Facts
- Wilmington Savings Bank filed a foreclosure action against Ameena Salahuddin in December 2017 for defaulting on her mortgage loan, which was secured by a property she bought in 2008. [lines="28-30"]
- Salahuddin executed a promissory note for $132,863.00, insured through FHA, and a mortgage deed securing the loan. [lines="35-42"]
- Wilmington claimed Salahuddin defaulted and sought to accelerate the debt, demanding payment for the outstanding principal and interest. [lines="46-49"]
- Salahuddin filed a counterclaim alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) while Wilmington denied the claims. [lines="52-57"]
- The trial court granted Wilmington's summary judgment and dismissed Salahuddin's counterclaim, leading to her appeal. [lines="74-75"]
Issues
- Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Atlantica on the grounds that Salahuddin's property was patented by a United States land patent? [lines="159-160"]
- Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment without addressing Salahuddin's jurisdictional challenge? [lines="165-166"]
- Was the trial court correct in establishing that Salahuddin was in default on her mortgage when the foreclosure case commenced? [lines="170-171"]
- Did the court err in limiting the remand proceedings to the compliance with 24 C.F.R. 203.602? [lines="174-175"]
- Did ongoing settlement negotiations invalidate the trial court's grant of summary judgment? [lines="178-179"]
Holdings
- The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment, as Salahuddin's land patent claim was not raised as an affirmative defense, thus waiving the issue. [lines="448-449"]
- The court affirmed that it did not err in entering summary judgment as there was no prior jurisdictional ruling necessary before that decision. [lines="403-404"]
- The court upheld that Salahuddin was in default, reinforcing earlier findings regarding her payment history. [lines="298-301"]
- The trial court's decision to limit the remand to compliance with 24 C.F.R. 203.602 complied with the appellate mandate and was not an abuse of discretion. [lines="214-215"]
- Ongoing settlement negotiations do not invalidate the trial court’s authority to grant summary judgment in the case. [lines="313-314"]
OPINION
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER JOHN SHELDON, JR., Appellee.
Case No. 5D2023-1668
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
October 8, 2024
LT Case No. 2022-CT-003363
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Jeffrey P. Cario and Kimberly Scarano, of Jeffrey P. Cario, P.A., Brooksville, for Appellee.
MACIVER, J.
The State of Florida appeals an order granting Appellee‘s motion to suppress evidence in which the trial court found that to initiate a valid stop, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a traffic
The evidence at the suppression hearing was that the Florida Highway Patrol trooper observed Appellee weaving several times over the fog line while driving northbound on Highway 19 in Hernando County around two o‘clock in the morning. The trooper testified that he initiated the traffic stop to conduct a “welfare check” because he was concerned the driver was ill, impaired, sleepy, or having mechanical issues. The trooper‘s bodycam video, which captured thirty seconds prior to the trooper activating his lights, showed at least two instances in which Appellee‘s vehicle swerved over the fog line. The trooper testified that he observed Appellee‘s vehicle weaving multiple times, and some of those instances occurred prior to the video being activated. The trial court found there was “nothing talismanic about the words ‘welfare check‘” and granted the motion to suppress. We agree with the State that this was error.
Welfare checks fall under the “community caretaking doctrine,” an exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s search warrant requirement, which recognizes the duty of police officers to ensure the safety and welfare of the citizenry at large. Taylor v. State, 326 So. 3d 115, 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). Under the welfare check exception, a “legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” Agreda v. State, 152 So. 3d 114, 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting State, Dep‘t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)); see also State v. Rodriguez, 904 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (stop may be justified even in absence of traffic infraction when vehicle is being operated in unusual manner causing legitimate concern for safety of the public). The investigatory stop must still be based on specific articulable facts demonstrating that the stop was necessary to protect the public. Dep‘t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Morrical, 262 So. 3d 865, 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
Contrary to the trial court‘s struggle with this concept, Florida law is clear that an officer is justified in stopping a vehicle
Here, the trooper had specific, articulable facts demonstrating a specific concern, and a traffic stop for a welfare check was justifiable under the circumstances.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
SOUD and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under
