IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE,

V. C.A. No.: 2203010050

wes eee SS

LYRIC A. CARTER.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Lyric A. Carter (hereinafter, “Defendant”) brings this motion to
invalidate the seizure of Defendant and suppress all evidence gathered after the
traffic stop on March 18, 2022. The Court conducted a hearing on Defendant’s
motion on May 28, 2025. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress is DENIED.

On the evening of March 18, 2022, Detective Guevara while driving a marked
police vehicle, entered Memorial Drive eastbound. ' Memorial Drive is a divided
roadway with a concrete median separating eastbound and westbound traffic. The
eastbound side of Memorial Drive has three lanes divided by solid lines (fog lines).

The three lanes consist of a travel lane, a bike lane, and a parking lane. While in the

' Detective Guevara’s marked police vehicle was equipped with a Network Video Recorder (the
“NVR”), which recorded the minute prior to the detective’s stop of Defendant. That video was
played at the hearing and corroborated much of Detective Guevara’s testimony given at the
hearing.
travel lane, the detective observed a white Toyota minivan (the “Toyota’”’) directly in

front of him.

Memorial Drive is a high traffic area that consists of both residential and
commercial property; the road also has high volume of pedestrians, bicyclists, and
motor vehicles. On the evening of March 18", there was no pedestrians and
bicyclists. However, there was, more or less, fourteen (14) parked cars, one of which

had their ignition engaged.

The Toyota was proceeding at an appropriate rate of speed. There were cars
traveling on the westbound side of Memorial Drive; however, there did not appear
to be any vehicles in front of the Toyota. While traveling behind the Toyota,
Detective Guevara watched the vehicle drift well into the bike lane three times. The
three instances of Defendant drifting into the bike lane lasted approximately: twenty-
two (22) seconds, six (6) seconds, and fifteen (15) seconds, respectively. The

detective had observed the vehicle for approximately a half a mile.

Based on those observations, Detective Guevara signaled for the Toyota to
pull over. After initiating the traffic stop for violation of 21 Del. C. § 4122, Defendant
was subsequently charged with driving under the influence of drugs, resisting arrest,

and possession of marijuana.
It is undisputed that the circumstances subsequent to the initial traffic stop
constituted sufficient probable cause to arrest Defendant. However, the parties differ
as to whether Detective Guevara had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the

traffic stop in the first place.

In his Motion to Suppress, Defendant argues that there was insufficient
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for an alleged lane violation and that the
stop, detention, and seizure of evidence violated his state and federal constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizures because he entered the bike lane in
a safe manner. The State responded that Detective Guevara had reasonable suspicion
to conduct a traffic stop because he was concerned about the safety risk posed by the
Toyota’s proximity to parked cars and the possibility of someone “jumping out” from

one of them.

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6
of the Delaware Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”” Under the Fourth Amendment, the occupants and the vehicle are seized

when a police officer conducts a traffic stop of a vehicle.* The stop and subsequent

* State v. Seaton,

2018 WL 656380

, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2018).
> State v. Clay,

2002 WL 1162300

, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2008).

3
seizure are subject to constitutional limits.* Therefore, the State must show that “the

stop and any subsequent police investigation were reasonable in the circumstances.””°

A stop is reasonable when it is supported by probable cause to believe that a
traffic code violation has occurred or that there is reasonable articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot.° Probable cause exists “as long as the officer is making
the traffic stop based on a violation of the traffic code that he has observed.’”’
Reasonable suspicion “must be evaluated in the context of the totality of the
circumstances viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the
same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer’s

subjective interpretation of those facts.’

The State argues that Detective Guevara had reasonable suspicion to stop
Defendant because Defendant violated 21 Del. C. § 4122(1), which relevant part

states that:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked
lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent

herewith shall apply: (1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as

4 Seaton,

2018 WL 656380

, at *2.

> Caldwell v. State,

780 A.2d 1037, 1045-46

 (Del. 2001).
6 Td.

7 Seaton,

2018 WL 656380

, at *2.

8

id.

practicable entirely within a single land and shall not be moved from
such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can

be made with safety.” (emphasis added)

The State contends that it was Detective Guevara’s reasonable belief that Defendant

had not moved into the bike lane with safety.

In his Motion, Defendant does not make an effort to justify his veering into
the bike lane. At the hearing, Defendant argued that the reasoning was to avoid the
headlights of the traffic heading westbound on Memorial Drive. Defendant
maintains that he was safe in doing so because there were no pedestrians, bicyclists,
and there was considerable distance between the Toyota and the parked vehicles.
Defendant, in his Legal Memorandum, cites to numerous cases to support his
contention that Detective Guevara lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant

violated § 4122(1).!°

In order to justify the traffic stop, Detective Guevara needed to demonstrate

through his testimony (by the articulation of factual circumstance prior to the stop)

921 Del. C. § 4122(1).

!0 State v. Blank,

2001 WL 755932

 (Del. Super. Ct. June 26, 2001); State v. Edwards,

2002 WL 32000657

 (Del. Com. Pl. May 31, 2002); State v. Clay,

2002 WL 1162300

 (Del. Super. Ct. May
28, 002); State v. Niffenegger,

2003 WL 23163274

 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2003); State v. Adkins,

2007 WL 1861903

 (Del. Super. Ct. June 26, 2007); State v. Seaton,

2018 WL 656380

 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan 30, 2018); State v. Jones,

2021 WL 579476

 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 6, 2021).

5
that he possessed a reasonable suspicion that Defendant crossed the lane lines

without first ascertaining whether it was safe to do so.!!

A driver violates § 4122 only by deviating from a lane without first ensuring
it’s safe to do so.'* The importance of this safety prerequisite was thoroughly
discussed in State v. Blank. In Blank, the Delaware Superior Court determined that
§ 4122 aligns with the principle that “changing lanes and crossing lane markings on
a highway are only prohibited when the driver has neglected to ascertain whether
such movement can be made with safety; the statute does not outright prohibit
crossing lane lines (even if for no apparent reason).”!? The Blank Court explained
that the trooper failed to establish reasonable suspicion because he could not

demonstrate the defendant’s line-crossing was done without first ensuring safety.'4

The Superior Court has identified examples of dangerous lane violations, such
as a defendant making sharp course corrections without awareness of surroundings
and almost colliding with another object,'° or a defendant crossing a fog line twice

and weaving within their lane.'®

'l State v. Blank,

2001 WL 755932

, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 26, 2001).

!2 State v. Jones,

2021 WL 5779476

, at *2 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 6, 2021).

'3 Blank,

2001 WL 755932

, at *2.

14

Id.


'S State v. Anderson,

2010 WL 4056130

, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2010); West v. State,

143 A.3d 712, 725

 (Del. 2016) (J. Valihura, concurring).

'6 State v. Mulholland,

2013 WL 3131642

, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. June 14, 2013).

6
Here, the Court finds that Detective Guevara had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop on a § 4122 violation. Detective Guevara testified that the
underlying reason for the traffic stop was because he was concerned that Defendant
was not safely going into the bike lane. The detective stated that the vehicles parked
on the right side of the roadway and the proximity of the Toyota to them posed a
safety problem. The Court agrees and his testimony is supported by the NVR

recording.

Upon the Court’s review of the NVR, the video shows that there were
approximately fourteen (14) parked vehicles along Memorial Drive and that
Defendant was driving in the bike lane while passing roughly eight (8) of them.
Defendant came considerably close to some of the parked cars he was passing, one
of which appeared to be occupied, and Defendant stayed in the bike lane even after
the headlights of vehicles heading eastbound had passed him, undermining any claim
that the glare of the oncoming light caused his deviation from his lane of travel. Due
to the proximity of Defendant’s Toyota to the parked cars, Defendant did not enter

the bike lane safely.

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Detective Guevara had
reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant crossed the fog line and entered into

the bike lane in an unsafe manner and, therefore, violated § 4122(1).
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.