AMBURGEY v. XU
Court of Appeals of Indiana
974 N.E.2d 716
While Indiana has not addressed this specific issue, we observe that some of our sister states have concluded that the running of a statute of limitations with respect to a рhysician does not preclude a complaint against a hospital on a theory of vicarious liability and apparent authority. See Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare--Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98, 112 (Tenn.2010) (observing that the plaintiffs filed a proper vicarious liability claim agаinst a hospital before their claims against a doctor were extinguished by operation of law and holding that the subsequent procedural bar of their claims against the doctor did not prevent the plaintiffs frоm pursuing their timely filed vicarious liability claim against the hospital); Kashishian v. Port, 167 Wis.2d 24, 481 N.W.2d 277, 286-287 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of apparent authority could be a basis for a medical malpractice action against a hospital for thе negligent acts of independent contractors, that the dismissal of the independent contractor based upon the failure to timely file a notice of claim was not a determination of the physiciаn‘s negligence, and that such a dismissal was appropriate despite the fact that the suit could be maintained against the hospital), reconsideration denied; Pamperin v. Trinity Mem‘l Hosp., 144 Wis.2d 188, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (noting that the statute of limitations hаd run against the negligent doctors and they could not be joined as defendants; the majority in Pamperin allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their lawsuit against the hospital).
CONCLUSION
In light of Sword and the foregoing authorities which we find persuasive, as well as our review of the designated evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Amburgey‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in finding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the claim of аpparent agency.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant-Intervening Defendant, Alan Steady, Appellee-Defendant, v. Richard KERN, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 49A02-1201-CT-34.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Sept. 20, 2012.
974 N.E.2d 716
Robert R. Foos, Jr., Lesley A. Pfleging, Lewis Wagner, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
OPINION
ROBB, Chief Judge.
Case Summary and Issue
A jury found Alan Steady one-hundred percent at fault for injuries Ronald Kern sustained when the two were involved in a car accident, and a $98,000 judgment was entered against Steady to compensate Kern for his injuries. Because Steady was only insured up to $25,000, State Farm, Kern‘s insurer, paid Kern underinsured motorist benefits. Steady requested that the trial court deem the judgment аgainst him satisfied because Kern was compensated by State Farm, and the trial court granted Steady‘s motion. State Farm appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred when it deemеd the judgment entered against Steady satisfied. Concluding the trial court did err, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2006, Kern and Steady collided while driving their vehicles, and the accident resulted in various bodily injuries to Kern. Kern brought suit against Steady to recover for his injuries, and Kern‘s insurer, State Farm, intervened as a party defendant. Kern‘s insurance policy with State Farm provided for medical costs and underinsured motorist coverage. After Kеrn filed a motion in limine, State Farm was removed as a named party. In March 2011, a jury found Steady one-hundred percent at fault, determined Kern‘s damages were $98,000, and returned a verdict for such amount. The trial court entered a general judgment on the jury verdict in favor of Kern and against Steady in the amount of $98,000 plus costs and interest.
Because Steady‘s insurance policy included a $25,000 limit, State Farm issued a check to Kern in the amount of $68,000.1 Steady‘s insurer issued two checks to Kern, one for $25,000, the limit of Steady‘s policy, and a second for $6,334.79 for medical costs and interest. State Farm moved the trial court to allow it to be realigned as a рarty plaintiff so that it could execute against the judgment as a subrogee of Kern to the extent of the payments State Farm made to Kern. The trial court denied State Farm‘s motion. Thereafter, Steady moved the trial court to deem the judgment entered against him as satisfied. The trial court granted Steady‘s motion.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
II. Satisfaction of Judgment
As a threshold matter, Steady argues State Farm lacks standing to appeal. “Standing is similar to, though not identical with, the real party in interest requirement of Trial Rule 17. The point of both requirements is to insure that the party before the court has a substantive right to еnforce the claim that is being made in the litigation.” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind.1995) (citations omitted). “Standing is defined as having sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. In order to havе standing, the party challenging the law must show adequate injury or the immediate danger of sustaining some injury.” Indiana Civil Rights Comm‘n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 716 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind.1999) (quotations omitted).
Steady argues State Farm lacks standing because State Farm was not a party to the case at the time judgment wаs entered against Steady. We disagree. Although State Farm was not a party to the proceeding, it did sustain a tangible injury by the trial court deeming the judgment against Steady satisfied. Indiana‘s Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coveragе Act requires insurers to offer coverage to their insureds for automobile accidents in which they are entitled to recover damages from uninsured or underinsured motorists. See
The insurer shall be subrogated, to the extent of such [uninsured or underinsured motorist] payment, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may later result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of [the insured] against any person or organization legally responsible for said bodily injury or death, or property damage, for which payment is made by the insurer. Such insurer may enfоrce such rights in its own name or in the name of the [insured] ....
We now turn to the merits of State Farm‘s appeal. State Farm contends the trial court erred by deeming the judgment against Stеady satisfied. State Farm cites Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, for support. In Peele, Gillespie was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in Peele‘s vehicle. Gillespie sued Peele and sought damages for his injuries, but Gillespie also filed an underinsured motorist claim with his insurer, Prudential Insurance Company of America. Pruden-
We disagreed with Peele, noting that insurance policies typically include a subrogation clause which provides that once an insured receives payment from a third-party tortfeasor, the insurer is entitled to reimbursement for the amount of benefits it previously paid to the insured. Thus, insureds typically do not end up with a double recovery. In Peele, however, Prudential missed its opportunity to subrogate Gillespie‘s proceeds because Prudential failed to abide by the requirements of its policy and statutory law, so Gillespie was in a position to possibly receive a double recovery. Despite this fact, we concluded, “Peele is not entitled to benefit from Gillespie‘s prudence in obtaining insurance coverage or from Prudential‘s failure to abide by its policy provisions and statutory law. Instead, we find it proper for the benefit to inure to Gillespie.” Id. at 959.
Rather than moving for setoff, Steady moved the trial court to deem the judgment against him satisfied because Kern was paid underinsured motorist benefits by his insurer. Despite this difference, the principle remains the same. When an insurer compensates its insured due to a third party tortfeasor being underinsured, the third party tortfeasor‘s liability is not reduced. Rather, Indiana Code section 27-7-5-6(a) provides that the insurer may enforce its insured‘s right of recovery against the third-pаrty tortfeasor, either in its own name or in the name of its insured, and that the insurer shall then be subrogated to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that results.2 To allow a judgment entered against the third-party tortfeаsor to be deemed satisfied due to the insurer‘s underinsured motorist payment to its insured would undermine the purpose of this statute. Thus, we conclude that when a judgment is entered against a third-party tortfeasor, said judgment is not sаtisfied when the plaintiff‘s insurer compensates the plaintiff due to the third-party tortfeasor‘s being underinsured. Steady is not entitled to benefit from Kern‘s carefulness and assiduousness in obtaining underinsured motorist insurance coverage. The trial court therefore erred in deeming the judgment against Steady satisfied.3
Conclusion
The judgment entered against Steady should not have been deemed satisfied due to State Farm‘s underinsured motorist coverage payment to Kern, and therefore the trial court erred. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
BAKER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.