STATE NEWS v MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Docket No. 133682
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 16, 2008
481 Mich 692
Argued March 4, 2008 (Calendar No. 3).
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CAVANAGH, KELLY, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The appropriate time to measure the applicability of a FOIA exemption is when the public body asserts it, unless the exemption provides otherwise. The passage of time and the course of events after the public body asserts the exemption do not affect whether
Justice WEAVER, concurring, agreed with the majority decision, but wrote separately to stress two points that she considered most important with respect to FOIA requests. Justice WEAVER agreed that the appropriate time tо measure whether the public record is exempt is when the public body asserts the exemption. While also agreeing that a public body need not continue to monitor a FOIA request after denying it, Justice WEAVER noted that a party can submit another FOIA request for the record after the denial if the party believes that changed circumstances allow disclosure. The circumstances may have changed over time, but it is those changed circumstances rather than the passage of time that are critical.
Reversed in рart and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
RECORDS — FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT — EXEMPTIONS.
The appropriate time to measure the applicability of an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act is when the public body asserts it, unless the exemption provides otherwise; the passage of time and the course of events after the public body asserts the exemption do not affect whether the public record was initially exempt from disclosure and are not relevant to judicial review of the denial of the request fоr disclosure (
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (by Herschel D. Fink and Brian D. Wassom) for the plaintiff.
Theresa Kelley for the defendant. East Lansing
Amici Curiae:
Debra A. Kowich, Gloria A. Hage, Eileen K. Jennings, Kenneth A. McKanders, Miles J. Postema, Paul J. Tomasi, Catherine L. Dehlin, Victor A. Zambardi, Louis Lessem, and Carol Hustoles for the Regents of the
Bernardi, Ronayne & Glusac (by Kаtherine W. MacKenzie) for the Michigan Association of Broadcasters and the Michigan Press Association.
Stuart J. Dunnings III, Charles Koop, and Kahla D. Arvizu for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, the Michigan Sheriffs’ Association, and the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police.
YOUNG, J. This case involves the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) privacy and law-enforcement-purposes exemptions to a police incident report. Following a notorious assault of several Michigan State University students in a dormitory room, plaintiff State News made a FOIA request that defendant Michigan State University disclose the report. Michigan State resisted this request, claiming that the FOIA privacy and law-enforcement-purposes exemptions permitted it to withhold the requested report. Litigation between the parties ensued, and the Court of Appeals eventually held that the circuit court had erred in determining that the entire report could be withheld. In its decision remanding the case to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals obsеrved that the “subsequent availability of information as a result of later court proceedings in the criminal justice system may well strengthen or weaken the arguments of the parties to a FOIA dispute regarding the applicability” of the exemp-
We conclude that this instruction from the Court of Appeals was erroneous and hold that unless the exemption asserted provides otherwise, the applicability of a FOIA exemption is measured when the public body asserts the exemption. The passage of time and the course of events after the assertion of a FOIA exception do not affect whether a public record was initially exempt from disclosure.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and remand this case to the circuit court, in accordance with the remainder of the Court of Appeals judgment that ordered an in camera inspection of the police incident report for the circuit сourt to decide what information is exempt from disclosure and to make particularized findings to support its conclusion, as well as to separate, if possible, the exempt material from the nonexempt material.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 2, 2006, State News submitted a FOIA request to Michigan State seeking disclosure of a police incident report that detailed an incident at Hubbard Hall, a student dormitory at Michigan State, on February 23, 2006. Three male assailants, one of whom was a Michigan State student, allegedly entered a dorm room, thrеatened three victims with a gun, and poured gasoline on one of the individuals while threatening to light him on fire. The three men were later arraigned on charges of home invasion, felonious assault, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. In
Michigan State denied the FOIA request, citing the privacy exemption2 and subsections 1(b)(i) to (iii) of the law-enforcement-purposes exemption.3 State News appealed administratively, and in a letter replying to State News, Michigan State University President Lou Anna K. Simon affirmed the оriginal determination to deny the FOIA request. State News then filed a complaint in the circuit court, accompanied by a motion to show cause why Michigan State should not disclose the report and a motion for summary disposition.4 The circuit court ordered a show cause hearing. Michigan State, in its response, attached affidavits from its FOIA officer, the Michigan State University Chief of Police, and the Ingham County Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney to support its decision to withhold the report. The affidavits stated that the police incident report contained “incident report persons sheets,”5 “narrative incident reports,”6 physical evidence documents,7 inmate profiles and booking photographs, and other information about the suspects.
At the show cause hearing, the circuit court heard arguments from the parties and ruled from the bench in favor of Michigan State, concluding that the report in its entirety was exempt under both the privacy exemption and subsections 1(b)(i) to (iii) of the law-enforcement-purposes exemption. However, the court did not inspect the police incident report in camera before it reached its decision. With respect to the privacy exemption, the court found that some of the information sought, such as names, addresses, birthdates, driver‘s license numbers, and criminal histories of the accused, victims, and witnesses, was information “of a personal nature” and that its disclosure would not further the core purpose of FOIA of shedding light on the workings of government. Thus, according to the circuit court, disclosure of this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
Turning tо the law-enforcement-purposes exemption, the court concluded that the analysis for the privacy exemption also applied to subsection 1(b)(iii) of that exemption, which protects against disclosure of investigating records that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. With respect to subsections 1(b)(i) and (ii) of the law-enforcement-purposes exemption, the court found that Michigan State had made a particularized showing that disclosure of the report would interfere with law-enforcement proceedings or deprive a person of a fair trial. The court relied on affidavits from the police chief and the chief assistant prosecuting attorney stating that the poten-
State News appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a published opinion per curiam, remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings.8 The panel identified several errors committed by the circuit court. It first addressed the circuit court‘s handling of the law-enforcement-purposes exemption. Citing Evening News Ass‘n v City of Troy,9 the Court of Appeals held that with respect to subsections 1(b)(i) and (ii), the circuit court had failed to offer particularized reasons to justify its conclusion that the entire police incident report was exempt from disclosure. With respect to subsection 1(b)(iii), the panel, relying on United States Dep‘t of Justice v Reporters Comm for Freedom of the Press,10 suggested the possibility that the names or addresses of the suspects or other information identifying them in the police incident report might be exemptible.
The panel then addressed the circuit court‘s handling of the privacy exemption. It followed the two-part test for the privacy exemption developed by this Court in Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed,11 and Mager v Dep‘t of State Police.12 Concerning the first prong of the test, the panel stated that, “as a hypotheti-
Next, the Court of Appeals, again citing Evening News, held that on remand the circuit court should review the requested information in camera. In addition, the panel held that the exempt and nonexempt material should be separated to the extent practicable, with the nonexempt material made available to State News.14
Michigan State sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to appeal on a limited basis and denied leave in all other respects.15
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo as a question of law issues of statutory interpretation.16 We give effect to the Legislature‘s intent as expressed in the language of
THE EFFECT OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME
We granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether the Court of Appeals erred in instructing [the circuit court], on remand, regarding the “personal nature” of public records covered by the Freedom of Information Act privacy exemption18 or the law enforcement purposes privacy exemption,19 including whether the “personal nature” of such records may be affected by the contemporaneous or later public status of some or all of the information.20
The Court of Appeals made the following observation about the effect of the passage of time on the FOIA exemptions in this case:
We note at the outset that the passage of time may have affected aspects of this appeal and that, while we can make some observations based on the record, there are other aspects about which we can only speculate. We know from the record that before it made its FOIA request to MSU, State News had already identified the three men arrested at Hubbard Hall. Thus, аt least the names of these men and some identifying information about them were in the
Rather obviously, public bodies and trial courts can only make decisions on FOIA matters on the basis of the information that is before them at the time, and it is not the function of appellate courts to second-guess those decisions on the basis of information that later becomes available. Here, because we do not have the any information about what may have transpired after the trial court‘s June 8 decision, we could not engage in such second-guessing in any event. We do observe, however, that the subsequent availability of information as a result of later court proceedings in the criminal justice system may well strengthen or weaken the arguments of the parties to a FOIA dispute regarding the applicability of the privacy exemption and the law-enforcement-purpose exemption.
As a practical matter, we suspect that this subsequent information, of which the trial court can take judicial notice on remand under appropriate procedures, will weaken MSU‘s position and strengthen State News‘s position. But, ironically, the newsworthiness of the information contained in the police incident report may also have decreased over time. Howеver, FOIA is not concerned with newsworthiness. Rather, it is concerned with requiring the
The panel reiterated this observation when it discussed the first prong of the privacy exemption and noted that “the passage of time and the course of events may have rendered some, if not all, of this information matters of public knowledge and therefore not of a personal nature.”23
We agree with the Court of Appeals statement that “public bоdies and trial courts can only make decisions on FOIA matters on the basis of the information that is before them at the time, and it is not the function of appellate courts to second-guess those decisions on the basis of information that later becomes available.” We disagree, however, with the panel‘s further, contrary musings that the passage of time and subsequent events could negate the applicability of a FOIA exemption. Rather, we hold that unless the FOIA exemption provides otherwise,24 the appropriate time to measure whether a public record is exempt under a particular FOIA exemption is the time when the public body asserts the exemption.
The denial of a FOIA request occurs at a definite point in time. The public body relies on the information available to it at that time to make a legal judgment whether the requested public record is fully or partially exempt from disclosure. The determinative legal question for a judicial body reviewing the denial is whether
Further, the procedures in FOIA for submitting a FOIA request, reviewing the FOIA request, and appealing that review suggest that the timing of the public body‘s response to the FOIA request is crucial to deciding whether the requested record is exempt. FOIA requires the public body to respond to a FOIA request within 5 business days, with a possible extension of not more than 10 business days.26 There is no language in that provision or elsewhere in FOIA that requires a public body to continue to monitor FOIA requests once they have been denied.27 FOIA does not prevent a party that unsuccessfully requested a public record from submitting another FOIA request for that public record
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and hold that events that occur after a public body‘s denial of a FOIA request are not relevant to the judicial review of the decision. Thus, in this case, the passage of time and course of events have no bearing on whether Michigan State properly denied State News‘s FOIA request under the privacy exemption and the law-enforcement-purpose exemption. Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.28
TAYLOR, C.J. and CAVANAGH, KELLY, CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
WEAVER, J. (concurring). I concur in the decision reached by the majority, but write separately to stress
First, I agree that the appropriate time to measure if a public record is exempt under a particular FOIA exemption is when the public body asserts the exemption. Second, while I agreе that “[t]here is no language in [
Notes
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act any of the following:
(a) Information of a personal nature if public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual‘s privacy.
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act any of the following:
*
*
*
(b) Investigating records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that disclosure as a public record would do any of the following:
(i) Interfere with law enforcement proceedings.
(ii) Deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial administrative adjudication.
(iii) Constitute an unwarrаnted invasion of personal privacy.
In Michigan Federation of Teachers, we also addressed whether information can be “of a personal nature” and whether an individual retains a privacy interest in that information if it might bе found elsewhere in the public domain at the time of the FOIA request. We held that “[t]he disclosure of information of a personal nature into the public sphere in certain instances does not automatically remove the protection of the privacy exemption and subject the information to disclosure in every other circumstance.” Id. at 680. Michigan Federation of Teachers quoted with approval the United States Supreme Court‘s observation that ” ‘[a]n individual‘s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissоlve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form.’ ” Id. at 679, quoting United States Dep‘t of Defense v Fed Labor Relations Auth, 510 US 487, 500; 114 S Ct 1006; 127 L Ed 2d 325 (1994). As with the modified Bradley definition, these holdings must guide the circuit court on remand when it applies the privacy exemption and the law-enforcement-purposes exemption to the facts of this case.
