188 Conn. 152 | Conn. | 1982
The defendant insurance commissioner has appealed to this court from judgments deciding the issues for the three plaintiffs, which are insurance companies related to each other under the State Farm aegis selling different forms of insurance protection. Each plaintiff had separately appealed to the trial court from the action of the defendant in imposing restrictions upon the renewal of its license to do business in this state. These licenses were renewed effective on May 1, 1976, in accordance with General Statutes § 38-20,
The restriction imposed by the defendant upon the licenses issued on May 1,1976, limited the activities of the plaintiffs in this state to the renewal of insurance policies previously issued to Connecticut residents and to other policyholders who might later come to reside in this state. This action of the commissioner resulted from a controversy over the practices of the plaintiffs in soliciting business in Connecticut, particularly whether they were obligated to do so more actively. The effect of the restriction was to prohibit the plaintiffs from writing any new insurance business in Connecticut.
The plaintiffs claimed in the trial court that the commissioner had no “just cause” to impose the restriction under the authority of the licensing statute, § 38-20, and also made several claims of unconstitutionality. The trial court sustained their appeals, however, upon the more limited ground that the commissioner’s policy of compelling insurance companies licensed to do business in Connecticut to serve all residents of the state could be implemented only by the issuance of an appropriate regulation in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes § 4-168.
In appealing from the decision of the trial court the commissioner maintains that his action in restricting the plaintiffs’ licenses did not require the prior promulgation of a regulation. His further contention is that the case should have been remanded in accordance with his pretrial motion,
“It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.” Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944). Although they concede the expiration on May 1, 1977, of the licenses which are the subject matter of the litigation, the parties separately advance several reasons to support their joint position that a real dispute still survives and that the case is not moribund for mootness.
The commissioner argues that the judgments of the trial court in sustaining the appeals implicitly require him to issue future licenses to the plaintiffs on an unrestricted basis. No such construction of the judgments, which by their terms merely sustain the appeals relating solely to the 1976-1977 licenses, is warranted. Nothing in the record suggests the judgments had any effect but to vitiate the limitations upon those licenses for the period during which they were effective or until some further action of the commissioner. Reference has been made to a separate suit brought by the plaintiffs when the commissioner attempted to conduct a hearing regarding the renewal of their licenses in
The commissioner next points to the enactment of amendments to § 38-20 effectuated by Public Acts 1981, No. 81-101, §§ 7 (a) and 7 (b) effective October 1, 1981.
The principal concern of the commissioner in contesting a dismissal for mootness appears to be whether any regulation could be applied retroactively to the claimed unethical conduct of the plaintiffs in breaching certain commitments said to have been made to him. This reluctance to let bygones be bygones where ethical principles may be involved may be commendable but does not by itself entitle him to a resolution of the issue by this court, even if that were possible on the present state of the record, which it is not. The parties concede that we cannot now resolve that issue because of the absence of any evidentiary hearing. Unless such a determination would provide the basis for action by the commissioner at some future licensing proceeding the situation would be one where “no practical relief can follow.” Reynolds v. Vroom, supra. Past conduct of an applicant may reflect present character and,, therefore, be a pertinent, though not necessarily controlling, consideration in a licensing proceeding. The relevance of any misconduct of these plaintiffs, which are corporate entities likely to have undergone some personnel changes in the six years which have passed since this action was brought, to their current qualifications for insurance licenses can more readily be determined at a hearing for that purpose than upon a remand of this case focusing exclusively on the events of six years ago.
The plaintiffs as well as the commissioner place great reliance upon the recognized exception to the mootness doctrine for situations which are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific
The plaintiffs make a further claim that the licensing statute, § 38-20, does not authorize the
The appeal is dismissed for mootness.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 38-20, as it read in 1976, was as follows: “AUTHORITY TO DO BUSINESS. REVOCATION. FINES. COMPANY OWNED BY FOREIGN STATE OR COMPANY CONTROLLED BY INSUREDS NOT TO BE licensed, appeals. No insurance company shall do any insurance business within this state until and except while it is permitted to do so under the terms of a license issued by the commissioner. Any such company desiring to obtain such a license shall make application to the commissioner, setting forth the lines of insurance which it desires to write. It shall file with the commissioner a certified copy of its charter or articles of association and evidence satisfactory to the commissioner that it has complied with the laws of the state or country under which it is organized and a statement of its financial condition in such form as is required by the commissioner, together with such evidence of its correctness as the commissioner requires. If the information furnished is satisfactory to the commissioner and if all other requirements of law have been complied with, he may issue Jo such company a license permitting it to do business in this state. Each such license shall expire on the first day of May succeeding the date of its issuance, but may be renewed without any formalities except as required by the commissioner. The commissioner may, at any time, for cause, suspend, revoke or reissue any such license or in lieu of or in addition to suspension or revocation
Public Acts 1981, No. 81-101, provides, in relevant part: “Sec. 7. Section 38-20 oí the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof: (a) No insurance company shall do any insurance business within this state until and except while it is permitted to do so under the terms of a license issued by the commissioner. Any such company desiring to obtain such a license shall make application to the commissioner, setting forth the lines of insurance which it desires to write. It shall file with the commissioner a certified copy of its charter or articles of association and evidence satisfactory to the commissioner that it has complied with the laws of the jurisdiction under which it is organized, a statement of its financial condition in such form as is required by the commissioner, together with such evidence of its correctness as the commissioner requires and evidence of good management in such form as is required by the commissioner. Applicant companies licensed in and operated from administrative offices in one state but domiciled in another state shall provide justification of such arrangement, satisfactory to the commissioner, which shall demonstrate that
See footnote 4, infra.
The commissioner has issued regulations in accordance with his statutory authority which became effective on June 3, 1982, the day before argument of this appeal. Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 38-20-1 through 38-20-5. These regulations apply to any .unlicensed insurance company seeking to solicit or market insurance products in this state and include provisions implementing § 7 (a) of Public Acts 1981, No. 81-101. See Insurance Regulations § 38-20-3 (B) (1) and (2).
Practice Book § 3012 (a) provides as follows: “The appellant shall submit ... to the chief clerk of the supreme court at the time a copy of the appeal is sent: (a) A preliminary statement of the issues intended for presentation on appeal. If the appellee wishes to present for review alternate grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed, or if he wishes to present for review adverse rulings or decisions of the court which should be considered on appeal in the event the appellant is awarded a now trial, he may file a preliminary statement of issues within fourteen days from the filing of the appeal.”