defendants, including Silvia, had raised a Ring claim on direct appeal. Thus, we conclude that Silvia‘s original, valid postconviction waiver, which he has never contested before this Court, precludes him from claiming a right to relief under Hurst.
For the reasons fully explained above, we conclude that Silvia‘s valid postconviction waiver, which included his understanding that “he was losing permanently his right to take advantage of any changes that may occur in the law,” Silvia, 2013 WL 5035694, at *2, precludes him from claiming a right to the benefit of Hurst. Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court‘s order granting Silvia a new penalty phase and reinstate his death sentence.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in result.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., dissenting.
Today this Court advances for the first time a new excuse, not a valid reason, to push Florida‘s death penalty jurisprudence into an unconstitutional abyss. This case is a classic example which illustrates application of this Court‘s retroactivity approach to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), to deny relief to defendants who have fully and completely preserved the constitutional challenges to Florida‘s death sentencing scheme. This new denial approach results in equal protection and due process
The construction of our current death penalty dilemma finds its origin in the issuance of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Although it was not a death penalty case, our high court in Apprendi addressed the issue of requiring a unanimous jury vote for certain factors. Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the United States Supreme Court applied the principles of Apprendi to capital defendants, holding that capital defendants “are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. For years after Ring, defendants facing the death penalty in Florida, including Silvia, attempted to rely on and asserted that Ring required a unanimous jury verdict to support a valid death penalty judgment. Over and over and over again the concept addressed in Ring with regard to unanimous jury verdicts was denied application in death penalty proceedings in Florida. E.g., Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 276 (Fla. 2004) (denying relief because the felony murder aggravator involved “circumstances submitted to a jury and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt“); Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 790 (Fla. 2004) (“We previously have addressed
It was not until January 12, 2016, when the United States Supreme Court issued Hurst v. Florida that the “fundamental constitutional right” requiring a unanimous jury verdict arose in death penalty proceedings constructed and built upon the foundational principles announced earlier in Ring.
With the issuance of Hurst v. Florida, the logical question arose as to how it would be applied and the extent to which it would be retroactively applied to those pending execution of a death sentence. That retroactivity question was answered, in part, by this Court in Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), when the Court held that Hurst would retroactively apply to only those cases in which the death penalty had been imposed on or after the date Ring had been issued in 2002. At that time, I reasoned in Asay that Hurst should also apply to cases prior to 2002 if the issue of requiring a unanimous jury verdict had been properly preserved for review in the proceedings even prior to Ring, relying on James v. State (James I), 615 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 1993). Asay, 210 So. 3d at 30 (Lewis, J., concurring in result). The Court rejected that reasoning and adopted a fixed retroactive date.
Within these parameters, cases began flowing to this Court in successive postconviction motions. Those cases that became final after Ring with unanimous
We now face Silvia in which Silvia has received a post-Ring, nonunanimous death penalty verdict. Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 966 (Fla. 2011). By now, it is well-established Florida law that Hurst requires unanimity and applies retroactively to “defendants whose sentences became final after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring.” Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016). Thus, regardless of the majority‘s unwillingness to mention this fact, Hurst applies retroactively to Silvia‘s case. E.g., Hojan v. State, 212 So. 3d 982, 999 (Fla. 2017) (”Hurst appl[ies] retroactively to defendants, like Hojan, whose
(2) No motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed beyond the time limitation provided in subdivision (d)(1)2 unless it alleges:
. . . .
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively . . . .
In the past, this Court has granted relief on changes in the law retroactively to postconviction defendants who preserved the issue for review on their direct appeal prior to the change. James I, 615 So. 2d at 669. In James I, we granted relief to a defendant who had asserted at trial and on direct appeal that the jury instruction pertaining to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague before the United States Supreme Court ultimately reached that same conclusion in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992). James I, 615 So. 2d at 668-69. We concluded that—despite his case becoming final before the principle of law had a case name—it would be unjust to deprive James of the benefit of the Supreme Court‘s holding in Espinosa after he had properly presented and preserved such a claim. James I, 615 So. 2d at 669. Similarly, I believe that defendants who properly preserved the substance of a Ring challenge at trial and on direct appeal prior to that decision should also be entitled to have their constitutional challenges heard. Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 218-19 (Fla. 2017) (Lewis, J., concurring in result); Asay, 210 So. 3d at 30 (Lewis, J., concurring in result). Similar to the defendant in James I, Silvia properly preserved his Ring challenge at trial and on direct appeal. Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 978.
In Mosley, this Court recognized that “fundamental fairness alone may require the retroactive application of certain decisions involving the death penalty after the United States Supreme Court decides a case that changes our jurisprudence.” Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1274-75. There, we cited James I and held that, “because Mosley raised a Ring claim at his first opportunity and was then rejected at every turn, we conclude that fundamental fairness requires the retroactive application of Hurst, which defined the effect of Hurst v. Florida, to Mosley.” Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1275. In that case, we further conducted a standard retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980); however, Mosley clearly stands for the proposition that, under James I, it is fundamentally unfair to withhold Hurst relief to post-Ring, nonunanimous defendants who properly raised the issue, regardless of whether they are in this Court on direct appeal or postconviction motion. Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1274-75. Therefore, to deny Hurst relief to Silvia is a violation of his right to due process under the
The purpose of the Rule 3.8503 motion is to provide a means of inquiry into the alleged constitutional infirmity of a judgment or sentence, not to review ordinary trial errors cognizable by means of a direct appeal. The motion procedure is neither a second appeal nor a substitute for appeal. Matters which were raised on appeal and decided adversely to the movant are not cognizable by motion under Rule 3.850. Furthermore, any matters which could have been presented on appeal are similarly held to be foreclosed from consideration by motion under the Rule. Therefore, a Rule 3.850 motion based upon grounds which either were or could have been raised as issues on appeal may be summarily denied.
Crucially, nothing in this Court‘s post-Hurst jurisprudence suggests any requirement for defendants to have pursued postconviction appeals to receive the benefit of Hurst. This Court has noted, however, that defendants who waived their
Relatedly, the majority does not make clear whether it treats Silvia‘s waiver of postconviction proceedings as a waiver of his right to habeas corpus. Of course,
Finally, this decision is ripe for reversal. As demonstrated above, there are a number of constitutional claims that Silvia can raise from this decision. Furthermore, unlike Asay which, despite its faults, relied heavily on Florida‘s adequate and independent retroactivity standard under Witt, Asay, 210 So. 3d at 15-22, this decision does not rely on any standard. The reasoning here amounts to “this is the answer because I say it is.” Considering the fundamental constitutional rights at issue, such reasoning is an insufficient basis to deny Hurst relief.
Based on the foregoing, I would apply Hurst to Silvia‘s case, vacate his death sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with the Constitution, our precedent, and fundamental fairness.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellee