State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka

& FARM FIRE CASUALTY STATE

CO., Petitioner/Appellant, A, Special

James C. WICK Administrator Stephen Bradley Estate Defendant,

Kintop, Peterson, Respondent.

Paul R.

No. C4-90-312.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 30, 1991. Kintop whimper

son heard as he reloaded approached. Kintop and then killed him- self. erratic, abusive,

Incidents of and violent relationship behavior characterized the be- Kintop Hughes. April tween and In 1981, Kintop threatened to kill himself Hughes relationship, should end their showing gun her a as he uttered the threat. later, A driving Hughes, month while with Kintop pulled to the side of the and road punched Hughes in the face several times. Hart, Dodge, Kenneth William M. W. Again, driving Hughes while with in June Geer, Meagher Minneapolis, petition- for & 1981, Kintop pulled Hughes’ head into appellant. er/ accelerated, lap his and claiming he was Koller, Herzog, W. Scott Peter A. Moss going to kill them Hughes both. When Barnett, Minneapolis, respondent. & finally relationship ended the in November 1982, Kintop rape Hughes tried to

then through shoved his head her bedroom 28, 1982, just days wall. On December death, Kintop again before own assault- OPINION Hughes. spending night ed While in guest, Kintop her home as an invited GARDEBRING, Justice. times, Hughes pulled struck several out issues, This case raises two the first le- hair, spoke language, her in weird gal evidentiary, involving and the second morning, licked her head. The next how- whether an intentional act exclusion of a ever, Kintop though nothing acted as un- liability policy applies homeowner’s to the happened. usual had who, conduct an insured because of men- Although Hughes begun dating had Pe- illness, may tal lack the to form 1982, Kintop terson in contin- November injure. light public the intent seeing Hughes socially, ued and when Kin- policy favoring coverage where top Hughes arrived at the home around general public, threatens the we construe 31, 1982, Hughes 3:00 a.m. on December policy language providing coverage inside, him where, allowed inside. Once the two because of mental in- Hughes until received a tele- conversed product sured’s act is the of a failure of the phone Realizing call from Peterson. cognitive capacities. insured’s volitional or phone Hughes,

Peterson was on the with Kintop Hughes, tearing off her attacked I. finger as he thrust his down her bathrobe early morning On the of December Kintop throat to stifle her cries. then lift- 1982, Stephen Kintop B. stormed into the head, Hughes ed over his threw her to the living ex-girlfriend, room of his Colleen floor, later, Kintop A and fled. short time Hughes, smashing through the front door Hughes called to tell that she would never pistol Standing with his hand. again. see him Peterson later arrived at Peterson, Hughes’ living room was Paul R. Hughes home and chatted with one of acquaintance Kintop’s then who was roommates, Hughes’ gun Kintop, until dating Hughes. Upon seeing gun hand, through burst the door into the by Kintop, brandished Peterson fled living room. through the back door into the street out- Kintop pursued. Firing side. Despite injuries as he chased severe multi- Peterson, fleeing wounds, Kintop ple gunshot shot Peterson Peterson survived to times, wounding hip several him Kintop’s damages. in the sue estate for Defense Collapsing conscious, head. but still Fire Peter- of the suit was tendered to State Farm (State Farm), prohibited Company testimony regarding ca- Casualty

& Kintop’s parents.1 carrier for pacity knowledge homeowner’s of another without direct under The tort claim was settled a Miller- of the individual. The second trial court Kintop’s Shugart agreement, in which es- reasoned intent could be inferred rights against to its assigned tate Peterson Kintop’s voluntary based and on actions his policy. State Farm under the State Farm It stated: intoxication. * * * present declaratory judg- the commenced Kintop The actions of Mr. were action, disputing coverage ment based on certainly qualify bizarre and as wanton exclusion, act” policy’s the “intentional He malicious. came to his friends provides: which house, pulled gun, a vic- chased the [sic] Coverage Liability 1. L—Personal tim several blocks and shot him several Payments Coverage M—Medical to Oth- times. A trier of could fact not conclude apply ers do not to: other than that there was an to (a) bodily injury property damage injure victim. the , expected by which or intended the [Kintop] act, Because committed an an * * * insured; intent, element of which is and because After the trial court denied State Farm’s [Kintop] voluntarily was at intoxicated summary judgment initial for motion act, of the time the of the his commission August of the case went to trial act is to been deemed have intentional September of jury before a the sole regardless capacity of his mental to form being Kintop, issue whether at the time of The intent. assault is therefore within the lacked shooting, capacity the mental to the intentional acts in- exclusion of the injure jury intend to Peterson. The found policy. surance favor, in Peterson’s but the trial court later alleged The of [Kintop]’s issue trial, reasoning ordered a new that it had not, under these as facts should 49.01(a) violated Minn.R.Civ.P. by disclos- law, a of given matter have the been to ing jury special to the how its verdict trier fact. of would affect the outcome the case. summary trial granted second court When assigned the case was to another Farm, judgment for State and Peterson judge July again State Farm appealed ruling previous that and the both summary moved judgment. for order new trial. motion, Responding to that Peterson sub- appeal, appeals On the panel court of testimony mitted the trial of Dr. William trial, affirmed the order for new re- but Brauer, psychiatrist the who testified at grant summary judgment. versed the jury the Dr. opined trial. Brauer that Kin- Wicka, State Fire Farm & Cas. Co. v. top had, shooting, at time of the 236, 242 (Minn.App.1990), rev. “deranged mental intellect which did de- (Minn. 14, 1990). granted Embracing Dec. prive him the capacity govern adopted states, majority the rule conduct in accordance with reason.” Coun- appeals panel court held that sel for Peterson elicited Dr. opin- Brauer’s act apply intentional exclusion does not ion through hypothetical question that “injuries resulting from acts committed at detailed shooting the facts of the and Kin- when, a time because of mental top’s days bizarre behavior in preceding insured is unable to control his or her shooting. con- second trial court reject- ed duct in Dr. Brauer’s accordance with reason.” at testimony lacking Id. foun- dation 240. appeals because Dr. The court of then per- Brauer had never reviewed sonally Kintop testimony, examined had of Dr. not com- exclusion Brauer’s plied Psychiatric with American finding Associa- that second trial court abused standards, tion which the trial court said its in rejecting testimony discretion appeals opinion 1. The erroneously court policy par under a homeowner’s issued to his Peterson, Kintop, states that was insured ents Farm. State State Farm Fire & Co. Cas. policy under a homeowner’s issued State Wicka, (Minn.App.1990). Farm; however, Kintop it is who is insured personal on Dr. Brauer’s lack of a the past based millennium. See Robitscher & Kintop. acquaintance with Id. at 241. Haynes, In the Insanity De Defense of Holding testimony that Dr. Brauer’s was fense, Emory L.J. Within evidence, appeals admissible the court of law, the area of insurance an extensive genuine ruled that a issue of material fact debate has occurred as to whether and Kintop, existed as to whether at the time of when an prevents insured’s mental illness shooting, deprived application of an intentional act exclu control his conduct in accordance rea- sion to the acts of an insured. Two lines of granted son. Id. at 241. This court fur- authority emerged, have agree which summary ther review on the reversal of mental illness affect the application of judgment.2 exclusion, an intentional act disagree but as to when that occurs.

II. The first line holds, of cases as a matter society always ap The law and have law, of the intentional act exclusion proached person’s claimed mental illness apply does not if results from an degree skepticism with a of and disbelief.3 Beyond general insane act.4 premise, this stems, This part, societal mistrust from however, the diverge cases and articulate the fear feigned that mental illness is with varying judging standards for the insured’s and frequency. ease See United States v. capacity to intentionally. act See Com 22, (2d Trapnell, Cir.), 495 F.2d 24 cert. ment, Incapacity Mental Liability and In denied, 851, 93, 419 U.S. 95 42 S.Ct. surance Exclusionary Clauses: The (1974). Stronger skepticism L.Ed.2d 82 Ef Intent, Insanity upon 78 Cal. putatively mentally arises when a person ill fect of 1027, (1990). L.Rev. 1045-51 Some courts appearance” has a “normal or “doesn’t look adopted have what amounts to a Perlin, “civil in sick.” Psychodynamics and the standard, sanity” applying coverage Insanity where “Ordinary Common Defense: the insured derangement suffered from Reasoning, Sense” and Heuristic of 69 Neb. 3, (1990). deprived L.Rev. 23 intellect that Despite the insured of these inherent suspicions, the concept govern that the mentally ill conduct in accordance person should responsibili be relieved from with reason. See Ruvolo v. American ty for certain acts has Co., 490, existed for at Casualty 498, least 39 N.J. 189 A.2d sought 2. Peterson petition leave to file a history late insured’s of extreme and bizarre behav- challenging appeals ior); review Dichtl, the court of decision Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 78 Ill. 970, 975-79, 759, 763-65, order for new trial. App.3d Notwith- 34 Ill.Dec. 398 standing motion, 582, this court’s denial of his (1979) (insured Peter- N.E.2d 586-88 found not son addressed the issue in his brief to this court. guilty by insanity); of homicide reason of West We will not entertain prop- matters that are not McGhee, 110, Am. Ins. Co. v. 530 N.E.2d 112 erly before this court. (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (adopting defense but com- equate mission of irrational act does not free, guilty, appal 3. Make mad the and legal insanity); Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. Turner, 73, 76-77, App.3d v. 29 Ohio 503 N.E.2d amaze, indeed, ignorant, Confound the 212, (1986); 216-17 Ruvolo v. American Cas. very eyes faculties of and ears. Co., 490, 498, 204, (1963) 39 NJ. 189 A.2d 208 Hamlet, 2, Shakespeare, Wm. act scene 2. (insured by psychiatrists certified as insane hospital); committed to 337, state Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 4. Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. 131 Ariz. 641 Miller, 515, 521-22, Mich.App. (insured's 175 (App.1981) 438 N.W.2d inability P.2d 251 to act in 638, (1989) curiam) (per (holding person 642 accordance with reason established over- whelming "intentionally” person, cannot act testimony); when Congregation of Rodef insanity, act). Co., Sholom cannot form an intent Marin v. American But Motorists Ins. 690, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. (1979) (tes- Corp. Boughton, see Transamerica 91 Ins. v. 177 154 348 253, timony by Mich.App. (1989) psychiatrist (agreeing insured’s 922 insured personality holding person had schizoid with cases acts of a deemed mental dis- ease); Mangus Co., v. insane Western Cas. & Sur. be intentional 41 within exclu- 217, 219-20, 304, sion). Colo.App. Leading subject 585 P.2d 306 treatises on the lean (insured guilty Appleman, found not of murder reason toward this view. See 7A Insurance insanity); Practice, Arkwright-Boston (Berdal 1979); Mut. Law & § 4501.09 rev. Ins. 4 Mfrs. Dunkel, 190, (Fla. Insurance, Co. (1984); v. 363 So.2d 193 Dist.Ct. Couch on § 27:156 10 Couch App.1978) (psychiatric testimony supported by (rev. on Insurance 2d § 41:696 at 706 ed. 328 (14th 1979). Many 100 ed. 204, (1963); Congregation Law of these 208 Rodef Co., jurisdictions objective also adhere to an Motorists Ins. v. American

Sholom 695-97, 690, Cal.Rptr. determining standard for intent. 154 See Cas- Cal.App.3d 91 Thomas, Reciprocal 7 348, (1979); ualty American Casu Exch. v. Kan. Globe 351-52 718, 337, 340, (1982); App.2d Ariz. 641 647 P.2d 1361 Lyons, 131 Utica alty Co. v. Co., 251, (App.1981). necessary Mutual Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. 254 P.2d 145, (1982); jurisdictions in other 223 Va. 286 S.E.2d 225 degree impairment State Gross, Automobile Mut. Ins. v. 188 apparent. Mangus v. Western Co. is less 542, 543-44, 789, Ga.App. Colo.App. 41 373 S.E.2d 791 Casualty Surety & (1978); (1988). 219-20, Rajspic P.2d 306 West But see v. Nationwide 585 McGhee, II), {Rajspic N.E.2d Ins. 110 v. Mutual Co. Idaho American Ins. Co. 729, 733, (1986) (infer- 718 P.2d (Ind.App.1988); Arkwright-Bos purpose Ins. v. Dunk ence that insured acted with the Mut. Co. ton Manufacturers (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. causing injury el, could not be made based on 363 So.2d another). 1978); shooting insane insured’s Mutual Fire Ins. Co. Nationwide 73, 76-77, Turner, App.3d 29 Ohio instructive, oppos- While neither of these 212, 217 N.E.2d ing adequately views describes when or contrast, By opposing, why the more narrow an insured’s mental illness affects the view, by exclusionary Using a mental- clause. holds that words of un- effect, meaning the in- certain ly ill insured is intentional where the more lib- physical of eral sweeps sured understands the nature view is ill-defined and too broadly. consequences the of the acts and intends to The rule embraced the court being incapable injury, though appeals cause of of suffers from these same short- Wicka, distinguishing right wrong.5 Using comings. from 461 N.W.2d at 240. Con- versely, authority representing the insured’s to understand the na- the narrow consequences ture and of actions the view is underinclusive and far too limited. establishing Shrinking inquiry solitary benchmark for whether an act to a element intentional, the narrow view maintains of whether the insured understood the person may physical that an insane “intend” an act consequences nature and of an act though person appreciate produces even cannot a standard more than restrictive wrongfulness of that conduct. M’Naghten rule in criminal law. Com- ment, Johnson v. Insurance Co. North Amer- 78 Cal.L.Rev. at 1054. Because all of ica, 340, 348, 616, directed, 232 Va. 350 S.E.2d 620 goal human behavior is it is ar- (1986); Torcía, 2 gued C. Wharton’s only Criminal that under the narrow view delir- Miller, Wagner, 515, 5. Colonial & Accident Ins. Co. v. state Ins. Co. v. Mich.App. 175 438 Life (Ky.1964); State Automobile S.W.2d 224 (1989) 380 (holding person N.W.2d 638 cannot act Gross, 542, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ga.App. 188 373 "intentionally” person, when because of insani (1988) (insured S.E.2d testified he 789 intended ty, act); Kipnis v. cannot form an intent and knew victim kill victim would die from Antoine, 215, F.Supp. (N.D.Miss. 472 220-21 blast); Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual shotgun 1979) (no evidence that insured lacked mental Co., 662, (1983) Ins. 104 Idaho 662 P.2d 534 act); Rider v. Pre to understand his I); (Rajspic Co., Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 42, Acc. Ins. A.D. 183 170 N.Y.S. 974 ferred 729, 733-34, 1167, 110 Idaho P.2d 718 1171- (1918), 530, (1920) 230 N.Y. N.E. 130 881 aff'd (1986) II) (that (Rajspic 72 insane insured could (mem.); DeLoache v. Carolina Ins. 233 Life battery to commit form intent did not mean 341, (1958); Pruitt v. Life S.C. 104 S.E.2d 875 forming capable insured was of intent to cause 396, Virginia, Ins. Co. 182 S.C. S.E. 189 649 of Mutual injury); Shelter Insurance Co. v. (1937); Johnson v. Insurance Co. North Amer Williams, 17, 1374, 248 Kan. 804 P.2d 1382-83 ica, (1986) (insured, 232 Va. 350 S.E.2d 616 (1991) (injury by mentally inflicted ill insured is hospital, now confined to state testified that he "intentional” where insured understands the na victim); generally intended see to shoot Annota consequences ture and of his acts and intended tion, Liability Insurance: Intoxication or Other injury although understanding to cause Incapacity Avoiding Mental Application conduct); wrongfulness of the Transamerica Liability Policy Clause in Corp. Boughton, Specifically Exempting Ins. Mich.App. 177 440 Coverage Injury Damage (agreeing Caused Intention holding 922 with cases ally by Insured, person or at Direction the acts of a deemed insane be 33 A.L.R.4A exclusion); (1984). but see All intentional and within lack the people ious or semiconscious would stances of the insured’s act were such that Simon, substantially act. harm was intent to commit a violent You certain to result. Annotation, You Intend Construction Only Applica Die Once—But Did It?: tion Liability Provision Psychiatric Assessment Insurance Suicide Intent Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries In Litigation, in Insurance 25 Tort & Insur- Expected Insured, tended or Even ance L.J. 653-54 (1984); A.L.R.4th Iowa Kem stringent M’Naghten rule excuses if the cf. ¶. Stone, per Insurance Co. individual could not understand the moral (Minn.1978). proven Whether di conduct, wrongfulness of the and it would rectly inference, byor the intent to cause particularly be a anomalous result to con- bodily injury reflects the insured’s state of provision strue an insurance contract more mind about the desired harmful conse harshly than our own criminal law stan- quences of an action the insured. dards. describing legal significance ascribed to Although reject we the formulations ad- actions, concept an insured’s of intent vanced under both the liberal narrow presence embodies the 'simultaneous of two views, agree we that an insured’s mental abilities; cognitive one and the other voli application illness can defeat tional. question intentional act exclusion. The It is axiomatic that before an in remains, need of answer however: When sured can be held liable insured must and under what circumstances does an in- have been able to entertain proscribed applica- sured’s mental illness defeat the bodily injury to cause and must tion of the intentional act exclusion? To have, fact, done so. See Restatement question presented answer the in this case (Second) 895J, (1979); of Torts comment c impression, of first we examine the exist- Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. ing principles of law in this state I), 662, 664, (Rajspic 104 Idaho 662 P.2d application insurance and the of intentional 534, (1983). Woida, 536 this court in act exclusions. ferred an bodily injury intent to cause individuals, applies As it to sane insured, planning where the after the ac the in law Minnesota is well-settled: an others, tion with fired several shots from a intentional act applies only exclusion where high-powered knowing rifle at a truck specific the insured acts with the intent to Woida, occupied. the truck was 306 bodily injury. cause See Woida v. North Similarly Stone, at in N.W.2d 573. we held 570, Star Mutual Ins. 306 N.W.2d 573 that the insured demonstrated an intent to (Minn.1981); see 11 Couch on Insurance when, bodily injury agreeing cause after (rev. 2d 44:289 at 449-50 ed. § dispute by fighting, settle a the insured requisite intent demands that the insured wrapped his fist with his belt and struck itself, intended the harm not that the in Stone, the other combatant. 269 N.W.2d Caspersen sured intended to act. v. Web Finally, at 886-87. in Continental West ber, 93, 99, 327, 298 Minn. 213 N.W.2d 330 Toal, 169, ern Ins. Co. v. 309 Minn. 244 (1973). subjective standard, Under this the (1976), 121 N.W.2d this court inferred an necessary intent be established bodily injury to cause where the proof injure of an insured’s actual intent to planned robbery, insureds had an armed inference, byor when the character of the knowing weapons their were loaded and act is such that an intention to inflict might injured. that someone be killed or can be inferred as a matter of law. Farm 177-78, Id. at 244 N.W.2d at 125-26. Exchange Sipple, ers Insurance 255 issue, capacity While mental was not at (Minn.1977); N.W.2d 376 Caspersen, bodily injury inference of an intent to cause Minn, 330; 298 at 213 at see Woida, Stone, in and Toal follows because Note, Injury Intentional Exclusion the insureds understood the nature obvious Intent?, Clauses—What is Insurance respective of their actions and the foresee Wayne (1986). L.Rev. ability The in flowing of harm from those actions. ference arises when the nature and circum Had these insureds not understood the na- acts, expectations poli- no inference could ensue. not within reasonable of their

ture cy “[ajbsent understandably provocative an Note, Insanity, Intent and Home- See situation which induces an instinctive re- 258, 261 Liability, 40 La.L.Rev. owner’s action.”); impulsive flex or an defensive (1979). cases demonstrate that our While Minn, Caspersen, 298 at 213 N.W.2d at cognitive capacity pre- insured’s (insured’s pushing conduct of aside sumed, capacity requirement cognitive coatroom attendant did not indicate an in- in cognitive test our parallels bodily injury although tent to cause criminal law. inju- insured intended the act which presumption cogni- criminal Under the ry). presumes sanity and capacity, the law tive Sipple This court held in that the sub- proving incapacity on places the burden jury mission of the intent issue to the party asserting it. State v. Bouw- See in dispute warranted where the facts were (Minn.1984). man, Crimi- suggested that the in- insured acted the ac- responsibility nal is excused where stinctively in the form of a reflex when tor, of mental does not during insured struck a farmer a heated the nature of his actions or understand exchange. Sipple, 255 N.W.2d at 376-77. that those actions are does not understand Similarly, Brown, we held denial of sum- wrong. 611.026 Minn.Stat. mary judgment proper where the insured justified standard is before While a strict argued reflexively he acted when he struck relieving responsibility, criminal we believe baggage tug-of-war clerk after a over statutory M’Naghten codification luggage deep some caused a cut provides partial rule answer when but Brown, finger. insured’s 293 N.W.2d at dealing the realm of insurance law. within Finally, rejected 824-25. we an insured’s bodily injury requires An intent to cause claims of self-defense and reflexive action appreciate only that the insured Smith, where the insured’s own action actions, wrongfulness of his but nature fray. escalated the violence of a barroom requisite intent also demands that the Smith, 313 N.W.2d at 203-04. Each of voluntary, originating insured’s actions be these cases demonstrates that the insured’s from insured’s own free will. particular to choose the action is as postulate rests on a of free law part much a of the intent formulation as persons will—that all mind of sound are ability appreciate the insured’s presumed conforming capable Moreover, their con- choice he has made. intent be- law, requirements duct to question of the and comes a for the trier of fact when any person freely suggests when the evidence that the insured chooses violate was not the master of his own upon rights, law or intrude another’s will. person may justly responsible. be held in Minnesota a law strikes delicate Drew, 333, 339, People 22 v. Cal.3d 583 balance between societal and individual in 1318, 1320, 275, P.2d Cal.Rptr. 149 277 dealing rights terests when (1978); Tyrell, Insanity: Crazy Defense, A responsibilities mentally of the ill. See Q. 48, Const, 35 Med. Trial Tech. In 53 VII, (insane Minn. 1 art. or men § principle, prior accord with our this cases tally incompetent persons ineligible to instinctual, reveal that reflexive or other- vote); 595.02(f) (person Minn.Stat. § involuntary wise actions do not evidence incompetent mind testify); unsound malign points animus that to an intent (1990)(excusing Minn.Stat. 611.026 crimi bodily Senst, to cause injury. See Smith liability actor, nal where the because 202, (Minn.1981); 313 N.W.2d 203-04 mental did not the nature of know Brown v. Casualty State Automobile & wrong); act or that it was see also Underwriters, 822, 293 N.W.2d 824-25 Co., Meils v. Telephone Northwestern Bell (Minn.1980); 376; Sipple, 255 N.W.2d at (Minn.1984) (suicide 355 N.W.2d 714 see also Family American Mut. compensable Ins. Co. v. Compensation under Workers’ Peterson, (Minn.1987) derange Act where causes mental (assault committed severity intoxicated insured ment of such that it overrides nor mal, thinking judgment); prove be, rational himself to likely the more he Co., 257 Minn. Anderson v. Armour & will have coverage. insurance (1960); 101 N.W.2d 435 v. Mid Olsson Peterson, 405 N.W.2d at 422. in- Unlike Co., 424, 430, 165 land Ins. 138 Minn. N.W. toxication, mental hardly illness is volun- (1917) (allowing recovery under tary and not laden potential with the accidental death policy where the insured’s or abuse fraud. product suicide a insanity). of insured’s conclusion, our holding imply does not show, As our cases an intent to cause bodi any this or court could adequately ly injury requires that possess the insured describe the process intellectual in which cognitive capacities, both and volitional ei the human mind intangible transforms ther of which affected in be thoughts into concrete action. cogni- With hold, therefore, sured’s mental illness. We tive and capacities volitional serving as the purposes that for the applying an inten parts essential of the equation, tional act exclusion contained a home containing rule these elements only serves policy, owner’s insurance an insured’s acts purpose limited of identifying per- those where, are deemed unintentional who, sons owing to incapacity, mental did defect, of mental illness or the insured does not act with the intent excluded under the wrongfulness not know the nature or of an insurance By drawing contract. cogni- on act, where, because mental illness or tive aspects and volitional already existing defect, deprived the insured is of the law, in our insurance juries trial courts and regardless to control his conduct any will be better able to assess when and understanding of the nature of the act or under what circumstances an insured’s wrongfulness. its application illness defeats the This rule only cogni addresses the intentional act exclusion. components tive and volitional already ex isting in concerning the law intentional act III. exclusions, but the rule also construes the policy insurance in accordance with the rea The other issue ap raised this expectations sonable of the insured. Atwa peal rejection concerns the trial court’s ter Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mutu psychiatric opinion response offered in (Minn. al Ins. to the motion for summary judgment. Re purpose of the intentional act sponding to State Farm’s motion for sum deny exclusion is to the insured a license to mary judgment, Peterson submitted the tri commit wanton and malicious acts. Peter testimony Brauer, al psy of Dr. William son, 405 N.W.2d. at 422. Both insurer and chiatrist, genuine to show issues of materi expect insured coverage will lie for unin al fact existed Kintop’s mental injuries insured, tentional shooting. at the time of the Testi regardless of the insured’s mental condi fying in response hypothetical question to a tion. expectations, Given these we see no shooting on the Kintop’s based unusual injuries discernable difference between before, days behavior opined Dr. Brauer insured, by mentally ill who lacks that shooting Kintop at the time of the had the to injure, formulate an intent to deranged “a mental intellect which did de and the insured who acts out of reflex or prive him capacity govern of the to his self-defense. any Nor do we believe finan conduct in accordance with reason.” The cial disincentive sway persons would those rejected opinion second trial court this who, because of mental lack the foundation, lacking stating: capacity to conform conduct to the law. is opinion this court’s that there was [I]t foreclosing insureds manipulating from insufficient foundation for the tender of their coverage through insurance the vol opinion. Dr. Brauer’s Dr. Brauer did not untary intoxicants, use of we stated: Kintop, ever Mr. interview nor did he are not inclined to create a situation any problem, ever treat him for

[W]e either where the mental, more drunk an physical insured can any or nor did he review Kintop. dispute records of Mr. There accuracy

medical No exists over the presented the hypothetical facts Kintop being or was no evidence treated * * * non-examining psychiatrist whether a is problems. any psychiatric “qualified” give expert testimony to re opinion perhaps Dr. Brauer’s is best garding a deceased’s mental condition. speculation”, “informed described as not Anderson v. Armour & 257 Minn. certainty type require courts of 281, 287-88, 101 N.W.2d 439-40 opinion apparent most evidence. It is (testimony personal history based on the Psychiatric the American Associa- individual). Rather, argued State Farm rendering opinion tion’s standards for and the trial court ruled that Dr. Brauer were not met here. The association’s adequately could not Kintop’s assess men standards set forth that one should not tal personal state without the benefit of a testify regarding anyone’s capaci- By examination.6 referencing Minn. ty directly knowing person. without R.Evid. questioned the trial court While Rule 703 of the Minn. Rules of whether hypothetical question itself application, presented Evidence is broad in its this support sufficient facts to Dr. opinion, appears beyond Brauer’s scope to be whether Dr. Brauer its qualified opinion or helpful. intent. sufficiency foundational hypothetical of a Portraying ruling this questioning as one question, however, judged by the con opinion “whether Dr. Brauer’s would be question tents of the by itself and not helpful to the trier of fact because of his whether the witness has ever examined the personal lack of Kintop,” contact with person, place thing question. or Cf. appeals court of held the trial court abused Corp., Wenner Oil Gulf excluding its discretion in Dr. Brauer’s tes- (Minn.1978). long expert So as the timony on the narrow basis having of there qualified witness is question and the con personal been no Kintop. contact with tains permit sufficient facts to that witness Wicka, 461 241 (citing N.W.2d at Minn. give opinion reasonable based not on agree R.Evid. We with the result speculation mere conjecture, opinion appeals, reached the court of but for a expert of an may witness be adequately different reason. upon hypothetical obtained data alone. Although number, 6. cited neither name nor Especially Applicable Psychi- with Annotations (1989 ed.). atry the APA standard psychiatric referenced profes- trial court at 37-38 psychiatrist does ethically testify opin- allow a sion is not without a moral rudder when re- garding personal ions are offered absent a per- another’s mental examination. without a situation, Recognizing delicacy provides: sonal of the examination. It Academy Psychiatry American and the Law psychiatrists On occasion are asked for an states: opinion about an individual who is in the Honesty, objectivity adequacy and the of the attention, light public or who has disclosed ques- clinical evaluation be called into information through about himself/herself expert opinion tion when an is offered with- public psychi- media. It is unethical for a personal out a examination. While there are professional opinion atrist to offer a unless expert opinion authorities who would bar an has he/she conducted an examination and regard to an individual who has not been granted proper has been authorization for examined, personally position effort, it is the such a statement. if, Academy that after earnest it is not Association, Psychiatric American Principles of examination, possible personal to conduct a Medical Ethics Especially Ap- with Annotations opinion may an be rendered on the basis of plicable 7(3) (1989 Psychiatry ed.) (the to § at 9 However, other information. cumstances, under such cir- Rule). Developed protect Goldwater to both responsibility it is the of the fo- unsuspecting public figures psychiatric and psychiatrist rensic to assure that the statement profession psychiatric specu- from the harms of opinion any reports testimony of his or lation, the public figures standard is limited to opinion clearly based on this indicate that permit psychiatric testimony would personal there was no examination and that criminal competency cases about the of a defen- opinion expressed thereby is limited. dant without examination or consent. Ameri- Law, Academy Psychiatry American of and the Psychiatric Association, can Opinions the Eth- Ethical Guidelines the Practice Forensic of for of Principles ics Committee (rev. Psychiatry 1989). Medical commentary Ethics IV & (Chad- Wigmore, injure Evidence 677 at 939 tort, there is no intentional but nei- 1979). ther, bourn rev. unless words are entirely cast loose moorings, from their can it be said that Expert opinion may be based on facts in taking careful aim and shooting someone is presented hypo evidence in the form of a negligence. an act of question. thetical Scott v. Southview (Minn. Chevrolet matter, me, fact of the it seems to is hypothetical The foundation for person that an insane does specific form a question posed to Brauer Dr. outlined un injure to his victim. Consequently, disputed already facts in evidence. Al if there is to be insurance coverage, we though personal a examination would most say must be able to that the insured’s act certainly opinion, bolster Dr. Brauer’s shooting his victim is both intended and weight, is a matter of not foundation. The unintended. But how can the law have it personal want examination in this case ways? both opinion does not render Dr. Brauer’s must, think, We I distinguish the stan lacking foundation. Under these circum personal dard of responsibility applies as it stances, the appeals correctly court of held law, in the criminal as it applies in civil tort that the trial court abused its discretion in law, and as it is contemplated liability for rejecting expert opinion gen and that a coverage. law, insurance Criminal with its uine issue of material fact exists emphasis punishment on and moral con Kintop’s at the time of the demnation, (the stresses the mens rea shooting. mind). guilty law, Tort emphasis with its victim,

on compensating the prefers to hold IV. person insane to the same standard of personal responsibility person. as a sane parts Those of the decision of the court problem court, then, for the in constru appeals regarding application of the in- ing liability policy insurance in an in tentional act exclusion acts committed situation, sanity protect is how to the in suffering an insured from mental illness sured from liability objective tort with its and the foundational basis for expert personal standard responsibility, while opinion are affirmed as modified. at the respecting same time the language Affirmed as modified. of the intentional act exclusion which adopts subjective personal standard of COYNE, J., part took no in the responsibility. consideration or decision of this case. I would use a liberalized version of the M’Naghten construing test in the intention- SIMONETT, Justice (dissenting). al act majority opinion, exclusion. The respectfully I dissent from the court’s however, go seems to me to further. It formulation of what constitutes an inten- holds that an act is also unintended tional act. “where, defect, because of mental illness or deprived insured is person If a sane takes careful aim at and control regardless any his conduct person, shoots another liability there is tort, understanding but, an intentional of the nature of the act or the act is intended, wrongfulness.” its jury there But to tell the coverage. is no insurance it' Yet if person an insane find a lack of intention aims at and where there is shoots victim, say inability we there is to control one’s conduct insurance cover- seems age. But if there is insurance to me a return to an coverage, urge uncontrollable this means the intentional impulse act exclusion irresistible test. I While do not inapplicable, spe- deny which means there is component no there is a volitional injure. then, cific intent to actions, But where is human I would not introduce an liability? the tort If there is no intent to volitional-type liability overt test into insur- defendant, coverage. I would not do so for three in grip paranoid anee of a delusion, schizophrenic fatally reasons. stabbed his unsuspecting father in the back. There all, mentally person, ill a who First of expert testimony was that defendant acted doing wrong any- but does it he is knows self-defense, in believing his fantasied ene- it, help he cannot way cannot be mies, father, person embodied of his committing an to be “unintentional said plotting destroy were to him and he was act,” given least not if words at are to be any without avenue of retreat. Id. at meaning. way, ordinary Put another their situations, 199 N.W.2d at 779. In such compulsion injure, from whatever person incapable is his act as arise, incompatible it source is not wrong; put way, or to it another the men- injure. the existence of an intent to tally ill person is unable to “think rational- temptation Hence failure to resist is ly of the reasons ordinary people which to ordinarily not considered as an excuse to right Ten, make that act wrong.” or C.L. legal avoid blame. and Punishment n Crime, Guilt, Secondly, practical way there is no (quoting an jurist, Australian Justice Chief distinguishing between uncontrollable Dixon). impulse. and a controllable Because an jury I would instruct a along somewhat impulse has not been resisted does not al- following lines in an insurance cover- ways mean that it could not have been. age case: You are to determine whether or problem simply way is that there is no not the injure defendant’s intent to was jury to draft a instruction that can effec- intended meaning liability within the of the tively guide jury. im- irresistible policy. person insurance A does not intend pulse conjecture test leaves too much to if, wrongful his actions because of mental theorizing, and unverifiable not to mention defect, illness or he did not know the na- excuses, self-serving perhaps why which is doing, ture of what he was ifor he did gained the test has favor our crimi- know, he did wrong. not know it was A Furthermore, nal I law. do not think a mentally person ill would not know person’s cognitive noncognitive impair- doing wrong what he was if he was neatly separated ments can so be as the laboring under a mental disorder or delu- impulse irresistible test seems to assume sion incapable which rendered him of order- they may be. ing thinking rationally to evaluate Third, I volitional-type see no need for a matter then before him. test. It seems to me M’Nagkten that the too, approach, Under this there would be test can broadly enough be construed genuine issue of material fact to be re- satisfy purposes liability insurance case, consequently solved this I coverage doing without violence to the ordi- agree the case must be remanded for trial. nary meaning language of the inten- join I in the opinion. balance of the court’s tional act exclusion. M’Naghten culpability excuses criminal person

if incapable the insane of distin-

guishing right wrong between even person

when the knows nature of his mentally person,

actions. A ill for exam-

ple, may killing he attempting know is

kill someone but because of his delusion he acting

thinks he is in self-defense or he is

unable to understand the nature and conse-

quences of the presented. moral choices Rawland, 17, 45-46, State 294 Minn. In Rawland

Case Details

Case Name: State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Aug 30, 1991

Citation: 474 N.W.2d 324

Docket Number: C4-90-312

Court Abbreviation: Minn.