State of Arizona v. Tywan Demetrius WoodsState of Arizona v. Tywan Demetrius Woods
Lead
OPINION
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, Tywan Woods was convicted of eight counts of aggravated assault, six counts of kidnapping, and two counts each of aggravated robbery and armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent and consecutive prison terms totaling 78.5 years. On appeal, Woods argues the court violated his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy when it granted the state’s motion for a mistrial without prejudice, permitting the state to try him again. Woods also argues the court erred by allowing an in-court identification of Woods and his vehicle. For the following reasons, we reverse Woods’s convictions and sentences.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ 2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining Woods’s convictions and sentences.
¶ 3 During Woods’s second trial,
Discussion
¶ 4 Woods argues “[t]he trial court erred in declaring a mistrial following the second trial and, therefore, the third trial violated [his] right against double jeopardy.” He did not object to the third trial on double jeopardy grounds; therefore, we review only for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson,
¶ 5 Declaring a mistrial “is the most drastic remedy for trial error” and should be granted “only when justice will be thwarted if the current jury is allowed to consider the case.” State v. Nordstrom,
¶ 6 At Woods’s second trial, L.C. frequently used profanity in her testimony and expressed extreme contempt for the men who had held her children captive. While one of her daughters was testifying, L.C. interrupted the questioning. Woods’s counsel asked the court to admonish L.C., and the court told her, “You need to keep quiet.” L.C. responded that she would leave the courtroom, but before leaving, accused Woods of holding her children “hostage,” and directed profanity and a racial epithet toward him.
¶ 7 Woods moved for a mistrial, arguing that what L.C. had said was “totally inflammatory” and “very prejudicial.” The state responded that L.C. had not said “anything different than what she said on the stand.” The trial court agreed that “[i]t was very much in keeping with her angry outbursts during her testimony” and denied the motion for a mistrial.
¶ 8 The court admonished the jury to “disregard [L.C.’s] angry outbursts and what she said on her way out of this courtroom.” Woods then asked the court to remove the admonishment because L.C. was a witness and “the jury can consider her demeanor as she is going out as part of her testimony in this ease.” The court told the jury it was “withdrawing [its] prior instruction to you, and allowing you to consider what [L.C.] said as she left the courtroom, to the extent that you deem it relevant and appropriate to do so.”
¶ 9 The next day, before the jury was brought in, the trial court stated there had been “matters that happened outside of the presence of the jury that are of concern.” Woods’s counsel told the court there had been “commotions going on outside” the courtroom after L.C. left.
¶ 10 The prosecutor told the trial court he had seen “law enforcement officers ... clearing the scene” and “they were still present when the jury was allowed to exit the front of the court.” According to the court, the jurors “certainly knew that [L.C.] had been stopped.” The prosecutor told the court he
¶ 11 The state moved for a mistrial, citing concerns about “the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial from this jury at this point,” but it did not articulate how Woods might have been prejudiced by L.C.’s behavior. Woods stated that he “would prefer to continue with the trial.” The trial court explained that one of the incidents the day before would not alone have been sufficient for a mistrial, “[b]ut, cumulatively, I am concerned that the defendant, well, and the State for that matter, would be denied a fair trial, that the jury would not be making decisions based on the evidence presented here in court, but extraneous matters.” The court did not explain the basis for its concern that Woods would be denied a fair trial based on L.C.’s outburst. The court then granted without prejudice the state’s motion for a mistrial without making a specific finding that there was manifest necessity for its ruling.
¶ 12 As noted above, the state bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] ‘manifest necessity’ for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant,” and the burden “is a heavy one.” Washington,
¶ 13 We agree with the trial court’s assessment that no information was conveyed during L.C.’s outburst other than her belief that Woods had held her children hostage and that she harbored animosity toward Woods, which already were apparent to the jury from L.C.’s testimony. In a similar context, the jury in State v. Bible heard the victim’s father refer to the defendant as “[t]hat * *]ing a[* *]hole.”
¶ 14 In addition to observing L.C.’s outburst in the courtroom, the jurors presumably heard commotion outside the courtroom after she left. They also might have seen police vehicles outside the courthouse and at least two may have known L.C. had been arrested. But, as the trial court acknowledged, much of the commotion took place outside the presence of the jury. According to the court, it was the cumulative effect of L.C.’s outburst and the events that followed that led it to grant the state’s motion for a mistrial.
¶ 15 Our supreme court has stated that when the trial court fails to make a “real effort to determine whether there were any feasible alternatives to declaring a mistrial,” there is no manifest necessity for a mistrial. McLaughlin v. Fahringer,
¶ 16 Importantly, the trial court made no findings regarding what the jurors saw or heard after L.C. left the courtroom. Instead, the court simply asked Woods’s attorney to repeat what he apparently had told the court in chambers. The court also described what it had heard after L.C. left and stated it “believe[d] ... the jury could probably also hear” the commotion. Even if we assume the jurors heard the commotion in the hall outside the courtroom, we do not know whether they connected the police presence outside the courthouse to L.C.’s conduct. And, although the court assumed the jurors knew L.C. had been stopped, the only information the court had was the prosecutor’s statement that there was still a police presence outside the courthouse when the jurors were allowed to leave. There is no indication L.C. was still at the courthouse when the jurors left; the court stated the police had addressed the situation and had “allowed her to drive away.”
¶ 17 Moreover, we cannot be certain, even from the court reporter’s account, why any jurors might have believed L.C. had been arrested, since she apparently had been permitted to leave the courthouse and was arrested elsewhere some time later. Although the court stated it understood that L.C. “was later arrested just up the canyon,” there was no explanation of the reason for her arrest. Nor do we know whether the two jurors the court reporter overheard “discussing that the person being arrested ... was [L.C.]” shared that information with any of the other jurors.
¶ 18 In this case, had any jurors responded affirmatively when asked whether they had seen or heard L.C.’s outburst and the ensuing commotion, the trial court could have inquired whether that information affected their ability to remain impartial. See Evans,
¶ 19 Another option available to the trial court was a curative instruction and admonishment to the jury to disregard any commotion or conduct by L.C. after she left the courtroom. In Jones v. Kiger,
¶ 20 Perhaps most importantly, the court did not address Woods’s desire to continue with the trial despite the disruption. See id. ¶ 9. In Jones, we pointed out that the trial court “ignored defense counsel’s assertion that his case was not damaged [by the hearsay testimony] without considering why that might be true.” Id. ¶ 10. We stated that, although “[t]he trial court is usually in the best position to determine whether manifest necessity requires a mistrial,” the court “must recognize that the defendant has a significant interest in deciding whether to take the case from the jury and ‘retains primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.’ ” Id. ¶ 9, quoting United States v. Dinitz,
¶ 21 Here, Woods stated he “want[ed] to resolve the issue” because he had “been going through this already for two-and-a half years” and that the multiple trials were “affecting [him] with [his] jobs” and “supporting [his] family.” The court made no further inquiry after Woods stated he preferred to continue with the trial. See Barton v. Commonwealth,
¶ 22 We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial, and Woods’s third trial violated his right to be free from double jeopardy and was fundamental error.
The Dissent
¶ 23 Our dissenting colleague disagrees with our conclusion that the trial court failed to make a “real effort” to determine whether there were feasible alternatives to ordering a mistrial, asserting that the court did not need to poll the jurors to determine how much of the commotion following L.C.’s outburst they had observed and whether they nevertheless could remain impartial. But because the court did not poll the jurors, we are left to speculate as to what they might have seen or heard after L.C. left the courtroom. As detailed above, the record does not establish that the jurors saw police arresting L.C. or that the two jurors the court reporter overheard discussing L.C.’s arrest shared that information with any other jurors.
¶ 24 Our dissenting colleague acknowledges the trial court “could have polled the jurors about their ability to remain impartial despite their observations of L.C.’s outburst and the ensuing commotion” but states polling the jury was unnecessary because “absolute necessity is not required” before declaring a mistrial. But a “high degree” of necessity is required, see Washington,
¶ 25 Moreover, neither the state nor the trial court articulated any prejudice to Woods resulting from L.C.’s conduct. In denying Woods’s motion for a mistrial the day before, the court noted that L.C.’s behavior as she left the courtroom was no different from her behavior during her testimony, in which she used obscenities to refer to Woods. In granting the state’s motion for a mistrial, the court made no assessment of the prejudice to Woods as a result of L.C.’s conduct after she left the courtroom. And although the court indicated it also was concerned about the state’s ability to receive a fair trial, neither the court nor the state articulated any prejudice to the state resulting from L.C.’s behavior. The outburst might have damaged L.C.’s credibility, but any damage to her credibility would have been done by the time she had finished testifying, and we do not see how L.C.’s further damaging her own credibility can be said to deprive the state of a fair trial. Moreover, L.C. was not the only witness who identified Woods as one of the' assailants. Thus, her testimony was not essential, and any damage to her credibility did not significantly prejudice
¶ 26 Our dissenting colleague states that the record “suggests the court was aware of the option of giving an instruction but implicitly chose not to do so” because it had given a curative instruction the day before after denying Woods’s motion for a mistrial. But the situation had changed and alternatives needed to be re-considered. Although it is correct that “[a] trial court has acted within its sound discretion in rejecting possible alternatives and in granting a mistrial, if reasonable judges could differ about the proper disposition, even though ‘[i]n a strict literal sense, the mistrial [is] not necessary,’ ” State v. Givens,
¶ 27 The trial court had no reasoned basis to reject the obvious alternative of polling the jurors to determine what their exposure to L.C.’s misconduct had been and how it had affected them, if at all. Indeed, courts commonly require trial judges to poll jurors when their impartiality is called into question. See, e.g., State v. Phillips,
¶ 28 Washington and Simmons v. United States,
¶ 29 Our dissenting colleague does not address the fact that the trial court ordered a mistrial over Woods’s objection, thereby depriving him of his “ ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’” United States v. Jom,
Disposition
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Woods’s convictions and sentences and remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice.
Notes
. Woods’s opening brief contains nearly twenty pages of facts, most of which are wholly irrelevant to the issues presented for our review. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(iv) (appellant’s brief shall include “[a] statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review”).
. The state dismissed a number of counts before Woods’s second trial.
. Judge Ann R. Littrell presided over Woods's second trial and entered the mistrial ruling that is at issue here.
. Judge John F. Kelliher Jr., presided over the third trial.
. Although Woods’s counsel reported to the trial court that L.C. and some spectators had made threats against Woods, his counsel, and the prosecutor, these alleged threats were made outside the courtroom and not in the presence of the jury.
. As our dissenting colleague correctly points out, the state made clear it wanted the trial court to order a mistrial only if it could re-try Woods. But the state’s equivocal position indicates it may have had some concern about whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial. And the state claimed to be concerned about Woods’s ability to receive a fair trial, not its own. Finally, the dissent does not explain how the state’s position below affects the double jeopardy analysis.
. Because we reverse Woods's convictions and sentences, we need not address his argument that the trial court in his third trial erred by allowing an in-court identification of Woods and his vehicle.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
¶ 31 As the majority points out, our supreme court has stated that when a trial court fails to make a “real effort to determine whether there were any feasible alternatives to declaring a mistrial,” there is no manifest necessity for a mistrial. McLaughlin v. Fahringer,
¶ 32 Because “[t]he trial court is usually in the best position to determine whether manifest necessity requires a mistrial,” we review its decision for an abuse of discretion. Jones v. Kiger,
¶ 33 In Washington, the Supreme Court stated that defense counsel’s improper and prejudicial arguments to the jury “may have affected the impartiality of the jury” and “the overriding interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation.” Id. at 510-11,
¶ 34 Notably, the state’s motion for a mistrial was content neutral. The prosecutor stated:
With everything that has been said, your Honor, and everything that, that has gone before, even the events of yesterday afternoon, or last evening, I now become concerned that we have a jury that, that may have a reduced ability to be fair and impartial in this matter.
The prosecutor made the motion “in the interest of justice and out of concern for the defendant’s right to a fair trial,” but he also stated that he was inclined to withdraw it if Woods did not join. When the trial court asked, “are you inclined to, or are you,” the prosecutor made clear:
I don’t want there to be any confusion about the State’s intention to bring this matter to verdict, whether it be this jury or a subsequent jury. So if the Courtbelieves that the State’s motion may be a waiver of that right, or result in a situation where the State would be precluded from retrying the defendant, I can’t allow that to be the end result.
So, again, if the Court has any concern about the State’s right to retry this matter if a mistrial is granted, then I’ll withdraw the motion.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the prosecutor’s position was not equivocal. Supra, n. 6. And, given that position, it is clear the court considered whether Woods could be retried in making its determination and believed it had no other option but to declare a mistrial. In contrast, the majority’s decision punishes the state in the exact way the prosecutor sought to avoid.
¶ 35 Both the defendant and the state have a right to a trial decided by a fair and impartial jury. Washington,
¶ 36 I recognize our inquiry does not end with a determination that the trial court is entitled to great deference. We must be satisfied the court has “exercised ‘sound discretion’ in declaring a mistrial.” Id. As the Supreme Court stated in Washington, a trial court’s decision cannot be upheld if it “acts irrationally or irresponsibly.” Id. In this case, the court did not act irrationally or irresponsibly.
¶ 37 The majority first concludes the trial court “could have but did not ask the jurors whether any extraneous information might have come to their attention.” Supra, ¶ 15. But the record shows that polling the jury on this issue was not necessary because it is evident that the jurors were exposed to potentially prejudicial information. When discussing the incident with counsel, the court noted that after L.C. had left the courtroom, “one could hear from inside the courtroom the sound of a woman yelling,” “banging,” and “commotion outside of the court.” The court further stated the jury “could probably also hear [the] noise from outside.” The prosecutor informed the court that law enforcement officers were still outside “clearing the scene ... when the jury was allowed to exit the front of the courthouse.” The court thus reasonably concluded that the jury “knew ... [L.C.] had been stopped” by police. And, the court’s belief was confirmed when the court reporter indicated she had heard two jurors “discussing that the person being arrested ... was [L.C.].” Woods does not dispute any of this on appeal. Because the record already contained sufficient evidence that the jurors had witnessed the commotion involving L.C., polling the jury on this issue would have served little purpose.
¶ 38 Ideally, as the majority points out, the trial court also could have polled the jurors about their ability to remain impartial despite their observations of L.C.’s outburst and the ensuing commotion. Supra, ¶ 18. Because there were two alternate jurors, the court potentially could have dismissed only those who could not proceed. But, although the record does not show a mistrial was
¶ 39 The majority also concludes the trial court could have given “a curative instruction and admonishment to the jury to disregard any commotion or conduct by L.C. after she left the courtroom.” Supra, ¶ 19. The record does not show that the court explicitly considered giving a curative instruction in response to the state’s request for a mistrial. But explicit findings on alternatives to a mistrial are not required, see Washington,
¶ 40 In denying Woods’s earlier motion for a mistrial based on L.C.’s in-court outburst, the trial court instead decided to give a curative instruction, admonishing the jury to disregard L.C.’s statements. But, at Woods’s urging, the court later withdrew that instruction. Thus, the record shows the court was fully aware of this alternative — and Woods’s opposition to it — when it granted the state’s motion for a mistrial the following day. See State v. Williams,
¶ 41 Based on the record before us, I cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial. See id. ¶ 10. The circumstances leading to the court’s declaration of a mistrial spanned two days. Notably, Woods considered L.C.’s outburst the first day to be so egregious that he moved for a mistrial. Woods clearly believed he was prejudiced by L.C.’s conduct to merit requesting a mistrial at that point. As to the state’s motion for a mistrial made on the second day, the majority takes issue with the fact that neither the state nor the court articulated any prejudice to Woods or the state resulting from L.C.’s conduct. Supra, ¶ 25. But, given Woods’s own motion for a mistrial, and the escalating circumstances leading to the court’s determination, I do not believe such articulation was necessary. See Washington,
¶ 42 The trial court “gave both defense counsel and the prosecutor full opportunity to explain their positions on the propriety of a mistrial.” Id. at 515-16,
. The majority acknowledges that some of the trial spectators had made threats against Woods and the attorneys outside the jury's presence. Supra, n. 5. However, the spectators also made comments that at least one individual "pretty strongly [thought] w[ere] heard by the jury.” The spectators also engaged in "inappropriate behavior,” which included one spectator "changing [his] shirt in the middle of [the] jury proceeding.” These incidents presumably added to the escalating series of events with which the trial court was concerned.