Carl F. and Debbie Townsend purchased, on August 14, 1981, an automobile policy from plaintiff State Farm through agent Bill Ridge. The policy described the Town-sends 1969 Chevrolet Impala which was the Townsends’ only operable family automobile. The policy provided coverage for a period from August 14, 1981 to November 14, 1981.
*334 On October 22, 1981, one Randy Throg-martin was sentenced to 30 days in the county jail and was afraid tо leave his car at his home during that period for fear his brothers would drive the car. Throgmartin had heard that the Townsends’ only had one car and sometimes they needed a second car for еrrands. Townsend agreed to keep the car at the end of his driveway. Throgmartin placed no restrictions on the Townsends’ use of the car. Mr. Townsend intended to use the car on the three or fоur days a week that his wife worked to go to the grocery store or pick his children up from school if the neighbor did not pick them up.
Townsend drove the car to his home on the 22nd; he drove it oncе on the 26th and again in the evening of the 26th when he was in an accident with defendant Schmidt.
Schmidt filed suit against Townsend and Throgmartin. Throgmartin had no insurance on the automobile. The policy that Townsend had with Stаte Farm provides:
“Coverage for the Use of Other Cars”
“The liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, or a newly-acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car.”
“Non-Owned car — means a car not:
1. owned by,
2. registered in the name of, or
3. furnished or available for the regular оr frequent use of: you, your spouse, or any relatives.”
State Farm brought this action seeking to determine that the liability coverage extended to Carl and Debbie Townsend did not extend to the acсident because the Throgmartin car was not a “non-owned” automobile under the terms of Townsends’ policy.
The trial court found that Throgmartin’s auto was not furnished for Townsends’ regular or frequent use and therefore was a non-owned auto within the provisions of Townsends’ policy. State Farm appeals and we affirm.
I.
The appellant claims the trial court erred in permitting Townsend to testify as tо a statement his insurance agent made to him after the accident. The appellant made no objection to the question and answer at the time of trial. The error, if any, was not proрerly preserved.
See State v. Pardock,
II.
State Farm contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Dodge Charger, although furnished or available to Townsend, had not been furnished for his regular or frequent use and was thеrefore a “non-owned car” within the meaning of the policy.
State Farm does not challenge any of the District Court’s findings of facts. They contend, however, that the court reached an erroneous conclusion of law after finding that the car was loaned for the thirty days that Throgmartin was to be incarcerated and then determining that because the car was loaned only for that period of time there was no “regular or frequent” use of the vehicle. State Farm argues that the issue is not whether the insured actually used the automobile on a “regular and frequent” basis but whether the insurеd could have made regular or frequent use of the vehicle and that the opportunity to make frequent use whenever he desires is more important than the actual use.
Except in determining thе legal consequences of the policy, we do not review the case de novo but only on errors assigned.
Bringle v. Economy Fire and Casualty,
“The purpose of a nonownership clause, such as the one in question, is to provide the insured with coverage while the insured is engaged in the
occasional
or
infrequent use
of an automobile other than the one specified in the policy, but not to provide liability coverage in regard to unspecified automobiles which are furnished or available for the insured’s frequent or regular use.”
Francis v. Farmers Casualty Co.,
No hard and fast rule has been nor can be established for determining the question of what constitutes furnishing for regular use, but each case must stand or fall on the particular facts before the court. Id. at 883. We lоok therefore at the facts in this record. The arrangement was initiated by Throgmartin for his convenience and purpose, that being a place to keep the car while he was in jail. The car was made available to Townsend for a limited period of time (the period of incarceration). Townsend also intended to make limited use of the ear during the thirty-day period. Prior to the accident Townsend had only driven the vehicle two times in a four-day period for his own purpose. He had also driven the car home from Throgmartin’s home. The arrangement between the parties contemplated use of the automobile by Townsend three or four days a week maximum. (That being the days his wife worked and the family car was not available.) He would use the car to pick up his children on these days if the neighbor did not pick up the children. He would also use the car to go to the grocery store if the other car was not available. The family went to the grocеry store two or three times a week. Therefore it was contemplated that the car would be driven short distances every two or three days, or an anticipated fifteen times during the periоd. The brief history of use is in accord with this arrangement. Although anticipated mileage is not a part of the record, it could not have been great.
The agreement between the parties did not contemplate that the vehicle was to be used regularly. State Farm argues that because Townsend had access to the car at all times that this fact is the sole controlling and detеrminative issue. We disagree. We must look at the record as a whole. In the Bingle ease at page 882, relied on by State Farm, the Iowa Supreme Court found a vehicle was furnished by an employer for insured employees’ use in the sense that it was supplied, afforded or provided specifically for the employees’ use whenever such was required for the purpose for which the vehicle was made available. The purpose for which the vehicle here was made available to Townsend, as shown by the uncon-troverted evidence, was to keep the vehicle whilе Throgmartin was in jail and keep it away from Throgmartin’s brothers. The use of the vehicle was a benefit of the arrangement.
Bingle
at 882 sets forth certain guideposts for determining the issue of regular use. We havе considered these signposts but note that the court’s discussion of signposts has evolved from accidents occurring while employees were driving employers’ vehicles. No employer-emрloyee relationship exists here. This was a one-time arrangement of limited duration. The use was incidental to the purpose for which the vehicle was taken to Townsend,
*336
to keep it during the оwner’s incarceration. The use that Townsend was to make of the car was casual or random, not predictable. He would use it
if
his wife had their car and
if
the neighbor did not pick the children up at school and he would use it i/his wife had the car and
if
he needed to go to the grocery store. The actual usage would be minimal.
Bringle
at 882. If the use for which the vehicle was furnished was an irregular, infrequent or casual one, it wоuld not come within the exclusionary clause and would be covered by the policy.
General Casualty v. Hines,
We have considered
Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America v. Continental Casualty Co.,
We distinguish the following cases where coverage was denied:
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Estate of Johnson,
We affirm the trial court.
AFFIRMED.