State of California v. MullinState of California v. Mullin
Entered: July 24, 2026
Before us is a motion to stay, pending appeal to this Court, a district court order and final judgment that vacated actions taken by officials at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS“) and the U.S. Department of State (“DOS“) to implement a presidential proclamation requiring that a $100,000 payment accompany all H-1B visa petitions. In doing so, the United
I.
The H-1B program permits employers to petition the government for temporary visas that allow nonimmigrant foreign workers in “specialty occupation[s],” which usually require at least a bachelor‘s degree, to work in the United States. See
The President claimed authority to require the $100,000 payment under two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that are codified at
Between September 19, 2025, and October 20, 2025, officials at DHS and DOS took, all together, ten different actions to implement the Proclamation. Those actions included DOS‘s issuance of answers to “Frequently Asked Questions,” which noted that the Proclamation‘s payment requirement applied prospectively, and DHS‘s issuance of a revised fee schedule, which set forth the new $100,000 payment requirement. In accord with the plaintiffs’ chosen terminology, we will refer to these actions collectively as “the Policy.”
On December 12, 2025, the plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the defendants’ implementation of the Proclamation via the Policy under the APA and for being ultra vires and unconstitutional.2 They alleged -- and the district court found -- “that the imposition of the $100,000 H-1B payment requirement negatively impacts [the plaintiffs‘] ability to staff publicly run colleges and universities, primary and secondary schools, and healthcare systems.” Those impacts would then, as the district court put it, “exacerbate staffing shortages in these sectors and endanger [p]laintiffs’ ability to provide important medical and educational services.”
With respect to the APA, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated that statute‘s procedural requirements under
Between early February and early April, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court then held a hearing on the motions on May 29, 2026. On June 8, 2026, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order -- and a corresponding judgment -- granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, after agreeing with the plaintiffs as to all their claims against the defendants. The district court also denied the defendants’ cross-motion. In so doing, the district court declared “[t]he Policy implementing the Proclamation . . . unlawful and . . . VACATED [it],” under
The defendants then filed a motion requesting that the district court: (1) stay its order and judgment pending the defendants’ appeal to this Court or, alternatively, (2) enter an administrative stay of the order and judgment while the defendants sought emergency relief from this Court. The district court declined to stay its order and judgment pending appeal but administratively stayed the order pending our resolution of the defendants’ emergency stay motion, which is now before us.
II.
“‘A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review’ and is not granted as ‘a matter of right.‘” Washington v. U.S. Dep‘t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 171 F.4th 473, 488 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009)). As the party seeking a stay, the defendants bear the burden of showing that the circumstances justify such “extraordinary relief” under Nken‘s four-factor test, which asks: (1) whether the defendants have “made a strong showing that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits of [their] appeal“; (2) whether they “will be irreparably injured absent a stay“; (3) “whether issuance of the stay will
III.
We begin with the first Nken factor, which concerns whether the defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal of the district court‘s order and judgment. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. We note that the plaintiffs’ excess-of-statutory-authority APA claim, see
In concluding that the Policy constitutes agency action “in excess of statutory . . . authority,” the district court reasoned -- based on Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989) -- that given the nature of the $100,000 payment requirement, Congress needed to have clearly delegated the power to the executive to require such a payment. In so doing, the district court emphasized the features of the $100,000 payment requirement that the district court believed made the imposition more like a tax within the meaning of the taxing power that Congress enjoys under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. The defendants, based on Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 589, 595 (1884), disagree with that conclusion because they contend that the $100,000 payment requirement is not a tax in that sense and is instead an “immigration regulation” that Congress could enact pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause of Article I.
As the plaintiffs correctly point out, Skinner‘s admonition that Congress speak “clearly” applies whenever the executive claims “discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as ‘fees’ or ‘taxes,’ on those parties.” 490 U.S. at 224. The defendants, however, contend that Skinner did not impose such “a heightened clarity standard,” and they rely for this contention on FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. 656, 674 (2025), which noted that Skinner did not “create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation.” But, as the plaintiffs correctly point out, the question here is not whether Congress may delegate the authority in question. It is whether Congress has done so. And as to that question, Skinner does set forth a requirement for the executive to show that Congress spoke “clearly” in conferring “discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as ‘fees’ or ‘taxes,’ on those parties.” Skinner, 490 U.S. at 224. This case presents that question, and apart from their mistaken reliance on FCC, the defendants do not explain why such a clear statement is not required here.
The defendants do assert that, even assuming that a clear-statement requirement applies, “the delegation [in §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)] is sufficient to include a tax just as it was in [Federal Energy Administration v.] Algonquin.” 426 U.S. 548 (1976). In support of that argument, the defendants note that in Algonquin, the Supreme Court concluded that a statute authorizing the president to “take such action . . . as he deems necessary to adjust the imports” of certain goods could include requiring certain payments on those goods. Id. at 550-52, 570-71. The defendants then contend that Algonquin‘s conclusion was rooted in that statute‘s “sweeping, discretion-conferring language.” (Quoting Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 254 (2026).)
The defendants further argue that § 1182(f)‘s language “is even broader” than the language at issue in Algonquin because § 1182(f) provides that the president may impose “any restriction[].”3 They go on to assert that the word “restriction” includes, as a matter of ordinary meaning, “a limitation, qualification, or confinement on an alien‘s entry” and that the monetary imposition at issue here is an “additional qualification” that must be satisfied before such a person can enter the United States as an H-1B visa holder.
In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, however, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory provisions at issue in Algonquin contained not only “sweeping, discretion-conferring language,” but also an “explicit reference” to the duties that the president wished to impose. See Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 254. Thus, because neither § 1182(f) nor § 1185(a), nor any other relevant H-1B-related provision, references the imposition of the kind of payment requirement at issue, we fail to see how Algonquin makes it likely that the defendants will prevail in showing that the Policy was not in excess of statutory authority.
Moreover, although the phrase “any restriction” is plainly broad, the Supreme Court recently had occasion in Learning Resources to determine whether a word that it identified as synonymous with the word “restriction” -- “regulation” -- included the power to impose a tax. 607 U.S. at 249. And, in determining that the word did not include a “tax,” the Court, in part, looked to Congress‘s pattern of usage of that term. Id. at 249-51. The defendants develop no argument as to why it would not similarly make sense to look to the pattern of usage of the term “restriction,” especially given Skinner‘s clear-statement requirement. And the defendants fail to do so even though -- as the district court indicated -- Congress’ pattern of usage suggests that when it imposes fees or delegates fee-imposing authority under the INA, it does so explicitly. See, e.g.,
The defendants separately seek to meet their burden under the first Nken factor by contending that the Policy does not constitute “final agency action” and so, for that reason, is simply not reviewable under the APA. See
We note, however, that in attempting to establish -- as they must -- that they will be irreparably harmed in the absence of the requested stay, the defendants contend that “[e]very day that passes” in which the district court‘s order vacating the Policy remains in place “more aliens can petition and enter the country.” It is hard to see how that can be the case if the Policy does not in and of itself constitute “separate final agency action” that imposes “rights or obligations.” Yet the defendants make no effort to square that circle. In addition, the defendants fail to cite to, much less wrestle with, this Court‘s precedent in Agatha v. Trump, 151 F.4th 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2025), which noted that “agency action that carries out a presidential directive is ordinarily subject to APA review.“; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 828 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President‘s directive . . . .“). They instead rely chiefly on an out-of-circuit district court opinion that explicitly avoids “wading into th[e] uncertain terrain” of whether “an agency‘s implementation of a presidential directive constitutes ‘final agency action’ reviewable under the APA.” Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Just., 815 F. Supp. 3d 73, 108-10 (D.D.C. 2025). We therefore conclude that the defendants have not made a “strong showing” that they are likely to succeed on their “final agency action“-based challenge either.
Having explained why the defendants have not met their burden as to the first Nken factor, we can briefly address the remaining Nken factors. We may assume, as to the second Nken factor, that the defendants have sufficiently shown that they would be irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay. But they have not shown, as to the third Nken factor, why the plaintiffs would not be substantially injured by a stay. Instead, they argue that the plaintiffs would not be “irreparably harmed” and largely train their arguments on the plaintiffs’ alleged ability to make up for interim harms that may flow from the imposition of the $100,000 payment requirement before this
In sum, the defendants have failed to make a strong showing as to the critical likelihood-of-success factor, and their arguments regarding the remaining Nken factors present, at most, a mixed picture. See Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. Loc. 2305 v. U.S. Dep‘t of Veterans Affs., 177 F.4th 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2026); see also Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S. 960, 960-61 (2009) (per curiam) (noting that “[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result” and suggesting that “in a close case . . . balanc[ing] the equities” “may be appropriate” (citation modified)). Accordingly, we deny the defendants’ motion to stay pending appeal to this Court the district court‘s June 8, 2026, Memorandum and Order and accompanying Judgment.
The Federation for American Immigration Reform and Professor Michael Clemens’ motions for leave to file amicus curiae briefs are granted, and the briefs are accepted for filing this day.
By the Court:
Anastasia Dubrovsky, Clerk
cc: Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, Robert Farrell, Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Helen H. Hong, Denise Yesenia Levey, Lorraine Lopez, Marissa Malouff, Michael Louis Newman, Julie Veroff, James Edward Stanley, James Everett Richardson, Nita Kumaraswami Klunder, Gerard J. Cedrone, Michelle R. Pascucci, Julia S. Canney, Joshua Nomkin, Jaylia Yan, David Moskowitz, Michael Kenneth Skold, Vanessa L. Kassab, Ian R. Liston, Jennifer Kate Aaronson, David Dana Day, Kalikoonalani Diara Fernandes, Sarah A. Hunger, Virginia Anne Williamson, Neil Giovanatti, Joseph Robert Richie, Kiel Ireland, Melina Maria Meneguin Layerenza, Barbara D. Underwood, Victoria Ochoa, Zoe Levine, Judith N. Vale, Daniel Paul Mosteller, Laura Howard, Robert A. Koch, Kyla Duffy, Jonathan T. Rose, Kate S. Worthington, Sara L. Wilmot, Faye B. Hipsman, Donald Campbell Lockhart, Abraham R. George, Tiberius T. Davis, Jeffrey Alderette, Matt A. Crapo, Christopher J. Hajec, Edwin E. Pieters, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Kamilyn Yoonsuh Choi