This сase is before us on remand from the Supreme Court for our consideration of language in the no-fault act’s “household exclusion,” MCL 500.3123(l)(b); MSA 24.13123(1)(b), whiсh excludes property protection insurance coverage for intrafamily property damage claims related to motor vehicle accidents. We conclude that the household exclusion’s reference to “a property protectiоn insurance policy” refers solely to the insurance policy covering the vehicle or vehicles involved in the accident. We therefore reaffirm our previous disposition reversing the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant and remand.
*107 i
The underlying facts оf this case were set forth in our previous decision,
This case stems from an accident that occurred when Ibrahim Mroue, while operating a rented truck, struck real and personal property owned by Mroue’s business. The accident caused $61,879.81 worth of damage, which рlaintiff paid to Mroue. Upon payment, plaintiff became subrogated to the rights of Mroue against defendant, the insurer of the truck. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the vehicle insurance policy the rental company had on the truck should provide indemnificatiоn to plaintiff for the amount it paid to Mroue for the damage to the real property.
In our earlier decision, we determined thаt summary disposition for defendant was improper because Mroue was not a named insured on the policy covering the rental truсk and, as such, was not a person named in “a property protection insurance policy” so as to exclude his property damage claim under the no-fault act’s household exclusion. Id. at 470. We remanded the case to the trial court for further procеedings. Id.
Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave, the Supreme Court, remanded the case to this Court to consider whether the statutory language “by a person named in a property protection insurance policy,” MCL 500.3123; MSA 24.13123,
limits the inquiry under § 3123 sоlely to the property protection insurance policy that covers the “vehicle involved in the motor vehicle acсident out of which the property damage arose,” or whether damage is excluded from property *108 protection benefits if the property owner was named in any property protection insurance policy. [State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Old Republic Ins Co,461 Mich 924 (1999) (emphasis in original).]
n
The cardinal rule in interprеting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
in
Undеr MCL 500.3123; MSA 24.13123, a no-fault insurer’s liability to pay property protection benefits is subject to certain statutory exceptions. Turner, supra at 28-29. Section 3123 provides:
(1) Damage to thе following kinds of property is excluded from property protection insurance benefits:
* ^ He
*109 (b) Property owned by a person named in a property protection insurance policy, the person’s spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the same hоusehold, if the person named, the person’s spouse, or the relative was the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose.
Our review of the no-fault act leads оnly to the conclusion that the statutory language, “by a person named in a property protection insurance policy,” refers to the property protection insurance policy of the vehicle or vehicles involved in the accident at issue. We find no contextual evidence in the no-fault act that the Legislature intended the household exclusion to broadly apply to a person named in any property protection insurance policy. The no-fault act uses the phrase “a policy” in reference to personal protection insurance benefits and personal injury insurance benefits under the no-fault act. MCL 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1). In § 3123, the reference to “a person named in a property protection insurance policy” is followed thereafter with “if the person named . . . wаs the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property dаmage arose.”
We do not find the use of the article “a” in this instance to be of particular significance. The use of the word “a” аppears to be dictated by the grammatical construction of the sentence and the fact that the matter at issue is “the motor vehicle accident” rather than the policy or the vehicle, both of which are preceded by the use of the indefinite article “a.” Moreover, we recognize, as apparently did the Legislature, that an accident may involve more than one vehiсle and more than one policy, thereby precluding the use *110 of the definite article “the” before those words. See MCL 500.3125; MSA 24.13125; see also Turner, supra at 34-35, 44-45.
In case law that has addressed the household exclusion we find no indication that the Legislature intended a universal reference to
any
named insured in
any
policy. The clear presumption in the legal analyses is that the household exclusion was intended to exclude from automobile no-fault coverage property damage covered by a homeowner’s policy of the insured or a household member who is also the owner, registrant, or operator of the vehicle involved. 41 ALR4th 973;
Shavers v Attorney General,
Finally, in interpreting no-fault exclusionary clauses, the cоurts have referred to the financial responsibility act, MCL 257.501
et seq.;
MSA 9.2201
et seq.,
as a guidepost for interpreting statutory insurance exclusions.
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co v Roe (On Rehearing),
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
