Only the validity of the service of process on the Secretary of State was passed on by the court below and is presented on this appeal. That validity depends upon an affirmative answer to two questions, to which the controversy has been narrowed in the argument: Was the defendant doing business in this State, upon the facts found by Judge Stevens? Does the statute authоrize service of process on the Secretary of State after the business, once carried on, has been disсontinued ?
It has been frequently pointed out that no satisfactory general definition can be made of the phrase “dоing business” as found in our statutes,
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and that, generally speaking, each case must be determined on its own facts. “No all-embraсing rule as to wbat is 'doing business’ has been laid down. The question is one of fact, and must be determined largely according to the fаcts of each individual case, rather than by the application of fixed, definite, and precise rules.”
Timber Co. v. Ins. Co.,
The objective of the law in which the phrase is found — its purpose and orientation to the carrying on of business' — must also be considerеd. For instance, licensing and taxing laws have been held to contemplate more extensive activities than would be required of a statute the purpose of which is to bring a corporation into the jurisdiction of the court. In
Knutson v. Campbell,
“ ‘Doing business,’ to bring an аlien within jurisdiction of local courts, does not mean that corporation must maintain such relation to ‘doing business’ as to bring it within stаtute requiring license, though enough business must be done to enable court to say that corporation is present.” C. T. H. Corporation v. Maxwell, supra.
In
Parris v. Fischer Co.,
The Court has been careful not to bring within the purview of the statute sporadic activities оf a foreign corporation which are not directly in performance of its charter functions, or which are not of such a character as to indicate a course of business which might be expected to recur as oppоrtunity offered; but the nature of the activities themselves, their magnitude, the multiplicity of contacts, the possibility that incidents may оccur and liabilities be created — especially where the entrance into the State is in the ordinary proseсution of the business which the corporation is chartered to carry on and is carrying on, and which definitely regards the State as a theater for future transactions of a like sort as often as occasion might arise — these are importаnt considerations in determining whether a corporation is, in a given instance, doing business in the State. On a single visitation to the Stаte the matter in hand may explode into a multitude of transactions of far-reaching importance.
Perhaps what is said by
Chief Justice Stacy
in
Ruark v. Trust Co.,
Refеrence to the purpose of the statute may throw some light upon the propriety of its application in particular instances, as in this. Obviously, that purpose was, in recognition of reciprocal duties, to prevent a foreign сorporation from accepting the protection of our laws in the transaction of its ordinary business, creatе obligations, and by reason of its remoteness from any forum available to a local citizen, secure immunity from liability. 'Within reаsonable limits the statute should be liberally construed to accomplish its remedial purpose.
In the case before us; the single trip of the Severance into our waters resolved itself into numerous transactions, lasting over a considerable period of time, and in one alleged liability of considеrable moment. The Severance entered the port and discharged a part of its cargo in the regular course of the business for which it had been chartered, and as a regular carrier of freight in the coastwise trade, was not making a casual entry into port, but one which would be repeated as often as it could obtain a cargo. Under the construction of the stаtute contended for by the appellant, the Severance might ply its trade in every port from Seattle to Bangor and back again, lеaving a trail of obligations in its wake, and never “do business” in any state, or become subject to any statute designed to bring it into court upon that basis.
The statute imposes no hardship upon the corporation comparable to that which would be imposed upon the ordinary citizen by forcing him to bring his suit in a distant court. It is a manifestation in the law of the principle of “livе and let live”; and we are of the opinion that appellant accepted its terms when, under the conditions set out, it entered the Port of Wilmington and engaged in the various activities disclosed in the findings of fact.
Anderson v. U. S. Fidelity Co.,
The evidence is sufficient to support the findings of fact made by the court below, and we are bound by them.
Shoenith, Inc., v. Mfg. Co.,
We do not regard the second query — that is, whether thе statute authorizes service upon the Secretary of State upon discontinuance of the business out of which the оbligation arises — as an open question here. In
Fisher v. Ins. Co.,
We think the service of process upon the Secretary of State is valid, and sufficient to bring the defendant into court, and we so hold.
Judgment of the lower court is
Affirmed.