State ex rel. Wyman v. TurkState ex rel. Wyman v. Turk
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Guernsey, Klinger, Crow.
Judgment affirmed.
HAMILTON, P. J., and ROSS, J., concur.
(Decided October 25, 1939.)
Mr. John A. Sieber, for plaintiff.
Mr. Thomas J. Herbert, attorney general, and Mr. Aubrey A. Wendt, for defendant.
GUERNSEY, J. This is a proceeding in habeas corpus brought by Robert S. Wyman against Dr. H. M. Turk, Superintendent of Lima State Hospital.
In his petition Robert S. Wyman alleges that he has been confined in Lima State Hospital since February 8, 1927, and that he was ordered committed to that in
In his return to the writ of habeas corpus issued herein the superintendent represents that he has Robert S. Wyman in his custody and, “that he has had custody of Robert S. Wyman since February 8, 1927, by virtue of an order of commitment issued by the Common Pleas Court of Ashtabula county, Ohio, under authority of
It was conceded by the parties at the trial that at the time of his commitment to Lima State Hospital, Robert S. Wyman was under an indictment for murder in the first degree, in the Common Pleas Court of Ashtabula county. The commitment to Lima State Hospital was made pursuant to the provisions of
These sections conditioned the commitment therein provided upon insanity at the time of the trial of the question of insanity without reference to whether insanity theretofore existed or whether the insanity of the defendant would constitute a defense to the offense charged.
Certain modified provisions of these sections, with other provisions, are now incorporated in
None of
There being no statutory definition of the words “insane” or “insanity” as used in
Under the common law and in the absence of statutory authority, courts had jurisdiction to inquire into the sanity of and commit persons under indictment as insane, either before trial or after trial and acquittal, upon the ground of insanity, and this jurisdiction at the time the sections in question were enacted had been extended by statute to the commitment of persons as insane who had not been indicted by reason of insanity.
The exercise of the jurisdiction both under the common law and under the provisions of the section mentioned, to determine whether a defendant was sane or insane, and if found insane to commit as insane before
Under the section mentioned the sole fact that a person is of unsound mind is not sufficient to justify commitment or detention on commitment. Taking into consideration the purposes of the commitment there are two general tests by which the insanity of the defendant for the purpose of commitment or detention on commitment are to be determined. The first is whether the person indicted has sufficient mental capacity to recall the events of his life so that he can furnish his counsel facts which ought to be stated and presented to the jury at his trial for the crime charged. State, ex rel. Davey, Gov., v. Owen, Judge, 133 Ohio St., 96, 104, 12 N. E. (2d), 144, 114 A. L. R., 686. The second is whether there exists in the defendant that degree or character of mental unsoundness as to make it reasonably probable that, if allowed to remain at large, he would, by reason of such mental condition, endanger life, person or property, or the safety, peace, health or morals of the public. 32 Corpus Juris, 679, Section 345; 6 Ruling Case Law, 203, Section 199.
In order to warrant the discharge of such person on a writ of habeas corpus, as sought in the instant case, it must affirmatively appear that the degree of mental capacity prescribed in the first test mentioned exists, and that the degree or character of mental unsoundness prescribed in the second test does not exist.
Applying these tests in the case at bar we find from
Both of the above tests not being resolved in favor of Robert S. Wyman the discharge of said Wyman upon the writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued is denied, and the petitioner is remanded to the custody of the Superintendent of Lima State Hospital.
It is further ordered that the petitioner pay the costs herein.
Judgment accordingly.
KLINGER, J., concurs.
CROW. P. J., dissents only from the judgment, being of the opinion that the evidence proves that it is not reasonably probable that petitioner would endanger life, person or property, or the safety, peace, health or morals of the public; and concurs in the reasoning of the opinion on the legal principles involved.