117 Mo. 1 | Mo. | 1893
— This is a suit by the collector of the city of St. Louis to recover back taxes for the year 1885, levied upon property described in the petition as follows: “A certain, lot of ground fronting four hundred and twenty-three feet and three inches on an alley in city block No. 2253 by a depth of one hundred and fifty-four feet, bounded on the north by said alley, and on the east, south and west by property of self.”
It seems to be conceded that defendant paid the taxes levied for 1885 upon its property assessed by the state board for the assessment and equalization of railroad property; and the first question is whether the property is to be deemed a part of the property assessed by the board pursuant to sections 6866 to 6875, or whether it is local property within the meaning of section 6876, Revised Statutes 1879. If it belongs to the first class then it is evident that this suit must fail, for in that event the defendant has paid all taxes which could be legally levied on the property.
The agreed facts bearing upon this issue are these: By an ordinance of the city of St. Louis passed in June., 1881, the defendant obtained permission to lay and operate its main and side tracks on G-ratiot street, upon the express condition that it purchased all of the real estate lying between given bounds south of that street. The defendant purchased the property upon which the taxes for 1885 were levied of Blackmer and Post on the 10th of April, 1883, and on the 13th of the same month leased it back to them for a period of eight years at an annual rental of $800. The lessees occupied the premises for manufacturing purposes when the property was assessed for taxes of 1885. It is further agreed that defendant purchased the property to comply with the ordinance, and for the additional reason -that it needed it for side-tracks, depots, round-houses and other buildings necessary to the operation of a railroad; that Blackmer and Post would not sell the land to defendant, except upon the condition that they were allowed to retain possession for the term of the lease; that defendant purchased the property for railroad purposes, to- be
Section 6876 provides: “All property, real, personal or mixed, including lands, machines and workshops, round-houses, warehouses and other buildings, goods, chattels and office furniture of whatever kind, owned or controlled by any railroad company or corporation in this state, not hereinbefore specified, shall
The property specified in section 6866, which is to be assessed by the state board, is that required to be returned to the state auditor, namely, the entire length of the road in this state and the length of double and side-tracks, with depots, water-tanks and turn-tables. This description taken by itself is not clear, but the uncertainty is, to a large extent, removed when taken in connection with section 6876. That section provides that all other property of the railroad company, real, personal, including lands, machinery and workshops, round-houses and other buildings shall be assessed by the local assessors. There can be no doubt but section 6866 includes the road, road-bed, bridges and that property actually used for the purposes of a right of way, but it is equally clear that it does not include lands used for shops, engine-houses, and warehouses. And we think it is equálly clear that section 6866 does not include land which may have been purchased for future yard purposes, and which is in fact not used for such purposes at the time of the assessment.
A comparison of the two sections can lead to but one conclusion, and that is this, that the property in question did not fall within section 6866, but did fall within section 6876. The fact that Blackmer and Post refused to sell the property to defendant, except upon the condition that they were allowed to retain possession for
To show that this property was included in the assessment made by the state board, counsel for defendant pursue this line of argument: That under the law the defendant had the power to take and hold all “necessary grounds for depots and side-tracks,” that this power carries with it the right to anticipate the needs and wants of the future, and that the word necessary, in this connection, does not mean indispensable, but includes the right to acquire and hold real property which is suitable and. proper to accomplish the purposes for which the defendant was organized, and what is suitable and proper must, to a large extent, be. left to the judgment and discretion of the directors. There is no objection to this line of argument when used' to show what property the defendant has the right to acquire and hold, but it furnishes no guide whatever by which to construe the two sections of the statute now in question. In the first place section 6866 does not speak of property necessary to the operation of the road. And, in the next place, the line of argument pursued by counsel for the defendant overthrows the result which they seek to reach, for it must be manifest that under it land used for machine and workshops, round-houses and warehouses would be necessary for the use and operation of the road, while ■all such property is clearly classed as local property by force of section 6876.
The property here in question was not used for railroad purposes when assessed, but was in the possession of defendant’s tenants, under an eight year lease, and used by them for manufacturing purposes, with the right reserved by the tenants to remove their buildings at the expiration of the lease. There is no claim made in this case that it was by any specific description returned to the state auditor, and the only claim is that •it should be deemed and taken to be property embraced within that property assessable by the state board. That it did not fall within that class of property is in our opinion too clear to call for further remarks.
From these facts it will be seen the taxes sued for were not extended on a “separate tax book to be known as the railroad tax book” as provided by section 6881 of Revised Statutes, 1879; and the first question is whether they should have been extended upon such a separate book. /
By reference to the sections of art. 5 of the city charter before mentioned it will be seen that the board of assessors in the city of St. Louis may use as many books in making the assessment as shall be by them deemed best, and there is nothing in the charter requiring railroad property to be assessed in a separate book. And by section 26, the taxes, state, city, etc., are extended on the corrected assessment books, and there is nothing in this section requiring railroad taxes to be extended in a separate book.
By reference to the general law relating to the assessment and taxation of railroads, being article 8 of chapter 145, Revised Statutes, 1879, it will be seen
Enough has been said to show that there is a direct conflict between the charter of the city of St. Louis and the general law, so far as they relate to the' method of extending the taxes levied upon railroad
It was held in Folkerts v. Power, 42 Mich. 283, that where different rolls are required for different taxes, the placing of a tax .on the wrong roll and omitting it from the right one was fatal to the tax. In this case the taxes were not extended upon a separate roll, as required by section 6881; no statement of the taxes was ever made out and certified to defendant as required by section 6882; the railroad tax book was never delivered to the' collecting officer as required by section 6883. The failure to comply with these provisions of the law is fatal to a recovery by the plaintiff. Indeed the only answer made to these and other objections is that the general laws do not apply to the city of St. Louis; while we have seen they do apply there as well as elsewhere in the state. It is not necessary to consider the many other minor
Section 6866 was amended in 1883, and sections 6881 and 6882 were amended in 1885, as will be seen by reference to sections 7718, 7733 and 7734, of the Revised Statutes, 1889, but the amendments do not change the law in respect of any matter before considered, and hence we have made reference to the general revenue law as found in Revised Statutes, 1879. The judgment is reversed.